

Sierra Leone: Support for the National Demobilisation Programme (Phases I and II)

Final inspection / Ex-post evaluation

OECD sector	1) Phase I: 72010 – Emergency aid 2) Phase II: 72010 – Emergency aid	
BMZ project IDs	1) 2000 65 094 2) 2002 65 793	
Project-executing agency	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR)	
Consultant	---	
Year of ex-post evaluation	2006	
	Programme appraisal (planned)	Ex-post evaluation (actual)
Start of implementation	05 / 2000	09 / 2001
Period of implementation	Originally 7 months (at the beginning of Phase I) Phase 2: no indication	33 months (Phases I and II)
Investment costs	1) EUR 5.11 million 2) EUR 1.25 million	1) EUR 5.11 million 2) EUR 2.37 million
Counterpart contribution	---	
Financing, of which Financial Cooperation (FC) funds	1) EUR 5.11 million 2) EUR 1.25 million	1) EUR 5.10 million 2) EUR 2.37 million
Other institutions/donors involved	World Bank, Department for International Development (DFID) and further bilateral donors	
Performance rating	2	
• Significance / Relevance	2	
• Effectiveness	1	
• Efficiency	2	

Brief Description, Overall Objective and Programme Objectives with Indicators

The programme was implemented in the framework of the "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme" (DDR) and aimed at disarming, demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants. The overall objective was to ensure peace in Sierra Leone and to create the pre-conditions for the reconstruction of the country. The programme target groups comprised ex-combatants and, in Phase II of the project, partly also the local civil population, who suffered from the war. Until the ex-post evaluation no specific indicators for the achievement of the objectives had been defined.

In view of the acute crisis, the evaluation of the project was carried out in accordance with the emergency procedures for natural catastrophes and political crises (Item 51a of the FC/TC guidelines).

The financial contribution was granted to the government of Sierra Leone under a joint financing provided together with the World Bank, DFID and other donors. As and when required, the funds were used to finance - pro-rata - the construction and equipment of demobilisation camps as well as investment costs and running expenses of existing camps and newly set up camps.

The ex-combatants from the different armed groups, whose number in the beginning was estimated at approximately 45,000, were to be given an incentive to disarm and reintegrate into the civil society.

Programme design / Major deviations from the original programme planning and their main causes

The civil war, which lasted until 2002, in addition to its heavy social consequences resulted in large-scale destruction of infrastructure and major disruptions of the state and institutional capacities of Sierra Leone. In the course of the conflict the country dropped to the very bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI) and, even though perceptible improvements have been made in terms of the indicators of life expectancy and literacy, Sierra Leone still belongs to the countries with the lowest HDI ranking. Accordingly, the share of poor people among the total population is very high. However, specific data are only available for the period before the war.

Once peace had been concluded the Sierra Leonean government and the international donor community initiated the "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme" (DDR) to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate the ex-combatants. Against this backdrop and due to the need for fast action, the programme appraisal was carried out in accordance with the fast-track emergency procedures mentioned above. Since the volume of funds required for the programme could originally be estimated only very roughly and it turned out that more funds would be required, the German government increased the FC funds provided for the first phase by granting three more tranches in a second phase between 2002 and 2004.

The overall concept of the emergency measures developed since 1998 in cooperation between the international community of donors and the Sierra Leonean government comprised a package of interrelated disarmament, reintegration and reconstruction measures, which built on the experience gained from similar crisis situations. Disarmament of ex-combatants and their participation in the DDR Programme was an indispensable prerequisite for inclusion of those ex-combatants in the reconstruction measures.

Given the difficult conditions in Sierra Leone the FC funds earmarked for the Programme were entirely transferred to an account maintained by the World Bank in the United States in order to enable the pooling of the funds and their pro-rata-use in the so-called Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration (NCDDR), which acted as the national coordination and executive body for the programme as a whole, was composed mainly of representatives from the government and the different warring fractions as well as from UN peace troops, UN-aid organisations and the further donors. Thus, the representatives of Sierra Leone took over high responsibility for the entire pacification process and the ensuing reconstruction process ("national ownership"). As regards the financial administration, the NCDDR was supported by the Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU), whose staff was provided by Price Waterhouse Coopers Ghana (PWC). The FMPU, which was itself monitored and checked by a second auditor, was entitled to draw on the donor funds provided. The actual implementation of funds (including the FC funds) was conducted by an Emergency Response Team (ERT) formed by the British consultant firm Crown Agents in Freetown, which was responsible for the operation of the camps and the entire related logistics, procurement and other services.

