

Ex-post evaluation


Support for Syrian volunteer teachers in Turkey

Title	Teachers' Incentives (Phase II, Phase III a/b)		
Sector and CRS code	Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation (73010)		
Project number	BMZ 2018 49 744 and 2017 40 869		
Commissioned by	BMZ – German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development		
Recipient/Project-executing agency	UNICEF		
Project volume/ Financing instrument	EUR 49 million (Phase II), EUR 44 million (Phase III a/b), FC grant		
Project duration	09/2017 – 11/2019		
Year of report	2023	Year of random sample	2022

Objectives and project outline

The objectives at outcome level were a) to improve the learning conditions of Syrian pupils, b) to improve the income of Syrian support staff in the education system. At impact level, the aim was to ensure high-quality and inclusive education in a protected environment for Syrian children and young people who are refugees in Turkey. In cooperation with UNICEF, the project paid monthly incentive payments to around 11,500 Syrian volunteers in the Turkish educational system during the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 school years.

Overall rating:
successful



Key findings

The project made an important contribution to its objectives – in cooperation with other stakeholders. The project has been rated “successful” for the following reasons:

- The project’s objectives were in line with the needs of Syrian children and young people, support staff and schools.
- The project complemented the significant efforts of the Turkish government and the measures of other international partners.
- Around 390,000 predominantly Syrian pupils benefited from the work of the Syrian assistants and thus around half of Syrian pupils at Turkish schools.
- The project was largely implemented by the Turkish Ministry of Education. As a result, around 85% of the project funds directly benefited Syrian support staff. However, this also affected the project’s steering options.
- Half of the Syrian support staff and Syrian pupils supported by the project were female.
- The effectiveness and sustainability of the project are limited due to structural factors and unsecured financing.
- UNICEF made important contributions to the development of quality standards for the employment of refugees as volunteers in education systems.

Conclusions

- In unfavourable contexts, Cash-for-Work measures such as precarious employment appear to offer only limited development opportunities for the beneficiaries.
- In corresponding sectors (e.g. education), Cash-for-Work measures can be used to reach women in a targeted manner.
- Educational measures should not only aim to improve educational offers, but should also take into account the structural factors that make it difficult to access the educational programmes.

Ex post evaluation – rating according to OECD-DAC criteria

General conditions and classification of the project

Since 2012, around 6.6 million people have fled war and persecution in Syria, predominantly to neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. At the beginning of 2018, there were 3,424,237 registered refugees from Syria living in Turkey, along with around 367,000 refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, among others. Approximately 1,088,907 (32%) Syrian refugees were between 5 and 17 years old and thus of school age (UNHCR 2022). The majority of Syrian refugees arrived in Turkey in 2013–2017, before Turkey built a 900km border fortification along its southern and eastern borders (Erdogan 2019). The majority of Syrian refugees live in the southern provinces of Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Hatay, Kilis and Adana, where they make up around 20–25% of the population, as well as in the large cities in the west and centre of the country (e.g. Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Bursa). The majority of Syrian refugees live in cities.

Up to 2017, Turkey pursued a generous refugee policy and granted Syrian refugees “temporary protection” status, connected to the expectation that the Syrian crisis would soon end and that refugees would return to Syria. The temporary protection status was granted by the *Directorate-General of Migration Management* (DGMM) in the respective provinces. The enrolment of around one million Syrian children and young people posed an enormous challenge for the Turkish school system. Significant progress has been made in this respect. The number of Syrian children and young people *enrolled* in Turkish schools increased from 230,000 in the 2014–2015 school year to 311,000 in the 2015–2016 school year, 492,000 in the 2016–2017 school year and 643,058 in the 2018–2019 school year (IACT Quarterly Updates 2014–2019). In the 2021–2022 school year, it reached 855,136 children and young people, the youngest of whom were already born in Turkey. As a result, the proportion of Syrian children and young people who attended Turkish school increased from 61.8% (end of 2017) to 63.23% (end of 2019) during the project period. The proportion of girls attending school was 50% of all pupils.

Under the March 2016 refugee agreement, the European Union pledged EUR 6 billion to Turkey for humanitarian aid, education, health care, urban infrastructure and socio-economic support for Syrian refugees in Turkey for the period of 2016 and 2018, in return for controlling refugee flows to the EU. The EU’s intention was for a large part of this money to be channelled through aid agencies. To this end, the European Commission and individual member countries set up large-volume support mechanisms such as the *Facility for Refugees in Turkey* (FRIT). It is in this context that the extensive involvement of German development cooperation in Turkey, which came to an end in 2008, should be understood. One of the instruments to support Syria’s neighbouring countries, in particular Turkey, was the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (BMZ) “Partnership for Prospects” (BONO), which was financed by the special refugee initiative and focused on the creation of short-term employment and income opportunities (*Cash-for-Work*) for Syrian refugees and nationals of the host countries. The project evaluated here to finance the salaries of Syrian support staff in Turkish education is part of this initiative.

Brief description of the project

The project aimed to improve the access of Syrian children and young people to high-quality and inclusive school education by financing monthly incentive payments for around 12,000 Syrian education assistants (direct target group). Approximately 250,000 Syrian pupils were expected to benefit from this (indirect target group). The Syrian support staff were deployed at temporary education centres and, after their gradual closure, in Turkish public schools with a high proportion of Syrian pupils. There they provided translation and support and acted as a link to Syrian parents. In their various roles, use of the support staff was intended to relieve the burden on the Turkish school staff and thus contribute to better educational quality. At the same time, the project offered Syrian assistants the opportunity to improve their income situation. The measure was part of an overarching UNICEF programme financed by several donors. It was carried out by UNICEF in close cooperation with the Turkish Ministry of Education. The second (2017–2018 school year) and third (2018–2019 school year) phases of the project are evaluated here.


Map/satellite image of the project country including project areas/locations

The following map shows the geographic distribution of Syrian refugees within Turkey at the end of the project period (September 2019).

UNHCR Turkey:

Provincial Breakdown Syrian Refugees in Turkey

as of 25 September 2019



Breakdown of total costs

	Phase II (planned)	Phase II (actual)	Phase IIIa (planned)	Phase IIIa (actual)	Phase IIIb (Planned)	Phase IIIb (Actual)
Investment costs (total)	49.0	49.0	12.0	12.0	32.0	32.0
EUR million						
Counterpart contribution	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
EUR million						
Debt financing	49.0	49.0	12.0	12.0	32.0	32.0
EUR million						
<i>Of which budget funds (BMZ)</i>	<i>49.0</i>	<i>49.0</i>	<i>12.0</i>	<i>12.0</i>	<i>32.0</i>	<i>32.0</i>
<i>EUR million</i>						

Evaluation according to OECD-DAC criteria

Relevance

Policy and priority focus

The project was in line with the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Developments (BMZ) objectives in Turkey. Since 2015, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been supporting Turkey – in addition to the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement – in providing services for Syrian refugees in the areas of education, vocational training and employment. As part of this, the Federal Ministry for Economic

Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been financing various Cash-for-Work measures since mid-2016 through the Middle East employment initiative, including the project evaluated here.

The project was flexibly adapted to the Turkish government's changing approaches to providing education for refugee children and young people from Syria. A distinction is generally made between three phases:

1) Emergency education programmes (2011–2013): The first few years were marked by the expectation that the conflict in Syria would soon end and Syrian refugees would return to Syria. Many refugees lived in camps along the Syrian border. Integration into Turkish society was therefore not considered necessary and was even undesirable. Syrian refugees were considered “guests”. This status did not allow them to register their children at Turkish schools. As early as 2011, the Turkish Ministry of Education approved the establishment of schools in the refugee camps. As a result, UNICEF and a number of philanthropic and religious organisations built schools inside and later outside the refugee camps, where a modified Syrian curriculum was taught in Arabic. This was done by voluntary Syrian teachers, who received compensation for expenses from UNICEF and the NGOs. The original idea of using Syrian voluntary teachers to teach Syrian refugee pupils came from the private initiative of Syrian parents.

2) Separate lessons for Syrian and Turkish pupils under the supervision of the Ministry of Education (2014–2016): Around 2014, it became clear that an end to the conflict in Syria was not foreseeable and that many Syrian refugees would remain permanently in Turkey. This shifted the focus to the integration of refugees. The government began to close refugee camps and allowed refugees to find a place of residence freely within the country. A new asylum law granted Syrian refugees *temporary protection* status, which was linked to an extension of their rights, e.g. to attend Turkish public schools. At the same time, a sense of uneasiness grew in the Ministry of Education due to the largely unregulated educational opportunities for Syrian children and young people. So from 2014 onwards, it began to take control of the institutions now referred to as *temporary education centres* (TEC). The executing organisations now had to comply with certain standards and obtain approvals from the directorates of the Ministry of Education at provincial level. Among other things, a Turkish school director was required. At the same time, many TECs were moved to regular school buildings, where they worked under a double shift system in the afternoon. This upheld the principle of separate instruction for Turkish and Syrian pupils. Starting in 2015, the Ministry of Education demanded that lessons in the TECs be taught in Turkish for 15 hours per week. To this end, the Ministry of Education recruited 5,200 Turkish teachers starting in October 2016 and trained them to teach Turkish as a foreign language. It also trained 1,800 school directors to integrate Syrian pupils. In this phase, UNICEF continued to finance the incentive payments for Syrian teachers still employed by the TECs with the support of various donors.

3) Transfer of Syrian pupils to the Turkish public school system (2016–2020): At the beginning of the 2016–2017 school year, the Ministry of Education published its intention to gradually close the TECs and transfer all Syrian pupils to the Turkish education system. For this purpose, no new children were enrolled in the first classes of the three levels of education (primary, lower secondary, upper secondary). At Turkish public schools, the children were taught entirely in Turkish according to the general Turkish curriculum. The Syrian volunteer teachers moved with the children to the Turkish public schools. There, they were no longer allowed to teach, but instead took on tasks such as maintaining contact with Syrian parents as integration assistants and served as a point of contact for Syrian pupils. With the support of various donors and, for the first time, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (Phase I of the project evaluated here), UNICEF continued to pay incentive payments to Syrian teachers who remained in the TECs and those who were now utilised in public Turkish schools. The last TECs were closed after the 2019–2020 school year. This means that the project phases evaluated here (2017–2018 and 2018–2019 school years) fall within the period when the TECs and enrolment at public Turkish schools still existed in parallel. Although the project was originally intended to finance the Syrian teachers' incentive payments in the TECs, it flexibly contributed to the Turkish Ministry of Education's change of strategy and the transfer of Syrian teachers to Turkish public schools.

The project took into account the relevant political, legal and institutional framework conditions in Turkey. At the political level, it followed and supported the Ministry of Education's strategy to integrate Syrian pupils into the Turkish public school system. It accepted the associated role change of Syrian teachers, even though this did not correspond to the original developmental objectives of the project – maintaining the professional qualifications of teachers and preparing them for qualified educational activity in Turkey.

Since 2016, Syrian refugees in Turkey have been allowed to apply for a work permit and thus work in the formal sector. This made it theoretically possible to fully employ Syrian assistants. However, during the project period these individuals were still classified as “volunteers” (in UNICEF's terminology: “*Syrian volunteer education*”).

personnel" (SVEP). They were permanently denied the opportunity to work as teachers at Turkish schools. This requires Turkish nationality, a Turkish university degree or the validation of the Syrian degree, as well as a competitive admission examination to enter civil service. In addition, they would have to compete against 600,000 unemployed Turkish teachers in the hiring process.

Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders

The project's dual objectives were based on the need of Syrian refugees for income and the need of refugee children and young people for education. As described above, the gross enrolment rate of Syrian children and young people at the start of the project was around 60%. At the same time, the schools in the regions with a high proportion of Syrian refugees were at the limits of their capacity, which was reflected, for example, in class sizes of 40–50 pupils. During the project period, many Syrian pupils still had language problems, as did their families. Many were also unfamiliar to the Turkish school system, especially as it operated according to different rules to those in Syria (e.g. coeducation). The presence of Syrian assistants at public schools was therefore important in order to create trust among parents, facilitate bureaucratic processes and mediate in conflicts. Pupils also needed support in the transition to public schools. However, the Syrian assistants had no influence on numerous external factors that led to Syrian pupils dropping out of school. These included the difficult economic situation of Syrian families, trauma and health restrictions, discrimination and bureaucratic obstacles.

