

Colombia: Social Programme Medellín

Ex-post evaluation

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| OECD sector | 43030 – Urban development and administration | |
| BMZ project ID | 1992 65 919 | |
| Project-executing agency | Corvide | |
| Consultant | Gitec / Antioquia Presente | |
| Year of ex-post evaluation | 2003 | |
| | Project appraisal (scheduled) | Ex-post evaluation (actual) |
| Start of implementation | 4. quarter 1993 | 2. quarter 1994 |
| Period of implementation | 48 months | 55 months |
| Investment costs | EUR 7.31 million | EUR 11.50 million |
| Counterpart contribution | EUR 0.65 million | EUR 4.84 million |
| Financing, of which Financial Cooperation (FC) funds | EUR 6.66 million | EUR 6.66 million |
| Other institutions/donors involved | none | none |
| Performance rating | Satisfactory degree of developmental effectiveness (rating 2) | |
| • Significance/relevance | Rating 3 | |
| • Effectiveness | Rating 2 | |
| • Efficiency | Rating 2 | |

Brief Description, Overall Objective and Project Objectives with Indicators

The programme comprised the expansion of transport and social infrastructure, the stabilisation of erosion-prone slopes at risk of sloughing and the financing of target group-oriented micro measures in three zones of the city of Medellín with a total of 15 marginal settlements.

The FC programme, which was carried out as an open programme, is part of the "Programa Integral de Barrios subnormales en Medellín" (Primed), under which land titling, water supply and sanitation, housing improvements and the resettlement of inhabitants of slopes that are at risk of sloughing were financed. The project-executing agency was Corvide, a municipal organisation in charge of social housing in Medellín that has since been dissolved.

The objective of the programme was to contribute towards improving the conditions of the housing environment in the programme area. The programme objective was to be considered achieved if

- the completed infrastructure was being properly utilised and maintained and still in a good condition three years after entry into operation,
- the slopes were not resettled again three years after they were stabilised and reforested, and
- the planned target group-oriented micro measures were implemented five years after the first disbursement for investment measures.

The overall objective of the programme was to improve the living conditions of the target group in the programme area in conjunction with the other measures of the Primed. This was also intended to contribute towards reducing drug-related and violent crime in the programme area. No indicators for achieving the overall objective were formulated.

The target group of the programme were the 30,600 people living in the 15 marginal settlements at the time of the appraisal. Women had an overproportionate share of 52.2% of the target group.

Project Conception / Major Deviations from the original Project Planning and their main Causes

The following measures were financed under the FC project:

- The construction of 9930 metres of serviceable roads and 19,030 metres of footpaths and stairways.
- Arrangement of small squares and parks with a total area of 3830 square metres to loosen up the housing landscape and create meeting points for the residents.
- Stabilisation of an area of 21 hectares to prevent resettlement and stabilisation of an area of 22 hectares with supporting walls to prevent the resettlement of residents living on the lower reaches of the slopes; the stabilised area was afforested.
- Construction of a total of 103 classrooms.
- Construction/expansion of two health stations.
- Construction of five community centres, 27 playgrounds and sports facilities with greens.
- 47 target group-oriented minor measures to embellish the housing environment and improve the social infrastructure with the aid of the target group's own contributions.
- Consulting services.

The estimates of quantities were changed in all measures that were financed. Overall, the quantities planned at the time of appraisal were noticeably exceeded. Besides, the unit costs turned out higher than estimated at the time of appraisal. These two factors led to a cost increase of 55%. The delays in the start of implementation and the implementation itself came to around two years.

The FC programme was a component of the first phase of the Primed, which contained not only the measures financed under FC but the transfer of now 6786 built-up plots to its residents, the expansion of drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, physical improvements to over 4000 homes and the resettlement of around 600 families from zones prone to landslides into newly erected settlements nearby.

