

Ex Post-Evaluation Brief

Chad: Cooperation Programme for Decentralised Rural Development Ouaddai-Biltine (PRODABO) – Phase I



Programme/Client	Decentralised Rural Development Ouaddai-Biltine (PRODABO) BMZ ID: 2002 65 157*	
Programme executing agency	Ministère Plan, Développement et Coopération (MPDC)	
Year of sample/ex post evaluation report: 2012*/2012		
	Appraisal (planned)	Ex post-evaluation (actual)
Investment costs (total)	EUR 5.7 million	EUR 5.91 million
Counterpart contribution (company)	EUR 0.7 million	EUR 0.25 million
Funding, of which budget funds (BMZ)	EUR 5.0 million EUR 5.0 million	EUR 5.66 million EUR 5.66 million

* random sample

Project description: Planned and carried out in a participatory approach, the PRODABO programme was an open cooperation programme between Technical and Financial Cooperation (TC/FC) in decentralised rural development. The FC component primarily comprised financing basic economic and social infrastructure (largely construction of schools) via a new development fund (Fonds de Développement Décentralisé - FDD) and the implementation of erosion protection measures (so-called water-spreading weirs) to raise agricultural yields, accompanied by training measures and engineering services.

Objective: The overall objective of the programme was to improve the target population's living conditions. The programme objective for the FC part was the sustainable operation and adequate capacity utilisation of the economic and social infrastructure established – to be measured by yield in the agricultural component and the capacity utilisation of the supported school buildings.



Target group: The target group was the total population living in the programme area of the 4 departments Assongha, Biltine, Ouaddai and Ouara in the Northeast of Chad outside the town of Abéché, which were largely classified as poor (estimated at about 300,000 persons at programme appraisal in 2002).

Overall rating: 3

During its actual execution, the programme concentrated largely on sustainably increasing agricultural yields and on constructing schools. All in all, a satisfactory developmental impact can be attested.

Of note: The approach entailed a very complex programme design – comprising numerous components with respective specific planning and executive arrangements that called for different institutional setups. This hampered effective allocation of the available funds.

Rating by DAC criteria



SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF TO THE PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

The PRODABO programme was closely and directly connected with the cooperation programme carried out in parallel in Southwestern Chad, the “Programme for Decentralised Rural Development in Maya Dala and Kabia” (*Programme de Développement Rural Décentralisé des Départements du Mayo-Dala et de la Kabia* - PRODALKA). The objectives, the FC interventions conducted as well as the organisational set-up were largely identical in both programmes. The programme region, Ouaddai-Biltine in Eastern Chad, was heavily affected by the unrest in neighbouring Sudanese Darfur. Unlike the various refugee aid interventions in the area, PRODABO was one of the few programmes dedicated to supporting the local population.

After completion of each of their initial implementation phases, the two programmes, PRODABO and PRODALKA, were merged and continued in several phases as of April 2006 under the DC Programme for Decentralised Rural Development (*Programme de Développement Rural Décentralisé* - PDRD) until December in 2010 and then terminated early. Both the initial programme organisation and the implementation approach were almost fully retained. The present ex-post evaluation for Phase I was carried out in desk-top mode. It is mainly based on the information collected by GIZ as lead agency in the cooperation programme. If local conditions permit, an ex-post evaluation should be conducted on site jointly with GIZ.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Overall rating: Rating 3

Relevance: Within the intervention logic of improving local living conditions, improved, locally administered basic economic and social infrastructure is indisputably relevant today. It was also in keeping with the DC priorities for Chad at the time. The intervention was designed as an open programme in rural areas. The intention was to cater for the needs of the target groups identified in a participatory approach through different components; corresponding measures were to be implemented with a significant counterpart contribution by the locally organised beneficiaries and/or users. For the first phase of the programme, a pronounced priority was attached to agricultural development measures, which was appropriate – considering the influx of refugees fleeing the conflict in neighbouring Darfur as well as resultant - worsening - supply bottlenecks. For the programme phase evaluated here, the planned provision of basic social infrastructure at municipal level only played a small role in actual implementation. It remained confined to the construction of some primary schools. The parallel implementation of sectoral programmes in social infrastructure (notably water and health) limited the target groups' range of choices for social infrastructure projects. The Chadian side was unable to ensure effective coordination and harmonisation of relevant bilateral and multilateral donor contributions in the sector, which resulted in a multitude of very diverse “rural development” project or programme

approaches - with divergent planning, implementation and financing arrangements; among those, the PRODABO programme enjoyed a very high degree of autonomy.