The project also met the public schools' need for staff to support the integration of Syrian pupils into the Turkish school system. As Turkey had not received any significant numbers of migrants and refugees before 2011, it lacked the structures to integrate pupils from diverse backgrounds and with sometimes traumatic histories.

The project also met the needs of Syrian refugees for a reliable income. During the project period, around 64% of Syrian households lived in cities at or below the poverty line. Around one million Syrians worked in the informal sector, including 200,000 minors. They earned significantly lower wages than Turkish people in the informal sector. Their wages were half of the official minimum wage. Although the employers of Syrian refugees in Turkey can apply for a work permit, only 60,000 work permits were issued by 2019. While at least one person worked in 84% of all Syrian households, only 3% of these people had a work permit. The European Union's transfer payments for vulnerable Syrian refugees were one twentieth of the official minimum wage. Against this background, it is clear that the incentive payments provided by the project in the amount of the minimum wage were an attractive offer for Syrian support staff.

Appropriateness of design

The project's results chain can be reconstructed as follows: FC provides funds (input) that are used by UNICEF and the Turkish Ministry of Education to pay monthly incentive payments to around 11,000 Syrian assistants in the Turkish education system (output). Thanks to their diverse involvement, these assistants support access to and retention of Syrian children and young people in the Turkish school system. Through their intermediary activities, they also contribute to improving the learning conditions of Syrian pupils (outcome). This increases the number of Syrian pupils in the Turkish education system and their educational success (impact).

From the perspective at the time, the results chain was plausible, even though it was already clear at the time that both the Turkish government and other international partners made significant efforts to achieve these objectives. Even back then, it was therefore assumed that UNICEF and numerous international donors would continue to implement their commitment to improving the quality and inclusion of refugee children and young people in Turkey in school education (including the development of teaching materials and teacher training on how to deal with pupils with special educational needs) as well as the provision and use of protected spaces. The project was only able to achieve tangible effects in terms of school attendance and educational success through the complementary commitment of various actors required here.

From today's perspective, it is clear that the Syrian support staff were only able to make a limited contribution to the project objectives in view of the structural factors mentioned above, which prevented Syrian children and young people from attending school and achieving success in school in Turkey.

Response to changes/adaptability

As part of the project, there was a flexible response to the transfer of Syrian pupils from the TECs to public Turkish schools, and financing of Syrian support staff continued despite their changed task profile. However, adjustments were made late, e.g. with regard to their new tasks as integration assistants, necessary further training

(e.g. Turkish language skills, psychology) as well as the assistants' reduced number of hours per week. The Turkish Ministry of Education provided the main impetus for the further development of the measure, such as the utilisation of Syrian volunteers in the provincial administrations of the Ministry of Education and in non-formal education, as well as the subsequent formalisation of the employment relationships of the support staff.

Rating summary:

The project was in line with the objectives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Turkish government with regard to the integration of Syrian pupils into the Turkish school system. It met the needs of Syrian children and young people, Syrian support staff and Turkish schools, but was unable to address important structural barriers. The results chain was plausible. The project flexibly supported the transition of Syrian support staff to the Turkish school system.

Relevance: 2

Coherence

Internal:

As part of the 2015 Refugee Agreement between the European Union and Turkey, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) supported Turkey's reception of Syrian refugees in the areas of employment and education. In the area of employment, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) promoted various measures to create short-term income (Cash-for-Work), vocational training, improved access to the domestic labour market, start-up of businesses and strengthening of value chains. In addition to the project considered here, among other things, FC carried out a similar project in this area to employ Syrian health workers in Turkish health care (WHO) as well as measures to promote employment and the establishment of start-ups among refugees via UNDP, Danish Refugee Council and ILO. TC implemented measures to provide short-term work opportunities (Cash-for-Work), vocational training, resources for business start-ups and promotion of small businesses that appealed to both refugees and vulnerable groups in the local population. These measures were financed by the Middle East employment initiative of the Special initiative on refugees and migration. There was no significant coordination between the project examined here and the other measures of the Employment Initiative. However, they had a complementary effect, as they addressed different target groups.

The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) also supported access to education for Syrian refugee children and young people. In this context, TC implemented measures to strengthen early childhood education, extracurricular education and vocational training. Furthermore, TC rehabilitated some schools in the southern part of the country, provided further training for teachers on the topics of integration and intercultural teaching, and promoted activities to strengthen social cohesion. Around 200 Syrian assistants were also trained. A stronger focus of these further training courses on Syrian assistants would have been desirable in terms of synergy development. With funds from the EU *Facility for Refugees in Turkey* (FRIT) and the EU Madad Fund (EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis), both of which were significantly supported by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), KfW financed the construction of around 340 pre-schools and schools as well as the energy-efficient rehabilitation of further schools. Some Syrian support staff may have been utilised at these schools. Overall, specific points of contact between the project examined here and the other Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) measures in the education sector were rather selective. Conceptually, however, the measures, in particular the construction of schools, the provision of additional staff by financing Syrian assistants, the promotion of extracurricular education, and the contributions to the qualitative further development of education through teacher training complemented each other. However, due to the limited coverage of the measures, this complementarity did not always come into play on the ground.

The measure was based on relevant international standards, in particular the right of children to education. The long-standing informal employment of Syrian support staff under the construct of volunteering only complied to a limited extent with the ILO standards for good work, especially as it is generally possible to issue work permits to refugees in Turkey.

External coherence:

The project complemented the Turkish Ministry of Education's extensive efforts to include Syrian children and young people in the Turkish education system and to offer them high-quality education. Between 2014 and 2019, a total of 640,000 Syrian children and young people joined the Turkish school system. This required the expansion of the available school infrastructure, the hiring of additional teachers and the development of new concepts for the linguistic and social integration of Syrian pupils. As Turkey had not previously experienced such an influx of non-Turkish-speaking people new offers for language lessons had to be created and concepts developed for intercultural teaching had to be developed. In all these areas, the Ministry of Education made extensive efforts, which were only partially offset by the financial contributions of its international partners.

The design of the measure was closely coordinated with the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education implemented the project independently to a large extent, with conceptual and administrative support from UNICEF. Conceptually, the use of Syrian assistants meaningfully complemented the numerous other measures undertaken by the Ministry of Education and its international partners to guarantee access to education for Syrian children and young people. These include the granting of financial incentive payments for school attendance as part of the "Conditional Cash Transfers for Education" (CCTE) programme and the development of language support programmes at the *Public Education Centres* (PEC), of *Remedial Education Programmes* (REP) and of *Accelerated Learning Programmes* (ALP) for refugee children and young people. In addition, the Ministry of Education trained around 70,000 teachers in how to deal with refugee pupils, introduced an examination system for foreign pupils and expanded YÖBİS, the digital management system for foreign pupils. UNICEF supported the Ministry of Education in the design and implementation of incentive payments for pupils (CCTE) and the various language and learning programmes. The support took place within the framework of the *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan* (3RP) drawn up by Turkey together with the international community from 2017 to 2019, whose outcome 2.2. envisaged sustainable access to and improved quality of formal and non-formal education for Syrian refugees.

Rating summary:

At conceptual level, the measure meaningfully complemented the other German DC measures to promote the education and employment of Syrian refugees in Turkey. In practice, however, the points of contact were small. The measure also supported the extensive efforts of the Turkish Ministry of Education and the international community to improve access to and quality of education for Syrian refugees.

Coherence: 2

Effectiveness

Achievement of (intended) targets

The objectives adjusted as part of the EPE were 1) Syrian refugee children and young people use the improved learning conditions at the Temporary Education Centres (TEC) and public Turkish schools through the use of Syrian assistants in the educational system. 2) Volunteering improves the income of Syrian assistants in the educational system. The project appraisal formulated the following objective: improved access to school education for Syrian refugee children is ensured. This objective is not formulated at outcome level and does not reflect the dual objectives of the project (use of improved learning conditions and income for Syrian support staff) and was therefore adjusted as part of the EPE. However, the indicators have been retained.

The target achievement at outcome level is summarised in the table below:

Indicator	Status during PA	Target value PA	Actual value at final inspection	Actual value at EPE
(1) Number of Syrian refugee pupils who regularly attend a Temporary	500,000 (total number of Syrian pupils who attended a TEC or public school in Turkey on 1 January 2017).	Phase II (2017/2018 school year): 250,000	Phase II: 215,057 Phase III: 389,100	Evaluation of actual value at project completion: partially achieved (Phase

Education Centre (TEC) or a public Turkish school and are taught or supervised there by Syrian volunteers financed by FC. (Module objective indicator 1)	This value refers to all Syrian pupils who attended the TEC on the reporting date as well as those already studying at Turkish public schools. Their Syrian teachers were financed by various donors, but they withdrew from this financing in the following years.	Phase III a+b (2018/2019 school year): 190,000 This value only refers to those pupils who received support from the Syrian assistants financed by the project.	This value only refers to those pupils who received support from the Syrian assistants financed by the project.	II), achieved (Phase III)
(2) Number of Syrian volunteer teachers who regularly provided instruction and received monthly incentive payments from FC funds in the amount agreed with UNICEF over the course of the project. (Module objective indicator 2)	13,000 (early 2017, with financial contributions from various donors) This figure refers to all Syrian teachers who taught at the TECs and who were financed by various donors. They withdrew from financing in the following years. Germany's contribution enabled the continued employment of Syrian support staff after the withdrawal of other donors.	Phase II (2017/2018 school year): 11,625 Phase III a+b (2018/2019 school year): 10,000 This figure refers exclusively to Syrian support staff financed by the project. This is a subset of the support staff financed by various donors at the beginning of 2017.	Phase II: 11,058 Phase III: 11,526 This figure refers exclusively to Syrian support staff financed by the project. This is a subset of the support staff financed by various donors at the beginning of 2017.	Evaluation of actual value at project completion: partially achieved (Phase II), achieved (Phase III)

Contribution to achieving targets

The project made the following contributions to module objective 1: In the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 school years, the project financed the utilisation of around 11,000 Syrian support staff at TECs and public Turkish schools. In the 2017/2018 school year, 9,205 assistants were utilised at TECs and 1,558 assistants at a total of 493 public schools. In the 2018/2019 school year, the assistants were deployed at a total of 1,265 public schools. The Syrian assistants worked at the TECs as class and subject teachers and taught a modified Syrian curriculum in Arabic there. The utilisation of Syrian support staff at Turkish public schools was regulated by the Syrian Volunteer Education Personnel Management Strategy (EPMS), which the Ministry of Education developed together with UNICEF in 2018. The intent of this strategy was that Syrian support staff could be deployed at Turkish public schools, at public education centres (non-formal and extracurricular education institutions), at research and counselling centres (RAMS) (corresponding approximately to psychological and pedagogical advisory centres) and in the directorates of the Ministry of Education at provincial and district level. Around half of Syrian support staff were deployed at public schools from 2018, while the other half worked at the other institutions mentioned. The support staff worked in 23 provinces at primary schools, secondary schools, vocational and religious schools with a high proportion of Syrian pupils. The religious schools (Imam Hatip Schools) are general education schools that prepare pupils for work as imams. They are very popular due to their conservative orientation, their teaching of Arabic language, gender-separated teaching and the lower entrance requirements for Syrian parents, who send their daughters to them in particular.

The Syrian assistants' tasks detailed in the Ministry of Education's strategy included support for scholastic and extracurricular education, administration, work with parents and psychological counselling. Administrative activities included supporting Syrian parents in registering their children for school and entering pupil data into the Ministry of Education's digital data management system. In the schools, the Syrian assistants focused on supporting Turkish teachers in their work with Syrian parents and serving as a point of contact for Syrian pupils in their everyday school life, e.g. when there were cases of bullying and conflict. In particular, they supported Turkish teachers in establishing contact with Syrian parents and during home visits, for example if there was a risk of dropping out of school. Due to legal requirements, the Syrian support staff were not permitted to carry out any independent

educational activity at the public schools, but were only permitted to enter a classroom, the school yard or the school bus when accompanied by a Turkish teacher. At the non-formal educational institutions (Public Education Centres), Syrian support staff were allowed to provide tutoring and additional Arabic lessons.

