



Ex-post Evaluation 2010 – Brief Report

Support to the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, Rwanda

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This report was written by independent external experts.
It reflects solely their opinion and assessment.

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Tabular overview

The evaluation mission

Evaluation period	Pre-Mission: 16.-20.01.2011 Main Evaluation Mission: 08.-30.03.2011
Evaluating institute / consulting firm	Particip GmbH Merzhauser Str. 183 79110 Freiburg
Evaluation team	Birgit Kundermann, Alexis Dukundane (Evaluators) Felix Gaisbauer (Researcher)

The development measure

1. Financial cooperation

Project title FC: Support to the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants	BMZ No. 2001 66 553	
Amount: 6.7 mil. EUR ¹	Disbursement status: 6.743 mil. EUR Contribution by districts: 0.1 mil. EUR (materials)	
Recipient/Project executing agency: Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission	Project appraisal report: December 2003	
<p>Overarching objective: To contribute to the stabilization of peace in the program regions</p> <p>Project objective: Ex-Combatants are successfully reintegrated in the Rwandan society in selected areas</p> <p>Target groups according to appraisal report: mainly demobilized fighters of Ex-FAR, Ex-RDF and diverse militia as well as the local population for employment (total 10,000) and 4,000 former fighters with chronic diseases or disabilities (Permanent Disability Rate > 30 %)</p>		
Timetable	Project appraisal	Final follow-up
Start of implementation	04/2004	07/2004
Prolongation		04/2007 – 03/2009
Implementation period	04/2004-03/2007	07/2004 –03/2009
Total costs (in million EUR)	6.7	6.743

¹ There are different data on the program costs in the program appraisal report: 6.7 mil. EUR in the general part and the short description, and 6,743 mil. EUR in Annex 1 of the same document of December 2003.

2. Technical cooperation

TC project title according to contract: Support to the reintegration of ex-combatants	Project number 2001.2521.1
Overall term broken down by phase: 01/2004-12/2007 (1 phase)	Total costs (offer) 1,533,000 EUR (BMZ)
Prolongation: 01/2007 – 12/2007	Budget increase by 500,000 EUR Total costs: 2,033,000 EUR (Final Report) No financial contribution by RDRC, but staff
Lead executing agency/agencies Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)	Implementation partner(s) Provincial and District Representatives of RDRC, District Development Committees, NGOs, self-help organisations
Overarching objective as per the offer: Ex-combatants are successfully reintegrated in the Rwandan Society in selected areas.	
Target groups according to offer: At least 10,000 combatants out of 70,000 combatants (96 % men, 3,9 % children, 0,1 % women) who are demobilized in the framework of the MDRP and reintegrated in Rwanda of three military factions as well as the civil population of reintegrating communities in Rwanda; in addition also the population of the recipient communities (districts).	

The rating

Overall rating	Good (no significant defects)
Individual rating	Relevance: Good, no significant defects; Effectiveness: Good, no significant defects; Impact: Satisfactory, positive results predominate; Efficiency: Satisfactory, positive results predominate; Sustainability: Good sustainability

Executive summary

The Program “Support to the Reintegration of ex-combatants” was conducted as a cooperation program between the German Development Bank (KfW Entwicklungsbank) and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ, now GIZ) in Rwanda between January 2004 and March 2009 with 6.743 mil. EUR for financial cooperation and 2.033 mil. EUR for technical cooperation. It was carried out in cooperation with the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) in eight districts of three provinces. The program objective was that “Ex-Combatants are successfully reintegrated in the Rwandan society in selected areas”. Its overarching objective was “to contribute to the stabilization of peace in the program regions”. It was embedded in the Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), which operated in seven countries of the Great Lakes Region between 2002 and 2009. The program’s components referred to capacity building for RDRC (GTZ), vocational training and business skills training for individual ex-combatants as well as cooperatives (GTZ), community based reintegration (CBR) works including employment as well as training for improved livelihoods (KfW), and finally, a medical rehabilitation component for ex-combatants living with disabilities and chronically ill ex-combatants (KfW). The program contribution referred to the last (reintegration) stage of the overall Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process which was already defined before the start of the program.

