

Bolivia: Poverty-oriented Emergency Aid Programme

Ex post evaluation

OECD sector	72010/Material relief assistance and services	
BMZ project ID	2000 66 308	
Project executing agency	Prefectura del Departamento de Cochabamba	
Consultant	Stange Consult	
Year of ex-post evaluation report	2010 (sample 2009)	
	Project appraisal (planned)	Ex-post evaluation (actual)
Start of implementation	Q 4 2001	Q 1 2003
Period of implementation	30 months	48 months
Investment costs	EUR 5.99 million	EUR 6.11 million
Counterpart contribution	EUR 0.88 million	EUR 1.00 million
Financing, of which Financial Cooperation (FC) funds	EUR 5.11 million	EUR 5.11 million
Other institutions/donors involved	-	-
Performance rating	3	
• Relevance	3	
• Effectiveness	3	
• Efficiency	3	
• Overarching developmental impacts	3	
• Sustainability	3	

Brief description, overall objective and programme objectives with indicators

The programme was conceived at appraisal as a self-help, open programme (emergency aid programme) in poor rural provinces of Cochabamba Department. Labour-intensive measures were promoted for repairing damage to agricultural areas and roads caused in 2000/2001 by floods and drought (Component A: Erosion prevention of agricultural land) and/or for the prevention of further damage due to weather (Component B: Road drainage facilities). The overall objective was defined as a contribution to reducing the poverty of the rural population and the exodus from poor areas of Cochabamba Department affected by unusual climatic conditions. The programme was to contribute to restoring and improving the livelihoods of the rural population impaired by drought and floods and creating at least temporary employment for the local unemployed or underemployed. Due to the originally envisaged emergency aid role of the programme, neither overall objective nor programme objective indicators were set in the course of implementation. Only at final inspection were programme objective indicators defined for additional performance assessment. The programme executing agency was Cochabamba Prefecture.

Programme design/major deviations from original planning and main causes

Viewed ex-post, the classification as an emergency aid programme is no longer reasonable. By today's standards, it would have had to meet the criteria and procedures for rapid response to natural disasters, crises and conflicts coordinated with BMZ. According to Article 47 of the Guidelines for Bilateral and Technical Cooperation with German Development Cooperation Partners on reconstruction projects for repairing damage caused by natural disasters and crises, a special procedure must be adopted to enable the immediate start and rapid implementation of measures. In fact, the programme was subjected to an abridged appraisal. The implementation of the measures was, however, delayed by more than a year. Presumably then, the programme did not contribute to the rapid repair of damage due to the emergency and/or the speedy implementation of reconstruction measures. At least as far as the erosion protection component is concerned, the choice of the measures, however, also indicates that the prime concern was not the short-term repair of destroyed infrastructure or the speedy rehabilitation of infrastructure at risk of collapse, as is typical for rapid response. In the ex-post evaluation, the programme was therefore assessed as a regular and not as an emergency aid programme with regard to impact and sustainability requirements. As outlined below, it was able to achieve at least partially sustainable results, also applying regular standards. An additional constraint is the limited data available on the impacts achieved.

The programme measures comprised two investment components: 1) Component A - Erosion prevention of agricultural land and 2) Component B – Road drainage facilities. In Component A, village land use plans were initially prepared with support from FC, which provided the basis for carrying out the following measures in eight watersheds: erection of dry stone walls for slope terraces, excavation of soakaway and slope ditches, erection of overflow barriers in existing erosion gullies, distribution or planting of seed and fruit-trees, securing slopes and dry-stone walls by planting and laying out timber plantations, including fencing.

In Component A works, altogether 82 localities or village communities were involved with altogether 3,754 families and these were also trained in the cultivation of cropland. The training activities were evidently successful as neighbouring village communities (not involved in the programme) have now started to continue with erosion protection measures on other land with their own resources.

In Component B, the following improvement measures were carried out on 10 rural roads with a total length of 374 km: construction and excavation of side ditches, excavation of overflow barriers, construction and/or improvement of culverts, fords, gabions, masonry and concrete channels as well as the improvement of an existing bridge.

In Component A, about 660 complementary training and educational events were held, particularly for drafting village land use plans with FC funding support. Also financed from programme funds were the personnel costs of the implementing unit, Unidad Transitoria de Ejecución del Programa de Emergencia (UTEPE). Moreover, office equipment was procured as well as the requisite vehicles.

Almost all the planning criteria defined at appraisal were adhered to. The design of the measures was adequate and served the purpose in full. The programme could not, however, be executed in two years as envisaged at appraisal, with implementation prolonged to over four years.

Key results of impact analysis and performance rating

For overall developmental performance, we come to the following assessment.