Syrian support staff were inadequately prepared for their new tasks associated with the switch to public schools. They required good Turkish language skills to fulfil their new role as language facilitators. Some assistants reported, for example, that they had difficulties interpreting meetings with the school psychologists, as they did not have the corresponding Turkish technical vocabulary. The assistants had the opportunity to take Turkish courses at the Public Education Centres and later also online language courses offered by UNICEF. However, given the high workload of second jobs and family commitments, it was difficult for many to make use of this offer. For their new role as integration assistants, the support staff needed additional psychological and social work skills that were not systematically imparted. In the literature, there are references to individual training courses, e.g. on multicultural education, which were offered once by GIZ, among others, but only around 200 Syrian assistants benefited from them.

Overall, Syrian support staff made a certain contribution to the module objective of better access to education and improving the learning conditions of Syrian pupils in Turkey. As intermediaries between the Syrian families and the Turkish school system, they provided information about the school system in the Syrian community, supported school registration, helped with the dialogue between schools and families on issues of discipline and when school drop-out was imminent, and were available to Syrian pupils as contact persons when there were conflicts and bullying in school. In this way, they contributed to the access to and retention of Syrian pupils in the Turkish school system. By providing lessons at the Transitional Education Centres and supporting school activities (e.g. festivals, excursions) at the public schools, they also contributed to the quality of school education. As already discussed under the evaluation criterion “Coherence”, the work of the Syrian support staff was integrated into the extensive efforts of the Turkish government and its international partners to expand the infrastructural and human resource capacities of the Turkish school system as well as the integration of Syrian pupils into the school system. It would therefore have been a failure to attribute the successes achieved in this area solely to the utilisation of the Syrian support staff. It must also be taken into account that, despite the diverse efforts, around 40% of Syrian children and young people did not attend school during the project period, mainly for economic reasons.

The project made the following contributions to module objective 2: In the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 school years, the project financed monthly incentive payments to around 11,000 Syrian assistants in the education system. These support staff were part of a pool that originally consisted of around 13,000 Syrians, which was set up in 2017 as part of the formalisation of the TECs by the Ministry of Education. As part of this, the Ministry of Education had around 20,000 Syrians with a higher educational qualification and previous experience in education undergo a three-stage training course supported by UNICEF. Of these, 13,000 were added to the *Syrian Volunteers Education Personnel* (SVEP) pool after successfully passing the final exam. The pool operated from 2016 to 2021. As part of the reorganization of the deployment of Syrian support staff in the Turkish education system, only 25% of support staff will be retained from 2022 onwards. Some of them continue to be employed by NGOs, while many others are now active in the informal sector.

The supported assistants were mainly graduates from a Syrian university. These included trained teachers with several years of teaching experience in Syria, as well as engineers, IT specialists and scientists. Some art, music and sports teachers had worked in Syria without an academic degree. Some assistants only had high school diplomas. This meant that the pool consisted of both trained teachers and people changing careers without educational training or experience. Particularly noteworthy is the proportion of women at 53% of the Syrian assistants, especially since the participation rate of women in the Syrian labour market is only 22%.

Incentive payments to Syrian support staff were based on the Turkish minimum wage, which was adjusted several times in view of the high inflation in 2017–2019. This was TRY 1,603 (EUR 353) on 1 January 2018 and TRY 2,021 (EUR 333) on 1 January 2019. With the transition from the TECs to the public Turkish schools, the scope of work of many Syrian assistants changed from a full-time job to a part-time job with a scope of 15 weekly working hours. Accordingly, they only received half of the minimum wage. As volunteers, the Syrian assistants did not have employment contracts under Turkish law that included social security, but worked under voluntary agreements. The duration of the employment relationship was limited to one year in each case, so there was always a high degree of uncertainty with regard to continued employment. In response to urgency on the Turkish side, which rejected long-term informal employment of Syrian support staff at schools, starting in 2022 support staff were offered full-fledged employment contracts based on a 40-hour week, which also included activity-related

temporary social security. However, these employment contracts continue to be financed from German DC funds, so there is no sustainability.

According to Syrian support staff, the incentive payments were not sufficient to support their often large families, especially when many received only half of the minimum wage after transferring to Turkish public schools. As a result, most of the assistants reported that they pursued another occupation in addition to working in the schools. These ranged from private tutoring to working in the textile and leather industry, in construction, at the market, taxi driving, in hospitality, building cleaning or home care. For many aid workers, working at schools was therefore more of an additional earning than a living income. Thus, the project only made a limited contribution to improving the incomes of Syrian assistants.

Quality of implementation

The implementation of the project was characterised by the strong role of the Turkish Ministry of Education. The Turkish education system is centralised, which gives the Ministry of Education a lot of influence. At the same time, the vertical structures, ranging from the Ministry of Education and the Education Directorates in the provinces and municipalities to the schools, enable the efficient implementation of policy guidelines. Based on this role, the Ministry of Education largely took over steering the content of the measure. This ranged from the selection and recruitment of Syrian assistants to their further training, the creation of task profiles, the secondment of assistants to the individual schools, their monitoring and the creation of salary lists. UNICEF's role was limited to selective content-related advice, e.g. in the creation of job profiles, their supervision and the creation of payrolls.. The strong commitment of the Ministry of Education facilitated the implementation of the measure but made it more difficult for UNICEF and its donors to help shape its content. It is also worth mentioning the Ministry of Education's self-confident approach to its international partners. Nevertheless, UNICEF made important contributions based on its expert opinion to the conceptual design of the utilisation of Syrian support staff (e.g. advising the Ministry of Education, co-developing terms of reference for support staff) at public Turkish schools, which was a novelty in Turkey.

The cooperation between KfW and UNICEF went very well. UNICEF developed the design of the project with its team of *education specialists*. UNICEF was open to considerate special requirements of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). UNICEF reported to KfW every six months. The reports were brief, but overall understandable and coherent.

The project did not provide for any specific measures to monitor gender-related outcomes. While UNICEF reported on the Syrian support staff and pupils reached on a gender-differentiated basis, KfW summarised these figures and reported on a gender-undifferentiated basis to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Gender-related risks, such as gender-based discrimination against Syrian assistants in the workplace, were not monitored.

Unintended consequences (positive or negative)

During the project period, there was a profound change in the originally positive attitude of the Turkish government and society towards Syrian refugees. In the course of the economic crisis, refugees were increasingly perceived as a burden, and there were also complaints with regard to their inadequate integration into Turkish society, whereby "integration" was understood as a complete adaptation. While the Turkish government officially maintained its refugee-friendly policy, both the government and the opposition tried to win votes in the 2019 presidential campaign with anti-refugee positions. In this context, the measures taken by the international community to support Syrian refugees in Turkey have been assessed increasingly critically in the media ("now the refugees have already been given something else"), especially as there are around 600,000 unemployed teachers in Turkey. Avoiding public relations work has reduced potential negative reactions in the general public.

Although the Ministry of Education made great efforts to integrate Syrian children and young people into the Turkish school system, Syrian support staff – as well as Syrian pupils and their parents – were repeatedly affected by discrimination and xenophobia at schools in individual cases. For example, some female assistants reported that school directors wanted to use them as cleaning staff or kitchen assistants, although this activity is not provided for in the Ministry of Education's (EMPS) strategy. Some assistants also mentioned that they would receive little respect at the schools. Other assistants, on the other hand, reported that they were well integrated into the staff. When the project was interrupted for six months in 2021 and the assistants did not receive any income, some assistants nevertheless went to schools out of duty to help the pupils there, while their Turkish colleagues supported them financially from their own resources. In these representations, it must be taken into account that all

interviews took place in the presence of the school director or a representative of the Ministry of Education. Overall, the evaluation gave the impression that experiences of discrimination by Syrian support staff's – as well as by Syrian pupils – were a taboo subject that was not addressed by UNICEF and KfW due to its sensitivity.

Rating summary:

The project made verifiable contributions to its two objectives, namely to improve the incomes of Syrian support staff and to improve access to education and the learning conditions for Syrian pupils. The project was based on a strong design, and its implementation was result-oriented. However, better preparation of Syrian support staff for their new roles at public schools would have been desirable. The Turkish Ministry of Education was result-oriented in its implementation. Some measures were taken to avoid unintended negative impacts.

Effectiveness: 2

Efficiency

Production efficiency

An analysis of the project's production and allocation efficiency must take into account its dual objective. On the one hand, the project aimed to generate income for Syrian refugees. On the other hand, it aimed to improve access to education and learning conditions for Syrian pupils in Turkey. Production efficiency examines the ratio of inputs to outputs, i.e. whether the resources used have had an adequate effect. An amount of EUR 49.0 million was provided as input in the 2017/2018 school year and an amount of EUR 44.0 million in the 2018/2019 school year. The project's outputs consisted of the number of Syrian assistants in the education system who received incentive payments from FC funds (an average of 11,058 assistants per month in the 2017/2018 school year and an average of 11,528 assistants per month in the 2018/2019 school year) and the number of Syrian pupils they reached. In accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry of Education, incentive payments were based on the minimum wage applicable in Turkey. This amounted to TRY 1,603 (EUR 353) on 1 January 2018 and TRY 2,021 (EUR 333) on 1 January 2019, so that the available project funds were able to support exactly the above-mentioned number of assistants in the payment of a full minimum wage over 12 months, taking into account slight exchange rate fluctuations. While the full minimum wage was still paid for teaching at the TECs in the 2017/2018 school year, the support work at the public Turkish schools in the 2018/2019 school year only took place with a teaching load of 15–20 hours per week, so only half of the minimum wage was paid. This explains the higher number of supported assistants with reduced project funds in the 2018/2019 school year. An increase in the “output” of supported assistants (and thus production efficiency) would only have been possible by reducing incentive payments, which would not have made sense for development policy reasons and would have violated the Turkish minimum wage law.

The number of Syrian pupils supported by the assistants is based on the supervision ratio specified in the TECs and later in the Turkish public schools. This was ten pupils per teacher in the TECs and 250 Syrian and Turkish pupils per assistant in the Turkish public schools, as estimated by UNICEF. An increase in the “output” of supported pupils would not have been possible without a deterioration in the supervision ratio. At the TECs, all beneficiaries were Syrian pupils. During the transition to the public Turkish schools, the Ministry of Education specifically sent Syrian support staff to schools that had previously hosted TECs or had a high proportion of Syrian refugees for other reasons. This was 80–90 per cent for some schools. This ensured that mostly Syrian pupils benefited from the presence of the support staff.

The incentive payments to the Syrian assistants were always paid out on time via the Turkish Post Office (PTT).

In view of the significant non-remunerated contribution of the Ministry of Education to the implementation of the project described above, UNICEF was able to keep its implementation costs low. UNICEF's personnel, operating and travel costs were five per cent of the total costs for the programme in Phase II, and two per cent of the total costs in Phase III. There is also the general overhead costs of eight per cent collected by UNICEF for all projects. This meant that 87 per cent of the project funds in Phase II and 90 per cent of the project funds in Phase III benefited Syrian support staff directly. By using the structures of the Turkish Ministry of Education, which thus made a high but unquantifiable contribution, UNICEF was able to keep its operating costs very low. This made the project exceptionally efficient.

In Phase II, the majority of Syrian support staff still worked full-time in the TECs. The number of supported Syrian assistants multiplied by 12 working months and the minimum wage applicable at the time equals the exact amount of money that was made available by FC for the incentive payments in this phase. In Phase III, the amount of money provided was also sufficient to provide the number of assistants listed by UNICEF with an incentive payment in the amount of the full minimum wage at the time. However, there are various statements that during this period, when the majority of assistants were already working at the public schools, they were only employed there half-days and also received only half a minimum wage.

Allocation efficiency

Allocation efficiency examines the ratio of inputs to outcome and impacts of the project. The question arises as to whether the same funds could have had a higher impact on the income of Syrian refugees and on access to and the quality of education for Syrian pupils if the measure had been designed differently.

The project was designed efficiently from the point of view of providing a temporary living income for Syrian refugees in Turkey. The use of Syrian support staff in the education system created legal employment opportunities that provided the beneficiaries with a regular income over a certain period of time. At the same time, the support staff made a positive contribution to the education of Syrian children and young people. Although many Turkish workers also only earn the minimum wage, many assistants considered it to be insufficient to support the subsistence of a large family. With regard to target group coverage, it must be taken into account that the project only reached around 0.5 per cent of the 2.1 million Syrians of working age who were in Turkey in 2019.

