

**Sierra Leone: Reconstruction of Rural Infrastructure (Phases I and II)**

**Ex-post evaluation**

<b>OECD sector</b>	1) Phase I: 72010 – Emergency aid 2) Phase II: 15061 – Post-conflict peace support 72010 – Emergency aid	
<b>BMZ project IDs</b>	1) 2000 66 274 2002 65 785*	
<b>Project-executing agency</b>	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR)	
<b>Consultant</b>	GTZ-IS	
<b>Year of ex-post evaluation</b>	2004	
	<b>Project appraisal (planned)</b>	<b>Ex-post evaluation (actual)</b>
<b>Start of implementation</b>	Q 2 2000	Q 1 2001
<b>Period of implementation</b>	30 months	41 months
<b>Investment costs</b>	EUR 5.73 million	EUR 5.73 million
<b>Counterpart contribution</b>	-	-
<b>Financing, of which Financial Cooperation (FC) funds</b>	1) EUR 2.73 million 2) EUR 0.25 million	1) EUR 2.73 million 2) EUR 0.25 million
<b>Other institutions/donors involved</b>	GTZ	GTZ
<b>Performance rating</b>	2	
<b>• Significance / relevance</b>	2	
<b>• Effectiveness</b>	2	
<b>• Efficiency</b>	2	

\* Project no. 2 is not the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of project no. 1 but instead provides for a fund increase out of funds from the anti-terror pact.

**Brief Description, Overall Objective and Programme Objectives with Indicators**

The objective of this open programme was to contribute to the social integration of ex-combatants into civil society and to the reconciliation process in the receiving communities. Another objective was to improve the social and material infrastructure available in the programme villages. The overall objective of the project was to contribute to the peace process in Sierra Leone and to economic reconstruction in rural areas. The programme target groups comprised ex-combatants as well as local civilians who suffered under the war.

In view of the acute crisis, the appraisal of the Financial Cooperation (FC)/Technical Cooperation (TC) project was carried out in accordance with the emergency procedures for natural catastrophes and political crises (item 51a of the FC/TC guidelines). The TC component comprised measures to reintegrate and train ex-combatants, primarily in construction-related crafts. The FC component financed investments in the training programme and in the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure such as schools, roads, hand pumps etc.

In a modification offer submitted to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), TC defined indicators to measure achievement of the programme goals that will help determine the success of the overall project. These indicators are also suitable for

the FC target system since the stated objectives are similar. The programme objective is considered achieved if, by the end of the programme:

- 75% of the ex-combatants have either settled in the receiving communities or can be located with the help of state agencies;
- 50% of those trained have found a paying job thanks to their new skills; and
- the social relations of the population are judged to be mostly non-violent in 75% of the programme communities.

Altogether the volume of funds provided reached EUR 6.26 million, EUR 2.73 of which were FC funds and EUR 3.01 million TC funds. EUR 0.25 million were provided out of the second tranche of the anti-terror pact of the German federal government. Residual funds amounting to EUR 0.27 million out of the FC project 'Rural Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Bo-Pojehun IV' (1990 66 176, 1990 70 335) were used to rehabilitate wells (additional component).

**Project Design / Major Deviations from the original Project Planning and their main Causes**

The civil war that lasted until 2002 had heavy social consequences in addition to the large-scale destruction of infrastructure and major interference with the state and institutional capacities of Sierra Leone. During the course of the conflict the country dropped down to the last position of the Human Development Index. Once peace was concluded the Sierra Leonean government and the international donor community initiated the "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program" (DDR) to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the ex-combatants. The present programme supported the reintegration component of the DDR and thus contributed to alleviating one of the country's most urgent problems. Against this backdrop and due to the need for fast action, the programme appraisal was carried out in accordance with the fast-track emergency procedures described above. This involved shorter planning and decision-making processes. In order to be able to react flexibly, the project was implemented in the form of an open programme. At the beginning of the programme, the plans were based on rough estimates that became more specific during the course of implementation. Overall, this basic concept was a fitting response to the clear need for action.

The implementation and planning were taken care of in an FC/TC cooperative project. The GTZ-IS implemented the TC component and served simultaneously as consultant for the FC component. In such constellations, the assignment and tasks of the GTZ-IS are not always clear. In an unrelated project the GTZ-IS succeeded in finding other donors such as the DFID to take part in the financing. The entirety of the measures carried out by the GTZ-IS were designated as 'ReAct' (Reconciliation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation Activities). The project-executing agency was the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR). However, owing to problems and deficiencies related to the organization and content, the project-executing agency did not play a direct role in programme implementation. Instead, the implementation was carried out more or less autonomously by the TC experts, the FC consultant and national NGOs in direct collaboration with the programme communities and their village development committees. Altogether the cooperation was satisfactory. The separate detailed planning of FC and TC turned out to be problematic. Occasionally the priorities and expected time frames varied. It would have been helpful to draw up a joint concept and to conclude a cooperation agreement as a common basis for the project activities. In general, however, the objectives were aligned and the measures were logically derived from these objectives. The division of the tasks was appropriate.

