

**Burundi: Rural Infrastructure in the Province Ruyigi**

**Ex-post evaluation**

<b>OECD sector</b>	21020 / Roads and road traffic	
<b>BMZ project ID</b>	Rural Infrastructure in Province Ruyigi, BMZ No. 1991 65 127	
<b>Project-executing agency</b>	Direction Générale des Routes	
<b>Consultant</b>	Until June 1995 : BIT Bureau International du Travail As from July 1995 : GTZ	
<b>Year of ex-post evaluation</b>	<b>2005</b>	
	<b>Project appraisal (planned)</b>	<b>Ex-post evaluation (actual)</b>
<b>Start of implementation</b>	10/1991	11/1992
<b>Period of implementation</b>	39 months	70 months
<b>Start of operation</b>	01/1995	08/1998
<b>Total cost</b>	EUR 3.17 million	EUR 3.09 million
<b>Counterpart contribution</b>	EUR 0.10 million	EUR 0.02 million
<b>Financing, of which Financial Cooperation (FC) funds</b>	EUR 3,07 million	EUR 3.07 million*
<b>Other institutions/donors involved</b>	None	None
<b>Performance rating:</b>	5	
• <b>Significance / relevance</b>	5	
• <b>Effectiveness</b>	5	
• <b>Efficiency</b>	5	

\* Remaining funds in the amount of EUR 2.900 will be used for projects implemented in the context of the sector-related programme "Family planning (BMZ Nr. 1993 65 214)".

**Brief Description, Overall Objectives and Project Objectives with Indicators**

The measures comprised the extension and rehabilitation of provincial roads (75 km) and rural roads (67 km), of eight market places and of one administrative centre as well as road maintenance works and consulting services.

The overall objective of the measures was to contribute to increasing the agricultural production and marketing of the population living along and near the programme roads.

The indicator for the achievement of the overall objective was an increase in the volume of products marketed of 25% in five years.

Programme Objectives:

- Improved access to markets in rural regions in the Ruyigi province,
- Improvement of infrastructure and sanitary conditions of the market places.

#### Indicators for the achievement of the project objective:

- Average number of motor vehicles using the roads: 1-3 small lorries per day on the small roads and at least 33 vehicles per day on the provincial road RP 216
- The facilities are functioning and used in accordance with their purpose.

#### **Project Design / Major Deviations from the original Project Planning and their main Causes**

Simultaneously with the start of implementation of the project a long-lasting civil war broke out in Burundi. Due to the war the per-capita income of the population in Burundi fell to USD 100 in the 1990s and has since then not recovered to any significant extent. Ethnic tensions caused refugee movements of approximately 1 million people (roughly 15% of the total population). Due to the civil war and the ensuing coup d'état international development assistance to Burundi came to a halt. The crisis had major negative impacts on the Burundi road transport sector. On the one hand, roads, bridges and passages were partly destroyed (in order to stop approaching militia units). On the other hand, for many years maintenance works had in fact been completely neglected. The agricultural production declined strongly due to the crisis. According to estimates of the FAO (2004) there was a decline in production of cereals by approx. 50% and of vegetables by approx. 70% as compared with the time of the project appraisal.

Due to cost savings in the rehabilitation of roads it was possible to increase the programme volume substantially (plan: extension/rehabilitation of 18 km of provincial roads, 50 km of small roads and improvement of six markets; actual: 75 km of provincial roads, 67 km of small rural roads and extension of eight market places).

#### **Key Results of the Impact Analysis and Performance Rating**

No data was collected on the use of the extended roads (number and type of vehicles). We assume that in the past the traffic volume was hampered by the political-economic crisis, security problems, fuel rationing, limited availability of spare parts and the reduced economic activity. Today, after the crisis has waned, the traffic volume on the small rural roads is estimated to have reached the relatively low volume expected at project appraisal, thus meeting the success criteria. However, the targets for the traffic volume on the provincial road RP 216 have by far not been achieved because, due to the asphaltting of the competing southern connection, it has developed into a local road connection with a low traffic volume.

Since no data is available, it is not possible to make any secure statement on the impacts of the project measures on the regional agricultural production and its marketing. For security reasons it was equally not possible to conduct the impact study that had originally been planned. However, due to the massive country-wide decline in production it seems rather unlikely from today's point of view that the impacts expected on production and marketing in the programme area were achieved to any satisfactory extent on a lasting basis.

