

Ex post evaluation – Togo

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Sector: Transport and communication (2102000 Road transport)
Project: Inner-city Bypass Lomé, BMZ 2009 67 182 *
Implementing agency: Ministère de la Ville, de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat et de la Salubrité Publique/AGETUR-TOGO

Ex post evaluation report: 2019

All figures in EUR million	Project A (Planned)	Project A (Actual)
Investment costs (total)	15.00	18.49
Counterpart contribution	2.00	2.00
Funding	13.00	16.49
of which budget funds (BMZ)	13.00	16.49

*) Random sample 2019



Summary: The project included the expansion of the second (6.6 km) of four sections of the inner-city bypass ("Petit Contournement" (PC), total length 14.5 km) to a paved two-lane or four-lane road as well as the construction of a four-lane connecting road ("Bretelle", 0.7 km) from the PC to the outer bypass ("Grand Contournement" (GC)). The PC is an important inner-city transit route. It runs past the international airport and also connects to the N1 and N34 national roads. In the project, construction measures (road subsurface, line laying, asphaltting, lighting, signage, drainage, walkways) and consulting services were financed to support the executing agency (construction planning, award of contracts, construction supervision and acceptance of work). In addition, drainage channels were rehabilitated or new ones built in a small, lower-lying area near the PC.


Development objectives: The EPE's objective at outcome level was the increased and safer use of the section of the inner-city bypass developed to meet demand for goods and passenger transport in Lomé. This was intended to contribute to economic development and to improving living conditions in Lomé (adapted objective at impact level).

Target group: The users of the newly built road sections, i.e. road users (all modes of transport) and residents. The latter also include street merchants and economic operators.

Overall rating: 2

Rationale: The good results overall in the areas of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and the overarching development objective are limited by the sustainability which was rated as only satisfactory and which could potentially have a negative impact on the sustainability of the project's developmental effectiveness. The project is rated as only just good.

Highlights: For the effectiveness of the project, especially the increase in traffic volume, it was crucial that the PC and the Bretelle, the GC and another connection between the PC and the GC, the Malfakassa Blvd., were built or upgraded within a short time of each other. The rapid expansion of these important transport routes for Lomé mentioned above and the connection to national roads in the hinterland was apparently not based on a structured planning process. This was a missed opportunity to further increase the effectiveness and impact, e.g. through development planning for the eastern part of the city of Lomé.




Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 2

Ratings:

Relevance	2
Effectiveness	2
Efficiency	2
Impact	2
Sustainability	3



Relevance

At the time of the project appraisal, two thirds of the “Petit Contournement” (PC) inner-city bypass, which is almost 15 km long, was unsurfaced, dotted with many potholes and flooded in many sections during the rainy season due to insufficient drainage. During the dry season, excessive dust on the unsurfaced sections often impaired visibility. This negatively affected the traffic flow on this road.

The PC was and is important for Lomé: at the time of the project appraisal, before the “Grand Contournement” (GC) outer bypass existed, the heavy-duty traffic coming from the port was routed via the PC to the national roads leading to the hinterland. Today, this heavy-duty traffic mainly uses the GC. Today, the PC is especially important for passenger and goods transport in the eastern part of Lomé, but also to and from the city centre, even for the poorest sections of the population who go on foot. It also serves as an additional alternative for traffic between the eastern and central part of Lomé and the north of the city, thereby helping to relieve congestion on inner-city roads.

At the time of the project appraisal, it was already foreseeable that the expansion/construction of the PC, the GC (Chinese financing) and the Malfakassa Blvd. (road close to the city connecting the PC and the GC) would take place at almost or exactly the same time. In combination with the Bretelle (four-lane road

connecting the PC and GC), they not only facilitate the transport of goods and passengers to and from the port and the area around the airport, but also route heavy-duty traffic out of the city and connect Lomé with the hinterland via adjacent national roads.

The details above show that the PC plays an important economic role in Lomé. It serves as an important route for passenger and goods transport in Lomé. This is also the basis for its potential to reduce poverty by stimulating economic development and to improve the living conditions of the people along this development axis.