Relevance: The programme was of high development-policy relevance, as it aimed at improving the conditions of life for the population in an area with an extremely high incidence of poverty and therefore is fully conform with the sectoral priorities of the Bolivian Government, also in retrospect. The results chain of the programme is largely conclusive (the improved agricultural production base reduces vulnerability to weather-induced yield fluctuations, better transport links raise marketing potential and both contribute to the stabilisation or increase of household incomes). The programme design adopted at appraisal, however, conforms less with an emergency aid programme aimed at short-term reconstruction than a standard FC programme with the medium-term objective of improving the prevailing conditions of life prior to the emergency. The programme was very limited in geographical and technical terms and has therefore had no regional effect. Cooperation with other donors played a subordinate role only. The division of labour with GTZ proved useful, with TC aimed at supplying food and seed at short notice and FC concentrating on medium-term erosion prevention and road drainage. The relevance of the programme is gauged as satisfactory overall (Subrating 3).

Effectiveness: At final inspection, the following indicators were stipulated for measuring programme objective achievement in Component A aimed at improving erosion prevention on agricultural land and the production base: (1) yields for individual crops and (2) marketed share of the harvest. The limited data available indicates that both indicators have been met in part, as outlined below. As to harvest yields, those for individual crops in some programme areas exceed the departmental average. For lack of baseline data, however, it is not known whether harvest yields have improved compared with the situation before and/or without the programme. With regard to microeconomic marginal contributions, these can be expected to have improved slightly due to increased cropping intensity as well as higher average yield. Altogether, approx. 160,000 local residents benefited from Component B (road drainage facilities) as they can now use the roads for transport. Around 12% of the target group also benefited from the job creation schemes in road construction, which must be rated as a rather small employment effect. We therefore assess the effectiveness of the programme as satisfactory (Subrating 3).

Efficiency: Measured in terms of total costs, the objectives were attained with a reasonable financial outlay. The duration of implementation did not meet the requirements of a programme designed for emergency assistance and was extended from 2 to about 4 years. As a result, the planned administrative costs of the programme rose by almost EUR 150,000, for the consultant, by almost EUR 200,000. The improved agricultural land and the rehabilitated roads are used and maintained by the target group, which for the most part has a favourable opinion of the contributions made. Programme efficiency is assessed as satisfactory overall (Subrating 3).

Overarching developmental impacts: The original overall objective of the programme was to make a contribution to i) reducing poverty in the rural population and (ii) decrease emigration from the poor areas of Cochabamba Department affected by unusual climatic conditions. This has in part been achieved. While no data is available on emigration trends during its term, the programme is unlikely to have been able to basically stop the exodus of the population due to the structural weakness of the programme area. Though not verifiable, it is, however, possible that emigration would have been even greater without the programme inputs. Altogether, the cultivated land

can be put to more intensive use thanks to the erosion protection measures, as also confirmed by the reported increase in family incomes. Another contribution to improved income in the medium term is the sale of timber. A contribution to alleviating poverty can thus nevertheless be assumed, though not verifiable by data. Overarching developmental impacts are assessed as satisfactory (Subrating 3).

Sustainability: With a view to maintenance of the improved agricultural land and the rural roads, the sustainability of the programme merits a favourable assessment. The cropland and roads inspected as part of ex-post evaluation are in good to very good condition. Also of positive note is that both programme participants and neighbouring village communities have started to continue with erosion protection measures on other land with their own resources. As to agricultural yields and hence family income, there are, however, certain sustainability risks due to seed degeneration over time and the absence so far of a policy for sustainable seed improvement in the programme area. Altogether, sustainability is assessed as satisfactory (Subrating 3).

Overall rating: Based on the above subratings, the developmental efficacy of the programme is assessed as satisfactory (Rating: 3).

General conclusions

No general conclusions have been drawn.

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness (outcome), “overarching developmental impact” and efficiency. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project’s overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

- 1 Very good rating that clearly exceeds expectations
- 2 Good rating fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
- 3 Satisfactory rating – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
- 4 Unsatisfactory rating – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
- 5 Clearly inadequate rating – despite some positive partial results the negative results clearly dominate
- 6 The project has no positive results or the situation has actually deteriorated

A rating of 1 to 3 is a positive assessment and indicates a successful project while a rating of 4 to 6 is a negative assessment and indicates a project which has no sufficiently positive results.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected.)

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability)

The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and an improvement is very unlikely. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. A rating of 1 to 3 indicates a “successful” project while a rating of 4 to 6 indicates an “unsuccessful” project. In using (with a project-specific weighting) the five key factors to form an overall rating, it should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally “successful” if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“overarching developmental impact”) and the sustainability are considered at least “satisfactory” (rating 3).