

Burundi: Emergency Programme for Burundi

Ex-post evaluation

OECD sector	72010 – Emergency aid	
BMZ project ID	1994 65 402	
Project-executing agency	Direction Générale des Routes (DGR), Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage (MAE), Régie de Production et de Distribution d'Eau et d' Electricité (REGIDESO), Régie des Services Techniques Municipaux (SETEMU), Direction Générale de l'Hydraulique et des Energies Rurales (DGHER)	
Consultant	GTZ	
Year of ex-post evaluation	2005	
	Project appraisal (planned)	Ex-post evaluation (actual)
Start of implementation	07/1994	10/1994
Period of implementation	18 months	46 months
Commissioning*	01/1995	07/1998
Total cost	EUR 6.65 million	EUR 6.65 million
Counterpart contribution	EUR 0.0 million**	EUR 0.0 million**
Financing, of which Financial Cooperation (FC) funds	EUR 6.65 million	EUR 6.65 million
Other institutions/donors involved	GTZ	GTZ
Performance rating	3	
• Significance / relevance	3	
• Effectiveness	3	
• Efficiency	3	

*The figures refer to the end of commissioning, which was conducted continuously for the individual measures.

** No quantitative information is available for the contribution rendered by the project-executing agency in the form of provision of staff, machines and rooms.

Brief Description, Overall Objectives and Project Objectives with Indicators

The overall objective of the FC/TC cooperation project was to contribute to stabilising the social and economic situation in Burundi, where at the time of the project appraisal the acute ethnic-political conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu population groups and their political representatives had started to escalate. The objectives of the emergency programme were: The creation of incomes and employment, making a contribution to ensuring the supply with food from the country's own production and maintaining the operation of important public supply and disposal facilities.

The measures implemented for this purpose comprised the labour-intensive repair of the communal infrastructure, the thinning, and to a minor extent the afforestation, of forests, the supply and distribution of seeds, the supply of working capital for the public supply and disposal utilities REGIDESCO (municipal power and water supply), SETEMU (sewage and solid waste disposal of Bujumbura) and DGER (rural power and water supply).

With reference to the emergency character of the programme, no indicator was defined for the achievement of the overall objective. The overall objective was considered to have been achieved when the programme objective indicators were fulfilled. The following indicators for the achievement of the programme objectives were defined in the course of the implementation of the measures: As regards the repair measures on communal infrastructure the indicator was the employment of 1,500 day labourers during the construction phase (this corresponds to around 340,000 man-days). The target indicator for the food supply component was that the supply with beans, manioc and potatoes be increased to the level of before the unrests. The indicator for the component "support of supply and disposal utilities" was the proper use of the equipment provided.

Project Design / Major Deviations from the original Project Planning and their main Causes

The problem analysis, the identification of programme measures and the preparation of the implementation of measures focused on specific priority areas and were carried out in line with existing TC and FC activities in order to ensure that a contribution could be made in the short term to stabilising the economic and social situation in Burundi. The concept of the measures was based on the idea that a short-term emergency situation had to be bridged and it was hoped that the project would contribute to satisfying the basic needs of the population, to improve the overall living conditions after the unrests and to reduce the danger of new violence. Again in line with ongoing TC and partly also FC projects, the programme areas were selected in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Gitega, Ruyigi and Ngozi. In order to be able to grant fast and nonbureaucratic assistance the emergency programme used the existing structures established under the ongoing TC projects. Until the conclusion of the TC project at the end of 1995 the GTZ consultant assigned to the DGR (Direction Générale des Routes) assumed part of the consulting tasks under the programme. Moreover, the programme was coordinated with the emergency and reconstruction measures of other donors by the GTZ consultant assigned to the Ministry of Planning. A detailed implementation concept was not drafted at programme appraisal. Instead, the concept was gradually and flexibly developed in the course of the implementation of measures.

During the implementation phase of the programme the violent conflicts in the country continued. At times construction sites were not accessible for security reasons, GTZ staff were several times withdrawn from Burundi, and due to security problems on the arterial roads from Bujumbura some staff could only reach the programme areas by plane. Due to the political instability in the country local progress reviews were not carried out during the implementation period, and at times the measures were implemented without any on-site support from international experts.