The core problem implied at the time of the appraisal was the poverty of a large part of the Togolese population and the associated poor living conditions. At that time, about 59% of the population lived below the national poverty line; this figure was about 55% in 2018 according to the World Bank. Even if the percentage of people living in poverty in Lomé is lower, the core problem remains extremely important. The fight against poverty is also still a priority of international development cooperation with Togo. The impact approach that serves as the basis for the project, namely that economic development – made possible by expanding relevant transport routes – contributes to poverty reduction (e.g. through improved access to education, markets, health care facilities, etc.) and the associated improvement in living conditions, was consistent with the national poverty reduction strategy at the time (“Stratégie de la Réduction de la Pauvreté”, 2009). This is still in force (“Plan National de Développement”, 2018-2022) and is reflected, among other things, in Togo's development cooperation with the West African Development Bank (BOAD), the African Union (Agenda 2063), the World Bank (WB) and the Chinese government. It is also aligned with the objectives of the Marshall Plan for Africa¹. The current sector strategy for urban mobility of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) concludes that improving inner-city passenger transport would no longer promote motorised private transport today, i.e. car and motorcycle use. Instead, the focus would be on building and/or expanding a local public transport system and – as in the case of the project – promoting non-motorised transport (pedestrians, cyclists).

The measure involves a single project. The project appraisal (PA) was carried out in close consultation with the WB. As in the case of the rehabilitation of urban roads in Lomé financed by BOAD, the implementation was based on the implementation structure created for the WB project “Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project” (EIREP).

In this context, the project was generally suitable for making a contribution to solving the core problem. The above-mentioned impact approach is generally plausible. The claim that a section of an inner-city bypass could make a relevant contribution for the entire country, however, was already too ambitious at the time of project appraisal. Yet given the importance of the PC as an inner-city transport route as described above, it is plausible that it will contribute to the economic development and improvement of Lomé's living conditions as its use increases.

Relevance rating: 2

Effectiveness

The EPE's objective at outcome level was the increased and safer use of the section of the inner-city bypass developed to meet demand for goods and passenger transport in Lomé and is evaluated using the following indicators:

Indicator	Status PA, Target value at PA	Status at final review ¹	Status EPE ²
(1) Increase in traffic on the expanded road section two years after commissioning.	Status 2009: 2,200 vehicles/day 6,700 motorcycles/day Target value:	5,600 vehicles/day 20,100 motorcycles/day Counting station 2:	Counting station 2:

¹ See Section 4.3. Here, the goal of extensive and high-quality transport infrastructure in densely populated urban areas is explicitly mentioned under the buzzword “new urban agenda”.

	2,700 vehicles/day 9,000 motorcycles/day	173 vehicles/hour 798 motorcycles/hour	345 vehicles/hour 1,790 motorcycles/hour
(2) Most pedestrians use the walkways along the expanded road section two years after commissioning.	Status 2009: 0 % as there was no walkway Target value: >50 %.	50.4 % of female pedestrians ³	Almost all pedestrians use the walkways if they are not blocked over longer distances.
(3) Most of the heavy-duty vehicles travelling northwest on the extended road section turn off onto the Bretelle to the large bypass two years after commissioning.	Status 2014: no data (Indicator was added at a later date): Target value: >50 %.	67 % of the heavy-duty traffic	68 % of all trucks and 90 % of the heavy-duty traffic.

¹ Traffic survey for the final review in June 2016 (three months after commissioning).

² As part of the EPE, a non-representative traffic survey was conducted three years after the final review at one of the four 2016 counting stations (counting station 2, southern direction) at the same time as the final review (morning rush hour; 7 am to 8 am).

³ Only female pedestrians were counted during the survey for the final review.

