Burkina Faso: Public Works and Employment

Ex-post Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD sector</th>
<th>16110/Employment policy and administrative management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMZ project number</td>
<td>1993 65 115</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project executing agency</td>
<td>Agence Faso Baara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>GKW, Mannheim</td>
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<td>Year of ex-post evaluation report</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Project appraisal (planned)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Start of implementation</td>
<td>March 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Period of implementation</td>
<td>48 months</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment costs</td>
<td>EUR 10.7 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterpart contribution</td>
<td>./.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance, of which FC funds</td>
<td>EUR 10.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other institutions/donors involved</td>
<td>./.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance rating</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relevance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effectiveness</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Efficiency</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>• Impact</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>• Sustainability</td>
<td>3</td>
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Brief Description, Overall Objective and Programme Objectives with Indicators

As part of the open-access multisectoral programme (under the French title: Travaux d’Intérêt Public pour l’Emploi - TIPE) in Burkina Faso, investment measures were financed for labour-intensive implementation by smaller local enterprises. Altogether, the programme comprised 91 individual projects, including markets, surface drainage, urban thoroughfares, schools and health facilities. Most these are run by municipalities today and were carried out on the initiative of the elected representatives of the first 33 municipalities established in Burkina Faso in 1995.

The programme objective was to create additional limited-term jobs in urban areas. The overall objective was to contribute to the temporary reduction of unemployment and underemployment through job creation schemes in the urban areas of Burkina Faso and promote private-sector development by commissioning small and medium-sized building contractors.
Indicators were only defined at programme objective level. These were:

- Wages make up at least 25% of costs of all individual FC-financed projects on average.
- The number of projected persons (employee months) employed by the FC project based on total wages in 4 years exceeds 33,000.

In hindsight, the measures implemented do not match up well with the programme objective: Finance for regular work such as routine servicing or cleaning was not included in project design and rehabilitation measures were not carried out. A programme with the sole objective of short-term employment could have been implemented with the same quantitative impact using fewer funds or with greater quantitative impact for the same input by financing regular work such as routine road maintenance or cleaning instead of investment measures. The overall objective and programme objective are also identical as defined at programme appraisal. From today's standpoint, the overall objective should have aimed at contributing to improving the social and economic situation of the population.

The ex-post evaluation is therefore based on the following modified programme objective: The - particularly poor - population in the programme regions makes sustainable use of the municipal, social and economic infrastructure facilities. The overall objective for the ex-post evaluation is: The programme makes a contribution to improving the social and economic situation of the target population. The original programme objective set at programme appraisal will still be taken into account as a secondary objective.

The new programme objective indicator is: 70% of the individual projects are being run successfully after three operating years. The success threshold is set lower here than in comparable municipal investment funds to take account of the secondary objective of short-term employment effects. Municipal infrastructure funds without this secondary objective frequently set the success threshold at 75% to 80% and place higher requirements on procedure for selecting individual projects. In the programme under review here, a more complex selection procedure would probably have prolonged the preparatory phase and delayed the employment effect. Moreover, the warranted use of plain, local materials for employment purposes can detract from sustainability, because these frequently need more maintenance.

No indicators were defined for the attainment of the overall objective (contribution to improving the social and economic conditions of the population). Aggregate national figures can be taken as proxy indicators, e.g. school enrolment rates, ratio of girls enrolled to boys, of attended births, of vaccinated infants.

The new programme objective of improving access to municipal services for the urban population conforms with national development-policy priorities as specified in the Priority Action Plan - PAP (improvement of access by the poor population to basic social services such as education and health care) and with the German development cooperation priority of decentralization/municipal development.

**Programme Design/Major Deviations from Original Planning and Main Causes**

The projects were selected in line with the criteria specified in the programme appraisal report. The mix of project measures comprising social, income-generating and economic and public infrastructure was basically sound. From an ex-post standpoint, the market infrastructure projects should, however, have been selected more carefully and the number of projects in this sector could have been smaller as no or little useful capacity was generated in the markets. In hindsight, it would have been useful to conduct complementary, investment advice measures for the municipalities in planning and preparing projects and at the start-up phase. Requiring the municipalities to provide evidence of adequate funds for operation and maintenance at project application did not prove to be fully effective either, as they only met these financial obligations in part.

In most of the individual projects financed, the municipalities take on responsibility for technical operation and maintenance on completion of the construction work. Exceptions in the sample reviewed were the
administrative building and the canteen of the university in Bobo-Dioulasso, which fall under the purview of the Ministry of Education.

In schools and health facilities, operational responsibility is shared between the municipalities and central government. As a rule, the municipal authority is responsible for maintenance work or replacement investments in the building, while the government bears personnel costs. The municipalities sometimes finance additional teachers or midwives. Income from school fees or visits by doctors are usually retained by the establishments to finance overheads, which enables them to employ cleaning personnel or caretakers, execute smaller repair work on their own and meet materials requirements.

