

Ex Post-Evaluation Brief

Burundi: Support for Reintegration Programme I + II



Sector	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (15220)	
Programme/Client	1) Support for Reintegration Programme I (2003 65 866) 2) Support for Reintegration Programme II (2005 66 562)*	
Programme executing agency	Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre (MSNDPHG)	
Year of sample/ex post evaluation report: 2012*/2012		
	Appraisal (planned)	Ex post-evaluation (actual)
Investment costs (total)	1) EUR 9.18 million 2) EUR 3.00 million	1) EUR 9.18 million 2) EUR 3.00 million
Counterpart contribution (company)	1) EUR 0.01 million 2) EUR 0.00 million	1) EUR 0.01 million 2) EUR 0.00 million
Funding, of which budget funds (BMZ)	1) EUR 9.17/9.17 mil. 2) EUR 3.00/3.00 mil.	1) EUR 9.17/9.17 million 2) EUR 3.00/3.00 million

* random sample

Project description: The Reintegration Programme I and II (APRS in its French abbreviation) aimed at the reintegration of refugees and ex-combatants. It was supported with FC funds amounting to EUR 12.17 million and TC funds of EUR 8.02 million. As Phase I and II were carried out at the same time, they will be assessed together here. The programme strengthened village institutions and capacities in municipalities for the assimilation of returnees and revived agricultural activities. It also promoted youth training and financed the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure along with housing construction.


Objective: The overall objective of both programme phases (with indicators on the number of peacefully settled conflicts, the satisfaction of basic needs and regular income) was to make a contribution to peacebuilding in the programme regions. This was to be achieved by means of the programme objective of social and economic integration of refugees and displaced and demobilised persons in the programme regions (with indicators on housing, representation and basic social assistance).

Target group: According to Programme Proposal I, the target group consisted of refugee families returning from abroad, internally displaced persons and ex-combatants. In contrast to this, the definition in Programme Proposal II was altered so that the target group consisted of the whole population of war victims from the programme region. Besides the groups cited in Programme Proposal I, the integrated programme approach also comprised the residents who had remained in place in the host municipalities.

Overall rating: 2

Of note: The objectives of the reintegration programme were achieved with very minor shortcomings. The results show that this programme, which was designed as emergency assistance, had sustainable capacity-building effects. The inclusive design of addressing all sections of the population was decisive for success and contributed to the peaceful co-existence of the population of war victims in their communities today and to their ability to earn a meagre but independent livelihood. A large number of schools, health centres, drinking water facilities and bridges are still operational and in full use four years after programme completion and are serviced by maintenance committees.

Rating by DAC criteria



—●— Project
—●— Average rating for sector (from 2007)
-●- Average rating for region (from 2007)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Overall rating: In a summary evaluation of the results and risks of the phases, we consider the developmental efficacy of the programme to be good (Rating 2).

Relevance: The programme approach of making a contribution to peace building in a country devastated by ten years civil war was highly relevant. Renewed efforts are still needed today to promote the peaceful co-existence and the social and economic integration of the population. The programme was also relevant to government strategy, which was based on Protocol IV: Reconstruction and Development of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.¹ The current national strategy from 2010 for the socio-economic reintegration of war victims² underlines the current relevance of the programme today.

As to harmonisation with other donors, only a few other reintegration programmes were conducted parallel to the APRS programme. Of special note here is the Programme National de Démobilisation, de Réinsertion et Réintégration des Ex-combattants (PNDRR) financed with US\$ 76 million from a regional multinational donor trust fund grouping IDA, the World Bank, the EU, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, and which demobilised altogether 23,022 out of 55,000 ex-combatants by the end of 2008.³

A special feature of the APRS approach is its inclusive and participatory procedure of addressing all categories of the population affected by the war, setting it apart from an individualised approach aimed solely at the group of ex-combatants. Assistance to an individual group provokes envy and risks fuelling conflict instead of contributing to peace.

A critical point is the complex and ambitious design of the APRS programme, which although restricted to two provinces sought to cover several sectors with relatively limited means. The amounts that were earmarked for some of the subcomponents (above all, housing construction and agricultural development) were not enough to meet the large needs in this sector. It would probably have been more effective to curtail these sectors and activities.

Summarising, the inclusive and participatory approach adopted by the APRS programme proved effective, particularly amidst the practically ubiquitous poverty in a country like Burundi after a long civil war. Sub-rating: good (2)

Effectiveness: The programme objective was the social and economic integration of refugees, displaced and demobilised persons and parts of the population that remained in place during

¹ 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.

² Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, du Rapatriement des Réfugiés et de la Réintégration Sociale. 2010. Stratégie nationale de réintégration socio-économique des personnes affectées par le conflit. Bujumbura, Burundi.

³ This programme was continued through the Burundi - Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project (P113506, 2009-2012) and complemented by the Burundi - Community and Social Development Project (P095211, 2007 - 2012).

the war in the Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces. Most of the relevant objective indicators had already been exceeded on programme completion, as verified by the evaluation findings:

(1) 70% of municipal representatives are returnees in proportion to their share of the population; 25% of returnees are women.

This indicator was already surpassed in 2007. The ratio of returnees in local government amounted to 100%, 36% of whom were women, as compared with the target of 70% (25% women) and a baseline figure of 0-3%.

After the programme had initially strengthened reintegration capacities, it then proceeded to lay the foundation for municipal development. Comprehensive municipal development plans (Plans Communaux de Développement Communautaire - PCDC) were developed to provide guidance not only for municipal but also for donor investments at local level. Other donors, such as the World Bank and Belgian development cooperation refer to these plans and use them for mutual consultation.

The issue discussed locally of whether it would have been more expedient to channel project funds via existing administrative authorities instead of through duplicate civic capacities was adamantly rejected as there was still no elected local government in 2004 and corruption was rife.

(2) 50% of the population (returnees and residents in the returnee communities) are of the opinion that they have access to basic social assistance.

This indicator was exceeded as early as 2007. The programme had financed 46 primary and secondary schools with housing for teachers in most of them as well as 15 health centres, 17 community centres, 103 toilets, 30 water pipelines, 13 rainwater reservoirs and 39 bridges. All inspected facilities are still operational four years after programme completion and in largely good condition.

The construction of **schools** has significantly reduced the distance for pupils (from 10 km to 3 km at most) and has much improved the school enrolment rate. The quality of school buildings financed by the programme is superior to similar buildings (see Annex 5, Figures 1 and 2). Now that classes comprise an average of 91 pupils according to official statistics, the population has begun to build classrooms itself to cope with the future increase. According to headmasters, parents' committees and official statistics, the government recruits sufficient teaching staff for the proper operation of the schools. The **health centres** financed by APRS are also operational and in good condition and are adequately run by basically trained but dedicated staff.

(3) 70% of beneficiaries (refugee households) have adequate accommodation by the end of 2007.

For returning refugees, APRS also financed the construction of 7,986 **dwellings** to the official government standard. The beneficiaries have now made various extensions to the houses as they did not in their view take account of the individual needs of the frequently numerous family members. Sub-rating: very good (1)

Efficiency: The infrastructure provided, as well as the micro projects and training courses, have surpassed the originally planned number, standard and quality. The efficiency of the programme is therefore rated as high. However, the originally estimated unit prices for infrastructure measures were geared to standards for plain buildings as part of emergency aid that did not correspond to official Burundian norms. In the end, the building costs were double those cited in the appraisal report but nevertheless corresponded to the national average. At 22% of all costs, the consultancy costs can be regarded as adequate in view of the complexity of the programme, the adherence to schedule and the successful implementation.

As to allocative efficiency, thanks to the participatory approach that included the whole municipality and publicised results at markets and churches, the restricted funds benefited the neediest sections of the population, as repeatedly confirmed in individual discussions and focus groups. Sub-rating: good (2)

Overarching developmental impact: The overall programme objective is to be measured with the help of the following indicators:

(1) 70% of social conflicts are settled peacefully through the local capacities supported by the programme.

This indicator was already exceeded in 2007 according to a survey. At that time, 90% of conflicts were settled peacefully. Discussions at ex-post evaluation revealed that the municipalities have developed a peaceful conflict resolution mechanism in the programme provinces based on local traditions, and this is known to the population. Approx. 80% of cases are reportedly resolved peacefully so that the target has been exceeded. If no settlement is reached, the case is referred to a tribunal.

(2) 60% of beneficiaries confirm their ability to satisfy basic needs on their own.

This indicator was not fully met at the end of the programme in 2007, as according to the survey only 20% of the beneficiaries (previously 0%) could meet their needs on their own. It also measures the agricultural component, which distributed 6,000 agricultural start packages to needy families as emergency assistance. These families were selected by participatory procedure in the 15 programme municipalities and received a pickaxe, two goats and seed as well as agricultural extension services. This did not, however, suffice to revive production and enable the families to satisfy their basic needs on their own. External factors, such as diseases among the goats and floods detracted from success.

