

Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal: Manantali Dam

Ex-post evaluation report

OECD sector	1) 23065 / Hydropower plants 2) 23065 / Hydropower plants 3) 23040 / Electricity transmission and distribution	
BMZ project ID	1) 1975 65 740 Manantali Dam 2) 1981 65 292 Deforestation measures Manantali Dam 3) 1997 65 405 Manantali Dam – Energy project	
Project-executing agency	Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal, OMVS (Organisation for the development of the Senegal River)	
Consultant	1) Groupement Manantali, Forschungsinstitut Senckenberg, 2) Deutsche Forstinventur-Service GmbH 3) Coyne et Bellier, Fichtner, Tecsub	
Year of ex-post evaluation	2008	
	Project appraisal (planned)	Ex-post evaluation (actual)
Start of implementation	1) 2 nd quarter 1981 2) 3 rd quarter 1984 3) 3 rd quarter 1997	1) 2 nd quarter 1982 2) 3 rd quarter 1985 3) 3 rd quarter 1998
Period of implementation	1) 68 – 73 months 2) 34 months 3) 51 months	1) 70 months 2) 34 months 3) 69 months
Investment costs	1) EUR 730.3 million 2) EUR 10.2 million 3) EUR 311.2 million	1) EUR 572.8 million 2) EUR 10.2 million 3) EUR 375.1 million
Counterpart contribution	1) ./. 2) ./. 3) EUR 20.4 million	1) ./. 2) ./. 3) EUR 1.4 million
Financing, of which FC (Financial Cooperation) funds	1) EUR 84.0 million 2) EUR 10.2 million 3) EUR 40.8 million	1) EUR 75.8 million 2) EUR 10.2 million 3) EUR 49.6 million
Other institutions/donors involved	AfD, EIB, ACDI, et al.	AfD, EIB, ACDI, WB et al.

Performance rating	1)	4
	2)	4
	3)	3
• Relevance	1)	3
	2)	3
	3)	2
• Effectiveness	1)	4
	2)	4
	3)	2
• Efficiency	1)	5
	2)	5
	3)	4
• Overarching developmental impact	1)	4
	2)	4
	3)	4
• Sustainability	1)	4
	2)	4
	3)	3

The ex-post evaluation of the project “Manantali Dam”, and of further investment measures associated with this project in the countries of Senegal, Mauritania and Mali, were jointly carried out by the evaluation departments of Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and KfW Entwicklungsbank (KfW). In order to do so, the three institutions agreed on a common evaluation concept based on the DAC criteria. Each of the three organisations mandated independent experts to carry out the ex-post evaluation at the project location.

Brief description, overall objective and project objectives with indicators

Originally, the construction of the Manantali dam was intended to achieve three objectives: the development of irrigation farming in the countries of Senegal, Mauritania and Mali, the provision of sufficient electrical power for these countries and making the Senegal River navigable. Due to its high investment costs, the latter objective was abandoned. Therefore only the other two objectives, i.e. development of irrigation farming and energy supply, are relevant for the assessment of the dam project’s success. The following project measures were implemented in the context of the project:

Real investment: Construction of a buttress dam with a concrete pier wall, two wing walls and a storage capacity of 11.3 billion m³ on the Bafing River, and construction of the Diama barrage at the delta estuary of the Senegal River. A hydropower plant with an installed capacity of 200 MW, including a transformer station and transmission lines (225 kV) of altogether 1,345 km were built and equipped to provide electricity for the three countries of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.

Complementary measures: Staff support for the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) for the operation of the dam and the management of the reservoir, as well as for the preparation and operation of the energy project (transferral of the management of the hydropower plant to a private utility company).

