Guinea: Forestry Programme (Phase I) Management of Forest and Rural Resources (Phase II)

Ex post evaluation report

<table>
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<th>OECD sector</th>
<th>31220/ Forestry development</th>
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| BMZ project ID | Phase I: 1989 66 004 (investments) 1991 70 143 (accompanying measures)  
Phase II: 1994 65 964 (investments) |
| Project executing agency | Direction Nationale des Forêts et de la Faune (DNFF) |
| Consultant | Deutsche Forst-Consult (DFC) – accompanying measures |
| Year of ex post evaluation report | 2010 |
| | Project appraisal (planned) | Ex post evaluation (actual) |
| Start of implementation | I: Q1 1990  
II: Q1 1995 | I: Q3 1990  
II: Q3 1995 |
| Period of implementation | I: 3 ½ years  
II: 6 ½ years | I: 4 ½ years  
II: 8 ½ years |
| Investment costs | I: EUR 14.62 million  
II: EUR 14.31 million | I: EUR 15.03 million  
II: EUR 14.29 million |
| Counterpart contribution | I: EUR 1.0 million  
II: EUR 1.78 million | I: EUR 0.82 million  
II: EUR 1.76 million |
| Financing, of which FC funds | I: EUR 6.14 million  
II: EUR 12.53 million | I: EUR 7.67 million  
II: EUR 12.53 million |
| Other institutions/donors involved | World Bank |
| Performance rating | 4  
• Relevance | 3  
• Effectiveness | 4  
• Efficiency | 4  
• Overarching developmental impact | 3  
• Sustainability | 4 |

Brief description, overall objective and project objectives with indicators

The first phase was implemented jointly with the World Bank as a pilot project under the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP). The overall objective was to conserve natural (or forest) resources and contribute to their sustainable management, primarily in the Guinée Forestière region. The programme objectives were defined as follows:

1. set up viable forest administration bodies at the Conakry headquarters, at the Seredou forestry centre, in the rain forest zone (prefectures of Lola, Macenta,
N’Zérékoré, Beyla and Yomou) and in the savanna areas (prefectures of Dinguiraye and Dabola);

(2) reduce deforestation in the state forests (forêts classées, FC) of Ziama and Diécké and in the savanna forests of Dinguiraye and Dabola prefectures; and

(3) lay the foundations for the sustainable management of 70,000 hectares of state forest in Ziama and Diécké and of up to 160,000 hectares of savanna forest.

Essentially, the implemented programme measures included

(1) in the forestry sector, the institutional strengthening of the headquarters of the forestry directorate in Conakry and of the five prefectures that are part of Guinée Forestière;

(2) basic and further training for forest administration staff working outside headquarters;

(3) management plans and pilot utilisation measures for the two state forest areas in Ziama and Diécké in the rain forest sector; and

(4) elaborating initial plans for selected tropical forests.

Phase II was implemented from 1996 to 2004 and was intended to protect and sustainably manage forest and rural resources, thereby improving the natural resource base for the local population (overall objective). The programme objective was to guarantee protection of the core areas and sustainable management of the logging zones in the state forests of Ziama, Diécké and Mont Béro, and to ensure that local communities engage in and benefit from sustainable management of rural resources in the adjacent areas. The measures implemented to that effect included, in particular:

(1) constructing new headquarters for the Centre Forestier N’Zérékoré (CFZ) as the responsible local agency;

(2) surveying the three forests concerned to elaborate annual operating plans and drawing up a management plan for Mont Béro (26,850 hectares);

(3) infrastructural measures – constructing forest stations (in Diécké and Mont Béro) and control posts; building and/or improving tracks and paths for patrolling and monitoring work; demarkation of internal boundaries between the zones;

(4) support measures for the local communities – setting up 24 classrooms and 22 shallow wells; expanding access tracks; promoting pond farming, pig farming, textiles and soap production;

(5) reforestation and enrichment plantations in an area of approximately 4,500 hectares, and tending measures for reforested and regenerated areas; and

(6) consultancy support for the CFZ in the following fields (non-exhaustive list): finance and general management, setting up GIS and IT systems for surveying and monitoring; biodiversity monitoring; silviculture; forest management and community support measures.

