

Columbia: Suburban rehabilitation, Bogota (SUR + ATP)

Ex post evaluation report

OECD sector	43030 Urban development and administration	
BMZ Programme ID	1999 65 435; 2002 65 231	
Project executing agency	The city of Bogota	
Consultant	SUM-Consult	
Year of ex post evaluation	2010 (2010 random sample)	
	Programme appraisal (planned)	Ex post evaluation (actual)
Start of implementation	Q1 2000	Q1 2001
Period of implementation	54 months	74 months
Investment costs	EUR 32.75 million	EUR 38.00 million
Counterpart contribution	EUR 25.69 million	EUR 30.94 million
Financing, of which FC funds	7.06	7.06
Other institutions/donors involved	--	--
Performance rating	3	
• Relevance	2	
• Effectiveness	2	
• Efficiency	3	
• Overarching developmental impact	3	
• Sustainability	3	

Brief description, overall objective and programme objectives with indicators

This programme - combining activities in the areas 'SUR', suburban rehabilitation, and 'ATP', the Anti-Terrorism Project - was designed to improve the local environment and living conditions for poor sections of the population in three areas on the south-eastern outskirts of Bogota, the national capital. To this end, the road network was expanded, and systems for drinking water supply and sanitation were improved. Municipal facilities (schools, community centres, sport and leisure amenities, etc.) were renovated and new facilities constructed as appropriate, and finance was provided for microprojects instigated by the inhabitants. In addition, the programme aimed to help establish an integrated, participative suburban rehabilitation strategy which would serve as a model (the overall objective). The programme objective was to achieve sustainable utilisation of the expanded municipal infrastructure, whilst simultaneously improving inter-institutional coordination and strengthening community participation. Due to the increasingly tense situation in marginal areas of the city (caused by violent acts of terrorism, committed by guerrillas and paramilitaries), the initial programme (SUR) was expanded during its implementation to include elements that focused more closely on conflict management and the prevention of violence (ATP).

The programme agency at the outset was the Bogota city council. In 2002 programme responsibility was transferred to another suitably qualified municipal body, so that in

2004, as part of a comprehensive reorganisation, all the institutions working in the urban rehabilitation domain would be merged into a new unit, the 'Secretaria de Integración Social'.

The programme's target group comprised those living in the residential areas of Bolonia, Ladrilleras and Vía Oriente (roughly 85,000 people). These areas were, and are, predominantly populated by poor families with monthly incomes of between one and three times the legal minimum wage (approx. EUR 150 – EUR 450). Of those in employment, around half work in the informal sector; some 15% of householders are women living alone, with the added burdens of both work and child-raising. Roughly 55% of the population is under 24. The residents are well organised. However, many of the social organisations are weak and depend upon external agencies (city institutions, Non-Governmental Organisations).

At programme appraisal, no indicators were set at the overall objective level. Indicators to measure programme objective attainment were defined separately for the following three components:

(I) The 'infrastructure' component (roughly 89% of total funds deployed): (Ia) three years after commissioning, 85% of the infrastructure should be properly used and maintained, and be in good condition, (Ib) the shortage of kindergarten places should be reduced from the initial level of 50% to 15-20%, and (Ic) the shortage of school places should be reduced from the initial level of 25% to zero.

(II) The 'social development' component (roughly 3% of total funds deployed): (IIa) documents handed out in mediation seminars, the establishment of support centres (especially in schools) and protocols for community development activities should heighten awareness amongst the target population with regard to conflict and violence prevention, and (IIb) within these three residential areas, trained, organised community action committees - some chaired by women, and with appropriate representation for young people - should be in place to manage and implement individual projects and maintain the infrastructure.

(III) The 'strengthening the project implementation unit' component' (roughly 8% of total funds deployed): (IIIa) a coordination entity should be in place at district level, efficiently managing participative suburban rehabilitation efforts, and (IIIb) coordination and workflow mechanisms between local authorities, district authorities and the suburban rehabilitation programme should be in place and running efficiently.

Project design / major deviations from original planning and their causes

As part of a progress review in 2000, the four original components of the FC programme were amalgamated into three. Planned measures in health infrastructure (e.g. basic health stations and primary health centres) were cancelled as a result. The health authorities had declared themselves against new infrastructure, since there was no guarantee it would be maintained, there was already ample provision of such centres, and the Ministry wanted to address itself more towards preventative work ('Plan de Atención Básica'). Components were added to address community safety issues (especially in the Bolonia area of the city) and to generate income (training and qualification of workers).