The indicators above are considered fulfilled. The results of the non-representative traffic survey at counting station 2 carried out as part of the EPE indicate that the traffic volume has continued to increase compared to the comprehensive traffic survey. Even just three months after commissioning, the comprehensive traffic survey in 2016 recorded a traffic volume that was twice as high as the indicator target that was to be reached two years after commissioning (indicator 1). Similarly, the indicator for heavy-duty traffic was already achieved three months after commissioning (indicator 3). The non-representative traffic survey also suggests that this indicator will continue to be achieved

However, the goal of “safe” use of the expanded section is not limited to the use of pedestrian walkways (indicator 2). Motorcycles and vehicles, for example, do not mainly use the lanes intended for them, but the entire width of the road. This could increase the risk of an accident. However, no official accident statistics were available. The issue of “safe use” was therefore addressed in the interviews. The results give a mixed picture: on the one hand, safety has been improved thanks to the better quality and the good condition of the PC and Bretelle (no potholes, no muddy roads during the rainy season) and the newly introduced road lighting. However, 44 % of the road lighting was no longer functional at the time of the EPE. The increase in the risk of accidents (faster driving, sometimes too fast, significant increase in traffic), the walkways, which are perceived to be too narrow or blocked (economic activities, parked motorcycles, cars) as well as temporarily standing water during and after heavy rain were, on the other hand, rated as negative in terms of safety.

The effectiveness of the project was positively influenced by the simultaneous expansion/construction of the GC and the Mafakassa Blvd. The fact that section 3 of the PC, as part of the N34 national road, has almost been completed in the meantime, is also likely to have had a positive impact. The expansion of these transport routes did not, however, go hand in hand with planning for the targeted urban/economic development of the now more developed areas along these roads (e.g. in the form of the targeted development of an urban district as a residential or commercial area, the planning of facilities such as schools, hospitals, etc. to increase the value of urban districts). This kind of planning could have improved the effectiveness compared to the current unplanned development.

Effectiveness rating: 2

Efficiency

Construction and consulting services were generally put out to international tender for the project. The costs are therefore based on the market prices prevailing at the time. The bid from the selected construction company was the cheapest by 14 %.

At the time of the project appraisal, it was assumed that construction would start in the fourth quarter of 2012 and that the implementation would last two years (including the guarantee phase). It was not possible to stick to this timetable and it has to be deemed unrealistic in hindsight. Construction began in July 2014 and the 12-month guarantee period ended in October 2017. The Project was completed with a roughly 34-months delay and a 23.30 % increase in total costs. The main reasons for the increase in costs were: the expansion of section 2 from Malfakassa Blvd. to the Bretelle (4.4 km) on four instead of two lanes and the additional construction of the four-lane Bretelle (0.7 km) as a connection to the GC, the higher costs of laying the supply lines and compensation, the longer implementation period, which led to an increase in consulting costs, and the cost of the fee (5 %) for the agency responsible for executing urban works (Agence d'Exécution des Travaux Urbains - AGETUR), which automatically increases with the higher construction costs.

To be able to compare the total costs in the Togolese context, the Direction Générale des Travaux Publics (DGTP) responsible for the management of road construction projects in Togo was asked for an estimate based on the project specifications (without knowing the actual construction costs of the project). Result: the DGTP estimated the current costs for the construction measures (excluding the consultant costs and the AGETUR fee) after internal discussions (calculations, referencing tender results from comparable projects) to be at least EUR 18 million. Higher construction costs were certainly considered a possibility. The actual construction costs of the project amounting to around EUR 16.3 million in 2016 are also considered appropriate in view of the good construction quality (production efficiency).

The cost increase is primarily due to the measures over and above the original concept of a 4.4 km long four-lane expansion of the PC and the construction of the Bretelle. This is understandable and justified in view of the use of these first 4.4 km by the heavy-duty port traffic and its routing from the PC via the Bretelle to the GC as well as the increasing utilisation of the PC's capacity.


The economic analysis conducted at the project appraisal was based on the World Bank's "Highway Development and Management" model. In the process, the estimated investment costs were compared with the economic benefits of the project for road users (reduced operating costs and time savings) and for the government (lower costs for maintenance and repair of the road structure). A useful life of 20 years, a scenario of average traffic capacity utilisation and an average annual increase in traffic volume of 4.5 % were assumed. This resulted in an internal rate of return of 31% at the project appraisal.