**Key Results of Impact Analysis and Performance Rating**

With a wage ratio of 26% and about 34,000 employee months, (about 2,800 employee years), the envisaged short-term employment effect was achieved. The short-term contribution ought in fact to have been even a little larger since local materials were used for the buildings and the labour component for their production was left out of account. Added to this are permanent jobs created in facility operation. Over 600 persons alone work in educational establishments, health stations, youth clubs and bus stations in the 42 projects reviewed in the sample. However, these jobs are only partly attributable to the programme as this also entailed extensions of existing facilities (e.g. extension of a school by a classroom). The contribution of the extensions cannot be quantified exactly. In the markets in successful operation, the municipal representatives and market traders questioned noted an increase in the volume of trade and the number of vendors.

The new programme objective defined at ex-post evaluation has been attained. Two sample surveys covering almost half of the financed infrastructure (42/91) in 14 of the 33 programme municipalities found that 71% of the number (72% measured by investment sum) of individual projects financed were in successful operation and use at the time of final inspection.

The risks cited in the programme appraisal reports can now be assessed as follows: Owing to the simple design, the anticipated risk of poor building quality has proved to be largely unfounded despite the rapid execution of the individual projects. An exception are the frequently used roofing tiles from local producers, which have had to be repeatedly replaced. The programme appraisal proved correct in estimating the risk of lack of maintenance, which was confirmed at final inspection. To limit this risk, the programme appraisal provided for project applicants to submit a maintenance scheme but compliance cannot be enforced. A complementary measure to assist the municipalities in drafting operating plans and possible leasing contracts was not carried out, although this could have mitigated the sustainability risk.

By creating employment opportunities on the one hand and facilitating access to basic social services and markets on the other, the programme made a direct contribution to improving the conditions of life and harnessing the economic potential of the urban population. The population was also involved in identifying projects either directly or indirectly via the elected municipal representatives. The ratio of the poor to the total urban population at the peak of the real income crisis caused by devaluation and at the start of implementation came to almost 30%. Urban facilities also provide services for the surrounding rural area with higher poverty rates. We therefore classify the programme as other direct poverty reduction (ODP).

The projects implemented have had no notable environmental impacts. Nor were they geared to environmental protection and resource conservation as a secondary objective. Well-run markets and bus stations with cleaning services help contribute to a clean environment, but these impacts are difficult to quantify. Very few final projects were directly concerned with environmental protection.

Owing to the socio-cultural division of gender roles, the short-term construction measures that involved physically strenuous work were of almost sole benefit to men. Some individual projects (health centres, markets, women’s centre) directly improve the conditions of life for women, however. Easier access to
education for girls, as evidenced by the increased ratio of girls to total pupils, indicates that use was made of the scope for improving gender equality in the education sector.

Since the individual projects were initiated by elected municipal representatives and since they have contributed to the provision of appropriate public services by the municipality and the legitimacy of the first decentralisation phase, the programme has made a contribution to participatory development/good governance.

In summary, we assess the developmental efficacy of the programme as follows:

**Relevance** (Subrating 2): The insufficient supply of the population with municipal infrastructure remains a development constraint. Improving the provision of municipal infrastructure and access to municipal services still conforms with the needs and goals of the partner country, the municipalities, the users and the aims of BMZ today. Since almost all projects were proposed by elected municipal representatives, they reflect in particular the priorities at local level. In some cases (e.g. sports grounds, urban parks), they have little bearing on direct poverty alleviation, however.

TIPE was carried out following the World Bank's Public Works and Employment Project, which had already been completed in 1996. Originally, both projects aimed at generating employment by means of labour-intensive building measures and applied concerted procedures and executing/implementing capacities. While the World Bank project concentrated on the two largest cities, Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, TIPE was carried out nationwide in 33 towns. On the one hand, this avoided overlaps and on the other, TIPE had a broader effect. The reform of public procurement prepared in the World Bank project, contributed to the success of TIPE.

**Effectiveness** (Subrating 3): According to a representative sample of 42 individual projects, the new programme objective defined as 'The - particularly poor - population in the programme regions makes sustainable use of the municipal, social and economic infrastructure facilities.' with the indicator of at least 70% of the individual projects financed in successful operation at ex-post evaluation was achieved by a small margin at 71% (72% measured in terms of the investment sum).

With a wage ratio of 26% and about 34,000 employee months (2,800 employee years) in the construction phase, the short-term employment effect and with that the programme objective as defined at appraisal were also met according to the figures. The actual employment effect surpasses these figures, however, in the short term because no allowance was made for the wage ratio in the production of the local materials and in the long term because jobs were created in operating the financed facilities.

**Efficiency** (Subrating 3): The national call to tender for goods and services generally resulted in market prices being charged for the execution of construction works. Moreover, the programme was implemented very speedily in the construction phase (91 infrastructure projects in four years). Efficiency deficits include overcapacities in the markets and delays in starting up health facilities. The income from the market infrastructure would cover overheads (cleaning, administration, maintenance), but it is allocated for other, non-project-related expense items in the municipal budget with hardly any for maintenance.