Decisions on the measures to be implemented in a given city district were made in the relevant city district committee and other municipal decision-making bodies, with the active participation of the people of the town. City district initiatives (particularly microprojects, which were financed out of a special fund, the 'Fondo de Desarrollo Comunitario') were included in the process.

A project consultant (SUM-Consult) supported the project agency and the other authorities and agencies responsible, for the full duration of the programme. The

consultant monitored pre-contract adherence to the stipulated criteria, reviewed planning documentation, tender documents and the bid evaluation process, and finally assisted in the handover of facilities to the communities. The main projects were implemented with the help of the responsible authorities detailed below:

Authority	Measures implemented
IDU (Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano)	Streets, paths and paved areas, green spaces
IDRD (Instituto Distrital para la Recreación y Deporte)	Municipal park facilities
SDIS (Secretaría Distrital de Integración Social)	Kindergartens
EAAB (Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá)	Water supply and sanitation networks
DAMA (Departamento Administrativo de Medio Ambiente)	Environmental protection

Key results of the impact analysis and performance rating

The programme objectives are appropriate from today's perspective, having been expanded to suit the revised package of measures (in the 2000 review study). The resultant overall objective was: to improve conditions in the local environment (including public safety) for the inhabitants of selected city districts, and to help institute an integrated, participatory suburban rehabilitation strategy which should then be replicated. In the course of ex-post evaluation, the following indicators were formulated to measure impact at the overall objective level:

- I) A reduction in the proportion of families living in unsatisfactory conditions;
- II) A decrease in the number of recorded acts of violence;
- III) A model for integrated, participatory suburban rehabilitation with an impact monitoring system is in place, and still being used (or its ongoing deployment is at least planned).

From the current perspective, the programme objective, and the originally defined inspection indicators defined, are seen as appropriate.

Relevance: the programme's chain of effects - investing in improving the condition of community infrastructure, public safety and opportunities for community involvement, and thereby enhancing living conditions and contributing to the development of an overarching strategy for integrated, participatory suburban rehabilitation - was logical. From the perspective of the time, and also from today's viewpoint, it addressed one of the core problems and bottlenecks to development. Furthermore, given the substantial deterioration in the general situation (the murder rate in the city, the drug trade etc.) the core problem has shifted toward the issue of security. In today's situation, this would again warrant biasing the programme's components toward the prevention of violence. The programme was embedded within the 'peace-building' priority area of development cooperation between Germany and Columbia. Continuous coordination took place with other donors (e.g. the World Bank, GTZ). The programme's approach was established within the city development plan as early as 2000, and later it was integrated into the associated implementation plan. Whether and to what extent urban development remains a priority area following Mr J. M. Santos' victory in the 2010 presidential elections, and after the mayoral elections in 2011, is not yet clear. Overall, the programme's relevance has been assessed as good (rating: 2).

Effectiveness: All the infrastructure projects visited (schools, kindergartens, roads, play areas, etc.) are currently operational and being put to use. The measures taken certainly reduced the shortage of kindergarten and school places in the short term; but natural population growth, together with (most notably) the influx of migrants (the

populations of entire areas being displaced by guerrillas and paramilitaries) has led to demand in these zones still exceeding supply. Mediation seminars and a variety of community-building activities, designed to raise awareness within the target population on the prevention of conflict and violence, have taken place successfully; in addition, support centres and their staff (predominantly in schools) provide care services on a regular basis. To maintain the infrastructure, representatives were trained and 'Comites de Sostenibilidad' were indeed established; but these are no longer in place, so they no longer carry out their remit. Women lead some of the community action bodies, and young people are also represented on them. Active community involvement - in the form of suitable grassroots organisations to manage and implement individual projects - has worked well during the implementation of the programme. A management team for inter-institutional coordination was put in place within the city council, and this proved its efficiency immediately - bringing into being a single, integrated approach to participatory suburban rehabilitation. In considering the three programme objectives, programme objective 1 - 'infrastructure' (approx. 89 % of FC funds), has been given the greatest weight. This objective was comfortably achieved. In consequence, effectiveness has been assessed as good (rating: 2).