According to the traffic survey in 2016, the annual traffic volume of motorcycles and vehicles rose by ~14 % (vehicles) and ~16 % (motorcycles) annually between 2009 (project appraisal) and 2016 (final review), which is significantly more than forecast at the time of the project appraisal. The results of the non-representative survey conducted as part of the EPE (see effectiveness) suggest that this trend has continued: according to this data, the annual growth in the period from 2009 (project appraisal) to 2019 (EPE) was just under 18 % (vehicles) and just under 21 % (motorcycles). In view of the actual development of traffic since the project appraisal (annual traffic growth tripled), it is reasonable to assume that the internal rate of return is more likely to correspond to the value generally forecast in the project appraisal for a high volume of traffic, i.e. 40.6 %. This is also supported by a highly simplified economic efficiency calculation that takes into account the actual traffic development according to a non-representative survey. Against this background, it can be assumed that the minimum value of 20 % as defined in the "Road Construction" appraisal guideline will be significantly exceeded.

At the time of the EPE, there was no data available regarding present savings in vehicle operating costs and travel times for the road section. However, it can be assumed that the good condition of the road at the time of the EPE will also result in savings in vehicle operating costs and travel times. In addition, interviews with users anecdotally reported time savings and lower costs for the transport² and repair of motor-

² The costs of using a "motorcycle taxi" along section 2 are said to have decreased according to one rider of a motorcycle taxi, this was confirmed by statements of residents/users. Reasons: low level of damage to vehicles due to better road quality, shorter travel times, easier to find new customers right after drop-off. One example given was a price reduction from CFA 300 to 200.

cycles. In addition to the time savings for goods transport, users also save time.³ A simulation of the travel time savings to central points in the city by improving the road makes it clear that the greatest effects occur in the immediate catchment area of the implemented project measures (PC section 2 and Bretelle) and above all for points of contact in the east of Lomé:



Data source: road network: <http://download.geofabrik.de/africa/togo.html>; Togo map: <http://www.maplibrary.org/library/stacks/Africa/Togo/Index.html>

Due to the good construction quality and the successful rerouting of the heavy-duty traffic to the GC, the expenditures for maintenance and repairs on the PC are not likely to be significantly higher than originally estimated, despite the higher than expected capacity utilisation. The rerouting of heavy-duty traffic to other transport axes could theoretically lead to increased maintenance costs and thus to a shift of maintenance problems within Lomé. However, it is assumed that this is not the case at least for the GC, as it has been explicitly designed for heavy-duty traffic.

The project's efficiency is deemed to be good, despite the delay, in view of the very good allocation efficiency and the fact that the cost increases were mainly due to additional services.

Efficiency rating: 2

Impact

The EPE's underlying and spatially adapted objective at impact level (see Relevance) was to contribute to improving living conditions in Lomé through economic development.

Positive developmental impacts in the above sense are demonstrated by the fact that the port, as the economic centre of Lomé, is continuously being expanded and has been the largest in the Gulf of Guinea since 2017, and that the expansion of section 2 has improved transport from/to the port. It is now faster and easier to reach for road users coming from the north and east of Lomé. The same applies to Lomé International Airport (see maps under Efficiency). Goods bound for Lomé also reach their destination faster. The fact that this impact was achieved or strengthened is largely due to the parallel construction of the first section of the GC and the combination of PC and GC via the Bretelle built as part of the project. This ensures that a large part of the heavy-duty traffic between the port and the neighbouring country of Ghana or the hinterland bypasses the city (see Relevance).

According to the final review, the expansion resulted in numerous new small businesses being set up along the road, which was a step towards improving the economic situation: at the time of the final review, about 350 smaller shops and about 20 commercial enterprises were counted along the road, compared with only about 50 and 15 respectively at the time of the project appraisal. The observations made during the visit to the catchment area of the project road during the EPE and the information gathered in the in-

³ Based on the results of the traffic survey of the final review (06/2016) and an estimated 2.5 passengers/vehicle and 1.5 "passengers"/motorbike as well as the assumption of a travel time saving of 10 minutes per trip and person, about 300 days of "travel time" are saved per (week) day.

interviews with users and residents also indicate positive economic development brought about by the project. Many new, small shops opened along the road. Some merchants who already lived along the road before the expansion mentioned an increase in sales, but also an increase in competition. This testifies to the appeal of the location for customers as well. Around a dozen small bars and restaurants have also opened up in the vicinity of the Togo 2000 exhibition centre. Many new houses have been and are being built along and around the road. The increase in value is obvious. An evaluation of satellite images along the financed road section before and after project implementation also shows signs of positive economic development (higher number of mainly trucks and upgraded buildings).