With regard to the contribution of Syrian support staff to access to and the quality of education of Syrian pupils, a distinction must be made between their roles in the TECs and in the Turkish public schools. At the TECs, they were employed as full-fledged class and subject teachers, thereby ensuring that refugee children and young people received schooling in the Arabic language. At the Turkish public schools, their work was subject to policy and legal requirements aimed at ensuring the privileged role of regular Turkish teachers. From that point on, the role of the Syrian support staff was limited to assisting Turkish teachers, and they were not allowed to assume any responsibility for the children themselves. This was not only the case for lessons and homework, where they were only allowed to carry out in-depth exercises with the pupils under the supervision of a Turkish teacher, but also for break supervision at the school yard or accompanying the children on the school bus, where they were also not allowed to replace the Turkish teachers. This was partly justified for reasons related to insurance law. At the same time, they had to take on new tasks, such as translation for school psychologists; they were unprepared for these tasks and their language skills were insufficient. Some assistants were only used for translating occasional meetings with parents. As a result, the potential of the Syrian assistants seems to have been under-utilised after the transition to Turkish public schools, thus reducing the efficiency of the programme. Consequently, the Ministry of Education reduced the number of Syrian support staff to a quarter starting in 2022, while at the same time demanding higher qualifications and a more targeted use of support staff. As a result, it broke through the dual objective of the project that had been in effect until then, which had not only focused on the contribution of support staff to the education system, but also on creating job opportunities for as many Syrian refugees as possible.

In principle, the importance of Syrian support staff at Turkish public schools with a high proportion of Syrian pupils is undisputed and is also recognised by the Ministry of Education, above all because of their role as a “bridge” between the school and the parents. Following the successful transition of Syrian pupils to Turkish public schools in 2019, it might have been more efficient to anticipate the change in design that took place in 2022 and to employ fewer but better qualified assistants with a clearer range of tasks. The resulting funds could possibly have been invested in reinforcing Syrian children and young people’s language development. However, this observation no longer concerns Phases II and III of the project considered here.

Rating summary:

With a share of 87–90 per cent of the project funds received directly by the beneficiaries, the project's production efficiency was very good.¹ Allocation efficiency deteriorated slightly after the transition to Turkish public schools but remained good. Overall, the measure's efficiency is good.

Efficiency: 2

Overarching developmental Impact

Overarching developmental changes (intended)

The adapted target of the EPE was "To ensure high-quality and inclusive education in a protected environment for Syrian refugee children and young people in Turkey." This corresponds to the overall objective of the UNICEF programme, of which the project was part.

The project proposal does not contain any indicators at impact level. However, there are various statistics on the integration of Syrian children and young people into the Turkish education system, as well as studies on the income development of beneficiaries of Cash-for-Work measures in Turkey. These are used here to assess the overarching developmental impacts of the project.

Between 2014 and 2019, the number of Syrian children and adolescents of compulsory school age (5–17 years) in Turkey increased significantly from 756,000 to 1,047,536 due to influx and births. At the same time, the absolute number of Syrian pupils increased from 230,000 in the 2014/2015 school year to 643,058 in the 2018/2019 school year. As a result, the *gross enrolment rate* also increased from 30% in the 2014/2015 school year to 61.4% in the 2018/2019 school year. Despite these successes, 38.6% of Syrian children and young people did not attend school at the end of the project period (2019). While in the school years 2014/2015 to 2016/2017 the majority of Syrian students were still attending TECs where they were taught in Arabic, during the project period (2017/2018 - 2018/2019) most Syrian students were already attending public schools. (see Fig. 2).


Fig. 2: Absolute number of Syrian refugees of compulsory school age, number of Syrian pupils in public schools and TECs, enrolment rate (2014/2015 – 2018/2019)

Academic year	Turkish Public Schools	Temporary Education Centres	TOTAL	School-age population	Gross Enrolment Rate
2014-2015	40,000	190,000	230,000	756,000	30.0%
2015-2016	62,357	248,902	311,259	834,842	37.0%
2016-2017*	201,505	291,039	492,544	833,039	59.0%
2017-2018**	387,849	222,429	610,278	976,200	62.5%
2018-2019***	552,546	90,512	643,058	1,047,536	61.4%

The gross enrolment rate varied greatly between the different school levels (see Fig. 3). In the 2018/2019 school year, almost all Syrian children (95.5%) attended primary school (grades 1–4), while just over half (57.7%) still attended lower secondary school (grades 5–8) and 26.8% attended upper secondary school (grades 9–12). This indicates that high school dropout rates increase with the age of the pupil.

Fig. 3: Gross enrolment rate of Syrian pupils according to school level in the 2018/2019 school year

¹ An assessment of the costs per educational unit (per pupil) is not possible due to the difference in activities at the TEC and the Turkish public schools and the different supervision ratios. Therefore, costs per educational unit cannot be reliably determined.



Source: Ministry of National Education / UNICEF 2019

It should be noted that access to education for Syrian children and young people improved during the project period – measured by the gross school enrolment rate. This continued a long-term trend that began in 2014 and extended beyond the project period. However, almost 40% of Syrian children and young people of compulsory school age did not attend school during the project period, especially in the lower and upper secondary school age groups.

There is little information available on the quality of the educational programme offered to Syrian pupils at TECs and public Turkish schools. In the early years, the TECs made an important contribution to the education of Syrian children and young people, but they were also fraught with problems. Outside the refugee camps, the TECs were often housed in unsuitable buildings that were too small or they used existing school buildings in the afternoon, but were not allowed to use the infrastructure of these schools (e.g. gymnasium, library, subject rooms, smart-boards). This shortened the available teaching time, and there was a lack of suitable books and teaching materials. The TECs were each chaired by a Turkish school director. The lessons consisted of 15 weekly Turkish lessons given by Turkish teachers employed by the EU's PICTES programme and 15 weekly general educational lessons in Arabic by voluntary Syrian teachers. There was a significant difference in salary and status between Turkish and Syrian teachers, and Syrian teachers were also exposed to the arbitrary behaviour of Turkish school management. This reduced the motivation of some teachers. Furthermore, not all volunteer teachers had educational qualifications, which affected the quality of their teaching. In principle, the TECs represented a parallel educational structure that opposed the integration of refugee children and young people into Turkish society.

With regard to the situation at the Turkish public schools, it can be seen from the interviews as part of the evaluation mission that a certain segregation has taken place in the Turkish school system. According to this, the proportion of Syrian pupils in schools in disadvantaged neighbourhoods is 80–97 percent, while there are no Syrian pupils in public schools in wealthier areas. The class sizes in the schools attended by refugees are 40–50 pupils, which makes good teaching difficult. Despite various language promotion measures, many Syrian pupils have difficulty communicating well in Turkish and are therefore unable to follow lessons fully. Many Turkish parents therefore believe that the presence of Syrian pupils impairs the quality of teaching at schools and try to enrol their children in schools without refugees.

The discussions as part of the evaluation mission and the literature indicate that Syrian children and young people were not able to benefit sufficiently from the available educational programme for various reasons. One key factor is the economic situation of many Syrian families, who cannot afford the clothes they need to attend school (especially winter clothes), school supplies and transport costs to school. Poor clothing can also lead to bullying by pupils and ultimately to school dropout. Starting in lower secondary school, many girls and boys have to work before or after school and therefore have little time for homework or exam preparation. The interviewed school directors reported problems with the attendance of Syrian pupils who were missing around 15–20% of school time. Many would come without books or homework or be so tired that they would fall asleep in class. Older young people need to work full-time to support their families economically. Similarly, for economic and possibly

cultural reasons, some girls marry as early as the age of 12 and leave school. Another problem is discrimination and bullying of Syrian pupils in mixed schools. Due to their experiences of war and displacement as well as personal trauma and losses in the family, many refugee pupils are particularly vulnerable to such hostility and often react by dropping out of school. Many of them themselves exhibit psychological abnormalities or social behavioural problems. In their families, they often receive little support, especially as the parents often have several jobs at the same time to secure the family's survival. There was no adequate psychological care available for these children.

With regard to the economic and social situation of the Syrian support staff, the results of the focus group discussions with Syrian assistants as part of this evaluation underline the conclusions of the evaluation of this project published by DEVAL in 2021. The situation of the support staff remained precarious during the project period. According to Syrian support staff, the amount of incentive payments, which were based on the Turkish minimum wage but were always increased with a delay, was not sufficient to support their families. For this reason, almost all male assistants and many women took on an additional job, which resulted in a high degree of strain and impaired teaching quality. Many Syrian assistants compared their own situation with the Turkish teachers employed by the PICTES programme, who were offered three times the salary and extensive training opportunities. In addition, there was no social security protection for the "volunteer work" of Syrian support staff. Despite the overall duration of FC support for Syrian assistants over several years, they perceived their professional situation as very uncertain. This was due to the lack of regular employment contracts, the lack of clarity about their social security, the lack of protection against termination, short-term contract extensions, the repeated restructuring of the programme and the lack of work certificates. The integration of Syrian support staff in public schools was different and not always optimal. Some reported experiences of discrimination and lack of involvement in the staff, while others shared very positive experiences. Many suffered from the arbitrariness of the school administrations, which did not always assign them appropriate tasks and often threatened dismissal in the event of conflicts. In view of this vulnerable position of Syrian support staff, there was no complaints mechanism through which the assistants could contact UNICEF or KfW directly in the event of problems. Regarding their self-image, many Syrian support staff regretted the transition from independent teaching at the TECs to a narrow range of support activities at public schools. Many viewed this as professional degradation and regretted the lack of respect they were shown at public schools. In summary, the economic and social situation of the support staff improved only to a limited extent during the project period.

Contribution to overarching developmental changes (intended)

The project made limited contributions to the observable overarching development policy changes with regard to access to and the quality of education for Syrian children and young people, as well as the socio-economic situation of Syrian support staff.

At the TECs, volunteer Syrian teachers directly contributed to ensuring the educational programme for Syrian pupils by providing teaching in the Arabic language. At the public schools, the Syrian support staff primarily contributed to securing access to education (e.g. supporting Syrian parents in school registration) and to preventing pupils from dropping out of school. Many described the assistants as a "bridge" between the school and the Syrian families. Important tasks include cooperation with Syrian parents, monitoring the presence of Syrian pupils, settling disputes in the school yard, intervening in bullying cases and providing support to younger pupils on their way to school. By supporting community activities at the schools, the support staff also contributed to the integration of Syrian pupils into the school community. They also supported the psychological care of pupils through translation activities. However, the effectiveness of their work remained limited in the face of structural problems. These include the overcrowding of schools, the lack of adequate psychosocial services for refugee pupils, the difficult economic situation of Syrian families, tensions between the Turkish and Syrian population, and the segregation of Syrian refugees in Turkish society.

The monthly incentive payments to Syrian support staff made an important contribution to their families' livelihoods, but were not sufficient, especially as payments were cut in half after the transition to public schools. As a result, additional professional activity, often in the low wage range, became necessary. The "volunteer" employment relationship was characterised by great uncertainty and a lack of fundamental rights and social security. Thus, the project made a certain contribution to stabilising the economic situation of the Syrian support staff, but was not able to contribute to overcoming their precarious status in general.

The project addressed Syrian refugee children and young people in Turkey, who are a particularly vulnerable group. Due to its design, however, it was not able to reach the most vulnerable among them, who are unable to attend school for various reasons.

Contribution to impact (unintended)

The centralised education system plays an important role in the multi-ethnic Turkish state's nation building. This is why education places great emphasis on teaching Turkish language and patriotic values. As a result, the Ministry of Education aimed to quickly integrate Syrian pupils into the Turkish education system. Refugees were not only required to integrate into Turkish society, but also to quickly adjust to it. This contradicted the desire of many Syrian parents to teach their children Arabic language and writing in the hope of soon returning to Syria. By supporting the Syrian pupils' transition from the TECs to the Turkish school system, the project indirectly supported the Turkish government's adaptation policy.