The measures were implemented on a larger scale than had been envisaged at project appraisal because due to favourable prices part of the funds and reserves for contingencies were not used and could, in consultation with KfW, be made available for additional measures. The focus of the programme activities (which accounted for 75% of total costs) was on the following areas:

- employment creation in the framework of repair measures on the communal infrastructure,
- distribution of seeds,
- thinning of forests that had suffered damage from fires and, to a lower extent, afforestation of forests,
- supply of working capital for REGIDESO and SETEMU.

The scope of some of these measures was extended and the following measures were implemented additionally:

- spare parts and materials were provided to DGHER, the rural water and power supply authority,
- The following measures were implemented in close cooperation with rural TC development projects: Rehabilitation of 13 smaller bridges and passages in Bujumbura Rural region, supply of 51 tons of fertilizers as well as pesticides and agricultural equipment, introduction of laying hen husbandry at 210 peasant families.

At project appraisal an implementation period of 18 months had been planned. The majority of measures were implemented in 1995. Almost all measures had been concluded in mid-1997, i.e. after around three years instead of one and a half years. The delay was mainly due to security problems and partly also to the insufficient performance of some small private enterprises. The further prolongation of the period of implementation (through mid-1998) was mainly due to the implementation of additional measures in order to spend remaining funds.

Key Results of the Impact Analysis and Performance Rating

The following results were produced in the context of the project: 182 km of dirt roads were rehabilitated (planned: 100 km), 51 smaller bridges and passages were constructed (planned: 30), 23 municipal buildings were rehabilitated and equipped (planned: 30), 900 tons of bean seeds were properly used for the production of 35,000 tons of beans (1,000 tons of seeds had been delivered, losses are estimated to account for roughly 10%), over 100 tons of other seeds and useful plants were produced and distributed (though 20% - 50% losses were incurred), ongoing agricultural development projects were supported, 3,000 ha of forests that had suffered damage from fires were afforested, around 6,000 tons of timber were distributed or sold and the operation of several public supply utilities was ensured. The volume of temporary employment created in the context of infrastructure and forestry measures was altogether around 760,000 man-days.

In particular with the import of 1,000 tons of bean seeds and support for the local production of other types of seeds the project made an important contribution to closing the supply gap for the 1995/96 harvest year, even though the selection and distribution of seeds showed certain deficits. Compared with the total volume of bean seeds of 2,300 tons for the country as a whole, which were financed in this season from donor assistance, the FC contribution played an important role. Overall, already in 1995 the national food production reached the level of the years 1988-93. Thereafter, however, production suffered increasingly from the long-term consequences of the crisis, in particular the reduction in the number of animals, which provide necessary manure. The production effect of the fertilizers delivered later and financed from remaining funds is estimated to be comparatively low given the small quantities supplied.

According to information provided by the consultants, the supplies delivered to REGIDESCO and SETEMU were properly used. One restriction has to be mentioned, however, namely that the storage of spare parts of SETEMU was deficient and that funds for the maintenance and operation of the equipment supplied (especially the waste compactor) were lacking. According to information provided by the project-executing agency, the tools and vehicles delivered to REGIDESCO were used on a sustainable basis. This enabled the executing agency to operate several building sites at a time and to react within an acceptable period of time to breakdowns. The vehicles were utilized for about 5 years without any significant problems and thereafter kept in operation through repairs.

The majority of the 23 municipal buildings rehabilitated were used in a satisfactory manner (one exception to be mentioned are some of the forestry buildings, which are situated in park areas at times not accessible for security reasons). As had been feared at the time of the project appraisal, the financial, technical and organisational capacity of the communities was too weak to ensure the proper maintenance of the local roads. Except for those local roads that ensure direct connections for, and are maintained in the framework of, ongoing projects (tea plantations in Bujumbura Rural, transit roads for refugee transports of the HCR) the accessibility of the

roads is today very limited (i.e. they can be used only in certain seasons or only with all-wheel vehicles). Due to lack of finance, no maintenance was carried out on the provincial roads, including the bridges, for whose operation and maintenance DGR is responsible. Still, they are passable.

The project had direct poverty relevance due to the provision of seeds and the employment and income effects of the forest thinning/afforestation measures and infrastructure measures. Improving gender equality was not one of the project's objectives. During the ethnic-political crisis the share of female heads of household increased strongly and these will probably have adequately benefited from the provision of seeds, the increase in incomes through employment creation measures and the (at times) improved infrastructure. The project did not aim at improving the environmental situation. We have no information on any negative environmental impacts that occurred during the project implementation. The project did not pursue the goal of improving the participatory development or good governance.