Even if no current data is available for the catchment area of the project and Lomé to statistically substantiate this perceived economic development, overall it can be assumed, in view of the indications mentioned above, that the project contributes to job promotion and income generation along the second section – and thus makes a contribution to reducing poverty caused by a lack of income.

The interviews and discussions with the residents and government institutions, however, also suggest that living conditions (beyond poverty reduction) have not improved for everyone and not in all areas as a result of the project. Positive aspects included the fact that the high levels of dust during the dry season were significantly reduced and that the second section of the PC is no longer a muddy road during the rainy season. Also highlighted were improved access to health care and shops for daily and medium-term needs thanks to improved transport services, better and upgraded living conditions due to the new road design and improved safety due to road lighting. According to the final review, the expansion/construction of the drainage system in the lower-lying “Be Kpota” residential area also had a positive impact on the living conditions there by improving the sanitary situation.

In the interviews, negative aspects mentioned in relation to living conditions were that the areas in front of the houses along the road are insufficient for economic activities and that there are not enough places to park and stop. In addition, rents and prices for land and houses in the project catchment area are said to have risen, in some cases significantly. Although this is also an indication of economic development, according to various interviewees (interviewed residents, authorities, consultant), it is also said to have contributed to gentrification.

Overall, there are strong signs that the project has contributed positively to reducing poverty (employment, income, access) through economic development. All interviewees also highlighted the positive changes in their living conditions due to the construction of section 2.

Impact rating: 2

Sustainability

The sustainability of the project's positive impacts depends in particular on the following aspects: the maintenance and repair of the PC, its future capacity utilisation and the fact that the heavy-duty traffic is still mainly on the GC.

The latter can be assumed from today's vantage point. The GC has national significance for Togo's economy. Its importance is underscored by the completion of its second phase in the near future. It also has priority in the allocation of the necessary maintenance budget. Despite the fundamental concerns over the available budget (see below), it is therefore assumed that the usability of the GC for heavy-duty traffic is ensured and that this traffic will not shift back to the PC.

The traffic survey in 2016 showed that roughly 37-40 % of the capacity of the PC was utilised at that time. It was assumed that the capacity (road cross-section) would be sufficient for another 15 years on the basis of an average annual increase of 5 %⁴. Doubts about this assumption arose in the course of the evaluation. Use by motorcycles and cars seems to be increasing faster than predicted. This could mean that the PC has to be expanded earlier than planned or that the need for maintenance will increase more due to the higher traffic volume.

The independent road maintenance fund “Société Autonome de Financement de l'Entretien Routier” (SAFER) is responsible for maintaining the PC. Until now, SAFER did not have to carry out any infrastruc-

⁴ This corresponds to the original planning period up to 2032.

ture maintenance measures due to the guarantee period, which only ended in October 2017, and the good construction quality. The final review anticipated that – depending on the condition of the road – maintenance work would not be carried out until about 3 years after commissioning, which would coincide with the time of this EPE.

From 2014 to 2016, SAFER was supported in the further development of the national road maintenance strategy by an SBF-financed expert in developing sustainable road and walkway maintenance concepts and tapping additional sources of financing. On this basis, a decree was passed in 2016, among other things, to increase the toll charges that are important for financing SAFER and to put additional toll stations into operation.

According to the final review, SAFER had a total budget of CFA 13.5 billion available in 2016, which represents approximately 45 % of the estimated financing requirement of CFA 30 billion for 2016. Concrete figures about the current budget and estimated financial requirements are not available. SAFER indicated as part of the EPE that its annual budget has only covered about 35 % of the actual financial requirements for its nationwide mandate for years. It can therefore be assumed that the shortfall will remain constant and significant.