The DDR Programme envisaged the admission of the ex-combatants in centres located in different parts of the country, in which they were to be disarmed, identified, registered, given medical treatment and supplied with food and hygiene kits. In an ensuing cooling-off period (of 10-90 days, in some instances also clearly longer periods) the ex-combatants were offered orientation training, including for instance socio-psychological advice, vocational and reintegration training, provision of basic knowledge about the civil society, etc. When released from the camps the ex-combatants were given identification documents and travel expense allowances to enable them to return to their hometowns. In addition the ex-combatants received a so-called Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA), to be able to satisfy their most urgent

financial needs and those of their families. At the start of the programme late provision of donor funds amongst some other reasons resulted in misunderstandings about and delays of disbursement of these TSA's to the ex-combatants which put the credibility of the programme at risk. The short-term provision of additional funds by the German side helped to ease the financial situation.

The registration and disarmament of ex-combatants was carried out by the United Nations Armed Military Forces for Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Other tasks, such as sensitisation campaigns, training measures, psychological advice etc., were assigned to specialised institutions (UN organisations, NGOs).

Due to the unclear situation immediately after the termination of the fighting that had repeatedly flared up, the planning made at the beginning of the programme was based on rough estimates which were revised in the course of programme implementation. Overall, this basic concept was a fitting response to the clear need for action.

During the phase of programme conception that ran parallel to the conflict, the costs for disarming the original assumption (in 1998) of 33,000 combatants (this figure was increased to about 45,000 combatants at the time of the project start in 2000) had been estimated to amount to USD 33.6 million. However, according to figures presented by UN representatives after the conclusion of the programme, a total of USD 100 million had been spent for the disarmament of the actual number of approximately 72,500 combatants. The biggest share of the costs was handled through the MDTF. The donor funds were provided pro rata and no specific cost areas were assigned to individual donors. Due to this procedure the whole process was speeded up tremendously. The financial administration of the programme was continuously monitored and checked by independent auditors. According to their reports there was no cause for complaint.

The donor community provided a comprehensive package of measures building on one another and comprising re-integration and reconstruction offers for both ex-combatants and the civilian population. The German side supported these measures with the FC/TC cooperative project titled "**Reconstruction of Rural Infrastructure (Phases I and II)**", BMZ Project IDs 2000 66 274 and 202 65 785 (BMZ final evaluation in 12/2004 and ex-post evaluation conducted by KfW dated 21 December 2004) with a total financing volume of EUR 6.26 million.

During the military confrontation that flared up time and again the overall concept of the programme was continuously adjusted to the respective situation in the country and also took account of the experience made earlier in similar conflict situations. In general, this was in line with the actual requirements and provided a good basis for the successful implementation of the programme. In summary, the technical implementation and the results can be assessed as satisfactory. Actual programme achievements exceeded the original targets.

Key results of the impact analysis and performance rating

The original **programme objective** was the disarmament of approximately 45,000 ex-combatants and their participation in initial orientation measures in the training camps.

The achievement of this programme objective was the indispensable prerequisite for containing the military confrontations that were flaring up time and again in the country and, thus, to improve the security situation of the civilian population. Given the prevailing civil war situation, the objectives defined were necessary and appropriate and at the same time very demanding.

On the whole it was possible until early 2002 to disarm around 72,500 ex-combatants, among them almost 10,550 women and 6,800 children. Altogether 56,700 persons registered for re-integration programmes, around 48,000 of whom concluded the measures until the closure of the programme in the beginning of 2004. For lack of funds and time, around 8,500 participants could not participate in the re-integration measures in the context of the DDR-Programme but at least received a lump-sum payment as a start-up assistance after they had been released from

the disarmament camps. As regards the around 15,800 disarmed ex-combatants who did not register for further re-integration measures, it is generally assumed that a large portion of them actually had found work in the larger urban centres and the diamond mines.