Key Results of the Impact Analysis and Performance Rating

The on-site ex-post evaluation revealed that the project objectives have been largely achieved:

- The health centres and school rooms constructed are being fully utilised and maintained by Metrosalud, the municipal health organisation, and the school administration of the city of Medellín, respectively. The transport infrastructure was in good condition and is being maintained by the competent department of the Medellín city administration which, however, has not yet had to carry out any major repair measures. The sports facilities and public installations (small parks, community centres) are being maintained by the inhabitants of the settlements themselves. Youths and adolescents very often turn to the sports facilities and playgrounds for lack of alternative activities in the settlements.
- The stabilisation and afforestation of the slopes was a lasting success. The trees and shrubs that were planted form a natural green barrier and have not yet been felled. Rock slides and landslides have virtually ceased since the erosion control structures were built. However, during the rainy season residents still have problems with rainwater running off on the surface. Nevertheless, the erosion control measures have greatly reduced this problem as well. Time and again, migrants have attempted to settle above the existing development. The inhabitants of the marginal settlements, however, have prevented new squatters from settling down. Besides, both the afforestation and the supporting walls represent formidable obstacles to any such attempts. Overall, no new homes were built on the endangered areas until the on-site ex-post evaluation. In the decade prior to the stabilisation measures, 41 fatalities and 145 injured were still registered in the programme area as a result of landslides, rock slides and flooding.
- 720 homes were destroyed and around 3500 persons were left homeless.
- The micro measures were completed already at the time of the final inspection even amid implementation problems with this programme component and delays. These measures have promoted the local inhabitants' own initiative and sense of belonging together. The acceptance of the measures is illustrated by the fact that the residents repair any damage that occurs swiftly and with their own resources.

In total, the FC measures in conjunction with the other contributions of the Primed have enabled the supported marginal settlements to stand out quite positively from those that did not receive the support. The attractiveness of the improved housing environment is also shown by the fact

that the population living in the programme area has nearly doubled since 1993; thus the population growth is clearly higher than in the other marginal settlements.

With regard to the achievement of the overall objective it can be said that the FC programme has contributed towards improving the living conditions in the programme area under the Primed. On the other hand, the on site ex-post evaluation also revealed that the income and employment situation of the target group has developed so negatively in the last decade as to counteract the positive programme impacts. With regard to reducing drug-related and violent crime, interviews with residents have revealed that normal crime has significantly declined as people are living together on a more harmonious level and social control has increased. Politically motivated violence by paramilitary groups and guerrillas, on the other hand, has been on the increase. This, in turn, is a reflection of the socio-economic situation of the adolescents in the settlements. As the adolescents have practically no alternative employment opportunities they often join a militant group that promises them income and protection.

A second phase of Primed began in other marginal settlements in 1999 but petered out and was eventually abandoned officially with the dissolution of Corvide in 2002, which was ultimately a victim of budget constraints. The planned FC support did not materialise because the city of Medellín is overindebted and therefore was unable to take up another loan (no grant funds were available for the second phase).

The programme provided the target group with a significantly improved social and economic infrastructure, and the risk of personal or property damaged from natural phenomena was greatly reduced. Even if the reduction of the risk to the inhabitants is hard to quantify in economic terms, representatives of the target group have reported very positive impacts in this respect. The housing improvements and land titling translated into a general improvement of the settlements for the inhabitants, of whom more than 4000 families had direct immediate personal benefits in the form of improved housing and land titles. The improved transport links to the city centre translate into shorter travel times and cost savings for the target group.

Classes are held free of charge in the classrooms that were financed. Health services rendered by the financed health stations generally must be paid for. However, these services are also charged at different rates depending on income, so that the burden on low-income patients is limited. In addition, the medical staff in the health stations reported that they do not refuse treatment to patients even if they are unable to pay.

The programme Primed has made a lasting contribution to improving the housing environment for around 25% of the population of the marginal settlements of Medellín. One indicator of this is the enormous population growth in the programme area, which has grown much more strongly than in the other marginal settlements. At the same time this illustrates the dilemma that has emerged with the cancellation of the second phase of Primed. At the time of appraisal the conception of the social programme was such that all marginal settlements were to be successively added to the integrated urban development. This way, imbalances in the development of the marginal settlements could have been avoided. This problem is not one for which the Primed can be held accountable but results from the fiscal constraints that hamper the city of Medellín.