At the beginning of the period of implementation the quantity estimate, time schedule and geographical programme plans were revised in a modification offer submitted by the GTZ to the BMZ. The package of measures was modified as shown:

<b>Comparison between targeted and actual programme results</b>					
<b>Component</b>	<b>Fund</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Appraisal</b>	<b>Modifi-</b>	<b>Actual</b>

	source		FC / offer TC	cation offer TC	
Training centers	FC	Construction and rehabilitation	4-8	13	13
Training (in construction-related crafts, agriculture, as a baker, haircutter etc.)	TC	Total number of people among them: ex-combatants among them: adolescents/ children among them: women Fields of training Duration of training (months)	3200 1600 - - 16 6	2225 1000 225 - 13 9	2354 888 222 671 13 9
Psycho-social therapy	TC	Psychological therapy Civics	For content see below	Un-modified	Un-modified
Construction/rehabilitation of basic village infrastructure destroyed in the war	FC	Rehabilitation buildings Rehabilitation roads Rehabilitation farmland Rehabilitation ferry	32 320 km 80 ha 1	26 130 km 50 ha 1	30 156 km 56.6 ha 1
Consulting services	FC	Implementation by the GTZ-IS	30 expert-months	Un-modified	Un-modified
Additional component	FC	Rehabilitation wells	617	487	482

Psychological therapy for the participants and courses in civics, an introductory phase to assist with the selection of a profession, and also theoretical and practical training were all integral parts of the training. Through individual and group therapy, role-playing, detraumatization, conflict and stress management etc. this psycho-social component helped to teach the participants about peace, gender issues and problem-solving techniques.

The programme's target groups comprised ex-combatants as well as local civilians who suffered under the war. Training these two groups jointly was an appropriate solution to the problem and encouraged reconciliation between ex-combatants and civilians. The introduction of training courses catering to women and the establishment of nurseries at the training centers contributed to a considerable increase in the number of female participants, which started out at a very low level. The other modifications described above were also appropriate, with the majority arising during the reduced planning stage for the programme.

The programme implementation period, originally scheduled for 30 months, was extended by 11 months and ended in June 2004. The main reasons were delays in on-site preparation and in the selection of locations and also the prolongation of the training period.

The actual costs do not differ much from the planned costs. Only the costs calculated for the first programme phase were revised in February 2001. This was justified because it was designed as an open programme and because of the reduced planning phase. The revised planning for phase 1 was adhered to. To date we have not found any indications of improper use of the funds. A final control of the use of the funds under the project is currently being prepared. By December 2004 GTZ-IS had received substantiation of the proper use of approx.

99% of the funds. Should any irregularities arise in connection with the rest of the funds, we will report on them accordingly.

In conclusion, the results and the technical implementation can both be assessed as satisfactory. All goals were nearly reached or slightly exceeded. The rehabilitated infrastructure was transferred to the village population and the state structures as planned at the end of the programme and is in satisfactory condition.

### **Key Results of the Impact Analysis and Performance Rating**

The indicators of impact defined by the GTZ and described at the beginning of this report refer to the reconciliation process that is among the programme goals and also to the social integration of the ex-combatants. These indicators were not reviewed systematically. Owing to interviews with the experts and a survey by the GTZ, sufficient information is available to assess the achievement of the programme objectives in this field. Accordingly, at least 50% of the trainees continued to make use of their new skills in the year 2004, and the population in at least 75% of the project communities judged the social relations to be non-violent. Although these two indicators can be considered achieved, whether 75% of the ex-combatants are actually living in the receiving communities after having completed their training is difficult to say, and a representative statement could only be made after an extensive analysis. Based on the information available, most of them stayed, but a significant number left the communities for urban agglomerations, driven in part by a lack of employment opportunities. Altogether, the programme objective related to the reconciliation process can be considered achieved. The joint training of ex-combatants and villagers was an essential factor in significantly reducing the conflict potential between the two groups and in encouraging the reintegration of the ex-combatants.