The present ex-post evaluation was carried out between September 2010 and October 2011 and included an inception phase, a pre-mission, the main evaluation mission and the reporting phase. It was conducted by Particip GmbH with two independent evaluators (Birgit Kundermann, Alexis Dukundane) and supported by a researcher working with the University of Konstanz (Felix Gaisbauer). The methodology included in-depth qualitative interviews with ex-combatants (XC), a participatory impact analysis, a comparative analysis of cooperatives as well as field visits in addition to semi-structured interviews and the study of documents.

Despite the positive and peaceful evolution in Rwanda since 2000, the regional conflict in the Great Lakes Region was never completely resolved. A considerable number of refugees and combatants of Rwandan origin left the country in 1994, but lives still outside the country with their children. The reintegration of ex-Combatants from the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) did not progress as quickly as foreseen in RDRP’s planning. Furthermore the persisting conflict in Eastern DRC with involvement of Rwandan fighters and their readiness to destabilize the Rwandan Government still constitute a threat for peace in Rwanda. However, the current developments are positive and give reason for hope that the large majority of the estimated 3,000 remaining fighters in the DRC might be reintegrated in the Rwandan society until the end of 2012. The German Development Cooperation sup-

ported the sub-regional stabilisation and peace process by various means: the Multi-Donor Reintegration Program (MDRP) received substantial funding and several bilateral reintegration projects and programs were supported as well. The present program was one of the first bilateral programs in this context.

The framework conditions in Rwanda developed very positively during the implementation of the program with a remarkable economic growth rate and decreasing poverty rates, and improving security throughout the country. Despite the overall peaceful and impressive development, economic disparities are increasing, especially between rural and urban areas. The program was conducted simultaneously with the national reconciliation process referring to the genocide in 1994 during the same period (2005-2008). The general confidence of the population in the Rwandan Government as well as in the comprehensive decentralisation process that marked the local development and improved the availability of services during the last decade is high. Although there is no declared open conflict registered in Rwanda any more, the former root causes of conflict still persist. They consist of a high level of mistrust and suspicion between citizens, poverty and socio-economic disparities, often in connection with the access to land and to natural resources as well as the distribution of resources between regions.

The evaluation refers to results chains that were reconstructed by the evaluation team as part of the inception phase of this evaluation. These result chains were assessed as ambitious (GTZ in particular) and generally showing a logical structure. However some gaps were identified, which were mainly undefined ends. These gaps relate to capacity building of RDRC and to the medical rehabilitation component. The latter gap did not lead up towards the program's objective, but was closely interlinked with other interventions and result chains under the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP). Socio-economic reintegration was not sufficiently specified for XC and the strategy for socio-economic development not sufficiently defined, assuming that social reintegration will automatically follow economic reintegration. This understanding of reintegration represents only a segment (XC and civilians) of a wider post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration process (including refugees, genocide victims and perpetrators and other social groups as well). The target group figures at the planning stage were unrealistically high with 10,000 XC according to GTZ's offer, but realistic for KfW, since KfW also considered civilians among those 10,000 beneficiaries. Female XC were neglected by the overall DDR-process and - in consequence – by the current program as well.

The relevance of the program was high, since it addressed crucial elements of a peaceful development such as the access to non-agricultural income by poor groups, broad-based