Comparing the emergency situation of 2005 with 2008 (end of programme), however, agricultural production of major staple foodstuffs, such as cassava, maize, beans and potatoes, increased in Gitega Province up to 2008, according to an IFAD report. After this, production fell sharply, which has, however, more to do with the establishment of the tax authority, which receives 80% of its revenue from the sale of agricultural produce, than with an actual decline in

output.⁴ Compared with nationwide data, the production of cassava and beans is higher in Gitega Province. This can, however, not be clearly attributed to the project. There are now 76 markets in the 15 municipalities that are held regularly. Beneficiaries questioned by the evaluation mission confirmed that they can now earn their livelihood as a consequence of the programme despite adverse circumstances. The rural areas of Burundi nevertheless suffer from malnutrition.⁵

We may thus conclude that the indicator has been largely met today.

(3) 50% of beneficiaries earn a regular income from employment or self-employment three months after the end of the respective measure.

This indicator was already met according to the survey in 2007, which found that 58% of beneficiaries earned a regular income (previously 0%). This development has been confirmed from the available information.

The components that contributed to meeting this indicator were micro projects and vocational training. One of the great successes of the programme was founding associations to carry out micro projects. Altogether 53 micro projects were supported, which provided 1,200 people with work and regular income (including the sale and storage of improved seed, trade, a carpenter's workshop and roofing tile factory). In 14 training centres, the vocational training component trained 2,043 youth who had been selected by their municipalities in a participatory way. All of the approx. 50 successful trainees who were questioned locally confirmed that they were able to make a living with the income from their work and were still performing their occupation. An unintended beneficial side-effect of the programme was that it enabled local NGOs to reconstitute themselves after the war and also train youth in the various occupational fields. All the training centres still exist, even if they have not all continued with the occupational fields they offered during the project.

The intended contribution to peacebuilding in the programme regions was achieved, as evident from the findings from focus groups, interviews and observations as well as statistical data and reports: People who had fought each other in the past now co-exist in neighbourly albeit impoverished relations, which would still have been unthinkable some years ago. Of key importance here was the programme's promotion of community facilities, such as conflict resolution committees, community centres for social events and community development plans that include all social groups (particularly also underprivileged people, women and youth etc.).

Altogether, the programme built capacity, not just by setting standards for an integrated

⁴ IFAD et le Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage (MINAGRIE). 2012. Etudes des Marchés des Produits Agricoles, Diagnostic des Services Financiers, Facilitation du Ciblage et Elaboration des Plans de Développement des Filières Prioritaires. Le Programme de développement des Filières (PRODEFI) et le Projet d'appui à l'intensification et à la valorisation agricoles du Burundi (PAIVA-B).

⁵ A UNICEF report of June 2012 warned of severe malnutrition in 58% of children in Burundi (<http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2012/06/severe-child-malnutrition-rate-in-burundi-unicef/>). See also WFP. 2008. Analyse Globale de la Sécurité alimentaire et de la vulnérabilité (AGSAV). Burundi Décembre 2008.

approach that included all sections of the population in reintegration - which has since been adopted by the Burundian Government and introduced nationwide - but also contributed to financing community development plans (Plans Communaux de Développement Communautaire - PCDC) which promote both community development and donor coordination.

Sub-rating: very good (1)

Sustainability: Considering the condition and current use of the financed infrastructure as well as the operations of the maintenance committees at schools and health centres, the outputs of the programme four years after completion can be regarded as tangible and sustainable. This is all the more astonishing as in the documents at the beginning of the programme large caveats were imposed on anticipated sustainability.⁶

The political climate in Burundi is, however, still fragile. The lack of democratic participation could lead to violence. Most of the opposition, for example, is located abroad. It therefore largely depends on the preparation and conduct of the elections in 2015 whether Burundi can finally move on from the civil war.

A high degree of sustainability was also achieved by the microprojects which gave rise to associations that still exist. The same holds for some of the successful trainees of the vocational training component, some of whom joined together to form associations/federations. NGOs revived by the programme after the war not only formed a network but also took the initiative to upgrade parts of the programmes or continue to support the trainees, which makes a major contribution to the sustainability of these activities. Sub-rating: satisfactory (3)

⁶ According to Programme Proposal I, "Sustainability targets should be reduced accordingly."

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and overarching developmental impact. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

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| 1 | Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations |
| 2 | Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings |
| 3 | Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate |
| 4 | Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results |
| 5 | Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate |
| 6 | The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated |

Ratings 1-3 denote a positive or successful assessment while ratings 4-6 denote a not positive or unsuccessful assessment

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability) The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Ratings 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while ratings 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (rating 3).