As regards the improvement in the local infrastructure - the second area focused on by the programme objectives - no indicators were defined. The corresponding measures were implemented as planned. The infrastructure that was built and/or rehabilitated (schools, roads, buildings, agricultural areas, rehabilitated wells) is in satisfactory condition and is being used adequately by the local population. Therefore, the programme objective in this area can also be considered achieved.

Reintegration was supported on the microeconomic level as well. 83% of the participants of the ReAct programme who were surveyed benefited from the project in the form of generated income. For 43% of them the skills they were taught are their sole means of earning an income. Overall, the income of the participants was significantly higher than the national minimum income. Taken together, the programme measures had a positive effect on local and regional economic cycles, at least temporarily. Due to the limited funds, this effect remained rather minimal, however.

In some areas concessions had to be made regarding effectiveness. Particularly women could not participate in the measures to a sufficient extent. The main reason for this was the definition of the ex-combatants by the national DDR programme. This definition was the result of a political process which the FC/TC project was unable to influence. Consequently, the specific problems that women faced during the civil war were not reflected in the participation criteria. In most cases women were not classified as ex-combatants because they did not own a weapon, or they were classified as war wives. They were underrepresented among the programme participants. FC/TC responded to this deficiency by introducing special training courses for women and by establishing nurseries, as a result of which the share of women participants increased substantially during the course of the programme. What is more, the training courses were not sufficiently geared towards the potential of the local labor market. Instead, they were designed to assist with the donor-funded reconstruction of infrastructure. The courses were dominated by construction-related crafts such as bricklaying, carpentry or road construction. Since the economic development of rural areas was rather modest, offers in this area were not matched by sufficiently high local demand. One sensible alternative would have been stronger support for agricultural activities, since many graduates do side work in the agricultural sector. In order to recognize the limits described above early on, a detailed analysis of requirements

that looked at more than just the path taken would have been useful. Such an analysis was dispensed with for lack of urgency, yet it could have been carried out at a later point in time.

At the time of the project appraisal the aspect of sustainability was not of prime importance, as suggested by the application of the FC/TC fast-track emergency procedure for natural catastrophes and political crises. The main focus was on resolving the crises quickly. Owing to the extremely difficult overall conditions and the urgent need for action, this approach was justified, yet it should have included an analysis of requirements as stated above. It would also have made sense to take the project design into account in the consolidation of the measures and in their transfer to viable structures (follow-up support for the programme and for graduates). However, as the institutions on the local level were weak, the possibilities for achieving this were limited.

The following developmentally relevant classifications were made during the ex-post evaluation:

- The programme measures contributed indirectly to improving the living conditions for the participants. Nevertheless, many of the ex-combatants were barred from participating due to the externally imposed selection criteria. For this reason, additional measures were added later on during the implementation period specifically to support women. They served to compensate for the deficiencies that were identified. Supporting women was not one of the programme's targets.
- The programme did not pursue any goals specifically tied to the environment. It did not have any negative environmental impacts.
- Even though the programme did not expressly target poor people, it improved the living conditions for the poor and was integrated into the national poverty reduction strategy. Sierra Leone suffers from mass poverty, above all in rural regions. Therefore, it can be assumed that the target group mostly comprised poor people. Poor people were included in the design and implementation of the programme and self-help mechanisms were activated – although their sustainability was limited.
- The programme contains elements of human rights education and conflict resolution. It was carried out with the help of the target group, traditional sources of authority, local NGOs and the village development committees. In this way, it was able to help strengthen them and to build up a civil society.

The risk associated with the programme was assessed during implementation as being high with low potential to be influenced. The assumptions as to the willingness of the participants to reconcile were proven to be correct. The security situation in Sierra Leone stabilized during the course of the programme. A certain degree of risk remains, however, since important causes of the conflict - such as mass poverty, lack of perspective of young adults, a critical security situation in the neighboring countries and disadvantages for broad parts of the population in terms of land use rights – have not been resolved. It also remains unclear whether appropriate and sustainable use of the infrastructure can be achieved.

Therefore, based on the key criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and significance/relevance we assess the programme's developmental effectiveness as follows:

- The applied methods and work methods, such as the type and organization of training/support, or cooperation with NGOs and village development committees, fulfilled the purpose and contributed to the programme's success. The programme objective of contributing to the reconciliation process and to the reintegration of the ex-combatants was achieved. The joint training of ex-combatants and the local population fostered the process of reconciliation. As a result, the coexistence of both groups in most of the communities in the programme area is now largely peaceful, and the majority of the trainees are still doing the work they were trained to do. The migration of some of the graduates to other regions may be due in part to insufficient orientation of the training courses to labor needs. On the other hand, however, to a certain extent this is unavoidable and is compensated by success in other areas. The second programme goal was to improve the local infrastructure. The construction work was performed as planned, and the newly created infrastructure is being

used adequately. Since the project was appraised quickly via an emergency procedure, sustainable use plays only a minor role in the assessment of the programme's success. It would have been a good idea to conduct an analysis of requirements at a later point in time, and to consider integrating follow-up support into the project design. However, this did not affect achievement of the goals. Therefore, we judge the project's effectiveness as satisfactory (sub-rating: 2).