poverty reduction, social cohesion between different groups, and the reduction of mistrust and suspicion. It was well embedded into the sub-regional MDRP. The low number of disarmed members of armed groups from Eastern Congo, however, decreases the relevance of the program, since it lowers - in practice - its contribution to the regional stabilization. Instead, the program beneficiaries included more ex-members of the other (ex-)armies, especially of the current Rwandan Defence Forces. It also integrated XC who were already demobilized several years before, but did not constitute an immediate risk for a peaceful development. The selected activities and outputs were very appropriate with regard to the program objectives, and reflect the most important requirements of the XC (type of training, employment), except for female XC. In addition, there was a high number of XC with disabilities, some of them with very severe health problems and a considerable number of XC with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder with particular needs as well. Both groups were not sufficiently considered through the RDRP and the strategy of the present program. The needs assessment for XC living with disabilities remained incomplete. The CBR component took civilians and XC into account and herewith constitutes an important “Do no harm” element of the program, avoiding positive discrimination of XC and allowing social reintegration by decreasing mutual mistrust between XC and civilians. The program strategy was in line with the main development policies in Rwanda and with general international DDR standards. Various national development politics favoured the program results, such as the decentralisation policy, the poverty reduction programs and the reconciliation process. The program was highly poverty oriented.

The **relevance** is rated as good despite a few deficiencies. **Rating: 2 (good rating, no significant defects)**

The effectiveness of the program was good: it achieved its objective and realized all the expected results described by the indicators. Some of the planned outputs had been over-achieved, and most of them were realized in good quality. The survey undertaken with this evaluation reveals that 61% of the XC improved their socio-economic reintegration status and that most of the supported XC have higher incomes than the comparison group (129% higher), except the more vulnerable CBR beneficiaries (51%). However, the comparison group shows better food security parameters than the program beneficiaries. Incomes of the program trainees (vocational and business skills) are much more diversified than those of other groups with mostly two and in some cases three considerable income sources. The achievement of the reintegration objective was largely supported by the good economic framework conditions. Most of the XC who received vocational training could establish a second income source related to the respective professional trade in addition to their agricultural activities. The contribution of these second incomes to the household income often re-

mained limited, but it allowed paying a variety of costs and a better living standard. Although the business skills trainees show good financial success, the influence of the business skills training on the socio-economic development was less obvious than expected in terms of new activities and income, but is reported as helpful for existing activities, other management purposes in local development, and even at household level. Its beneficiaries enjoy fairly good socio-economic conditions. 70% of the CBR beneficiaries have benefited from employment not only to cover living costs, but also for investments, especially in livestock development and in buying plots or improving private houses. The trainings connected to CBR and rural livelihoods – mainly of limited duration – do not show a tangible influence on the reintegration of XC and their economic activities. XC living with disabilities in Rwanda could reduce considerably their Permanent Disability Rate. Their number has decreased from 8,500 XC in 2003 to 2,525 XC in 2010. The Government of Rwanda and the Japanese Cooperation completed the result chain by providing appropriate housing for severely disabled XC (Rwandan Government) and vocational training (JICA) for other XC with disabilities from 2007 onwards.

In most cases, the social reintegration followed the trend of economic reintegration. Only in some cases, the social integration is perceived as much more advanced than the economic reintegration for factors mainly outside the project's influence (e.g. family). Many XC were engaged in local security services, and also took over civil responsibilities at community level. Suspicion by community members could be reduced, mainly as part of the overall reconciliation and reintegration process, but also as a result of the cooperation on CBR working sites and the involvement of XC – together with civilians – in economic cooperatives. The effectiveness of the cooperatives' approach followed by the program was difficult to analyse as the cooperatives mainly followed economic activities which made it difficult to assess the extent to which such approach could also contribute to civil society strengthening. The self-identification and outer identification still identify 50% of the XC with a military background or between military and civilian identities.

The CBR-projects created community assets such as rural feeder roads and land terraces, which were appreciated at all levels and which show long-term benefits. The dual strategy of individual and community support proved to be positive. Unexpected positive results refer to the environment, which was considerably improved through CBR projects such as the land terraces (erosion control), and some of the constructed roads (lakeshore protection).

The coverage of the program was generally good, although the support was not always focused on the neediest areas (sectors with most XC in the districts). An appropriate gender strategy for this particular program was not developed while the overall DDR process is not

sufficiently gender-sensitive. The program could have undertaken specific activities outside the RDRP framework to assist women in the XC-context.

