

Country: Kenya

Ex post evaluation report

OECD sector	16040 / Low-cost housing construction	
BMZ project ID	1996 656 88	
Project executing agency	Amani Housing Trust	
Consultant	FA. GITEC, Düsseldorf SUM Consult, Wiesbaden Runji & Partners	
Year of ex post evaluation	2009 (2009 random sample)	
	Project appraisal (planned)	Ex post evaluation (actual)
Start of implementation	April 1997	September 1997
Period of implementation	5 years	11 years
Investment costs	EUR 8.05 million	EUR 8.74 million
Counterpart contribution	EUR 1.4 million	EUR 1.4 million
Financing, of which FC funds	EUR 6.65 million	EUR 7.34 million (including interest of EUR 0.69 million)
Other institutions/donors involved	-	-
Performance rating	3	
• Relevance	2	
• Effectiveness	3	
• Efficiency	3	
• Overarching developmental impact	3	
• Sustainability	3	

Brief description, overall objective and project objectives with indicators

The project's overall objective was to achieve a sustainable improvement in living conditions for the impoverished population of the Mathare 4A slum. The project was based on the knowledge gained in the pilot phase (BMZ nos: 1986 70 242, 1989 70 139, and 1990 70 392), which began in 1992 and was concluded in 1997, and which was financed from the fund for research and skilled personnel. A permanent improvement in the slum population's living conditions and environment was set as the project objective. The project agency was the Amani Housing Trust (AHT). The project comprised measures for the creation of basic infrastructure to improve the area (including roads, footpaths, drinking water supply and drainage, fire hydrants, street lighting, bathrooms, refuse collection points etc.), and for the development of community institutions. Training sessions financed by the project authority, covering hygiene and conflict management (among other subjects), took place alongside these measures. Total project costs ran to approx. EUR 8.74 million, of which some EUR 6.65 million were financed from FC funds. Project implementation was suspended

between 2001 and 2004 due to violent conflict. Earnings from interest of EUR 0.69 million were generated in this period, which fed into total costs. The estimated worth of the land made available (19.2 hectares) constituted the Kenyan contribution; this was valued at EUR 1.4 million.

Project design/major deviations from original planning and their main causes

A peculiarity found in Kenya is that slum dwellers are not squatters, but tenants who rent their huts with no title to property. This also applies in Mathare 4A, where huts are erected in open areas and let on an informal basis. These informal landlords do not provide any kind of infrastructure such as toilets, washing facilities, etc. Similarly, no maintenance is performed on the huts. At the start of the project, infrastructure such as water supply, sewage disposal, electricity, refuse disposal, roads and paths was almost completely lacking. Drinking water was supplied by private water sellers at rates three to four times the price of the urban water tariff. Numerous uncontrolled rubbish dumps and the lack of toilets caused serious hygiene problems. Prior to project implementation, all these failings led to precarious living conditions in the project area.

The basic concept for the Mathare 4A project was developed with reference to the pilot phase (1992-1997). Until that time such a comprehensive programme of slum rehabilitation had never been planned and implemented. Previous knowledge in this area relied on the World Bank's experiences in projects that were similar, but smaller in size. One of the main findings from the World Bank projects was that, following the provision of improved infrastructure and a more attractive environment in which to live, the genuine target group became displaced by those who were financially better off. The particular merit of the Mathare 4A project was that, whilst the type of accommodation and infrastructure provided would certainly improve standards of living for the impoverished population, the general environment would be left in a state that remained unattractive for better placed social strata. Examples of this were the limited size and number of rooms in each house, the width of the roads (single track) and the basic standard of communal sanitation facilities. Displacement of the target group could thus be prevented.

The following measures were planned:

- Compensation for the informal landlords who rented out the huts, and takeover of the relevant accommodation and rents through AHT, the project agency;
- Organisation of the target group and social work activities to go in hand with the project, by the project agency;
- Phased construction of basic infrastructure (communal bathrooms, roads and paths, street lighting, refuse collection points etc.);
- Construction of new housing;
- Development of institutional bodies within the target group community; and
- Support for the project agency from consultants.

As far as was possible the programme was implemented as planned, although some variations arose during infrastructure construction. Until 2001, with a revenue efficiency of around 95%, the AHT was even able to generate surpluses. However, a variety of interest groups sabotaged project operation from the outset. Project implementation was hampered above all by interference from assorted interest groups (former landlords, water sellers etc.), which substantially delayed project completion. It even came (among other things) to physical assaults on project agency staff, rent boycotts, vandalism and arson. For the most part, the infrastructure that was destroyed in the process was subsequently rebuilt. Kenya's ethnic conflicts repeatedly carried over into Mathare 4A, a factor which complicated project implementation. In 2001 the project had to be suspended for three years because of the violent disputes. The project was resumed at the end of 2003; however, in order to meet domestic political requirements rents had now been fixed at uneconomical levels. For these reasons, on 31 January 2009 AHT, the project agency, decided to pull out of the project. The Kenya Urban Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), a state initiative, intends to continue the project in future. This should build on the existing infrastructure. In addition, more

efficient use should be made of the limited space available by building houses with several floors, and title to property should be transferred to residents' cooperatives.

Key results of the impact analysis and performance rating

The building of roads and paths and the installation of street lighting have contributed significantly to allowing Mathare 4A to become a lively, busy and safer place. It is also expected that the frequency of sexual assaults on women at night will substantially reduce as a result. In addition, unexpected positive changes were observed, such as the complete disappearance of the numerous brothels that were typically found in Mathare 4A before the start of the project. Besides Mathare 4A's improved appearance, the level of petty crime commonly associated with the brothel trade has also fallen. The residents attribute this development to the strengthening of the community, whose social development was consciously accelerated by the project. Women in particular have benefited from the vending stands which have been provided along the newly-built roads. This for them is their first opportunity to become economically independent.