The following objectives were defined for the expansion of irrigation farming:

- Overall objective: Increasing self-sufficiency in wheat (no indicators)
- Project objective: Economically viable production of rice, maize, wheat, sorghum, tomatoes, sugar-cane, and other cultures (e.g. fruit and vegetables) through the development of new irrigation areas in Senegal, Mauritania and partially Mali.
- Indicators: In 2006, the developed irrigation area amounts to 54,700 ha in Senegal (alternative scenario: 56,900 ha), 20,350 ha in Mauritania (alternative scenario: 28,700 ha), and 3,000 ha in Mali
Cultivation intensity is 150 % in the large perimeters and 200 % in the small perimeters (as of 1986)
A positive cash value of net earnings (FCFA 18.09 million at a discount rate of 6 %)
As of 1986, self-sufficiency in sugar of up to 73 % in Senegal and of up to 44 % in Mauritania

The following objectives were defined for the energy project:

- Overall objective: Utilization of electrical power generated at low cost by means of the Manantali dam as a basic requirement for the commercial and industrial development of the three countries
- Indicators: 5 years after taking the Manantali hydropower plant into operation, a macroeconomic cost-cover ratio of at least 65 % is achieved in the OMVS member states
More than 60 % of the electricity is utilized for production purposes.
- Project objective: Contribute to covering electricity demands in a safe and environmentally friendly way
- Indicators: Once full production capacity is reached, 540 GWh are fed into the Eastern and Western transmission lines (annual average value over several years)

Project-executing agency for all projects is the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal, which was founded by the states of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal in 1972 in order to promote the cross-border development of the potential of the Senegal River.

Project design / major deviations from the original project planning and their main causes

In irrigation farming, the national agricultural authorities of Senegal and Mauritania are responsible for the expansion and maintenance of the irrigation perimeters. The responsibility for the cultivation of the publicly financed perimeters really lies with the user groups today, who have to pay fees for public services, including the provision with and utilization of irrigation water. This modification of the system has not yet been completed, nor has it yet achieved the desired results with regard to reducing public funding in the irrigation sector.

SOGEM, owned by the three member states of the OMVS and with its headquarters in Bamako, is responsible for the operation of Manantali. The electricity production itself was awarded to the South African company Eskom Energie Manantali (EEM), a subsidiary of the South African electricity utility Eskom, on the basis of an international call for tenders. EEM is in charge of the operation and maintenance of the production plants, of the electricity transmission lines up to the transfer points where the national utility companies EDM, SENELEC and SOMELEC take over, as well as for the collection of tariffs. However, it has no right to adjust the level and structure of tariffs to operational requirements. Although it would have been justified, EEM has

not yet used its right to cut off electricity in case of arrears of payment. After deduction of the fees for their management services, EEM transfers the proceeds from the prescribed tariffs to SOGEM. SOGEM uses this revenue to operate and maintain the dam, to service the debts for the energy project and to finance the Fonds de Risque Hydraulique (FRH), which is intended to balance out possible production and income losses in times of insufficient water supply in the Manantali reservoir.

From 1977 until 1980, USAID carried out an environmental study with a financial volume of approx. USD 3.4 million (equivalent to approx. EUR 3.2 million at the time) in the context of the planning of the dam. According to the standards of the time, all relevant fields involved were examined, e.g. hydrology, chemical and biological development of the water quality, impact on agriculture, health aspects, urban and rural development. All aspects which had a relevant impact at the time of ex-post evaluation, in particular the increase in water-induced diseases like schistosomiasis and diarrhoea and the proliferation of reeds and water hyacinths had been recognised as risks resulting from the construction of the dam. Short-term measures on the basis of this study were the establishment of the limnological station and of the nature reserve on the Bafing River by Mali, for example. Long-term measures to limit negative environmental effects were launched in 1995 in the context of the "Programme d'Atténuation et de Suivi des Impacts sur l'Environnement (PASIE)" with a volume of approx. USD 19.0 million, which was supported by ADB, AfD, CIDA, the World Bank and a contribution of the OMVS.

Other environmentally relevant fields are flood farming and fishery, for example. Due to the river regulation as a result of the dam, it is unlikely that flood farming will ever reach its original level again. The water regulation caused by the construction of the Manantali dam and the Diama barrage lead to a decrease of the fish population in the Senegal River of approximately 90 %. Simultaneously, the Manantali reservoir became increasingly important for the supply with fish. With catches of a volume of roughly 1,300 t/year and an estimated potential volume of 3,000 t/year, the reservoir is the third largest source of fish for the land-locked country of Mali. Summing up it must be pointed out that back in the 80s, both the studies on the project's environmental impact carried out in the context of the planning of the dam, and the implementation of corresponding measures to limit negative effects, had a high standard. Seen from a current perspective, they came very close to the recommendations of the World Commission on Dams of the year 2000.