As a result it is assumed that almost all active combatants were given a chance to make a new start into the civilian society and that most of them were able to take advantage of this chance. The project helped to ensure the disarmament of 72,500 ex-combatants. This is 161% of the number of participants defined at the start of the project. Thus, the project objectives were clearly exceeded.

The disarmament and registration of ex-combatants was the condition sine qua non for the participation in further re-integration and training measures. The total number of participants who took part in the follow-up measures was nominally higher than originally planned and corresponds to 66 % (registrations = 78%) of ex-combatants actually disarmed. These figures are very satisfactory. Interviews conducted in the context of the ensuing FC/TC cooperative project "Reconstruction of Rural Infrastructure" showed that in 2004 at least 50% of the participants in training measures were still working in the job in which they had been trained. The social relations are judged to be mostly non-violent in at least 75% of the programme communities by their population. According to the information available, most of the participants stayed in the communities where they had been trained, however, a significant number also left for larger urban centres due to a lack of employment opportunities among other reasons. Altogether, the programme objective can be considered as achieved as regards the reconciliation process. Especially the joint training of ex-combatants and villagers was an essential factor in significantly reducing the conflict potential between the two groups and in encouraging the reintegration of the ex-combatants. An example of the nature and importance of the rapprochement that took place and the talks that were held is given in the GTZ publication contained in Annex 4.

Thus, the **overall objective** of contributing to securing peace and creating the prerequisites for the reconstruction of the country, which had originally been considered as necessary and adequate but was also fraught with considerable risks, was fully achieved.

At the time of the project appraisal, in line with the FC/TC fast-track emergency procedure for natural catastrophes and political crises, the aspect of sustainability was not of prime importance. The main focus was on the short-term easing of the civil war conflict through the rapid and lasting disarmament of the warring fractions. Owing to the extremely difficult overall conditions and the urgent need for action, this approach was appropriate to solve the problem.

The following developmentally relevant classifications were made on the occasion of the ex-post evaluation of the project 'Support for the National Demobilisation Programme (Phases I and II)':

- The programme measures contributed indirectly to improving the living conditions of the participants. At the outset specific support for women had not been one of the programme's targets (G 0). However, in the course of the project implementation it became apparent that due to the specific selection criteria (among other, the type of weapons carried) many female ex-combatants did not qualify to take part in the programme. For this reason, additional measures were introduced later on in the framework of the complementary reintegration measures specifically to support women. These measures served to compensate for the deficiencies that had been identified.
- The programme did not pursue any goals specifically related to the environment. The project did not have any negative environmental impacts (UR 0).
- The project was not expressly directed at poor target groups but it can be assumed that poor people or ex-combatants who were at risk of sinking into poverty made up the clear majority of the target group. The fact that they were given the opportunity to participate in the reintegration measures helped to activate self-help mechanisms, which can however be described as sustainable only to a limited extent (category SUA (= other direct poverty eradication)).

- The programme contains elements of human rights education and conflict resolution. It was carried out with the involvement of the target group and, in this way, it helped strengthen the target group and to build up a civil society (category PD/GG 1).

At the start of implementation the **risk** associated with the programme was assessed as being high with **low potential to influence the risks**. Given the satisfactory course of the programme implementation the risk assessment was reduced to medium. The assumptions as to the willingness of the participants to reconcile were proven to be correct. Since the end of the fighting the economic, political and security situation of Sierra Leone has continuously been improving. However, it has to be stated that, due to the continued fragile political situation and the fact that state institutions are not fully functioning, the political risks described in the programme appraisal report continue to exist and constitute a fundamental danger. Important causes of the conflict - such as mass poverty, lack of perspective of young adults, a critical security situation in the neighbouring countries and disadvantages for broad parts of the population in terms of land use rights – are also persisting. It also remains unclear whether an appropriate and sustainable use of the infrastructure that has been reconstructed can be achieved.

The **effectiveness** of the programme is slightly limited because women in particular were only insufficiently able to participate in the measures. The main reason for this was the definition of ex-combatants in the framework of the national DDR programme, which frequently did not classify women as ex-combatants because they did not own a weapon, or they were classified as war wives. For these reasons women were underrepresented among the programme participants. In consequence, supplementary reintegration programmes were introduced later on to try and integrate this target group, at least partially, through specific offers. Such measures had a positive impact.