Additional problems were:

- Lack of a clearly delineated national strategy on rural development
- Insufficient, non-institutionalised and/or non-formalised donor coordination
- Considerable differences on the donors' side concerning the definition and conceptual design of rural development and its distinction from other policy fields (particularly the promotion of decentralisation and municipal development)
- Sub-Rating: still 3

Effectiveness: Owing to the large share of agricultural development measures (about 2/3 of the amount invested), outcome achievement – in terms of adequate capacity utilisation of installed infrastructure – is measured primarily by the sustainable increase and continuity of agricultural production and productivity. Soil and water conservation measures (building stone bunds) effectively protected an area of 2,454 hectares (altogether 14,074 hectares for all phases). The restored and/or new potential resulting from hydraulic engineering measures in Phase I amounted to about 550 hectares for post-flood cultivation of grain in the rainy season and irrigated horticulture during the dry season. The latter is reportedly carried out on at least 170 hectares, with recorded yields for the main crops (tomatoes and onions) ranging between 10,000 and 20,000 kg/hectare and for garlic between 6,000 and 8,000 kg. Owing to the very uneven natural distribution of watersheds and hence agricultural development potential, hydraulic engineering measures were confined to only a few cantons. The expected 30% yield increase for millet grown behind stone bunds (+150 kg/hectare) was achieved according to GIZ information; the programme-induced increase of yields for post-flood cultivation of millet is estimated at 500 kg per hectare. Additional higher production and income resulted from the above-mentioned horticulture support. The improvements in production and income cannot be quantified reliably for general lack of data; they have, however, been confirmed as a trend in target group surveys conducted in the framework of the TC component. Social infrastructure, in contrast (here construction of primary schools), only makes up slightly over 15% of the amount invested. The school enrolment rate selected as indicator has reportedly increased to 75%. No information is available on the ratio of enrolled girls and drop-out rates. Sub-Rating: 3

Efficiency: The very high ratio of consultancy expenses to total costs amounts to about 27% - well in excess of estimates at project appraisal detracted considerably from the production efficiency of PRODABO. Leaving aside the so-called 'green window' fund administered separately by GIZ without direct participation by the FC consultant, this ratio increases to 34%. In part at least, this is due to the more difficult implementation conditions as a result of the Darfur crisis. For lack of common standards, the specific costs of the infrastructure installed can hardly be assessed and compared with the results of other programmes. The primary schools built in Phase I, however, incurred higher unit costs in comparison with previous sectoral programmes financed by FC. The reasons for this are in part caused by (a) price rises, (b) more complex procedures related to the participatory

approach and (c) relatively high construction standards.

Yield increases achieved for millet as main crop (about 500 kg/hectare for water-spreading weirs and 150 kg/hectare for stone bunds) – if assessed under purely economic criteria - have to be considered in the lower range for allocative efficiency at best; this holds true at least for the first phase. Physical yields for horticultural products are apparently good and are predominantly sold on the market. Besides, the aspect of stabilisation and/or risk reduction plays a major role for the target group, which by and large lives under subsistence conditions. Sub-Rating: still 3

Overarching developmental impact: At impact level (improved living conditions and poverty reduction), main programme results in economic and/or agricultural terms consist in the greater availability of millet as staple foodstuff for the population in the programme region (for Phase I of the programme evaluated here, increased annual production of about 650 t corresponds to the annual requirements of altogether more than 3,600 people). The income earned from marketing vegetable produce cannot be quantified reliably due to considerable regional and seasonal fluctuations as well as scarcity of data. In surveys (which, however, lack a baseline), target group representatives indicated an income growth of at least 20%. No verified findings are available on the exact number of households that benefited from those development measures. In view of the above-mentioned focus on hydraulic engineering measures in a few suitable cantons, the population in the relevant favourable sites inevitably benefited disproportionately. Accordingly, the intended improvement in living conditions and/or poverty reduction effects were scattered. Concerning social infrastructure, access to primary schools was improved for about 2,200 pupils; no further indicators (e.g. developments in learning and/or examination outcomes) are available. It is worth pointing out that PRODABO was one of the few programmes in the region to target the native population. A multitude of parallel programmes/projects - largely concentrating on refugees from Darfur – led to some disparities between them and the local population. In this respect, the programme reduced conflict potential. In capacity terms, the “grassroots groups” promoted by the programme still act as service providers in the majority of villages, according to GIZ information – despite having no official mandate. Consequently, an altogether still satisfactory developmental impact can be attributed to the programme. Sub-Rating: 3

Sustainability: Responsibility for operation and maintenance of the infrastructure supported through the programme rests with the different user groups. These reportedly make the requisite contributions, which can be rated as largely adequate for the economic investments of Phase I (above all the water-spreading weirs and stone bunds). The situation is more critical at municipal level concerning “public” infrastructure (i.e. not operated by private user groups): Contrary to expectations at project appraisal, the decentralisation process has not been implemented as planned, and local elections have not taken place so far. Neither rural municipalities nor municipal councils exist as local institutions which could function as operators with a long-term mandate. Despite extensive

TC assistance, operational capabilities of the interim bodies set up so far lack cannot be considered sustainably ensured. Reportedly, nonetheless, they have so far fulfilled their role; in part supported by NGOs, they have recruited teachers and carried out maintenance measures for the schools. However, considerable institutional, financial and technical risks remain, particularly with recurrent costs. Thanks to the lower follow-on costs, Robust construction standards for the new schools will lead to low follow-on costs, thus at least reducing the risk of insufficient maintenance in the first operating years. It is questionable The availability of substantial budget contributions by regional or central government institutions in order to ensure adequate operation remains doubtful for the foreseeable future. Sub-Rating: 3

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and overarching developmental impact. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Ratings 1-3 denote a positive or successful assessment while ratings 4-6 denote a not positive or unsuccessful assessment

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability) The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Ratings 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while ratings 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (rating 3).