Altogether the **effectiveness** is rated as good, because many positive results have been registered in line with the expectations. **Rating: 2 (good rating, no significant defects)**

At the impact level, contributions to both the stabilization of local peace and poverty reduction have been realized. But reintegration in the RDRP framework was treated as an independent segment referring to XC and the general population only, instead of considering a wider process of national reintegration (refugees, genocide perpetrators and victims and other groups to reconcile and reintegrate). The own perception of the reintegration status of XC shows that they see themselves to the same extent or better integrated as refugees (81%), other citizens (55%) or other XC (64%). Full reintegration is in this perspective largely correlated to the period of return to the community of origin and the opportunities for economic activities or access to productive assets (such as land). The CBR activities contributed to the process of reintegration and produced particular benefits in those areas, where security was not yet established (Western Province). The population perceived the employment of XC as a reduction of risk of theft and herewith as an improvement of local security and the stabilization of peace.

The influence of the program at the sub-regional level was limited, since the number of reintegrated XC from the conflict area in the DRC was by far not as high as expected. The communication of positive experiences between XC and those still living in the forests in DRC is supposed to be limited, since the radio coverage is insufficient.

The program contributed to poverty reduction and to the achievement of mainly the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG 1). The reintegration of the very vulnerable groups of severely disabled XC was achieved through the construction of appropriate houses and vocational training by the Rwandan Government and within the RDRP after medical rehabilitation. In this precarious context, the contribution of the program to the reintegration process was considerable, but it did not constitute the most crucial step to create the necessary conditions, which allowed the program to unfold its effects. Its main contribution according to the population was that it provided employment for XC in difficult periods. Thus, CBR improved the confidence of the population in the local security considerably. The present program was embedded at the ending point of the DDR process in Rwanda. It had only limited influence on the general settings of the reintegration and peace process.

The **impact** of the program was enhanced through the national social and economic development. The impact of the program is rated as satisfactory, since the positive developments

are numerous, but the influence of the program on the stabilization of peace is limited. **Rating: 3 (satisfactory rating; positive results predominate)**

Regarding efficiency, the program components were generally well organised, and the cost-benefit ratio of many important outputs is assumed to be good too with the exception of the treatment of a small minority of severely disabled XC (2.5% of all treated XC-D). This treatment is assumed having consumed a huge part of the budget of this component, while a durable solution to the medical problems was found very late. The medical component shows management weaknesses and a considerable lack of available documentation on its implementation as well.

The utilisation of local service providers in several components generally favoured program efficiency. However, despite good implementation efficiency, the allocation efficiency of the CBR component was limited. The added value of the VT in terms of scaling-up was fairly good, since the RDRC engaged in this approach already in 2006, partly as a result of GTZ's convincing monitoring results. The added value of the medical component was good in terms of decreased disability rates (outcome), but less accentuated in terms of technical innovations in the health sector, since the medical treatment was paid and some equipment provided to the hospitals.

The program components worked independently from each other and the phasing between GTZ's main interventions and KfW's main interventions was spread over the implementation period and could have been better coordinated. The day-to-day coordination of the program was difficult to assess, since knowledgeable former staffs were hardly available. Operational synergies during implementation remained limited. At the same time, strategic synergies of GTZ and KfW were very obvious, especially in the MDRP context. The program was well anchored in the RDRP and the sub-regional MDRP.

The rating for **efficiency** is satisfactory, due to the existence of some deficiencies in the Medical Rehabilitation Unit component and the insufficient coordination between GTZ's and KfW's intervention. Nevertheless the overall results are rather positive. **Rating: 3 (satisfactory rating; positive results predominate)**