Efficiency: Because the implementation body was changed as part of Bogota's administrative reforms, programme completion was delayed until the second quarter of 2007 (instead of the fourth quarter of 2005 as planned). Implementation delays are seen (amongst other things, including strong fluctuations in exchange rates) as the cause of increased international consultancy costs. The authorities followed the usual market practices (public invitations to tender) to ensure infrastructure costs were reasonable. All the infrastructure projects completed were subject to national norms and standards, and were monitored accordingly by the relevant responsible bodies. In a few cases (schools, kindergartens and roads), defects in construction quality were evident which led to temporary limitations in use. A recurring problem has been that, time after time, side streets on hillsides have been left unsealed. This leads to substantial erosion, causing mud to be deposited on main (asphalt) roads and also in the drains. In principle, the services and infrastructure which have been provided are used appropriately by the target group. Overall, the programme's efficiency has been assessed at level 3.

Overarching developmental impact: improvements to infrastructure (and their positive effects) are clearly apparent in paths, roads and educational facilities, and in the nature conservation park, play areas and green spaces; the facilities are extensively used, and their positive impact is evident. As a result, significant developments, predominantly in private building and retail, have taken place along the asphalt roads. The population's standard of living has improved. The provision of food to the needy and the undernourished, which was established under the microcredit fund, has not only survived but been expanded, and has ultimately been taken over by the current programme agency ('Secretaria de Integración Social'). As for community development and improving the security situation, the view of the local population is that the programme certainly improved the position initially, but there has been no long-term effect. The overall security situation in the main cities has again deteriorated in recent years, affecting the programme area in particular; this is, however, attributable to external factors. A model for integrated, participatory suburban rehabilitation is certainly in place; but this was only employed with substantial limitations, so it is not possible to point to entirely positive effects here. A unified system of impact monitoring was developed, but is no longer in use following municipal reorganisation. In the area of overarching developmental impact, rating 3 has been awarded.

Sustainability: in principle, responsibility for maintaining the completed building projects falls under the remit of the relevant authority. Each of the authorities has a department which follows up that responsibility on a regular basis. However, in some cases the budget is insufficient to provide a comprehensive guarantee of maintenance to a high

standard. Joint inspection of individual projects has shown that, particularly in the areas of schools, kindergartens and play areas, but also in the pathway and roads infrastructure, major defects are present in places. Due to the adverse social conditions, vandalism and theft - lights, manhole covers, fencing, plants - are common. The committees of local, trained representatives established at the end of the programme to maintain the infrastructure ('Comites de Sostenibilidad') are no longer in existence. Furthermore, the programme agency should be checking whether the sector authorities fulfil their maintenance obligations, but this does not happen. Some community members remain keen to ensure sustainable development and to implement further individual projects. On the other hand, there is evident displeasure with the inefficiency of the city council; this is based on the decision (described earlier) to deploy insufficient staff to ensure that bridge-building continues at the community level. Opportunities for the local population to participate intensively in community development are heavily dependent on the outcome and political priorities of the approaching (2011) mayoral elections. The result is also expected to be decisive for the 'Convivencia' project; already underway, this focuses more on coexistence and security issues, and less on infrastructure projects. The programme's sustainability has been assessed as satisfactory (rating: 3).

These individual scores result in an overall assessment of the programme as satisfactory (rating: 3).

General conclusions and recommendations

It makes sense to have a clear formulation of objectives, including appropriate indicators (specifying source data and benchmarks), which should be updated if the project is modified or extended in scope.

As a tool, the microcredit fund is appropriate within a participatory, integrated approach to suburban rehabilitation; but to achieve far-reaching, sustainable success, it needs to be supported over a longer period and, to some extent, requires an institutional base.

In a wider context, we should ask to what extent known external factors that have a negative impact on the intended effects of the programme - migration, drug-dealing (especially in schools), the building of new prisons in the middle of the programme area, etc - can be eliminated, or at least mitigated.

The final phase of project implementation and progress to date have both shown the importance of the facilitating role played by politics, and hence the importance of staff continuity and the commitment of the city council.

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness (outcome), “overarching developmental impact” and efficiency. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project’s overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

- 1 Very good rating that clearly exceeds expectations
- 2 Good rating fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
- 3 Satisfactory rating – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
- 4 Unsatisfactory rating – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
- 5 Clearly inadequate rating – despite some positive partial results the negative results clearly dominate
- 6 The project has no positive results or the situation has actually deteriorated

A rating of 1 to 3 is a positive assessment and indicates a successful project while a rating of 4 to 6 is a negative assessment and indicates a project which has no sufficiently positive results.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected.)

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and an improvement is very unlikely. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. A rating of 1 to 3 indicates a “successful” project while a rating of 4 to 6 indicates an “unsuccessful” project. In using (with a project-specific weighting) the five key factors to form an overall rating, it should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally “successful” if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“overarching developmental impact”) and the sustainability are considered at least “satisfactory” (rating 3).