At the project appraisal we had seen an important risk in terms of organisational and financial weaknesses on the part of the local and communal administrations and public supply utilities and this was expected to have a negative impact on the sustainability of the measures implemented. This risk materialized to a substantial degree. However, as the project was designed as an emergency measure the aspiration in terms of sustainability was clearly reduced. The control problems identified at project appraisal in the context of the employment-intensive small-scale infrastructure measures actually materialized only to a limited extent. Due to the strained security situation a more intensive coordination through the use of foreign experts was not possible on a continuous basis. To cancel the project would have meant a further deterioration of the social situation of the target group, whose members do not have any alternative sources of income generation. Against this background we consider the continuation of the project, irrespective of the risks that occurred, as acceptable.

We rate the developmental effectiveness of the project as follows:

- The programme objectives of creation of incomes and employment, making a contribution to ensuring the food supply and maintaining the operation of important public supply and disposal facilities were achieved on a temporary but not on a long-term basis. The local and communal authorities and public utilities responsible for the established infrastructure and the spare parts and equipment provided are not able to ensure the proper maintenance due to lack of funds. The impacts achieved in the area of food supply were only of a temporary nature. Due to the negative framework conditions for agriculture a sustainable increase in production was not achieved. The project did not make a significant contribution to solving the core problems identified at the time of project appraisal. Since the requirements on sustainability are reduced for emergency aid projects and because we gave the project's temporary impacts a stronger weighting we finally arrived at a sufficient assessment of the project's effectiveness (sub-rating 3).
- The impact hypothesis according to which the financing of employment-intensive infrastructure measures and the provision of seeds to peasants (who were not in the position, among others due to looting, to procure seeds from their own funds,) would produce a temporary improvement in the employment and income situation and in food production was plausible (relevance). Still, the impact on the target group was limited since it was only of a temporary nature. Overall, the impacts achieved were (as yet) not sufficient to stabilise the economic and social situation in Burundi. Still, it is plausible to assume that the project made a contribution to easing the strained situation in the country (significance). We classify the programme's significance/relevance as overall sufficient (sub-rating 3).

- The project achieved significant temporary income and employment effects for the target group at acceptable costs (production efficiency). The allocation efficiency was somewhat reduced due to the lack of sustainability of the physical programme measures. Overall, we judge the project's efficiency as satisfactory (sub-rating 3).

Therefore, overall we judge its developmental efficacy still to be sufficient (rating 3).

General Conclusions and Recommendations

In the event of a political-economic crisis the parallel implementation of multi-sectoral measures involving several institutions in the partner country, whose implementation capacities are strongly reduced as a result of the crisis, represents a particular challenge in terms of programme coordination and control. Against this background emergency measures should have a narrow focus in terms of the volume of measures implemented and the number of participating implementation institutions. Either should the number of implementation institutions involved be manageable and limited, or else the institutions should be strengthened through the temporary establishment of donor-supported project implementation units. The latter seems to be an acceptable alternative in view of the temporary impacts on which the present project focussed.

Legend

Developmentally successful: Ratings 1 to 3	
Rating 1	Very high or high degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 2	Satisfactory developmental effectiveness
Rating 3	Overall sufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Developmental failures: Ratings 4 to 6	
Rating 4	Overall slightly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 5	Clearly insufficient degree of developmental effectiveness
Rating 6	The project is a total failure

Criteria for the Evaluation of Project Success

The evaluation of the "developmental effectiveness" of a project and its classification during the ex-post evaluation into one of the various levels of success described in more detail below concentrate on the following fundamental questions:

- Are the **project objectives** reached to a sufficient degree (aspect of project **effectiveness**)?
- Does the project generate sufficient **significant developmental effects** (project **relevance** and **significance** measured by the achievement of the overall development-policy objective defined beforehand and its effects in political, institutional, socio-economic and socio-cultural as well as ecological terms)?
- Are the **funds/expenses** that were and are being employed/incurred to reach the objectives **appropriate** and how can the project's microeconomic and macroeconomic impact be measured (aspect of **efficiency** of the project conception)?
- To the extent that undesired (**side**) **effects** occur, are these tolerable?

We do not treat **sustainability**, a key aspect to consider for project evaluation, as a separate category of evaluation but instead as a cross-cutting element of all four fundamental questions on project success. A project is sustainable if the project-executing agency and/or the target group are able to continue to use the project facilities that have been built for a period of time that is, overall, adequate in economic terms, or to carry on with the project activities on their own and generate positive results after the financial, organisational and/or technical support has come to an end.