About 10,000 people were resettled from 46 villages and rural hamlets in the area of today's reservoir. 30 villages, 250 km of rural unpaved roads to link these villages to the main traffic, 4,500 new houses, 148 wells, institutions of social infrastructure (schools, health centres, warehouses) were built in the context of the resettlement. In the time of transition, food aid was provided and financial compensation payments to the amount of altogether FCFA 120 million were made (1986/87). In the resettlement process, also the cultural interests of the people concerned were taken into account. The total costs of the resettlement measures amounted to approx. USD 27.0 million. They were financed by USAID, UNDP and the government of Mali, which paid a contribution of approx. USD 3.0 million (converted figure).

Key results of the impact analysis and performance rating

All the projects had a general developmental orientation. The protection of resources played a particularly important role in all of the projects. While the energy project contributes to protecting the global environment by avoiding CO2 emissions, the construction of the dam and the ensuing regulation of the Senegal River had clearly detrimental effects on the environment. The projects had no potential to essentially promote gender equality. Even though their objectives were not expressly aimed at promoting participatory development / good governance, the projects did strengthen cross-border co-operation.

The developmental rating may be summarised as follows:

Relevance: The expansion of **irrigation farming** in order to improve the country's self-sufficiency corresponded to developmental priorities, given the fact that agriculture was threatened by frequent draughts in the 80s. However, it is questionable from a current perspective whether it made sense to focus on the cultivation of rice. The results of the ex-post evaluation show that cultivating rice for two or more crop seasons, as it would be required to use Manantali's potential in an economically viable way, was not among the target group's priorities. The development of the political environment was not adequate with regard to agricultural self-sufficiency in the sense of autarchy. Especially in Senegal, structural adjustment measures and the country's accession to the World Trade Organisation aimed at opening the markets, which clearly showed that particularly for Senegal, the rice production did not have any comparative economic advantages. Therefore, from a current perspective, objective and design of the dam are no longer appropriate with regard to rice cultivation by means of irrigation farming. Other positive aspects of the dam, like river regulation, disaster prevention by means of avoiding flood waves etc. remain unaffected by this assessment.

Shortages in the supply with rice were a core problem for a short time only (during the periods of draught). During the entire period assessed in the ex-post evaluation (1975-2007), supply with rice was ensured either by means of imports (Senegal) or cultivation on farmland outside of Manantali (Mali). Only in Mauritania it still played a certain role because of the continuing structural shortage of wheat, the country's staple crop.

The chain of impact expected at the time of project appraisal, i.e. "irrigation farming to grow rice – increased self-sufficiency in rice supply – more income from rice production", did not materialize. Even at the time of project appraisal it was not conclusive, and seen from a current perspective it is only valid with great restrictions because of the lack of comparative advantages, so that it would be required to come up with entirely new chains of impact today.

Donor alignment in the irrigation sector was altogether not very convincing. Mali was not concerned by an alignment in the Senegal valley. Mauritania and Senegal have issued pleading documents (Mauritania: *Stratégie de Développement du Secteur Rural*; Senegal: *Lettre de Mission*) with financing offers for external donors in order to create an institutional platform for an alignment, but the results were little convincing from an exclusively sectoral point of view so far.

The problem at the core of the **energy project**, i.e. the insufficient supply with electrical energy, perseveres and has even been accentuated. Again, the chain of impact expected at the time of project appraisal is applied without modification. Provided the energy is used appropriately and productively, economically viable and environmentally friendly energy production leads to more economic diversification, employment, income, and growth, particularly in the industrial sector.

However, in none of the three countries electrical power seems to be utilised in this primarily productive way. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, energy production from water power has clearly increased in importance due to the dramatic rise in oil prices and the greater urgency to reduce CO₂ emissions. In retrospect, the construction of Manantali in order to promote environmentally-friendly electricity production was a sensible decision, both with regard to design and strategy.

During the planning phase for the dam and for the energy project, there was a close concertation between the 16 donors and the political representatives of the three OMVS countries at a number of international conferences. Not for all issues an agreement could be reached. On the one hand, the current operation model of the energy project may be considered a success. On the other hand, efforts to harmonise donors in the irrigation farming and electricity supply sectors with a view to developing sustainable structures were not discernable.