The sustainability of the program is good regarding the generation of income by individuals who received vocational training, business skills training and earned money through CBR, as well as for the XC whose health status could be improved in such a way that they were enabled to reintegrate in a civilian life. Many participants could invest the income in housing, livestock rearing or other economic activities. However, temporary employment could not resolve the general vulnerability of CBR participants in the rural areas. The sustainability of the communal infrastructure created by the project (roads and land terraces) is good for ter-

ances and for many roads as well, as far as these roads generate local economic benefits. The “reintegration” of XC proves as sustainable and durable up to now since there are no signs of rearmament. But it is unclear whether this reintegration will prove sustainable in periods of (risk of) conflict. However, program investments in economic reintegration have in general contributed to the sustainability of XC’ reintegration. The overall sustainability of the program – partly seen as a pilot program (Vocational Training, CEFE², Medical Rehabilitation) – is limited, because a capitalization process had neither been defined nor followed informally. The monitoring of results was discontinued shortly after the achievement of the outputs in the pilot phase for CEFE and VT. Lessons learned could therefore not sufficiently be prepared and transferred to RDRC and MRDP, except for the monitoring of VT-trainees (GTZ). However, RDRC adopted Vocational Training in its program in 2006 on the basis of GTZ’s analysis. A thorough monitoring for several years and a platform beyond the RDRC to share the lessons learned as well as their documentation would have been necessary to achieve the overall sustainability of the program.

In consideration of all positive aspects and the high degree of probability that the overall success of the program will remain significantly positive, the **sustainability** is rated as good.

Rating: 2 (good sustainability)

The **overall rating of the program is good (no significant defects)** because of its good relevance, effectiveness and sustainability, but rather satisfactory regarding the program impact and efficiency.

Main recommendations of the present evaluation refer to future DDR programs in other regions or other countries of the Great Lakes Region (GDC), as well as to the RDRC and the MDRP to integrate into the remaining reintegration activities:

- a wider understanding of “reintegration”, which in post-conflict situations not only refers to the reintegration of XC, and a respective integration of DDR programs into the overall reintegration process which therefore requires a wider institutional setting;
- the consideration of community based reintegration approaches as realized in the present programme (Do No Harm elements / inclusion of whole community in labour activities) balancing the positive discrimination of XC through the program services and reducing mistrust between XC and civilians;

² CEFE means “Competency-based Economies through the Formation of Entrepreneurs”.

- the conceptual and operational development of family based reintegration approaches and respective consideration of gender and female XC within the DDR framework as well as outside this framework to reach women who avoid to register as XC;
- the improved consideration of XC with disabilities and their requirements as well as PTSD as part of medical support as well as throughout reintegration programs,
- the fostering of “post-combatant” identities that build on the experiences and transfer them into a civilian context;
- a stronger differentiation of target groups, time schedules and areas suitable for the specific activities planned to improve their success;
- and finally an improved and longer term monitoring, and the elaboration and transfer of lessons learned into the RDRP and the MDRP framework.

Level of achievement of indicators (results)

Indicator	Achievement 2009 (final report) ³	Ex-Post Assessment 2011 (evaluation)
1. Local population confirms that ex-combatants are contributing to the process of reconciliation or at least are not hampering it (detailed definition of the level: at least 50% of local population in 5 pilot districts)	KfW: 98 % of local population confirms that XC support the reconciliation process after CBR-works GTZ: Cooperatives contribute to peaceful development, incl. members of different factions and civilians	The majority of XC contributes actively to the process of reconciliation / peaceful development and security. The population often considers them as “exemplary”. Suspicions against XC could largely be reduced. There was virtually no indication that XC currently hampers the reconciliation process. INDICATOR ACHIEVED
2. Ex-combatants perceive their economic and social perspectives in the civil society as improved in comparison to the date of disarming (detailed definition of level: at least 70% of the ex-combatants participating in the various Programme activities / measures perceive their perspectives as improved)	KfW: - 95,7 confirmed that their living conditions at the period of CBR was improved - 95,9 % confirmed that their live is improved after CBR - 30,6 % confirmed that the CBR salaries were used to buy livestock or plots - 38,4 % confirmed that the CBR savings were used for investments for plots, livestock or income generating activities	(<i>Adaptation: “Ex-combatants perceive their economic and social perspectives... = status improved in the retrospective</i>) The economic reintegration profiles of 61% of XC show positive trends, 28% a volatile situation and 11% a negative trend. Compared to the prevailing overall poverty problems, this trend is very positive. About 70 % of the CBR workers used parts of their salary for productive investments. Out of the CBR savings, about 70 % might have been used for productive investments.