The public image of the project is often misleading. For example, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) website says: "The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's (BMZ) Cash-for-Work programme has financed the salaries of more than 12,000 teachers for the fifth consecutive school year. This enabled around 337,000 children to be taught during the 2020 school year." (Source (German only): <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/cash-for-work/beispiele-tuerkei-8604>, consulted on 18 December 2022). Three years after the closure of the TECs, the term "teachers" is still used, although it is Turkey's official policy to use these as assistants who may only enter a classroom if accompanied by a Turkish teacher. The claim that the utilisation of Syrian assistants facilitated the education of 337,000 children is also incorrect, as they are taught exclusively by regular Turkish teachers. At the same time, it hides Turkey's extensive counterpart contribution to the integration of Syrian children and young people into the Turkish school system as well as the contributions of Turkey's other international partners. There is a risk that the Turkish side will not appreciate this kind of public image of the project, which could affect future cooperation between Germany and Turkey in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Summary of the rating:

The utilisation of Syrian support staff made a positive contribution to teaching Syrian children and young people in the TECs and to improving the learning environment at Turkish public schools. However, due to numerous structural problematic factors, this contribution had only a limited impact. The incentive payments contributed to the Syrian support staff's household incomes, but their situation remained precarious for years under the construct of "volunteering".

Impact: 3

Sustainability

Capacities of participants and stakeholders

The project enabled Syrian support staff, many of whom had training in education, to continue working in their profession. After the switch to public Turkish schools, however, they were no longer allowed to work independently. The support staff did not receive any further training opportunities during the project period, although working at Turkish public schools required new skills such as good Turkish language skills, psycho-social support, social work and conflict management. As a result, the support activity did not enable Syrians to develop professionally. It was seen more as a career degradation (which would have also occurred if they took on alternative jobs in the informal sector). The Ministry of Education did not issue any employer references to the assistants that verified they worked as assistants and that could be used for later applications. As a result, there was no improvement in the professional prospects of Syrian support staff at the end of the programme.

The project did not have a clear exit strategy. The main changes to the programme were made at the initiative of the Turkish Ministry of Education. In 2021, the ministry came to the conclusion that only a quarter (2,500) of the original 12,000 Syrian assistants were still needed for integration tasks. From 2022, they were offered regular employment via the Turkish Red Cross, but this will continue to be financed by FC. The other Syrian assistants were offered language courses at short notice after their dismissal and – after five years at Turkish schools – training on "Turkish work culture", which was intended to support the application process. Some support staff continued to be employed by NGOs in the non-formal education sector – also with FC financing. However, many had to take on informal jobs in the low-wage sector (e.g. textile factories, taxi drivers, goods carriers). As a result, the project was unable to build a bridge between the support staff and permanent, qualified employment.

The Ministry of Education appreciated the work of Syrian support staff at the public schools and therefore agreed to extend the project several times. However, after the FC financing expires, the Turkish education administration is not expected to provide independent financing for the support staff. Rather, the Ministry of Education argues that the work of the support staff will no longer be necessary in the foreseeable future due to the continuously improving Turkish language skills of Syrian pupils. The Ministry of Education places particular emphasis on the translation activities of Syrian support staff and does not take into account their more complex role as integration assistants for Syrian refugees.

It is plausible that some Syrian pupils have been attending school for longer due to the Syrian support staff's commitment to preventing early school leaving and have found a better learning environment there. However, it is questionable whether the presence of Syrian support staff alone is sufficient to prevent early school leaving if external factors such as poverty and discrimination stand in the way. Nevertheless, it is plausible that school attendance will positively impact Syrian pupils' lives in the long-term and increase their resilience, even though it is difficult for many to directly utilise the value of attending school in the face of the economic crisis and discrimination.

Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

The professional prospects of Syrian support staff did not improve significantly as a result of the project, the contribution of which is therefore limited in this regard. A stronger focus on further linguistic and technical training for the support staff would have been helpful here. At the same time, an exit strategy could have supported the development of alternative professional prospects at an earlier stage. However, this would have been difficult to implement, as UNICEF had largely left the implementation of the measure to the Ministry of Education and only made a small contribution with regard to the content. In turn, the Ministry of Education had no developmental interest in the professional future of the support staff.

The Ministry of Education is also not interested in the long-term financing of Syrian support staff from its own funds. Instead, the integration work will be carried out by the school psychologists present at each school in the future. As a result, the project was unable to make a lasting contribution to opening up the homogeneous Turkish education system to groups of different origins and creating corresponding structures.

By financing teachers at the TECs and Syrian support staff at Turkish public schools, the project contributed to teaching and improving the learning conditions of Syrian pupils in Turkey.

Durability of impacts over time

There is no long-term financing for the project. As a development-oriented transitional aid measure, the project aimed to temporarily provide income. It is unlikely that the programme will continue after the FC support expires.

The duration of the impacts achieved is mainly limited to the project term. During this period, Syrian support staff were able to make positive contributions to the education and school integration of Syrian refugee children and young people. They will benefit from their schooling in the long term. The positive impacts of the project on the income of Syrian support staff and the capacities of Turkish schools to accommodate refugee pupils will come to an end with the discontinuation of the FC contribution. The desire for professional activity may remain for the former female assistants, but no data is available on this.

Summary of the rating:

The impacts of the project are limited to the project period, as is usual for Cash-for-Work measures. It was not possible to create longer-term prospects for Syrian support staff or schools with a high proportion of Syrian pupils. As an educational measure, the project probably contributed to long-term positive effects for the children and young people who were enrolled in school.

Sustainability: 3

Overall rating:

Phases II (BMZ 2017 408 69) and III a/b (BMZ 2018 497 44) of the project "Teachers' Incentives" are evaluated together here, as they were designed identically and their impacts cannot be differentiated from one another. In line with its dual objectives, the project made positive contributions to the income of Syrian support staff and to

the school attendance of Syrian refugee children and young people in Turkey. It was largely in line with the objectives of the German and Turkish governments as well as some needs of Syrian children and young people as well as schools. Implementation of the measure was mainly in the hands of the Turkish Ministry of Education, which proved to be very efficient, but also limited the steering options. The project supported the Turkish government's own efforts to integrate Syrian children and young people into the Turkish school system and contributed to its positive development. The duration of the project impacts is mainly limited to the project period; independent financing of the measure by Turkey is improbable.

Overall rating: 2

Contributions to the 2030 Agenda

The project aimed at Sustainable Development Goals 1 (No poverty) and 4 (Quality education). Contributions were also made to Sustainable Development Goals 5 (Gender equality) and 10 (Reduced inequalities). The design of the measure was based on the use of the existing structures of the education administration, which also limited steering options. With its dual objectives, the project pursued a holistic approach to social and economic development. With the Syrian children, young people and adults, the project addressed a particularly vulnerable group, but was unable to reach the most vulnerable among them who did not attend school or did not have a higher-quality education. Support for the project was provided to its beneficiaries from the top down. They did not have any co-determination, consultation or complaint mechanisms, which contributed, among other things, to the precarious situation of Syrian support staff. It is also unclear to what extent the Syrian support staff's work was monitored for quality in the interest of protecting Syrian pupils. Given the political, legal and economic conditions in Turkey, the project was unable to open up long-term prospects for Syrian support staff and Syrian pupils, meaning that its contribution to their resilience remained limited. *Leitfrage: Welchen Beitrag leistet die Maßnahme zur Umsetzung der Prinzipien der Agenda 2030 für Nachhaltige Entwicklung?*

Project-specific strengths and weaknesses as well as cross-project conclusions and lessons learned

The project had the following strengths in particular:

- ✓ With the dual objective of increasing Syrian assistants' incomes and improving the learning conditions of Syrian pupils, the project met the needs of Syrian refugees in Turkey.
- ✓ The project complemented the Turkish government's own efforts and the measures taken by other donors to integrate Syrian children and young people into the Turkish education system.
- ✓ Around half of Syrian support staff were women, which is a very good figure in view of the traditionally low labour force participation rate of Syrian women.
- ✓ The Syrian support staff provided an important bridge between the Syrian families and the Turkish school system, thereby fulfilling a function that could only be performed by them. Their efforts at least delayed pupils from leaving school.
- ✓ In Phase III a/b (2018/2019 school year), the project reached around 390,000 predominantly Syrian pupils, which corresponded to around half of all Syrian pupils who attended a Turkish school. As a result, the project achieved a high level of coverage.
- ✓ The project was implemented almost entirely via the existing structures of the Ministry of Education, which contributed to a high level of efficiency. This meant that 85–90% of the project funds could be used for incentive payments to Syrian support staff.
- ✓ The project contributed to the continuous increase in the gross enrolment rate of Syrian children and young people during the project period.

The following weaknesses were identified:

- Syrian support staff were not adequately prepared for their new tasks at Turkish public schools. They would have benefited from specialist language courses as well as further training on psycho-social support for traumatised children and young people, on social work with refugee families, conflict management and the protection of children and young people. At the same time, there was no system for quality assurance of the Syrian support staff's work.

- Syrian assistants encountered reservations and discrimination at some schools, from which they were largely unprotected, as their continued employment depended on the goodwill of the respective school administrators. During the project period, there was no complaints mechanism to which Syrian support staff could turn in the event of problems.
- Due to a lack of labour rights and social security, the situation of Syrian support staff employed as “volunteers” remained precarious during the project period. Most assistants had a second job to make ends meet.
- Implementation of the project by the Turkish Ministry of Education was very efficient, but also reduced KfW’s and UNICEF’s steering options. The Syrian support staff or corresponding stakeholder representatives were not involved in the design of the project. The exit strategy implemented in 2021 proved to be chaotic and destroyed trust among Syrian support staff.

The project did not reach the 40% of Syrian children and young people of compulsory school age who did not attend school. Conclusions and lessons learned:

- Even in countries with a low female labour force participation rate, it is possible to reach women with Cash-for-Work measures if these take place in sectors with a high proportion of women, such as education or health.
- The contribution of long-term Cash-for-Work measures to improve the employment prospects of refugees is also limited. External factors such as legal requirements, economic crises and discrimination on the labour market make it difficult for even well-educated refugees with professional experience to take up work commensurate with their training.
- Long-term Cash-for-Work measures are precarious employment relationships that offer only limited development opportunities for the beneficiaries. Adequate labour rights can contribute to greater stability for beneficiaries and thus improve the effectiveness of incentive payments.
- Measures to promote access to education for refugee children and young people should not only aim to improve educational programmes, but should also address those factors that prevent children and young people from using this educational programme. These include the economic situation of refugee families, psycho-social stress and trauma as well as experiences of discrimination and bullying at schools.

Evaluation approach and methods

Methodology of the ex-post-evaluation

The ex-post-evaluation follows the methodology of a rapid appraisal, which is a data-supported qualitative contribution analysis and constitutes an expert judgement. This approach ascribes impacts to the project through plausibility considerations which are based on a careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. This also includes – when possible – the use of digital data sources and the use of modern technologies (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). The reasons for any contradicting information are investigated and attempts are made to clarify such issues and base the evaluation on statements that can be confirmed by several sources of information wherever possible (triangulation).

Documents:

- in-house project documents (project proposal, annual reporting, final inspections), final reports from UNICEF, strategy papers from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Turkish government, evaluations of similar projects in Turkey's education sector, scientific studies.

Data sources and analysis tools:

- Statistics on the educational situation of refugee children and young people in Turkey (sources: UNICEF, Turkish Ministry of Education)

Interview partners:

- Interviews with the Ministry of Education in Ankara, the provincial directorates of the Ministry of Education in Gaziantep and Izmir, interviews and focus group discussions with school directors and Syrian support staff

The analysis of impacts is based on assumed causal relationships, documented in the results matrix developed during the project appraisal and, if necessary, updated during the ex post evaluation. The evaluation report sets out arguments as to why the influencing factors in question were identified for the experienced effects and why the project under investigation was likely to make the contribution that it did (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure and its influence on results is taken into account. The conclusions are reported in relation to the availability and quality of the data. An evaluation concept is the frame of reference for the evaluation.

On average, the methods offer a balanced cost-benefit ratio for project evaluations that maintains a balance between the knowledge gained and the evaluation costs, and allows an assessment of the effectiveness of FC projects across all project evaluations. The individual ex post evaluation therefore does not meet the requirements of a scientific assessment in line with a clear causal analysis.

The following aspects limit the evaluation:

- The Ministry of Education selected the interviewees and schools to visit in advance. Further visits and discussions were not permitted.
- A representative from the Ministry of Education or the provincial directorates was present at all individual meetings and focus group discussions. This also made it difficult to have an open conversation. Sensitive points were omitted so as not to jeopardise the interview partners. It is therefore possible that the evaluator has not heard important critical points.

