


# Ex post evaluation – Chad

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**Sector:** Rural development (CRS Code 43040)  
**Project:** Decentralised rural development in the regions Mayo-Kebbi and Ouaddai-Biltine a) 2002 66 320 (Phase I - Mayo Kebbi), b) 2004 66 250\* (Phase IIa), c) 2007 65 065\* (Phase IIb), d) 2008 66 590\* (Phase III/Exit phase)  
**Programme executing agency:** Ministère du Plan, Développement & de la Coopération



## Ex post evaluation report: 2014

		Project A (Planned)	Project A (Actual)	Project B-D (Planned)	Project B-D (Actual)
Investment costs (total)	EUR million	5.70	5.50	20.70	**17.47
Own contribution	EUR million	0.70	0.15	0.70	0.40
Funding	EUR million	5.00	***5.35	20.00	**17.47
of which BMZ budget funds	EUR million	5.00	5.35	20.00	**17.47

\*) Projects in 2014 random sample; \*\*) plus transfer to Mayo-Kebbi water supply (EUR 3.0 million in total)  
 \*\*\*) incl. residual funds of predecessor programme, EUR 0.35 million

**Description:** The TC/FC cooperation programme was predominantly planned and implemented with the help of the local population. Phase I was concentrated in the Mayo-Kebbi region in south-west Chad; the subsequent phases were then carried out in Mayo-Kebbi and the region of Ouaddai-Biltine in the east, some 800 km away. FC mainly supported the development of social infrastructure (predominantly school buildings and rural health centres) as well as commercial structures (warehouses, slaughterhouses, roads and small dams, the latter principally in the east), along with advanced and further training measures and engineering services.


**Objectives:** The ultimate objective (impact) was to contribute towards improved living conditions and to reducing poverty in both programme regions. Achievement of the programme objective (outcome: appropriate use of economic and social infrastructure) was to be measured based on the targeted utilisation of 75% of the completed infrastructure buildings three years after start of operation.

**Target group:** The predominantly poor rural population in the regions (as of 2002: roughly 300,000 people in the east (Ouaddai-Biltine) and 650,000 in the south-west (Mayo-Kebbi)).

## Overall rating: 3 (Phase I - Mayo-Kebbi), 4 (all subsequent phases)

**Rationale:** Positive effects were achieved primarily with school buildings, with a trend towards better sustainability prospects in Mayo-Kebbi. There were limited impacts in connection with makeshift health centres. In Ouaddai-Biltine the security situation hampered the implementation, sometimes considerably. The hydraulic engineering measures implemented there (25% of the investments) are now largely redundant. Combined with the lower school enrolment rates in Ouaddai-Biltine, this explains the negative evaluation of Phases II + III.

**Highlights:** Infrastructure maintenance and operation was to rest with public institutions; who never assumed this role. The facilities were therefore left to the sole responsibility of the local population, which largely was and still is overstretched as a result.



## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 3 (Phase I - Mayo-Kebbi), 4 (subsequent phases - all sub-projects)

Largely positive impacts particularly result from social infrastructure interventions (school buildings and health centres); however, target groups and non-governmental bodies operating such infrastructure can be overstretched as a result, sometimes considerably. Sustainability prospects in Mayo-Kebbi tend to be rated better than in the east. Most of the farming measures (carried out largely in Ouaddai-Biltine) were effective for a limited period only. This allows for a still satisfactory evaluation for Phase 1 that was confined to Mayo-Kebbi, whereas overall results for the "joint" Phases II and III are no longer satisfactory.

#### Brief additional information on programme description

Two interventions were combined in the TC/FC cooperative programme entitled "Decentralised rural development in the regions of Mayo-Kebbi and Ouaddai-Biltine": (i) the "Decentralised rural development programme Ouaddai-Biltine " (PRODABO) in the east at the Sudanese border with the zones of Ouaddai, Wadi Fila (Biltine) and Dar Sila; and (ii) the "Decentralised rural development programme Mayo-Dalla and Kabbia " (PRODALKA), also referred to as Mayo-Kebbi, implemented in the south-west of Chad. In 2011 the cooperative programme was terminated prematurely, ultimately in part due to a lack of commitment from the Chadian side.

Both regions have been priority areas of German DC for a long time, whereby Ouaddai-Biltine in the east was markedly affected by the civil war in neighbouring Sudan (region of Darfur). Resulting security problems as a (including work disruptions, repeated evacuations) sometimes made implementation significantly more difficult. The programme was also held in high esteem there because it was one of the few to support mainly the local population, while most other donor-funded interventions primarily targeted refugees from Sudan.

Investments in both sub-regions comprised social and economic infrastructure. In Mayo-Kebbi the focus of the 140 individual development measures was primarily school buildings (61 classroom wings) and health centres (33 buildings), which were the main requests from the population. In Ouaddai-Biltine, 150 individual development measures were funded; by contrast to Mayo-Kebbi, water flow retention structures and other erosion protection measures (39) played a prominent role alongside storage facilities for crops (52 buildings) and schools (32 classroom wings).