Up to the year 2003, initiatives to promote economic and social development in the adjacent areas were implemented in cooperation with GTZ as part of a joint programme; after 2003, they were implemented under the FC programme.

In both phases, the target group was the local population in the areas concerned; the staff of the forest administration acted as intermediaries, but also benefited directly from most of the programme measures. The national forest agency Direction Nationale des Fôrets et Chasse (DNFC), which was later renamed Direction Nationale des Forêts et de la Faune (DNFF), served as executing agency. In the start-up phase of the programme, considerable institutional weaknesses were identified at the executing agency, including poorly trained and unmotivated staff, low salaries and defective equipment. However, that diagnosis more or less reflected the dysfunctional state of
public agencies in general. In the forestry sector, consequences included poaching and widespread logging activities which were unsustainable and illegal; yet they seemed not to be seriously addressed – or even condoned – by political decision-makers.

A third programme phase, called Projet de Gestion des Ressources Forestières (PGRF; BMZ ID 2000 66 456), was launched in 2004, but it was prematurely terminated in May 2009. It is not covered by this ex post evaluation report. Apart from acute political tensions in Guinea, the early termination of the third phase was mainly due to extreme structural and governance-related weaknesses within the country’s public administration, along with a lack of will to implement the reforms previously agreed upon. This problem was highlighted in various reports and letters to the German Embassy, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and GTZ.

The overall cost of the first phase was 14.6 million EUR, including German Financial Cooperation (FC) funds of 7.7 million EUR (51%), IDA funds of 6.1 million EUR (43%) and a counterpart contribution by the Guinean government of 0.8 million EUR. The overall cost of the second phase was 14.3 million EUR, including FC funds of 12.5 million EUR (87%) and 1.8 million EUR from Guinea’s national budget.

**Project design / major deviations from the original programme planning and their main causes**

The first phase had originally been drawn up under the aegis of the World Bank. It was designed as a forest utilisation programme for the country’s different vegetation zones (rain forest and savanna forest) and was implemented under a joint financing scheme. However, since Guinea lacked a sustainable forest management methodology and various nature conservation NGOs urged for changes, the utilisation-oriented approach was replaced by a largely conservation-oriented focus during implementation planning. This was in keeping with the BMZ’s tropical sectoral approach at the time. The revised concept also included the development of adjusted and sustainable utilisation strategies for future management plans. Major modifications from the original approach occurred in the following areas, in particular:

- forest infrastructure measures to promote logging (including the construction of 75 kilometres of forest roads) were abandoned;
- programme activities were refocused on rain forest zones, which required conservation more urgently; management measures that had been planned for the less endangered savanna forests, did not get beyond a first surveying stage;
- forest “management” measures in primeval forests, including the removal of over mature trees, were cancelled;
- the consultancy measures for the forest agencies shifted their focus from logging and wood processing to finance and project management.

As the intervention area was initially under-estimated by about 20%, the workload for boundary marking was larger than expected. Only a bit less than half of the reforestation and enrichment plantations were implemented, because the procurement of seeds and seedlings from Côte d’Ivoire turned out to be rather complicated; furthermore, salary payments to the workers were disrupted several times, after the

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1 Although timber exports are officially prohibited, the EU estimates illegal exports of tropical timber to Europe at no less than 60,000 metric tons per year, with exports to the Far East considered to range at least in the same order.
World Bank had repeatedly stopped the disbursement of funds due to delays in the counterparty's performance of its obligations.

In line with the aforementioned conservation-oriented approach, the FC accompanying measures were focused on strengthening conservation aspects, particularly by mapping and surveying the flora and fauna of the state forests of Ziama and Diécké and by integrating these surveys into the management plans.