- For programmes of this kind, the cost/benefit aspect and, therefore, the aspect of efficiency can be assessed to only a limited degree, which is why they play only a comparatively minor role in the evaluation of the programme's developmental effect. Since the project was carried out in the post-war period, the costs were surely higher than for other vocational education and training programmes. In general, the budget was rather tight in light of the measures that were implemented. The cooperation with local NGOs and trainers was, for the most part, cost-efficient. Overall we judge the costs to be adequate. On the other hand, the use is difficult to quantify, yet it can be considered relatively high: added to the direct use of the training on the microeconomic level is additional use in the successful reconciliation process in the programme communities, which also had a positive influence on other parts of life. Therefore, the project's efficiency can be classified as satisfactory overall (sub-rating 2).
- From today's point of view, the project concept was adequate and suited to contribute to the peace process in Sierra Leone and to the economic reconstruction in the agricultural regions (relevance). The lack of focus on sustainability was purposely accepted during the project appraisal in response to the urgency of the problems. Despite the relatively limited volume of funds, a noticeable contribution could be made to the achievement of the overall objective (significance). 1.3% of all ex-combatants in Sierra Leone were reached by the programme, making it the second-largest of its kind in the country. The programme's exemplary nature is illustrated by the fact that other donors such as the DFID took part in the ReAct Programme of the GTZ-IS. What is more, the programme had an important signalling effect on the consolidation of the peace process in Sierra Leone, due mainly to the fact reaction time of DC. Therefore, we consider the significance and relevance of the project to be satisfactory (sub-rating 2).

After weighing the above mentioned key criteria we classify the programme (Phases I and II) as having generally satisfactory effectiveness (rating 2).

### **Lessons Learned**

Even for cases in which the accelerated emergency procedure is applied, in cooperative projects the objectives and measures need to be elaborated jointly and the results of the coordination attempts need to be laid down in a cooperation agreement. However, this agreement must be designed in such a way that it allows for flexible action by both organizations.

As regards process-oriented projects, a subsequent, thorough analysis of requirements should not be dispensed with in the future. Above all, a gender-specific analysis of the target group should be conducted in order to ensure that women/former women combatants can participate in the project, and the selection criteria should be adjusted if need be.

The approach of providing joint support for ex-combatants and for the civil population who was affected by the war seems better suited to fulfil the requirements of a process of peace and reconciliation than focusing the support measures solely on ex-combatants.

When short-term goals (reintegration of ex-combatants) are combined with long-term goals (reconstruction of rural infrastructure), not only should the adequacy of the programme period be verified, but it should also be verified whether a follow-up support phase is necessary, and to what extent the programme measures could be flanked by longer-term projects aiming for sustainability.

## Legend

Developmentally successful: Ratings 1 to 3	
Rating 1	Very high or high degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 2	Satisfactory developmental effectiveness
Rating 3	Overall sufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Developmental failures: Ratings 4 to 6	
Rating 4	Overall slightly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 5	Clearly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 6	The project is a total failure

### Criteria for the Evaluation of Project Success

The evaluation of the "developmental effectiveness" of a project and its classification during the ex-post evaluation into one of the various levels of success described in more detail below concentrate on the following fundamental questions:

- Are the **project objectives** reached to a sufficient degree (aspect of project **effectiveness**)?
- Does the project generate sufficient **significant developmental effects** (project **relevance** and **significance** measured by the achievement of the overall development-policy objective defined beforehand and its effects in political, institutional, socio-economic and socio-cultural as well as ecological terms)?
- Are the **funds/expenses** that were and are being employed/incurred to reach the objectives **appropriate** and how can the project's microeconomic and macroeconomic impact be measured (aspect of **efficiency** of the project conception)?
- To the extent that undesired (**side**) **effects** occur, are these tolerable?

We do not treat **sustainability**, a key aspect to consider for project evaluation, as a separate category of evaluation but instead as a cross-cutting element of all four fundamental questions on project success. A project is sustainable if the project-executing agency and/or the target group are able to continue to use the project facilities that have been built for a period of time that is, overall, adequate in economic terms, or to carry on with the project activities on their own and generate positive results after the financial, organisational and/or technical support has come to an end.