³ Schlussbericht des Projektes Unterstützung der Reintegration von Ex-Kombattanten, Rwanda, GTZ , 31. Januar 2008; Final Report, Support for the reintegration of ex-combatants, Community Based Reintegration Component, KfW /AFC, April 2009.

Indicator	Achievement 2009 (final report) ³	Ex-Post Assessment 2011 (evaluation)
	<p>- 29,1 % of the CBR salaries and 17 % of the CBR savings were used for medical purposes</p> <p>GTZ: Incomes of most of the trained XC are doubled or even more shortly after the trainings.</p>	<p>The social reintegration profiles do not show negative trends except few individual problems. XC perceive themselves in almost similar conditions compared to the rest of the community.</p> <p>INDICATOR ACHIEVED</p>
<p>3. Ex-combatants have increased capability to sustain their livelihood (detailed definition of level: at least 50% of an estimated 10.000 ex-combatants have increased their capabilities to sustain their livelihood)</p>	<p>KfW: survey shows that for many, live is better than before CBR, and 30 – 40 % have made investment in livelihoods; health was improved through salaries</p> <p>GTZ:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - most XC have doubled their income and some have tripled their income after the vocational training (masons) - more than 50 % could improve their income and one third could stabilize the economic situation 	<p>Most of the trainees who received vocational training have at least a second income source through masonry or other professional trades (e.g. electricity). Trained people realize salaries about 2.000 – 2.500 RWF/ day. Their income is higher than that of non-beneficiaries. The economic vulnerability of CBR workers could not fully be resolved.</p> <p>INDICATOR ACHIEVED</p>
<p>4. Ex-combatants remain in their target district / community (detailed definition of level: more than 50 % remain in their district / community), only valid for GTZ</p>	<p>KfW: none</p> <p>GTZ: about 5 % have left their districts only and went to Kigali (demobilization long time ago in many cases and situation already stabilized)</p>	<p><i>This indicator is less specific and relevant, and could only indirectly be followed up. There are only few cases of definite migrations reported, but a number of mobile XC work in urban areas, but their homesteads and families remain in the districts of origin.</i></p> <p>INDICATOR ACHIEVED (limited evidence!)</p>
<p>5. Decreased Permanent Disability Rate (PDR) among beneficiaries of medical</p>	<p>KfW: average decrease of PDR: 17.4 %</p>	<p><i>The evaluation could not generate new data, and an update of the PDR rate at</i></p>

Indicator	Achievement 2009 (final report) ³	Ex-Post Assessment 2011 (evaluation)
rehabilitation (detailed definition of level: PDR decreases by 10% on average), only valid for KfW.	GTZ: none	<p><i>MRU was not available. Some results of the end-of-project assessment were confirmed by MRU in 2010 (decreased number XC-D).</i></p> <p>INDICATOR ACHIEVED (limited evidence!)</p>
6. The status of economic reintegration has improved for at least 60 % of the program beneficiaries (income, income sources, savings, expenses, food security).	Not applicable	<p>The indicator is achieved because reintegration curves show positive trends (61%) and incomes are 129% higher than those of non-beneficiaries, Beneficiaries have more income sources and savings, but less food security..</p> <p>INDICATOR ACHIEVED</p>
7. The status of social reintegration has improved for at least 60 % of the program beneficiaries (social acceptance, social responsibilities, self-perception, outer perception).	Not applicable	<p>The indicator is achieved because reintegration curves show positive trends (61%). Social acceptance in the community has further increased (100% now), and the number of social responsibilities in the community as well. A full identification as civilian (not referring to the combatant identity any more) is only achieved for 50% of the XC.</p> <p>INDICATOR ACHIEVED</p>

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