The second phase was designed as a project that was financed in parallel with a land registry programme of the World Bank (which was discontinued at a later stage); it was intended to systematically implement the conservation and management plans of the first phase and enhance the involvement of the local communities. It was carried out in cooperation with GTZ. That cooperation ended in 2003, and the remaining measures to support the local communities were taken over by the FC programme. Towards the end of the implementation period, contacts were established with the Forêt Forte logging company, which owns licenses for the programme area, in order to promote approaches for sustainable and certified forestry according to the rules of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Moreover, the programme sought to coordinate its activities with the Rio Tinto mining company, which exploits (or plans to exploit) iron ore reserves in the programme area, in order to ensure that mining activities would be ecologically compatible and environmental compensation measures would be carried out.

**Key results of the impact analysis and performance rating**

The available data does not allow for a sufficiently detailed analysis of the programme's economic impact. However, there is general agreement that the forest agency's financial situation has not changed very much over the past 20 years; illegal logging and poaching persist, which highlights a continuing governance crisis. This means that the programme's support measures have not produced significant positive effects, let alone any sustainable improvements at the executing agency.

An analysis of local communities or sample farms from an economic or business perspective is not available. Therefore, the programme's impact on the economic situation of the target groups until now cannot be quantified. In view of the limited scope of support for local communities (EUR 0.96 million for approximately 70,000 people over an 8-year period), it is fair to assume that effects have only been limited.

From today's point of view, there are concerns that poverty in the programme area will continue to increase. One reason for this is high population growth with no adequate alternative income sources. This is further exacerbated by ongoing political tensions in Guinea. The scope of the income generating measures that were implemented by the programme was too limited to reduce poverty by a significant margin.

As a priority, the programme was aimed at environmental protection and resource preservation (high environmental relevance). By contrast, its effectiveness to promote processes within civil society and improve governance was generally rather low. Despite some neatly formulated statements in the national forestry plan on participatory forestry methods, and despite significant assistance from German Technical Cooperation (TC) to draw up the relevant strategies and the legal and administrative regulations, there was only selective support for local communities. Eventually, there was no real implementation of participatory and sustainable resource management concepts. Neither did the programme contribute significantly to advancing gender equality.
Initially, the key risks identified were the low capacity and willingness of the forestry staff to embark on the planned conservation and management methods, and the Guinean government's lacking ability to finance them on an ongoing basis. According to available information, both risks seem to have materialised and may be regarded as evidence of inadequate governance and/or a lack of political will to implement sustainable forestry policies. Moreover, there an acceptance issue on the part of the local communities is considered to also play a role. Initially, there was at least some acceptance, which was more or less confined to direct support measures for local communities and did not continue after the programme had ended. By contrast, it was not possible to enlist any real support for the key aspects of the natural resource management measures, as is also borne out by the unwillingness of the groupes de chasse to cooperate with the programme. While 116 hunters' groups had been involved at the beginning of the second phase, there was only one left by 2007. With view to persistently weak governance, the programme's realignment towards a more utilisation-oriented approach was also identified as a substantial risk. Considering the economic and political framework, it is to be assumed that this risk has materialised.

The developmental impact of the programme is rated as follows:

**Relevance** (sub-rating 3): The relevance of initiatives to protect and sustainably manage tropical forests continues to be very high, particularly as the increasingly fragmented rain forest of Western Africa ("Upper Guinea Forest") is a highly endangered ecosystem that is unique in the world. Until today, Guinea has lost over 70% of its woodland areas and 95.9% of its closed forests and has not been able (or willing) to reverse this trend. Rather, deforestation has been aggravated by high population growth, which is further intensified by immigration. According to FAO estimates, by 2020 Guinea will no longer be able to cover its demand for timber and firewood from its own production. This situation is compounded by the fact that many woodland areas are also attractive for mining companies (e.g. to exploit iron ore and bauxite reserves), which usually leaves barren wasteland behind once mining operations come to an end. In that respect, it would have been helpful to get the relevant sectors involved at an early stage. At least, efforts were made (albeit towards the end of the programme) to coordinate the activities with Rio Tinto in order to make sure that their iron ore mining operations are environmentally compatible. Basically, the programmes combined conservation and sustainable management approach, which was complemented by support measures for the local communities, is in line with common methodology. However, the programme design relied chiefly on responsible public agencies, failing to (openly) address their weakness or lack of motivation, the inadequate governance structures in the forestry sector and widespread corruption. The programme was in accordance with Guinea's official plans and strategies, the focal points of German Development Cooperation (DC) at the time and other international development goals (MDG).