There are also very high sustainability risks for the measures. The local communities are responsible for the maintenance of small roads and market places. Already at the time of the project appraisal the maintenance of small roads was not implemented regularly due to lack of funds. And today the financial resources of the communities are even more scarce. According to the assumptions made at project appraisal about the specific maintenance costs of rural roads the communities of Ruyigi Province would have to spend about EUR 180,000 for the maintenance of the roads per year. This corresponds to about twice their total annual budget. In contrast to the situation at project appraisal the population is no longer willing to participate in unpaid road maintenance works (travaux communautaires). Exact statistics about the state of the roads are not available. Due to the inadequate maintenance it can be assumed that the passability of most of the rural roads, but also part of the provincial roads, is limited (i.e. they are only seasonally passable or can be used only by all-terrain vehicles or with limited speed). These assumptions were confirmed in the context of the final evaluation, when some of the

project roads were inspected. As far as the market component of the project is concerned those areas where maintenance is required do not receive sufficient attention (toilets, water supply).

We rate the developmental effectiveness of the project as follows:

- The project did not achieve any sustainable improvement in terms of giving the people living in the project area access to markets because the roads are gradually degrading due to lack of maintenance. The hygienic conditions at the markets improved only partially (reduced dust, water and mud on the market platforms). Even though the market places were equipped with toilets/water supply facilities, this did not have any positive lasting impact because most of the facilities are not functioning and no maintenance funds are available for repairs. Against this background we rate the effectiveness of the project as clearly inadequate (sub-rating: 5).
- The assumption that better traffic connections will help intensify the agricultural production in a project region that has the necessary potential can be regarded as basically plausible (relevance). On the other hand, the significance of the project seems to be low because the unfavourable development of the socio-economic framework caused by the civil war strongly hampered the development of agriculture and traffic. Major income effects occurred in the context of the temporary employment effects. We rate the significance and relevance of the project as clearly inadequate (rating 5).
- Due to the favourable specific investment costs it was possible to implement many more measures than had originally been planned (production efficiency). No cost recovering fees are charged for the use of the infrastructure established (markets) and given the probably low effects on agricultural production (of the road component) a positive rate of return for the projects cannot be assumed (allocation efficiency). Overall, we judge the project's efficiency to be clearly inadequate (rating 5).

Overall, we judge the project's developmental efficacy to be clearly inadequate (rating 5).

The majority of the rural population in the programme province is currently living in absolute poverty. The labour-intensive construction measures, which were, however, not organised by the target group itself, helped to temporarily create jobs and incomes and, thus, contributed to directly reducing poverty on a temporary basis. The project has the potential to improve gender equality. This potential is used to a limited extent since the position of women, who are responsible for marketing agricultural products, is strengthened. The project did not aim at improving the environmental situation. The project did not produce any discernible negative impact on the environment. The project did not pursue the goal of improving the participatory development or good governance.

## **General Conclusions and Recommendations**

The existing sustainability problems with regard to the rural roads to be maintained by the communities are due, besides the crisis situation in Burundi, to the fact that at the time of the project appraisal the expectation about the reform potential of the Burundi administration was too optimistic. They show that such projects should be tackled only once the aspired conceptual changes have actually been implemented.

The concept of the programme was not suited to cope with the crisis that occurred in Burundi. Still, in coordination with the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and due to the positive socio-economic impacts, the project was neither cancelled nor were any major changes to the project introduced. In retrospect, given the heavily changed framework conditions it would have been advisable to redesign the project as emergency aid and to redefine the target system and readjust it to be largely oriented to achieving temporary employment effects.

## Legend

<b>Developmentally successful: Ratings 1 to 3</b>	
<b>Rating 1</b>	<b>Very high or high degree of developmental effectiveness</b>
<b>Rating 2</b>	<b>Satisfactory developmental effectiveness</b>
<b>Rating 3</b>	<b>Overall sufficient degree of developmental effectiveness</b>
<b>Developmental failures: Ratings 4 to 6</b>	
<b>Rating 4</b>	<b>Overall slightly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness</b>
<b>Rating 5</b>	<b>Clearly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness</b>
<b>Rating 6</b>	<b>The project is a total failure</b>

## Criteria for the Evaluation of Project Success

The evaluation of the "developmental effectiveness" of a project and its classification during the ex-post evaluation into one of the various levels of success described in more detail below concentrate on the following fundamental questions:

- Are the **project objectives** reached to a sufficient degree (aspect of project **effectiveness**)?
- Does the project generate sufficient **significant developmental effects** (project **relevance** and **significance** measured by the achievement of the overall development-policy objective defined beforehand and its effects in political, institutional, socio-economic and socio-cultural as well as ecological terms)?
- Are the **funds/expenses** that were and are being employed/incurred to reach the objectives **appropriate** and how can the project's microeconomic and macroeconomic impact be measured (aspect of **efficiency** of the project conception)?
- To the extent that undesired (**side**) **effects** occur, are these tolerable?

We do not treat **sustainability**, a key aspect to consider for project evaluation, as a separate category of evaluation but instead as a cross-cutting element of all four fundamental questions on project success. A project is sustainable if the project-executing agency and/or the target group are able to continue to use the project facilities that have been built for a period of time that is, overall, adequate in economic terms, or to carry on with the project activities on their own and generate positive results after the financial, organisational and/or technical support has come to an end.