The economic situation of the residents has again deteriorated against 1993. This thwarts some of the positive effects of the programme. Most severely affected are single mothers and their children, most of whom live in extreme poverty. On the other hand, women benefit from the

improved options of day care for their children offered by the new playgrounds, sports facilities and schools. 80% of those who use the financed health stations are women and their children. Despite the manifold burdens they carry, women also have an above-average participation in the self-help groups.

From the current perspective, a major risk to the sustainability of the facilities financed is posed by the critical budget situation of the city of Medellín. As the main operating organisations must rely on the allocation of budget funds there is a danger that they may be under-financed. At the same time it must be taken into account that the tasks in the project area represent only a small portion of the tasks of the respective institutions. As per today, a further risk to the sustainability consists in the growing militarisation of the marginal settlements.

Our overall assessment of the project's developmental effectiveness is as follows:

- The project objectives have been largely achieved and the financed infrastructure is being used intensively. Thus, the project's effectiveness is satisfactory (sub-rating: Rating 2).
- As per today, the target group's main problem is no longer the inadequate housing environment but the gradual impoverishment of large portions of the target group. In this respect the project conception, which did not include any measures to promote income and employment, was only partly suitable for improving the people's living conditions. For this reason cutbacks have to be made with regard to the programme's relevance. Accordingly, the achievement of the overall objective must be placed into perspective as well because the population's living conditions were improved but not in a central aspect. Within the limits so defined, the overall objective has been achieved. This can be derived from the high acceptance of the financed infrastructure, the improved cohabitation and the reduced inclination towards violence within the settlements. The cancellation of the follow-up phase and the dissolution of Corvide make it clear that the programme was not embedded into a long-term poverty reduction policy of the government or of the city of Medellín. Overall, the significance and relevance of the project, however, are still sufficient (sub-rating: Rating 3).
- The cost efficiency of the programme is hard to estimate because no reference values could be defined given the heterogeneity of the measures. It is poorer than was expected at the time of appraisal. For each person living in the marginal settlements around EUR 190 was expended (only FC measures); this figure does not appear to be excessive given the volume of the financed measures. No information is available to judge the efficiency of the operation of the financed infrastructure because no analyses were performed for the individual operators. Considering the acceptable specific investment cost, the ultimately warrantable delays in the implementation and the currently good state of the financed facilities, the efficiency of the programme is still satisfactory (sub-rating: 2) although it has to be noted that in this case the developmental efficiency was given only secondary importance in the overall assessment of the programme.
- Under consideration of the above key developmental criteria we assess the project's developmental effectiveness as **sufficient** (overall rating: Rating 2).

General Conclusions applicable to other Projects

none

Legend

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| Developmentally successful: Ratings 1 to 3 | |
| Rating 1 | Very high or high degree of developmental effectiveness |
| Rating 2 | Satisfactory degree of developmental effectiveness |
| Rating 3 | Overall sufficient degree of developmental effectiveness |
| Developmental failures: Ratings 4 to 6 | |
| Rating 4 | Overall slightly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness |
| Rating 5 | Clearly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness |
| Rating 6 | The project is a total failure |

Criteria for the Evaluation of Project Success

The evaluation of a project's "developmental effectiveness" and its classification during the final evaluation into one of the various levels of success described in more detail below concentrate on the following fundamental questions:

- **Are the project objectives reached to a sufficient degree (aspect of project effectiveness)?**
- **Does the project generate sufficient significant developmental effects (project relevance and significance measured by the achievement of the overall development-policy objective defined beforehand and its effects in political, institutional, socio-economic and socio-cultural as well as ecological terms)?**
- **Are the funds/expenses that were and are being employed/incurred to reach the objectives appropriate and how can the project's microeconomic and macroeconomic impact be measured (aspect of efficiency of the project conception)?**
- **To the extent that undesired (side) effects occur, are these tolerable?**

We do not treat **sustainability**, a key aspect to consider for project evaluation, as a separate category of evaluation but instead as a cross-cutting element of all four fundamental questions on project success. A project is sustainable if the project-executing agency and/or the target group are able to continue to use the project facilities that have been built for a period of time that is, overall, adequate in economic terms or to carry on with the project activities on their own and generate positive results after the financial, organizational and/or technical support has come to an end.