#### Relevance

With hindsight, the relevance of improved basic infrastructure for better living conditions - together with the associated intervention logic cannot be disputed. Decentralising operation and administration essentially seems coherent – provided this is backed by sufficient capacities and resources. This approach was consistent with German DC's then newly defined priority area of "Decentralised rural development" with Chad, which replaced the previous focus on agricultural development. The interests and priorities of the population were to be considered when implementing both measures. In this context, however, the actual choice was limited to a few social and economic infrastructure areas. This multisectoral approach - with many, sometimes only indirectly interlinked components - led to an increasingly complex programme structure and a greater need for coordination. With some exceptions, the selections were made by regional planning groups that generally involved a wide range of local players. Public institutions and service-providers are as good as absent in the programme regions; accordingly, the concept focused on the target groups and non-governmental operator groups taking responsibility for operating the structures. This particularly makes sense with economic infrastructure, which is usually designed to generate additional income that can be used to finance operating and maintenance expenses. With social infrastructure, by contrast, there are generally follow-up costs that constitute an additional burden for those affected. The approach of de facto relieving the state of its responsibilities ultimately overstretched the predominantly poor population, at least to some extent. Retrospectively, we cannot clearly determine to what extent this "capacity" aspect was analysed ex-ante as regards social infrastructure (or whether the concept that had previously been applied with agricultural support was simply copied into a new sector).

When evaluating relevance, a distinction must be made between the population's aspirations and those of external actors, especially government priorities. As demonstrated by surveys, building schools and health centres was a key priority for the population, to which the programme responded extensively. The provision of secure storage space for crops was significant particularly in Ouaddai-Biltine; equally, water harvesting in seasonally flooded valleys (wadis) to boost yields was clearly desired by the local population, making it highly relevant from their perspective.

The special situation of Ouaddai-Biltine is also worth mentioning: the region is directly adjacent to the Sudanese Darfur region and was affected for years by the ongoing conflict there – among others by the influx of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees. Those were the primary target of most other donor-financed interventions in the region. In this respect, at least part of the programme was designed and implemented in a fairly fragile context. However, this aspect is not reflected in the intervention logic. Neither can it be reconstructed to a suitably consistent degree ex-post, given the sparse availability of data in general. According to previous experience elsewhere, the programme approach of supporting the local population at least as much as helping refugees should be highlighted as a positive aspect.

On the part of the state there was neither any effective coordination of donor contributions in the sector nor any rural development strategy. This meant that - countrywide - various approaches with different modules were adopted alongside each other. Consequently there are doubts regarding relevance from the government's perspective, at least to some extent. After the programme ended the state also refrained from including the infrastructure established through the programme into development projects that were subsequently launched.

Overall, we rate the relevance of all phases as satisfactory.

**Relevance rating: 3 (all projects and phases)**

### Effectiveness

In order to measure outcome, 75 % of the infrastructure were to be used as intended three years after hand-over to the user groups. Rural roads, in particular, were to be passable all year round after three years; for school buildings the enrolment rate was expected to rise to at least 70% three years after commencing operation, with girls making up more than half of the headcount. Specific indicators on agricultural yield increases due to water retention in the wadis were not determined ex-ante; nonetheless yield development can be estimated using available data.

With the help of 61 school buildings, each with 2 classrooms, roughly 7,300 children were accommodated appropriately for the first time – sometimes with teaching in two shifts. In this context significant growth can be noted for Mayo-Kebbi in pupil numbers in funded schools - along with a minor increase in the ratio of girls, which was already relatively high before. However, this was not achieved in Ouaddai-Biltine, neither in terms of overall pupil numbers nor in relation to the still extremely low ratio of girls.

A total of 45 (additional) rural health centres markedly improved accessibility for patients, in some cases reducing the radius from more than 20 km to less than 5 km. On the other hand, the (low) quality of medical care stagnates owing to lack of commitment from the state. Nothing has been added to the centres since they were handed over (with sufficient equipment), and there is a lack of qualified personnel (particularly nurses).

The measures were implemented promptly. A utilisation rate of over 90 % is documented for buildings (schools, health centres, storage facilities, etc.). Targets were just about reached with regard to road utilisation (only in Mayo-Kebbi) (cf. also Sustainability). By contrast, the intended enrolment rate in Mayo-Kebbi was just about missed with a figure of 65 %; however, at less than 50 % it fell well short in Ouaddai-Biltine. Increasing the ratio of girls was even less successful, which can be attributed to local traditions, labour demand and, in certain cases and areas, the lack of security.

In Ouaddai-Biltine the water retention measures in wadis (Phases II + III) and the resulting improved water supply allowed for two cultivation periods for the first time – but only for a short period and on small ar-

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<sup>1</sup> Although no *baseline* is available here, quality data leads us to conclude that the enrolment rate at the appraisal must have been way below 50%.

eas. In the initial periods, yield increases of 30 % (+150 kg/ha) were achieved with sorghum behind stone walls, while the yield increase for post-flood cultivation in the early period is estimated at 500 kg/ha. Three years after the measures' completion though, less than half of all structures are still functional. The reasons include silting, but mainly the damage caused by high water flows in the rainy season, which the constructions could not withstand. Damages could not be repaired as the programme was terminated prematurely. Most user committees admit that - after a few good years - agricultural incomes fell back to the levels recorded before the programme started.