Methods used to evaluate project success

To evaluate the project according to OECD-DAC criteria, a six-step scale is used for all criteria except for the sustainability criterion. The scale is as follows:

- Level 1** very successful: result that clearly exceeds expectations
- Level 2** successful: fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
- Level 3** moderately successful: project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
- Level 4** moderately unsuccessful: significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
- Level 5** unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
- Level 6** highly unsuccessful: the project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all six individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "moderately successful" (level 3).

Publication details

Contact:

FC E
Evaluation department of KfW Development Bank
FZ-Evaluierung@kfw.de

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KfW Group
Palmengartenstrasse 5–9
60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany

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Target system and indicators annex

Project objective at outcome level		Rating of appropriateness (former and current view)			
During project appraisal: Improved access to school education for Syrian refugee children is secured.		The project pursued a dual objective, namely to increase the income of Syrian volunteer teachers deployed in education and to improve the learning conditions for Syrian refugee children and young people at the Temporary Education Centres (TEC) and, after the camps and thus the TECs were successively closed in 2018 and 2019, at the regular Turkish schools. However, the module objective only focuses on improved access to school education.			
During EPE (if target modified) Module objective 1: Refugee Syrian children and young people use the improved learning conditions at the Temporary Education Centres (TEC) and public Turkish schools through deployment of Syrian assistants in education. Module objective 2: Volunteering improves the income of Syrian assistants in education.					
Indicator	Rating of appropriateness (for example, regarding impact level, accuracy of fit, target level, smart criteria)	PA target level Optional: EPE target level	PA status (2017)	Status at final inspection (2020)	Optional: Status at EPE (2022)
Module objective indicator (PA) Number of Syrian refugee children who regularly visit TECs and are taught there by FC-financed teachers Reformulation (EPE): Number of Syrian refugee pupils who regularly attend a Temporary Education Centre (TEC) or a public Turkish school and are taught or cared for there by Syrian volunteers financed by FC.	At the time of the project appraisal, the indicator was measurable as UNICEF was aware of the number of Syrian pupils taught in the TECs. At the time of the project appraisal, it also measured the performance of the FC-financed voluntary teachers, namely the number of children they taught. The transfer of Syrian pupils and volunteer teachers to regular Turkish schools made it difficult to measure the indicator. The Turkish Ministry of Education did not publish any figures on the number of Turkish and Syrian pupils at its schools during the project period. For this reason, UNICEF can only provide an approximate estimate of the total number of Syrian and Turkish pupils who have presumably benefited from deployment of Syrian volunteer teachers for the 2018/19 school year. Any changes in the enrolment rates of Syrian children and young people that may have been caused by the economic crisis during the project period cannot be tracked in this way.	Phase II (2017/2018 school year): 250,000 Phase III a+b (2018/2019 school year): 190,000	No information, but the UNICEF programme started in 2014	Phase II: 215.057 Phase III: 389,100 The figures refer to the number of Syrian pupils who benefit from deployment of Syrian volunteers. They were valued by UNICEF according to a predefined key (28 children per volunteer teaching assistant). Turkish children also benefit from the volunteers'	Financing ended in mid-2019

	Similarly, the average proportion of Syrian pupils at the supported schools is unknown. This lack of transparency reduces the reliability of the figures for the module objective indicator. Another challenge is that Syrian volunteers no longer actively taught at regular schools, but instead carried out various supporting activities. This also makes it more difficult to understand how many children benefited from their services and to what level.			presence in schools.	
Output indicator 1 (all phases, PA): Number of Syrian volunteer teachers who taught regularly and received monthly incentive payments from FC funds in the amount agreed with UNICEF over the course of the project. Proposal (EPE): This indicator should be used as a second module objective indicator to map the second objective of promoting employment.	The indicator measures the number of voluntary Syrian teachers financed by FC and thus reflects the central output of the project. This means that the indicator corresponds to the impact level of an output and is accurate. The project phases each relate to one school year. The number of Syrian volunteer teachers supported is measured per school year. Many volunteers have been employed for several years, so the total number of people supported does not correspond to the total number of teachers supported in the individual school years. All in all, the figures mentioned are easily comprehensible; the indicator is SMART. From the 2018/2019 school year onwards, some of the volunteers were no longer entrusted with teaching tasks, but performed supporting activities at regular Turkish schools. Nevertheless, the original formulation of the indicator was retained. In an earlier version of the project proposal, the aim was to have 10,000 Syrian volunteer teachers for Phase II. As a result, the output indicator would also have been achieved in Phase II. The indicator is not gender-disaggregated, but UNICEF reported on a gender-disaggregated basis.	Phase II (2017/2018 school year): 11,625 Phase III a+b (2018/2019 school year): 10,000	No information, but the UNICEF programme started in 2014	Phase II: 11,058 Phase III: 11,526	Financing ended in mid-2019
Output indicator 2 (all phases, PA): Share of disbursements to Syrian voluntary teachers that were made on time, i.e. within 14 days of the end of the month at the latest.	This indicator is not reported in either the annual reporting or the project completion report of the two phases. UNICEF's reports also do not contain any information on this. Presumably, there are no reliable figures for this. As a result, the indicator proved to be impractical. – Salaries were paid out via the Turkish Post (PTT) to the Syrian volunteer teachers' cash cards after their activity was confirmed by the Ministry of Education and reviewed by UNICEF.	Phase II + III: 90%	Not specified	Not specified	Financing ended in mid-2019.

EPE proposal: deletion of this indicator as it was not measured.					
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Project objective at impact level		Rating of appropriateness (former and current view)			
Syrian children and young people who have fled to Turkey are guaranteed high-quality and inclusive education in a protected environment. (UNICEF programme objective).		At impact level, the project proposal refers to the UNICEF programme objective. It should be noted that the FC-financed measure contributed to UNICEF's overall programme being far more comprehensive with regard to improving the quality and inclusion of school education for Syrian children and young people in Turkey, which included the development of teaching materials, teacher training for dealing with pupils with special educational needs, as well as the provision and use of protected spaces. The overall programme was also financed by other donors. The quality of education for Syrian children and young people in Turkey cannot therefore be attributed solely to the FC measure. For this reason, no indicator is formulated at impact level.			
During EPE (if target modified):					
Indicator	Rating of appropriateness (for example, regarding impact level, accuracy of fit, target level, smart criteria)	Target level PA / EPE (new)	PA status (2017)	Status at final inspection (2020)	Status at EPE (2022)
No impact indicator available	Given the nature of the programme, no impact indicator was formulated. The FC measure's contribution to this indicator would not be clearly verifiable. One possible indicator at impact level is the completion rate of Syrian pupils in the TECs and regular schools that had support from Syrian volunteers compared to other institutions or the corresponding drop-out rates. However, the Turkish Ministry of Education does not publish any data on this. Another possible impact indicator would be the contribution of incentive payments to the household income of voluntary teachers and thus their short-term and long-term contribution to alleviating poverty. Some figures are available from an evaluation of DEVAL. These emphasise the predominantly short-term nature of the income improvements.				

Risk analysis annex

All risks should be included in the following table as described above:

Risk	Relevant OECD-DAC criterion
Volatile political situation in Turkey and Syria (PA)	Impact, sustainability Turkey remained politically stable during the project period despite a severe economic crisis. However, the relationships between the local population and Syrian refugees deteriorated significantly during the project period. Prejudices against refugees increased, exclusion and isolated violent attacks against refugees occurred. The majority of Syrian refugees refused to return in view of the ongoing difficult political situation in Syria.
Changed refugee numbers and movements due to developments in Syria and the EU (PA)	Effectiveness Since Turkey closed its border with Syria in 2018 and set up a border fence, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has remained constant at around 3.6 million.
Continued efforts by the Turkish Ministry of Education, in cooperation with UNICEF, to improve education for Syrian refugees (PA)	Relevance, efficiency Starting in 2016, the Ministry of Education integrated Syrian pupils into the Turkish public school system, which had a positive effect on their school attendance rates. The Ministry of Education continues to strive to fully integrate Syrian pupils into the school system, working with UNICEF and numerous other partners.
No deterioration of the security situation in Turkey (PA)	Relevance, effectiveness In 2018 and 2019, the violent confrontations in northern Syria intensified. However, this had no impact on the security situation in Turkey.
Development of prices, salaries and exchange rates (PA)	Efficiency The high inflation in Turkey required several adjustments to the incentive payments to Syrian support staff during the project period. Overall, inflation had a rather favourable effect on the availability of project funds.
No downturn in available Syrian teachers, e.g. due to changes in employment law (PA)	Relevance, effectiveness During the project period, there were no changes to employment law for Syrian refugees in Turkey. The supply of Syrian support staff remained stable.
Follow-up financing by other donors after the end of the project term (PA)	Sustainability During the project period, some donors withdrew from financing the salaries of Syrian teachers or assistants, meaning that Germany remained the programme's only donor in 2019. At the time of the EPE, the (follow-up) measure continues to be fully dependent on German financing.

Project measures and their results annex

The following table summarises the outputs provided by the project. It summarises the information in the project completion report (2020), which in turn is based on UNICEF's final reports for Phase II (2018) and Phase III (2019):

Table 1: Overview of project services

Project phase	Phase II	Phase III	
		A	B
School year	2017/2018	2018/2019	2018/2019
Term	09/2017–11/2018	12/2018–11/2019	12/2018–11/2019
BMZ number	2017 408 69	2017 408 69	2018 49 744
Volume (EUR)	49 million	12 million	32 million
Syrian support staff (average number per month)	11,058	11,528	
Of which women	53%	53%	
Of which in Temporary Education Centres	9,205	n/a	
Of which in public schools	1,558	n/a	
Number of public schools at which FC-financed support staff were deployed	493	1,265	
Number of Syrian and Turkish pupils benefiting (estimate)	215,057	389,141	
Of which Syrian pupils in Temporary Education Centres (number per month)	91,595	72,469	
Of which Syrian and Turkish pupils in public schools (indirect, number per month, 250 per school, estimate)	123,462	316,358	

Recommendations for operation annex

The programme involves temporary salary payments for Syrian support staff in Turkish education. No long-term continuation of the programme is planned.

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Evaluation questions in line with OECD-DAC criteria/ex post evaluation matrix annex

Relevance

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / o / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Policy and priority focus			2	o	
Are the objectives of the programme aligned with the (global, regional and country-specific) policies and priorities, in particular those of the (development policy) partners involved and affected and the BMZ?	To what extent did the project's objectives correspond to the policies and priorities of the German Federal Government, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Turkish government in the areas of displacement, employment and education during the project period (2017–2019)?	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) (2017–2022) Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Middle East Employment Initiative, 2016 UNICEF, No Lost Generation Initiative			
Do the objectives of the programme take into account the relevant political and institutional framework conditions (e.g. legislation, administrative capacity, actual power structures (including those related to ethnicity, gender, etc.))?	To what extent did the measures take into account the legal framework conditions for refugees in Turkey during the project period, particularly in the areas of residence, access to education and access to employment? Did they contribute to improving these framework conditions? To what extent did the framework conditions restrict the impact hypothesis of the measure (e.g. long-term value creation of education and professional experience are not possible if there is no access to the labour market)? To what extent did the project take into account the capacities and needs of the promoted educational institutions? To what extent do the measures correspond to the implementation capacities of the project-executing agency UNICEF? To what extent did the measures take into account the relationships between the local population and Syrian refugees?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed. Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants			