Overall, the **effectiveness** of the programme, i.e. the degree of achievement of the programme objectives, was very high in terms of solving the existing problems (**sub-rating: 1**).

Though the donor funds provided for subsequent complementary reintegration measures were not sufficient to implement measures for all persons interested, the programme was highly relevant for solving the existing problems because in an immediate crisis situation it contributed to easing the situation rapidly and comprehensively. The overall objective of the programme was fully achieved. In consequence we rate the **relevance and significance of the project as satisfactory (sub-rating 2)**.

The measures were carried out by the NCDDR in close cooperation between the Sierra Leonean government and the auditors, consultants, NGOs and other institutions in charge of the actual implementation of the programme. Due to this close cooperation it was possible to implement the planned measures overall successfully, in a flexible manner and always responding to the prevailing situation at costs that were reasonable and acceptable given the framework in which the programme was situated. The financial handling did not give cause for complaint. The project's **efficiency** in terms of providing a solution to the problem is rated as satisfactory overall and thus the project is awarded **sub-rating 2**.

Overall, we consider both phases of the project as relevant and as having satisfactory developmental effectiveness (overall rating 2).

General conclusions and recommendations

At the end of 2004 the programme as a whole was subject to a final evaluation conducted on behalf of the World Bank. The overall result of the evaluation was very positive. The following general conclusions made in the final report, which we support as well, are of importance for other programmes implemented on the subject of "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR):Political consequences

- Since a DDR process is aimed at the short-term easing of political and military conflicts and is to improve the security situation complementary measures are required to prevent further conflicts in the future.
- National ownership and a high degree of consent with the process of pacification are indispensable prerequisites for the successful implementation of a DDR programme.
- Programme design and implementation
 - The institutional responsibility for the disarmament and demobilisation process should be with the same institution as the one in charge of the process of reintegration. It is of vital importance that the activities of all protagonists are closely coordinated and interrelated.
 - The DDR process must be accompanied by measures to reconcile the conflicting parties and to build up mutual confidence as well as by efforts to reintegrate the ex-combatants into the civil society.
 - Strong, transparent and trustworthy implementation structures and a good database for the programme implementation will enable a better adjustment of a DDR programme to actual developments.
- Financial handling
 - Pooling the different donor funds may help to substantially increase the required flexibility to adjust the handling of DDR programmes to the prevailing situation. In this respect, a timely provision of donor funds and a strong, independent and credible handling institution/unit are vital for the programme success.
- Target groups
 - A DDR process should be examined on a timely basis under sociological aspects in order to make it possible to adjust the process when required.
 - The specific situation of female combatants and child soldiers has to be dealt with according to their specific needs. The civilian population has to be involved in an appropriate manner in the integration and reconstruction programmes, in particular to prevent financial distortions. Transitional payments may have a positive impact on the local economy.

Legend

Developmentally successful: Ratings 1 to 3	
Rating 1	Very high or high degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 2	Satisfactory developmental effectiveness
Rating 3	Overall sufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Developmental failures: Ratings 4 to 6	
Rating 4	Overall slightly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 5	Clearly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 6	The project is a total failure

Criteria for the Evaluation of Project Success

The evaluation of the "developmental effectiveness" of a project and its classification during the ex-post evaluation into one of the various levels of success described in more detail below concentrate on the following fundamental questions:

- Are the **project objectives** reached to a sufficient degree (aspect of project **effectiveness**)?
- Does the project generate sufficient **significant developmental effects** (project **relevance** and **significance** measured by the achievement of the overall development-policy objective defined beforehand and its effects in political, institutional, socio-economic and socio-cultural as well as ecological terms)?
- Are the **funds/expenses** that were and are being employed/incurred to reach the objectives **appropriate** and how can the project's microeconomic and macroeconomic impact be measured (aspect of **efficiency** of the project conception)?

- To the extent that undesired **(side) effects** occur, are these tolerable?

We do not treat **sustainability**, a key aspect to consider for project evaluation, as a separate category of evaluation but instead as a cross-cutting element of all four fundamental questions on project success. A project is sustainable if the project-executing agency and/or the target group are able to continue to use the project facilities that have been built for a period of time that is, overall, adequate in economic terms, or to carry on with the project activities on their own and generate positive results after the financial, organisational and/or technical support has come to an end.