**Effectiveness** (sub-rating 4): Considering the underlying conditions in Guinea (instability, corruption and lack of interest), it was impossible to achieve the objective of creating a well-functioning forest administration, guaranteeing forest conservation and implementing participatory and sustainable management methods. During the implementation period, the programme produced some positive effects which, however, did not continue beyond the programme's implementation period. The CFZ has more or less discontinued all field activities (patrols, elaboration of management plans etc.) which are necessary to safeguard the programme's achievements on the ground.

**Efficiency** (sub-rating 4): From today's point of view, the cost-benefit ratio of the measures appears disproportionate, as the programme produced its beneficial effects
(e.g. strengthening the executing agency and introducing sustainable forestry methods) only on a temporary basis, i.e. during the term of the programme itself. Besides, the target groups did not enjoy any significant revenue increases.

**Overarching developmental impact** (sub-rating 3): According to available information, the protected forests' vegetation cover in the programme area has, in general, remained stable which is a positive indicator in terms of the overall objective of forest conservation; however, this may not necessarily be related to the programme. Regeneration of degraded areas was identified as another indicator, but there is no reliable information available. It cannot be ruled out that, in keeping with common practice in the region, tree density has been (and is still being) thinned out and high-value tree species have been extracted – thus leading to degradation. According to information provided by local NGOs, poaching is also rife in the area on a massive scale. In the absence of any data, it is not possible to determine whether local communities have been able to generate any significant additional income from agroforestry and sustainable forest management. By Guinean standards, the programme ventured into new territory by seeking constructive cooperation with logging and mining companies. Yet it is questionable whether any long-term structural effects will arise from that, after the FC involvement was discontinued in 2009.

**Sustainability** (sub-rating 4): According to our findings, the programme did not produce any permanent effects that extended beyond the implementation period, as it was not possible to secure continued funding from the executing agency; furthermore, key constraints identified before the start of the programme, particularly in the governance area, continue to persist on the same scale or worse.

**Overall performance** (rating 4): Weighing the aforementioned criteria, the programme's overall developmental impact is rated as unsatisfactory.

**General conclusions and recommendations**

Measures to protect natural resources and, in particular, forests are aimed at "public goods" (such as biodiversity, climate protection etc.) that are worthy to conserve from a global perspective. In some cases, these goods are situated in countries that are politically unstable and have weak institutions. Only rarely do these partner countries accord priority to such programmes and, in view of unstable public structures, there is a risk that conflicting interests, which may even receive political condonation, thwart programme efforts. Cooperation with formally responsible public agencies is a necessary condition for success, but in most cases, it is not sufficient to guarantee success (far from it). In parallel, it is crucial to build robust alliances with other players in the sector, including grassroots groups, NGOs and/or the private sector, in order to be effective beyond the implementation period and to create an exit scenario enabling the relevant donor organisation(s) to withdraw without jeopardising sustainability. Efforts to build such alliances usually require a great deal of time and resources; if governance structures remain weak, the only alternative is to discontinue the involvement more or less rapidly – with lacking sustainability prospects.
Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness (outcome), “overarching developmental impact” and efficiency. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project’s overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

1. Very good rating that clearly exceeds expectations
2. Good rating fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
3. Satisfactory rating – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
4. Unsatisfactory rating – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
5. Clearly inadequate rating – despite some positive partial results the negative results clearly dominate
6. The project has no positive results or the situation has actually deteriorated

A rating of 1 to 3 is a positive assessment and indicates a successful project while a rating of 4 to 6 is a negative assessment and indicates a project which has no sufficiently positive results. **Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:**

**Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability)**

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

**Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability)**

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected.)

**Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability)**

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

**Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability)**

The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and an improvement is very unlikely. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. A rating of 1 to 3 indicates a “successful” project while a rating of 4 to 6 indicates an “unsuccessful” project. In using (with a project-specific weighting) the five key factors to form an overall rating, it should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally “successful” if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“overarching developmental impact”) and the sustainability are considered at least “satisfactory” (rating 3).