	How were Syrian pupils integrated into Turkey's public education system? Were the systems overloaded and was there loss of quality? Were more Turkish teachers hired? Were there enough qualified teachers available? Have double shifts been introduced?				
Evaluation dimension: Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders			2	0	
Are the programme objectives focused on the developmental needs and capacities of the target group? Was the core problem identified correctly?	To what extent did the measures meet Syrian refugees' needs for income and job prospects? How long did the individual employment opportunities last (e.g. duration in months)? Why was this specific duration chosen (e.g. fair distribution of income opportunities to as many beneficiaries as possible, children's need for continuous care)? How did the change in their role (from volunteer teachers to education assistants) affect Syrian volunteers' motivation and output? What impact did this have on the quality of the children's education? To what extent did the measures meet the needs of Syrian and Turkish children and young people? To what extent did the measures meet the needs of Syrian and Turkish girls and women? To what extent did the measures contribute to improving learning and development conditions in the Turkish school system?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed. Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian and Turkish parents			
Were the needs and capacities of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group taken into account (possible differentiation according to age, income,	To what extent did the measures contribute to stabilising the incomes of particularly vulnerable groups among refugees (e.g. single women, minorities, people	Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian and Turkish pupils Interviews with Syrian and Turkish parents			

gender, ethnicity, etc.)? How was the target group selected?	with disabilities, people with low levels of formal education)? According to which criteria were the support staff selected? What kind of social background did the volunteers come from? To what extent did the measures contribute to improving the learning and development conditions of particularly vulnerable groups among Syrian and Turkish children and young people (e.g. girls, married girls, children with disabilities, working children, survivors of violence against children)? Which children and young people attend the formal school system? What are the particular challenges for girls and boys? What are the opportunities for Syrian pupils to advance in the Turkish education system? How many graduate from primary to secondary level? How many then move to vocational training and university? What are the barriers to access (cost, transport, income)? What opportunities do children and young people have to use their education? In what areas are they allowed to participate in the formal Turkish labour market?			
Would the programme (from an ex post perspective) have had other significant gender impact potentials if the concept had been designed differently? (FC-E-specific question)	What alternative options would have been available to promote women to a greater extent within the framework of the project and break up traditional gender roles? Would this have been feasible?	Interview with UNICEF Interview with the Ministry of Education		
Evaluation dimension: Appropriateness of design			2	0
Was the design of the programme appropriate and realistic (technically, organisationally and	How were the support staff recruited? What was their professional background? To what extent were the support staff prepared for their tasks?	Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with UNICEF implementation partners		

financially) and in principle suitable for contributing to solving the core problem?	What were the working conditions of the assistants (working hours, insurance, remuneration)? How was support staff integrated into the school organisation? How did they cooperate with the regular teachers? What tasks did support staff overin the schools? What alternative income options were available to the support staff?	Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed. Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with regular Turkish teaching staff
Is the programme design sufficiently precise and plausible (transparency and verifiability of the target system and the underlying impact assumptions)?	Was the financing part of a UNICEF programme? How is it integrated into the concept? Were the FC funds intended for specific use(s) (earmarking)? Is there a plausible connection between the promoted activities (financing of management and expense allowances for Syrian support staff) and the desired objectives (income for refugees, improved learning conditions for refugee children)? Are the most important variables measurable (use of Syrian support staff, income of support staff, learning conditions of children)? Was the situation of girls and women sufficiently taken into account in the design? What role did KfW play in the conception and design of the measures? Does KfW have an influence on certain decisions?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF
Please describe the results chain, incl. complementary measures, if necessary in the form of a graphical representation. Is this plausible? As well as specifying the original and, if necessary, adjusted target system, taking into account the impact levels (outcome and impact). The (adjusted) target system can also	The project is based on the following impact hypothesis: The employment of Syrian refugees as voluntary assistants in schools for Syrian and Turkish children and young people is intended to increase the income of refugees and improve the learning conditions of children and young people. The latter goal aims to break down barriers to access to education for refugees and increase the number of Syrian children and young people attending school. This was	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF

be displayed graphically. (FC-E-specific question)	ultimately intended to prevent a "lost generation" of refugee children in Turkey without access to education. Temporary employment was intended to increase the resilience of refugees. This should also achieve positive effects among refugees (e.g. psychosocial impact of employment, fewer conflicts). The plausibility of this impact hypothesis should be investigated.			
To what extent is the design of the programme based on a holistic approach to sustainable development (interplay of the social, environmental and economic dimensions of sustainability)?	To what extent is the programme aimed at both economic and social improvements for the target groups (Syrian volunteers and children / young people)?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF		
For projects within the scope of DC programmes: is the programme, based on its design, suitable for achieving the objectives of the DC programme? To what extent is the impact level of the FC module meaningfully linked to the DC programme (e.g. outcome impact or output outcome)? (FC-E-specific question)	The project is part of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's (BMZ) Middle East employment initiative. This supported a number of Cash-for-Work projects for Syrians and Turkish people in Turkey.			
Evaluation dimension: Response to changes/adaptability			2	0
Has the programme been adapted in the course of its implementation due to changed framework conditions (risks and potential)?	Were there conceptual adjustments during the course of the measure (e.g. recruitment of support staff, organisation of enrolment of Syrian refugees in school)? How did the programme react to the transfer of Syrian pupils to the public Turkish schools during the period examined?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF		

Coherence

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Internal coherence (division of tasks and synergies within German development cooperation):			2	0	
To what extent is the programme designed in a complementary and collaborative manner within the German development cooperation (e.g. integration into DC programme, country/sector strategy)?	Which other DC measures took place in Turkey parallel to the project during the project period? To what extent was the project designed to complement these measures? What specifications in this regard were used as a basis for the project (e.g. regional and country strategy)?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with GIZ managers responsible for refugees and education in Turkey Overview of FC and TC involvement in Turkey (2017–2019)			
Do the instruments of the German development cooperation dovetail in a conceptually meaningful way, and are synergies put to use?	What other DC measures took place in Turkey in 2017/2019 in the areas of Cash-for-Work / employment and education? What were the common objectives of these measures? Where were connecting factors with regard to content? Where were there overlaps? Where were there gaps?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with GIZ managers responsible for refugees and education in Turkey Overview of FC and TC involvement in Turkey (2017–2019) Detailed information on particularly relevant FC and TC projects (e.g. PP, services)			
Is the programme consistent with international norms and standards to which the German development cooperation is committed (e.g. human rights, Paris Climate Agreement, etc.)?	To what extent did the project contribute to the realisation of human rights (e.g. right to education, right to income, right to asylum)? To what extent did the project contribute to the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees (2018)? To what extent did the project take into account international agreements to strengthen gender equality?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF			

Evaluation dimension: External coherence (complementarity and coordination with actors external to German DC):			2	0	
To what extent does the programme complement and support the partner's own efforts (subsidiarity principle)?	What were the Turkish government's general lines of refugee policy in 2017–2019? What specific policy has been pursued with regard to Syrian refugees' employment and education opportunities? What resources did Turkey itself provide to supply the refugees? What international support did Turkey receive in admitting refugees to regular schools?	Interview with Turkish Refugee Affairs Authority Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interview with UNICEF			
Is the design of the programme and its implementation coordinated with the activities of other donors?	To what extent did KfW and UNICEF coordinate with other donors (e.g. the EU) when designing and implementing the measure?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interview with the EU			
Was the programme designed to use the existing systems and structures (of partners/other donors/international organisations) for the implementation of its activities and to what extent are these used?	To what extent did the measure rely on national structures (e.g. schools,) and strengthen their capacities to receive refugees? To what extent did the measure promote the inclusion of refugees in the formal education system?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interview with UNICEF			
Are common systems (of partners/other donors/international organisations) used for monitoring/evaluation, learning and accountability?	To what extent did the follow-up of the measure rely on the data collected by UNICEF and the national government structures (e.g. schools, Ministry of Education)?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interview with UNICEF			

Effectiveness

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Achievement of (intended) targets			2	0	
Were the (if necessary, adjusted) objectives of the programme (incl. capacity development measures) achieved? Table of indicators: Comparison of actual/target	To what extent was the project able to achieve its impact indicators? How many female and male volunteers with what qualifications were employed by the measure? How many girls and boys benefited from the measure?	Interview with UNICEF Random interviews with educational institutions, support staff, pupils			
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to achieving objectives:			2	0	
To what extent were the outputs of the programme delivered as planned (or adapted to new developments)? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	How many Syrian volunteer support staff in the education system received financial support? What output did the volunteers provide? How many educational institutions benefited from the support staff? How many children and young people benefited from the work of the support staff?	Interview with UNICEF Interview with UNICEF implementation partners			
Are the outputs provided and the capacities created used?	To what extent will the voluntary Syrian support staff model continue to be used in the education system? How has it been further developed in the meantime? How were the services offered by the support staff used in the educational institutions? How were the schools that received assistance from support staff selected? (Number of enrolled children and young people, number of school-leaving qualifications, gender-disaggregated, 2017–	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Turkish teachers Interviews with Syrian and Turkish pupils Interviews with Syrian and Turkish parents			

	2022) How was children's access to the services also designed from a time perspective (e.g. afternoon lessons), What barriers to access existed for Syrian pupils, such as transport costs, security, bullying, violence by teachers, separate sanitary facilities? To what extent have the refugees been able to use the knowledge they gained through volunteering for their further professional development?	
To what extent is equal access to the outputs provided and the capacities created guaranteed (e.g. non-discriminatory, physically accessible, financially affordable, qualitatively, socially and culturally acceptable)?	To what extent did all refugees have access to volunteer positions? According to which criteria were the support staff selected? To what extent did children and young people, especially girls and members of vulnerable groups, have access to the services provided or supported by the support staff? Were there specific offers for children and young people, especially girls who do not attend school?	See previous question
To what extent did the programme contribute to achieving the objectives?	To what extent have the incentive payments to Syrian voluntary support staff in the education system contributed to improving their income? To what extent has the work of volunteer support staff contributed to improving the learning and development conditions of refugee children and young people? To what extent were the specific factors taken into account that lead to girls and boys dropping out of school early?	See previous question
To what extent did the programme contribute to achieving the objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?	See previous question.	See previous question.

Did the programme contribute to the achievement of objectives at the level of the particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups involved and affected (potential differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)?	To what extent have particularly vulnerable refugees benefited from the creation of volunteer positions? To what extent have particularly vulnerable children and young people (Syrian and Turkish girls and boys, pupils of other nationalities) benefited from the work of the support staff?	See previous question
Were there interventions specifically addressing gender impact potential (e.g., through women's participation in project committees, water committees, use of social workers for women, etc.)? (FC-E-specific question)	Have specific measures been implemented to specifically promote women or break up traditional gender roles?	Interview with UNICEF Interview with the Ministry of Education Interview with Syrian assistants
Which project-internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Was KfW able to provide the financing on time so that it could be used as intended?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interview with implementation partners
Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended objectives of the programme (also taking into account the risks anticipated beforehand)? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	What role did the issue of work permits for Syrian refugees play in the implementation of the project? What rights did the assistants have and were these transparently documented and communicated to them? Was there an easily accessible complaints mechanism? What role did formal barriers play in Syrian children's and young people's access to the education system? What role did factors such as child labour, child marriage, violence in schools and discrimination play in the access of Syrian children and young people to the education system?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian and Turkish pupils Interviews with Syrian and Turkish parents

Evaluation dimension: Quality of implementation			2	0	
How is the quality of the management and implementation of the programme (e.g. project-executing agency, consultant, taking into account ethnicity and gender in decision-making committees) evaluated with regard to the achievement of objectives?	What role did UNICEF play in implementing the measure, what role did the Ministry of Education play? How would UNICEF and its partners rate the quality of project management? Were gender aspects adequately taken into account?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with Syrian assistants			
How is the quality of the management, implementation and participation in the programme by the partners/sponsors evaluated?	What role did Turkish state structures play in the placement of Syrian volunteers in the education system, especially in the area of education and youth? How would you rate the quality of the contribution of Turkish government structures to the project and vice versa?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with UNICEF			
Were gender results and relevant risks in/through the project (gender-based violence, e.g. in the context of infrastructure or empowerment projects) regularly monitored or otherwise taken into account during implementation? Have corresponding measures (e.g. as part of a CM) been implemented in a timely manner? (FC-E-specific question)	Has gender-sensitive project monitoring taken place? How were the monitoring results handled?	Interview with UNICEF Interview with KfW Interview with the Ministry of Education			
Evaluation dimension: Unintended consequences (positive or negative)			2	0	
Can unintended positive/negative direct impacts (social, economic,	Were there any negative social, economic and possibly environmental impacts of the project?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education			

ecological and, where applicable, those affecting vulnerable groups) be seen (or are they foreseeable)?	Did the project exacerbate existing inequalities? Were significant population groups excluded from the project? Did the project contribute to exacerbating conflicts, especially between refugees and the host community? Were people exploited as part of the project? Were people exposed to particular risks as part of the project? How was it ensured that volunteer support staff did not engage in physical or psychological violence, including sexual violence, against children and young people? How was it ensured that no bribes or sexual favours were demanded when recruiting the volunteer support staff? Did the project have unintended positive effects? What was the duration of and social protection for the volunteering commitment (e.g. in the event of illness-related absence, right to holiday, maternity leave, duration of the volunteer assignment)? Was there an independent point of contact that was known and could be easily reached by the support staff in the event of problems? Were support staff provided with supervision to help them process their impressions and problems?	Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants
What potential/risks arise from the positive/negative unintended effects and how should they be evaluated?	What are the consequences of the above-mentioned potential negative effects on the people affected, in particular women and girls? How can unintended positive impacts (in the future) be further reinforced? Was there an established exchange between the schools or centres and the	See previous question

	support staff in order to share experiences and learn from them?	
How did the programme respond to the potential/risks of the positive/negative unintended effects?	What measures has the project taken to prevent any negative effects? What measures has the project taken to use or reinforce any unintended positive impacts?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed

Efficiency

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / o / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Production efficiency			2	o	
How are the inputs (financial and material resources) of the programme distributed (e.g. by instruments, sectors, sub-measures, also taking into account the cost contributions of the partners/executing agency/other participants and affected parties, etc.)? (Learning and help question)	What costs were financed from project funds? Were these costs justified? What contribution did the Turkish Ministry of Education make to the measure?	Interview with KfW Interview with UNICEF Interview with Turkish Ministry of Education			
To what extent were the inputs of the programme used sparingly in relation to the outputs produced (products, capital goods and services) (if possible in a comparison with data from other evaluations of a region, sector, etc.)? For example, comparison of specific costs.	Was the total financial expenditure per volunteer and per pupil attending school appropriate? What cost components made up this total expenditure? Was the compensation (wages) paid to the support staff appropriate? Was it sufficient to make a living, especially in the case of single women? Did the support staff incur additional costs for the educational institutions? Who was responsible for these costs?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interview with Syrian assistants			

If necessary, as a complementary perspective: To what extent could the outputs of the programme have been increased by an alternative use of inputs (if possible in a comparison with data from other evaluations of a region, sector, etc.)?	Could a larger number of assistants have been employed with the same funds? What would have been necessary for this? Are there comparative figures from other donors (e.g. EU) on the unit costs for deployment of assistants in education and other sectors (e.g. health) in Turkey? Which benchmarks can be used to evaluate the amount of incentive payments for assistants (e.g. cash-for-work payment, income of regular teachers, minimum wage)	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF			
Were the outputs produced on time and within the planned period?	Were the assistants recruited in time for the start of the school year and made available to the educational institutions?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF			
Were the coordination and management costs reasonable (e.g. implementation consultant's cost component)? (FC-E-specific question)	Were UNICEF's administrative expenses and overhead (8%) reasonable? Would implementation of the project via the Turkish partners be more efficient and effective, at least starting with a focus on regular Turkish schools?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interview with implementation partners			
Evaluation dimension: Allocation efficiency			2	0	
In what other ways and at what costs could the effects achieved (outcome/impact) have been attained? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	What alternatives were there to improve the income situation of refugees, especially in the area of cash transfers or Cash-for-Work? What opportunities and risks would the awarding of work permits to Syrian refugees entail? Would the current legal situation enable work permits to be issued? Would there be an opportunity to offer Syrian assistants permanent employment relationships? Who would pay for the long-term financing of these	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interview with implementation partners			

	employment relationships and their resulting costs (e.g. health and unemployment insurance)? What impact would this have on the employment situation of Turkish education professionals? Could similar improvements in learning conditions for Syrian refugees also have been achieved through other, more cost-efficient measures?	
To what extent could the effects achieved have been attained in a more cost-effective manner, compared with an alternatively designed programme?	How could the project have been implemented more efficiently within the existing concept? Is there potential for further savings during project implementation? What consequences would these have had on the quality of the service provided? How was planning done for the Syrian assistants' needs? How was their recruitment, their monitoring and the payment or invoicing for work performed carried out?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interview with implementation partners
If necessary, as a complementary perspective: To what extent could the positive effects have been increased with the resources available, compared to an alternatively designed programme?	Could more support staff positions have been created or more children and young people have been reached with the same funds? In what way? Could alternative approaches and concepts have achieved more impact in a more cost-effective manner?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interview with implementation partners

Impact

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Overarching developmental changes (intended)			3	0	
Is it possible to identify overarching developmental changes to which the programme should contribute? (Or if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time.)	How did the income and employment situation of Syrian assistants develop in the long term, especially for women? How did the school-leaving qualification rates (differentiated by year and degree) and the social and professional integration of Syrian children and young people, especially girls and those from vulnerable backgrounds, develop at the supported educational institutions? How did the numbers of school leavers change from primary to secondary school? What are the hurdles for Syrian children? How did topics such as early marriage of girls, child labour and violence against children develop at the supported educational institutions? How did the coexistence of refugees and the host community develop in the environment of the supported educational institutions?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants			
Is it possible to identify overarching developmental changes (social, economic, environmental and their interactions) at the level of the intended beneficiaries? (Or if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)	See previous question	See previous question			
To what extent can overarching developmental changes be identified at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group to which the programme	See previous question	See previous question			

should contribute (Or, if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)					
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to overarching developmental changes (intended)			3	0	
To what extent did the programme actually contribute to the identified or foreseeable overarching developmental changes (also taking into account the political stability) to which the programme should contribute?	To what extent can changes in the employment and income situation of assistants, school attendance and school success of pupils, the social and professional integration of children and young people outside schools, as well as the coexistence of refugees and the host community, be attributed to the temporary employment of Syrian assistants in the education system?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants			
To what extent did the programme achieve its intended (possibly adjusted) developmental objectives? In other words, are the project impacts sufficiently tangible not only at outcome level, but also at impact level? (E.g. drinking water supply/health effects)	To what extent was the measure able to contribute to increasing the income of assistants and to increased school attendance (enrolment) and completion rates, especially of girls, through improved learning conditions? Were drop-out rates for boys and girls reduced? What other positive effects did the employment of assistants have (e.g. meaningful activity, continuous support for children and young people)?	Interviews with Syrian assistants			
Did the programme contribute to achieving its (possibly adjusted) developmental objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?	What positive effects did the measure have for children and young people, especially girls and those from vulnerable groups who attend the educational institutions receiving help from assistants? Were children and young people, especially girls, also able to be reached outside these facilities? In this regard, which measures (outreach) were aided by assistants (e.g. work with parents, education, awareness-raising)?	No interviewees available			

Has the programme contributed to overarching developmental changes or changes in life situations at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group (potential differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.) to which the programme was intended to contribute?	See previous question	See previous question
Which project-internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended developmental objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	See similar question under “Effectiveness”	See similar question under “Effectiveness”
Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended developmental objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	What opportunities are there for refugee children and young people to continue their education and gain access to the formal labour market? What factors contribute to child labour and early marriage, which in turn affect the use of education?	Interview with Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with Syrian assistants
Does the project have a broad-based impact? - To what extent has the programme led to structural or institutional changes (e.g. in organisations, systems and regulations)? (Structure formation) - Was the programme exemplary and/or broadly effective and is it reproducible? (Model character)	What structural changes did the employment of “voluntary assistants” in Turkey’s education system entail? What consequences did the use of voluntary assistants have for the regular Turkish school staff, especially women? To what extent have the volunteer assistants created new task profiles that can now be taken on by permanent staff? How was the use of volunteer assistants in the education sector adopted by other organisations and in other countries?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with Turkish teachers

How would the development have gone without the programme? (Learning and help question)	What alternative sources of income are available to Syrian refugees, especially women, in Turkey? What opportunities do Syrian children and young people, especially girls, have to participate in the regular education system in Turkey? Are there alternative regular support services for Syrian children and young people in Turkey? What activities did other donors support in the education sector?	Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with Turkish teachers			
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to (unintended) overarching developmental changes			3	0	
To what extent can unintended overarching developmental changes (also taking into account political stability) be identified (or, if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)?	What (unintentional) positive or negative changes in the employment and income of Syrian assistants, the access of refugees to education and the coexistence of refugees and the host community can be observed in the environment of the supported educational institutions?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with leaders from former Transitional Education Centres (TEC) and regular schools where Syrian volunteers were deployed Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian and Turkish pupils Interviews with Syrian and Turkish parents			
Did the programme noticeably or foreseeably contribute to unintended (positive and/or negative) overarching developmental impacts?	To what extent are these changes due to deployment of Syrian assistants at the respective educational institutions?	See previous question			
Did the programme noticeably (or foreseeably) contribute to unintended (positive or negative) overarching developmental changes at the level of particularly	Did the measure exacerbate inequalities or marginalise certain groups? Alternatively, did the measure succeed in improving the living conditions and future opportunities of	See previous question			

disadvantaged or vulnerable groups (within or outside the target group) (do no harm, e.g. no strengthening of inequality (gender/ethnicity))?	particularly vulnerable refugees, children and young people?	
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Sustainability

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / o / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Capacities of participants and stakeholders			3	o	
Are the target group, executing agencies and partners institutionally, personally and financially able and willing (ownership) to maintain the positive effects of the programme over time (after the end of the promotion)?	To what extent was the model of deployment of voluntary Syrian assistants in the Turkish education system to support vulnerable children and young people continued after the end of the project (2019)? By FC? By the international community / UNICEF? By the Turkish Government? What are the chances that these employment opportunities for refugees will be converted into regular employment relationships? How can these be financed? What is the current position of the Turkish government towards awarding work permits to Syrian refugees?	Interview with Turkish Refugee Affairs Authority Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interview with UNICEF Interview with the EU			
To what extent do the target group, executing agencies and partners demonstrate resilience to future risks that could jeopardise the impact of the programme?	What are the Syrian pupils' educational qualifications? What options are there for Syrian pupils to utilise the value of the education they have acquired? What does the labour market integration look like for Syrian pupils finishing school? How many families manage to acquire Turkish citizenship? On what basis can this be done?	Interview with Turkish Refugee Affairs Authority Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants			

	What is the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey? Do refugees voluntarily return to Syria? Are there or will there be large-scale returns to Syria? Has the Turkish government established adequate framework conditions for the long-term integration of Syrian refugees? How will international financing for refugee aid measures develop in Turkey, taking into account the influence of the Ukraine crisis, among other things? How will this impact the Cash-for-Work measures?				
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities:			3	0	
Did the programme contribute to the target group, executing agencies and partners being institutionally, personally and financially able and willing (ownership) to maintain the positive effects of the programme over time and, where necessary, to curb negative effects?	The project is a transitional aid measure. Therefore, there is no requirement that the partner government must continue the measure unchanged. Has the Turkish government created the capacities and taken concrete measures to support the integration of Syrian children and young people into the education system? What professional prospects are there for Syrian assistants, especially those who are leaving the volunteer service? What are the future prospects of the Syrian volunteer programme in the education sector?	Interview with Turkish Refugee Affairs Authority Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education			
Did the programme contribute to strengthening the resilience of the target group, executing agencies and partners to risks that could	Has the measure strengthened the resilience of Syrian assistants and Syrian children and young people so that they can now better deal with the adverse circumstances of their refugee	Interviews with Syrian assistants			

jeopardise the effects of the programme?	situation? Can refugees generate value from their education?				
Did the programme contribute to strengthening the resilience of particularly disadvantaged groups to risks that could jeopardise the effects of the programme?	Did the measure strengthen the resilience of particularly vulnerable assistants as well as vulnerable children and young people?	Interviews with Syrian assistants			
Evaluation dimension: Durability of impacts over time			3	0	
How stable is the context of the programme (e.g. social justice, economic performance, political stability, environmental balance)? (Learning/help question)	Which external factors have a significant influence on the situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey (including the political and security situation in Syria, political situation in Turkey, legal framework conditions, COVID-19, Ukraine crisis, inflation, food shortages, economic crisis)?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian and Turkish parents			
To what extent is the durability of the positive effects of the programme influenced by the context? (Learning/help question)	What influence do these factors have on the situation of Syrian refugees, in particular their employment and income situation, their access to education and the social and professional integration of young refugees?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian and Turkish parents			
To what extent are the positive and, where applicable, the negative effects of the programme likely to be long-lasting?	Under these conditions, how long-term is the project impact (income, education, integration) assessed to be? How has donor engagement developed in relation to the Syrian volunteer programme? Has the diversification of the sources of financing been successful?	Interviews with the Turkish Ministry of Education Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian and Turkish parents			