If TIPE had not achieved any other impacts beyond short-term employment effects through the use of the infrastructure, we would have classified it as less efficient at ex-post evaluation, since the same employment effect could have been obtained with less investment, by financing ongoing works, for instance.

**Impact** (Subrating 3): In the view of the interviewees, the programme has contributed to improving the conditions of life at local level. No socio-economic statistics are, however, available to verify this. No indicators were defined for the attainment of the overall objective, either. Aggregate national figures can be taken as proxy indicators, e.g. school enrolment rates, ratio of girls enrolled to boys, of attended births, of vaccinated infants. Based on the figures available on the positive developments, it is reasonable to assume that the schools and health facilities financed under the FC programme have made a beneficial contribution in the programme towns. With its nationwide scope, the programme has had a certain broad impact. It did
not, however, include any complementary components for planning projects or for drawing up operating schemes. No sustainable employment effect in the building sector could be ascertained at ex-post evaluation. However, long-term employment effects are evident in the operation of the individual completed projects.

**Sustainability (Subrating 3):** Generally, neither the municipalities nor the operators provide sufficient funds for maintenance and replacement investments. However, most of the infrastructure facilities inspected were in a functional condition after being in operation for six to ten years. The main weakpoints were leaky roofs or frequently malfunctioning water or electrical installations (with the exception of health facilities). The positive developmental efficacy of the programme so far can be expected to diminish but to remain good overall.

**Performance rating (Rating 3):** Weighing up the above subcriteria, we assess the developmental efficacy of the programme as sufficient overall.

**General Conclusions**

For future *job creation programmes*, we recommend drawing clearer distinctions as to the situation at the outset:

In *emergency aid programmes* primarily aimed at a rapid employment effect and not at job sustainability or the added value of the financed infrastructure - the concern being to alleviate a temporary crisis or reintegrate ex-combatants - measures with a smaller investment and proportionately larger wage component should be selected for reasons of efficiency. With this end in view, financing regular works should not be ruled out in general, particularly where the sustainability risk for the operation of the financed infrastructure has already been classified as high at programme appraisal. Financing regular works may also afford more opportunities for the employment of women than construction work, which requires heavy physical exertion. Markets are frequently cleaned by women in Burkina Faso, for example.

When faced with structural unemployment or underemployment in the absence of an acute crisis, types of programme should be selected that are geared more to the lasting elimination of the causes of unemployment and not just to alleviating the symptoms in the short term. For FC in this case, more sustainable approaches, such as vocational and technical education and training, SME promotion, microfinance or the development of economic infrastructure accounting for maintenance issues, would be more suitable than building programmes with short-term effects.

On the whole then, investment programmes should not be carried out simply for the sake of the employment effect in the construction phase. Nevertheless, labour-intensive methods are a suitable instrument for promoting employment as a secondary objective when constructing or rehabilitating infrastructure facilities with sustainable use as a priority concern.

To avoid incentives for creating overcapacity in future *municipal development programmes* aimed at raising municipal revenue we recommend demanding a counterpart contribution by the municipalities, particularly in market infrastructure (markets, bus stations, slaughterhouses). As markets proved to be particularly risky in retrospect, new ones should be planned in several expansion phases, with each phase only implemented when the previous capacities have been fully utilized. Risks can also be reduced by extending old sites instead of developing new ones. When asked during planning in TIBE, the market traders also voiced readiness to change location, but the customers failed to appear at the new site so that the vendors were forced to return to the old premises. Greater account should also be taken during planning of the very diverse demands vendors place on market stands, ranging from plain roofed lots to larger boutiques.

The municipalities should regularly allocate reserves for maintenance. For this, the investments financed from municipal development funds must also be registered as municipal property. To raise awareness in the population of the need for preventive maintenance, municipalities should provide them with clear information about the operating and maintenance costs of the facilities and the income earned by them.
With social infrastructure facilities, which usually run a deficit, the incomes should be administered directly by the operating committees and not be channelled into the general municipal budget. This way, operating committees can carry out smaller maintenance work or procure materials themselves in response to needs.

In future, complementary measures should be conducted to assist municipalities in drafting operating plans and leasing agreements. To avoid subsequent disputes between municipalities and operators, the agreements should clearly specify who is responsible for which maintenance tasks. Attention should be paid here to a fair division of risk between operators and municipalities and operators should not be obliged to execute larger-scale and costly maintenance work under short-term contracts. The contracts should also explicitly specify the rights of the operators in relation to the municipalities, not just their obligations.

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness, overarching developmental impact and efficiency. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project’s overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

1. Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
2. Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
3. Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
4. Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
5. Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
6. The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

A rating of 1 to 3 is a positive assessment and indicates a successful project while a rating of 4 to 6 is a negative assessment and indicates an unsuccessful project.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability) The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected.)

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and an improvement is very unlikely. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. A rating of 1 to 3 indicates a “successful” project while a rating of 4 to 6 indicates an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally “successful” if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“overarching developmental impact”) and the sustainability are considered at least “satisfactory” (rating 3).