We assess the relevance of irrigation farming as unsatisfactory (**rating 4**). The relevance of the energy project fulfils the expectations without significant shortcomings (**rating 2**).

Effectiveness: Except for the development of a new area, the project objectives with regard to irrigation farming have not been achieved. The agricultural utilisation of the land fell far short of expectations. Cultivation intensity is below 100 % in Senegal and at merely 50 % in Mauritania. What had been expected was an intensity of 150 % in the large perimeters and of 200 % in the smaller perimeters. The overall objective “increasing the level of self-sufficiency” was therefore only partially achieved, although both the set of objectives and the level of expectations were essentially realistic. Low cultivation intensities and restriction to only one crop season per year are clearly an indication that the potential of the river regulation ensured by Manantali and Diama is not used. On the whole, the potential for irrigation farming provided by the Manantali dam is not used.

By contrast, some of the technical project objectives of the energy project have clearly been surpassed. The average electricity production exceeded the estimated value by 37 %, there were no major interruptions of operation since the installations were put into operation in 1998, and technical loss is less than 20 %.

On the whole, the construction of the dam could have been justified without the objective of expanding and intensifying irrigation farming.

We assess the effectiveness of the **irrigation farming project** as clearly inadequate (**rating 5**). We assess the effectiveness of the **energy project** as good (**rating 2**).

Efficiency: With regard to the **irrigation farming** project, the cash-flow analysis for the perimeters in Senegal shows that even without taking investment and maintenance costs for the Manantali dam into consideration, no positive profit contribution could be achieved for the entirety of perimeters benefiting from the Manantali dam. With FCFA 214.3 billion (EUR 326.2 million), the deficit of Senegal's irrigation farming sector was considerably larger than expected in the project appraisal report¹. The financing of maintenance costs and replacement investments is far from guaranteed. Due to the negative results of the production efficiency, we

¹ Even if the time series for the cost-benefit analysis was continued beyond the year of the ex-post evaluation (2006) and if the 2008 increase in world market prices for white rice were taken into account, the result would not be significantly better.

also expect a negative allocation efficiency. Similar calculations were not possible for Mauritania because of a lack of transparency. The low cultivation intensity and the fact that fields are often left fallow in the dry season make it seem very likely that the result in Mauritania would be very similar to the one in Senegal.

Compared to the reference scenario of expanding thermal power plants, the **energy project** achieves a positive macroeconomic rate of return even if the costs for the construction of the dam are fully taken into account. With a rate of return of approx. 4.5 %, the utilisation of water power for the energy production proves to be an inexpensive solution.

The dynamic prime costs of energy production are not covered by the operating company's income from tariffs. With an annual production of 740 GWh and a discount factor of 6 % (taking into account the entire amount of construction costs for the dam), prime costs are at 8.81 EURCent/KWh, whereas income from tariffs is at 4.7 EURCent/KWh. The cost-cover ratio of 53 % is clearly insufficient. Even if the investment costs of the dam were considered as sunk cost, the operational cost-cover ratio would reach only 82 % (5.7 EURCent/KWh in costs as compared to 4.7 EURCent/KWh in tariff income). However, a sunk cost perspective is hardly justifiable, since the dam was built explicitly to improve electricity supply.

The assessment of the macroeconomic cost-cover ratio shows a similar picture. Only 64 % of the macroeconomic costs for production, transmission and distribution in the three countries Senegal, Mali and Mauritania are covered. The minimum requirement level of 65 % has therefore almost been achieved, but no substantial improvement may be expected. The low macro-economic cost-cover ratio means that the demand in electricity has been artificially increased and does not correspond to economic priorities. As a consequence, the energy project's allocation efficiency is not satisfactory, either.

We assess the production and allocation efficiency of the **irrigation farming** project as clearly inadequate (**sub-rating 5**), and those of the **energy project** as unsatisfactory (**rating 4**).

Overarching developmental impact: On the whole, the contribution of **irrigation farming** to achieving the overall objective (increasing self-sufficiency and promoting commercial and industrial development) was low. In Senegal, self-sufficiency in the staple crop rice has deteriorated rather than improved. Senegal is one of the world's largest importers of rice. Although Mauritania's self-sufficiency has improved, structural deficits in the food supply persist. Demand in wheat (staple crop) is covered by 100 % from imports. Even if another overall objective in the sense of the Millenium Development Goals were taken as a basis, e.g. alleviation of poverty, irrigation farming would not have contributed to achieving the objective. More poor people live in the project regions in Senegal and in Mauritania than is the average in these countries; the low population growth in the project region around St. Louis in Senegal is an indication of a continued rural exodus.