Of the available budget, between CFA 517 million and CFA 944 million was allocated to roads in Lomé in the period 2014 to 2018. According to SAFER, it can be assumed that the PC will enjoy a high but not the highest priority in the allocation of funds for maintenance. In addition, the agreement reached according to the final review that a budget of at least EUR 100,000 will be made available on a permanent basis each year for the maintenance of the PC is not compatible with the system in which the use of the available budget is decided annually at a conference involving numerous stakeholders. There is therefore a risk that the necessary funds for maintenance will not be available in the long term or on schedule. Overall, there seems to be hardly any “preventive” road maintenance, but only “reactive” maintenance, which remedies (the most urgent) damage after it has occurred.

Also important for the sustainability of the project are the activities in the surrounding area, i.e. the cleaning and maintenance of the drainage channels along the PC, the removal of sand washed up from the unsurfaced secondary roads and the functioning of the road lighting. These functions have been the responsibility of the Lomé municipality to date and have not been carried out adequately. Large drainage channels were full of sand during the EPE, i.e. at the beginning of the rainy season. The road lighting was no longer fully functional (see Effectiveness). According to the municipality, this is due to the fact that no money was allocated for the PC in the 2018 budget at the end of the guarantee period and that the tender took longer than planned after the city provided the necessary budget for 2019. There has been a contract with an external service provider only since the beginning of June 2019.

Lomé is subdivided into 13 municipalities, but has a mayor who presides over all of the municipalities. As part of the decentralisation process in Togo, the municipalities of the city are being upgraded. Elections were scheduled for the weeks following the EPE (mid-2019). The PC runs through four of the municipalities, section 2 alone through two. The PC partly seems to run directly along the border between two municipalities. During the EPE, it was still unclear to all the local dialogue partners whether, to what extent and from when the tasks described above and previously the responsibility of the Lomé municipality with regard to activities in the surrounding area (including the necessary budget) would be transferred to the strengthened municipalities – or whether these would continue to be handled by a higher-level (municipal) structure. In the meantime (as of the fourth quarter of 2019), i.e. around four months after the above election, the Lomé municipality assumes that its technical directorate will continue to be responsible for activities in the surrounding area, at least for the next six years. In terms of sustainability, this is a positive development, at least compared with the option that the municipalities that are democratically legitimised, but smaller and (still) with less capacity, would from now on be responsible for the tasks described above. The latter would present a risk that is difficult to assess and is at times significant, at least for the transitional period, possibly also for the longer term. This is because as soon as parts of the PC are under water for a lengthy time, or more often, due to insufficient drainage, the road structure, including walkways, could be damaged. However, this does not affect the road as a whole, only certain spots. The inadequate maintenance and repair of the drainage infrastructure as well as another failure of the road lighting could, however, severely impair the longevity of the positive effects.

The quality of the constructed infrastructure is deemed to be good. Despite the above-mentioned deployment of experts to develop sustainable road and walkway maintenance concepts, the maintenance and

repair of the infrastructure is still inadequate in financial and organisational terms. The responsibility for the work in the surrounding area, including the drainage which is important for the road structure, appears to have remained in the hands of the municipality for the time being. The municipality had previously been entrusted with this task, despite the decentralisation process. This would ensure that work in the surrounding area would be carried out, at least in the medium term, although similar to road maintenance, it would probably not be preventive but only reactive maintenance and repair in the event of problems.

As far as “safe use” is concerned, there is also the risk from today's perspective that this will no longer be the case in the future. In view of the already low level of enforcement of traffic regulations (speed, parking in the lane for motorcycles and on walkways) and use of areas around the road (the spread of shops, merchants and construction sites on walkways), it is likely that if traffic continues to increase, the risk of accidents will rise significantly and the objective of safe use will no longer be met in the future.

Overall, sustainability is rated as only just satisfactory.

Sustainability rating: 3

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

Level 1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
Level 2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
Level 3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
Level 4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
Level 5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
Level 6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).