The measures were implemented with the involvement of the population – generally with a financial contribution in Mayo-Kebbi, but also with in-kind contributions in Ouaddai-Biltine – e.g. by providing construction materials. In all cases, contributions were asked for - both with economic as well as social infrastructure.

The effectiveness of Phase I is rated as satisfactory on the whole. However, the widespread dysfunctionality of water retention structures (25% of the investment volume) and the much lower enrolment rates in Ouaddai-Biltine lead to an unsatisfactory assessment of Phases II and III.

**Effectiveness rating: 3 (Phase I - Mayo-Kebbi) and 4 (Phases II + III)**

### Efficiency

Working conditions in rural areas of Chad must be taken into account when assessing efficiency. With largely non-existent input from partner institutions (in terms of resources as well as expertise), high supervision efforts were required by the programme itself (i.e. consulting assignments), which impaired production efficiency. The specific costs of the established infrastructure can barely be assessed for lack of standardisation. That said, construction costs in Chad and particularly in rural areas are extremely high. Cement costs, e.g., are roughly ten times German prices and three to four times as much as in other Sahel countries. The comparatively high unit costs - as compared to other projects in Chad - can mainly be explained by relatively strict building quality standards, e.g. for schools or storage facilities. That said, almost all of those structures were in good condition at the time of the evaluation.

The economic evaluation of agricultural yield increases in Ouaddai-Biltine was rated as just about positive at the end of the first programme phase. However, it has by now turned negative. As the infrastructure is barely usable, no more additional yields can be generated. The operation of storage buildings has been a success: the opportunity to store grains after harvesting and sell them for up to three times as much after several months generates substantial profits and income growth at respective sites. Accordingly, sufficient amounts of lease fees can be collected by individual user groups.

All told, the efficiency of the first phase is classed as satisfactory; however, the follow-up phases are rated as no longer satisfactory - particularly given the insufficient allocation efficiency in the main funding area of agriculture as well as mixed results in the education and health components.

**Efficiency rating: 3 (Phase I - Mayo-Kebbi) and 4 (Phases II + III)**

### Impact

The intended contribution to better living conditions and towards poverty reduction is likely to have been delivered, to some extent at least, in Mayo-Kebbi; this is mainly due to better accessibility of schools and health centres. Having said that, the data does not permit any further assessment of impacts or education success, completing school and general health trends: – at best, only qualitative is data available, i.e. no systematic survey results or similar findings.

Economic impacts materialised predominantly by means of the storage buildings in Ouaddai-Biltine, and to a lesser extent via access roads in Mayo-Kebbi. By contrast, all data suggests that yield-induced income gains observed in the early years have evaporated due to the breakdown, neglect and subsequent decay of most water retention structures after a few positive years.

In analogy to the effectiveness rating, phase 1 has generated satisfactory impacts overall; (however, impacts in relation to the subsequent phases are unsatisfactory).

**Impact rating: 3 (Phase I - Mayo-Kebbi) and 4 (Phases II + III)**

### **Sustainability**

Given the almost total absence of public institutions particularly in rural areas, all measures were handed over to local user groups after completion, with a few exceptions (e.g. four municipal market buildings in Mayo-Kebbi). Those groups were to operate and maintain the infrastructure, making or organising repairs where necessary. Contributions were to be collected from the population affected for this purpose. The same principle applied to storage buildings (which are relatively easy to maintain), water retention structures as well as for schools, health centres and even for roads. The premature end to the German commitment was detrimental here, as follow-up supervision foreseen for the initial operating phase was limited at best.

The approach of ultimately relieving the state of its responsibilities overstretched the mostly poor population – and not only with regard to infrastructure maintenance; at least in the programme regions, e.g., fewer teachers are now employed and paid for by the state than before the programme started. The same applies to health centres. In both cases the vast majority of the personnel are also paid by parents and users.

No agreements of any kind were reached with the state for the operation of schools and health centres. In terms of maintaining infrastructure, storage buildings are relatively sustainable given their good quality construction and low maintenance expense. By contrast, parents frequently encountered capacity problems with running primary schools. In Mayo-Kebbi in particular, most school buildings are still in good condition, and makeshift repairs are carried out when necessary. Generally, population and user groups are overstretched with maintaining health centres, multi-purpose buildings and particularly roads as well as water management infrastructure.

With no substantial contributions to be expected from the state in the foreseeable future, the sustainability of Phase I is assessed as still satisfactory, but as unsatisfactory for the other phases.

**Sustainability rating: 3 (Phase I - Mayo-Kebbi) and 4 (Phases II + III)**

### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Ratings level 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while ratings level 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Ratings 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while ratings 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (rating 3).