The contribution of the **energy project** to power supply is particularly important for Mali (Manantali accounts for 92 % of the country's electricity) and Mauritania (34 %). However, its contribution to commercial and industrial development is low. The low macroeconomic cost-cover ratio through tariffs leads to market distortions. Proxy indicators like the share of the manufacturing industry in the GDP or the number of people employed show that this sector continues to be weak. Available data on employment in Senegal's manufacturing industry indicate no significant improvement in the development of industry and commerce.

In contrast to previous attempts of co-operation between the three countries, **OMVS** has revealed itself as a stable institution of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. By means of regular statutory meetings of the heads of state and government and other sub-organisations, it ensures continuity in interstate dialogue, which was essentially continued even during the war between Senegal and Mauritania (1989/1990). However, the great number of stakeholders is a risk for the existence of OMVS in the long term, because it hampers efficient management in view of the sustainable and successful operation of the entire system (Manantali Dam, Diama Barrage, electricity production, supply of irrigation water).

The political dialogue institutionalised through OMVS plays an important role in cross-border co-operation between the three countries. Owing to this co-operation, an agreement on the international status of the Senegal River has been reached between the three countries, which is an important basis for the joint exploitation of the river's potential and for avoiding conflicts about the utilisation of river water between upstream and downstream populations. OMVS and the high degree of legal regulation of interstate relationships with regard to water utilisation in brought about serves as a model and forms new structures. It can be a model for replication in other regions. Current efforts to prepare for the accession of the state of Guinea (Conakry) to the OMVS community and plans to build more hydropower plants with the OMVS as central project-executing agency underlines the great political importance of these structures.

We assess the overarching developmental impact of the **irrigation farming project** as unsatisfactory (**rating 4**); the overarching developmental impact of the **energy project** is altogether not satisfactory either (**rating 4**). The positive structure-building processes triggered by OMVS are not sufficient to counterbalance the negative aspects.

Sustainability: Irrigation farming: The high risks threatening the objective of achieving a satisfying degree of lasting self-sufficiency in corn persist. Approaches for a more intense exploitation of the potential created by Manantali and Diama (diversification of crop cultures, optimisation of cultivation intensity) are barely visible so far. The causes for the deficits are so numerous and complex that the perspectives for a sustainable utilisation in the future must be considered as low. In the long term, the irrigation sector in Senegal and Mauritania will depend on public subsidies and also on the support of foreign donors. The same applies to the operating company of the Diama barrage, which can cover only about 30 % of its operating costs from tariffs for water taken from the Senegal River.

Energy project: The bad payment record of the electricity customers (the national energy utility companies of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal) poses a particular risk. The high accumulated arrears of payment and therefore the tight liquidity of SOGEM threaten the financing of the necessary maintenance works at the Manantali dam and the debt service to the various donors. Since electricity supply through Manantali is such a priority, the conference of ministers has decided to balance arrears of payment by means of subsidies in the recent past. It may be assumed that this will also be the case in the future. However, since there is no binding regulation with regard to the amount and timing of subsidy payments, the latter will always be subject to *ad hoc* decisions, and a lasting attainment of the project and overall objectives therefore remains permanently uncertain.

Due to its political importance in the region and its experience in dealing with cross-border investments, national governments and international financing institutions, the OMVS structure will continue to exist in the future. There are currently no political signals to force OMVS in the

background. Current plans to build additional hydropower plants in Félou and Gounia rather indicate an intention to keep up the OMVS structure in the long term.

We assess the sustainability of the **irrigation farming project** as inadequate (**rating 4**) and the sustainability of the **energy project** as satisfactory (**rating 3**).

Overall developmental efficacy

In order to deduce the overall developmental efficacy, the projects' respective sub-ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, overarching developmental impact and sustainability were weighted in relation to their share of costs as calculated at the time of project appraisal for the dam (59 % for irrigation farming, 41 % for energy production) and merged into a single rating (weighted average). This constituted the basis for the overall rating. Both the above-mentioned sub-ratings as well as the overall rating are attributed to the project "deforestation measures Manantali dam", which was essentially a component of the dam's construction and indispensable for the proper operation of the dam. The rating for the project "Manantali dam energy project" is exclusively composed of the sub-ratings for the energy project.