The project's developmental efficacy is assessed below, based on the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, overarching developmental impact and sustainability:

Relevance: The assumption that accommodation and infrastructure measures would improve the target group's immediate environment and thereby deliver improved living conditions was reasonable. The improvement of living conditions for slum dwellers has been registered as a specific goal in the MDGs. In Nairobi there are currently over 200 slums, and the trend is rising. That is why the improvement of living conditions in the slums is, among other topics, an integral component of Kenya's PRSP. Even though housing improvements do not represent a focal point for German EC (economic cooperation) in Kenya at present, the project's approach, in view of its relevance to MDGs, remains in keeping with the central objectives of the German Federal Government. There was appropriate coordination with other donors active in slum rehabilitation, given that they were concentrating on other slums at the time. The relevance of the Mathare 4A pilot project has consequently been assessed as good (rating 2).

Effectiveness: For the occupants of the newly built houses, accommodation quality has vastly improved. Of the 2,383 new houses only a few are uninhabitable through neglect. The number of occupants per room, however, remains high. Existing houses in the slum were connected to the infrastructure provided. To some extent, this is being used as intended. However, conditions are not always right for sustainable operation. The roads and paths are in very good condition. To all appearances, the street lighting, river defences, toilets and showers continue to function. At present, however, the community bodies are being used for other purposes than intended. Most of the refuse collection points have been destroyed. The water supply is only functioning to a limited extent. Against this background, effectiveness has been judged satisfactory (rating 3).

Efficiency: The basic infrastructure that has been provided conforms to the needs of the target group with regard to improving their living conditions. For the inhabitants, rental levels dropped sharply at the start of the project. The costs of construction and of the remaining structural activities bear comparison with similar programmes, and far exceed the efficiency of Kenyan state projects. Because of the influence of interest groups, whose influence was not properly assessed at the time of project appraisal, formal project close-out was delayed by several years. However, the planned measures were broadly completed in 2001 (approx. 85% fund utilisation). After that only somewhat limited rehabilitation measures were implemented plus consultant-managed sessions on conflict analysis and coping strategies. In view of the significant delays, efficiency has been assessed as satisfactory (rating 3).

Overarching developmental impact: Improving the living conditions of the impoverished population of Mathare 4A is at the core of this project. The programme has given rise to

various positive effects in the areas of economic development, safety, hygiene and health. Despite the difficult operating conditions, a stable social environment was created for the very first time. Besides reducing illness, the provision of potable water led to financial savings by reducing the cost of obtaining drinking water supplies. Furthermore, improved sanitation made a positive contribution to the hygiene situation in Mathare 4A. However, the number of waterborne diseases (e.g. diarrhoeal disorders) is on the rise again for the first time since project implementation. This development has been caused by the partial breakdown of the public water supply accompanied by the provision of poorer quality supplies through the informal water trade, although no cholera outbreaks have been reported in the project area since the programme began. The positive effects are immediately apparent when one looks at other slums in the neighbourhood, which have not experienced similar intervention. The project's effects have thus made a partial contribution toward MDG attainment and have been assessed as satisfactory (rating 3).

Sustainability: Due to the high quality network of roads and streets, positive socio-economic development is expected within the quarter on a long-term basis. The other slums in Nairobi have no comparable infrastructure. However, the majority of the houses will show the need for maintenance in the coming years. If refurbishment is not carried out then, they are certain to become uninhabitable. The project agency's concept for accommodation management has been abandoned for now. Hence the sustainability of the accommodation component depends upon KENSUP's future involvement in Mathare 4A, which is very uncertain. However, the positive impact of this project will certainly outweigh the negative effects of deteriorating infrastructure for many years to come. The project's sustainability has therefore been ranked as satisfactory (rating 3).

These individual scores give rise to an overall assessment of the project as satisfactory (rating 3).

General conclusions and recommendations

Since not all circumstances can be controlled, political support is required (especially in the sensitive area of slum upgrading), which means early involvement of the relevant bodies in the planning process.

As far as possible, the interest groups concerned should all be identified, analysed and integrated into the process so that the potential for conflict can be minimised and channelled, for example by integrating the informal water sellers into particular work processes within the slum.

Simple infrastructure development measures, such as building roads and paths and installing street lighting, can lead to enormous, positive, and sustainable socio-economic changes (safety, economic development etc.).

Good quality public infrastructure, of such simplicity that it is not of interest to the middle strata of society, serves to strengthen sustainably improved living conditions for the poorer strata.

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness (outcome), “overarching developmental impact” and efficiency. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project’s overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

- 1 Very good rating that clearly exceeds expectations
- 2 Good rating fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
- 3 Satisfactory rating – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
- 4 Unsatisfactory rating – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
- 5 Clearly inadequate rating – despite some positive partial results the negative results clearly dominate
- 6 The project has no positive results or the situation has actually deteriorated

A rating of 1 to 3 is a positive assessment and indicates a successful project while a rating of 4 to 6 is a negative assessment and indicates a project which has no sufficiently positive results.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected.)

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and an improvement is very unlikely. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. A rating of 1 to 3 indicates a “successful” project while a rating of 4 to 6 indicates an “unsuccessful” project. In using (with a project-specific weighting) the five key factors to form an overall rating, it should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally “successful” if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“overarching developmental impact”) and the sustainability are considered at least “satisfactory” (rating 3).