As a result, we assess the developmental impact of the projects "Manantali dam" and "deforestation measures Manantali dam" as overall unsatisfactory. The result lags clearly behind expectations, and despite visible positive results, the negative results dominate (**overall rating: 4**).

We assess the developmental impact of the project "Manantali dam – energy project" as satisfactory. It falls clearly short of expectations, but the positive results dominate. Among other reasons, this ultimately positive assessment is justified by the fact that the use of renewable energies for a sustainable electricity supply will considerably increase in importance in the future. (**overall rating: 3**).

General conclusions and recommendations

Among others, the following general conclusions and recommendations are given:

- For future cross-border investments in infrastructure with transregional organisations, the structural reinforcement of the organisation should be given more attention in the analysis of institutions, in order to recognise strategic weak points in time and offer corresponding support.
- In order to limit the constantly present tension between state sovereignty on the one hand and the technical requirements of cross-border infrastructure on the other hand, a long-term co-operation strategy and close concertation of the respective national policies in the sectors benefiting from the infrastructure measures is required.
- The large number of institutions which constitute the OMVS system is no guarantee for an efficient management. Instead of equal representation of the different nationalities in each individual institution, there should be equal representation in the organisation as a whole. This procedure would make it possible to focus exclusively on professional aspects instead of national aspects when filling positions in the individual institutions of the system. Moreover, operation units with the same or similar tasks (e.g. operation of the Manantali dam and of the Diama barrage) should be merged in order to achieve synergies and simplify decision-making processes.

- Co-ordination of the donors for cross-border and cross-sectoral projects should not be restricted to the individual investment, but should also include the downstream sectors which are the intended users of the potential created by the investment.
- Due to the close connection between electricity production and electricity distribution, the project design of future electricity production projects should also take into account the distribution side. The implementation of measures to ensure the sustainability of distribution (e.g. cost-covering tariffs) should be a prerequisite for further electricity production projects.
- New projects in agriculture should focus on the cultivation intensity of the existing perimeters. One of the priorities should be the provision of sufficient economic incentives.
- The design and implementation of resettlement measures should be based on the long-term development goals for the people concerned.
- There should be exact data on the costs for measures to protect the environment or to alleviate social hardship, e.g. caused by resettlement, in order to make it easier to implement such measures.

Abbreviations

ACDI	Canadian International Development Agency
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
EIB	European Investment Bank
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
EDM	Energie du Mali SA
EEM	ESKOM Energie Manantali
ESKOM	South African electricity production and distribution utility
FCFA	Central African CFA franc
OMVS	Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal/Organisation for the development of the Senegal River
PDIAIM	Projet de Développement Intégré de l'Agriculture Irriguée en Mauritanie
SAED	Société Nationale d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve Sénégal et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal et de la Falémé
SENELEC	Société d'Electricité du Sénégal
SOGED	Société pour la Gestion et l'Exploitation de Diama
SONADER	Société Nationale pour le Développement Rural
SOGEM	Société de Gestion de l'Energie de Manantali
SOMELEC	Société Mauritanienne d'Electricité

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness (outcome), “overarching developmental impact” and efficiency. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1 | Very good rating that clearly exceeds expectations |
| 2 | Good rating fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings |
| 3 | Satisfactory rating – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate |

Formatiert: Schriftart: Arial, 10 pt

- 4 Unsatisfactory rating – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
- 5 Clearly inadequate rating – despite some positive partial results the negative results clearly dominate
- 6 The project has no positive results or the situation has actually deteriorated

A rating of 1 to 3 is a positive assessment and indicates a successful project while a rating of 4 to 6 is a negative assessment and indicates a project which has no sufficiently positive results.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected.)

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and an improvement is very unlikely. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. A rating of 1 to 3 indicates a “successful” project while a rating of 4 to 6 indicates an “unsuccessful” project. In using (with a project-specific weighting) the five key factors to form an overall rating, it should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally “successful” if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“overarching developmental impact”) and the sustainability are considered at least “satisfactory” (rating 3).