

## Ex Post-Evaluation Brief

### SRI LANKA: KV-Jaffna Rehabilitation Project, Housing and schools



<b>Sector</b>	Emergency relief and corresponding services (7201000)	
<b>Programme/Client</b>	KV-Jaffna Rehabilitation Project, Housing and Schools; BMZ no. 2000 65 607*	
<b>Programme executing agency</b>	Ministry of Economic Development	
<b>Year of sample/ex post evaluation report: 2013/2013</b>		
	Appraisal (planned)	Ex post-evaluation (actual)
<b>Investment costs (total)</b>	EUR 3.01 million EUR	EUR 3.04 million EUR
<b>Counterpart contribution (company)</b>	EUR 0.45 million EUR	EUR 0.45 million EUR
<b>Funding, of which budget funds (BMZ)</b>	EUR 2.56 million EUR EUR 2.56 million EUR	EUR 2.59 million EUR** EUR 2.59 million EUR

\* random sample 2013; \*\* Remaining funds of EUR 0.024 million from precursor project according to AK

**Short description:** The programme financed construction materials for the new construction and/or rehabilitation of 1,074 houses in Jaffna. The programme actively involved the target population in the reconstruction of homes. The target population had been displaced by the civil war, who at the time lived in refugee camps or with family members. Furthermore, the programme finance rehabilitation of 32 schools and a warehouse as well as repairing a hospital wing. In addition, the programme financed 363 sanitary facilities for schools in Jaffna.

**Objectives:** The overarching goal of the programme was to contribute to the reconstruction and peace process on the Jaffna peninsula by creating the foundations for long-term settlements in the region (indicators to measure the primary goal were not specified in appraisal documents). This was to be achieved via the programme objective, which provided for improvements in living conditions and living environment by rehabilitating housing and social infrastructure (e.g. schools) (to be measured by homes occupied by the target group and the use of rehabilitated schools).

**Target group:** The target group consisted of approximately 1,400 families, living under the poverty line. The families of single mothers (e.g. war widows) had priority.



#### Overall rating: Note 2

The programme contributed significantly to the resettlement of the Jaffna region under the most severe conditions of conflict.

#### Points to note:

As part of the programme, the homeowners displaced by the conflict were encouraged to rebuild their houses on their own. This owner-driven approach was later adopted by other organisations, such as the World Bank. Several tsunami reconstruction programmes were also based on this model.

#### Rating by DAC criteria



## **EVALUATION SUMMARY**

Overall rating: 2

### Relevance

The programme was highly relevant, in that it was designed to contribute to social and economic rehabilitation and development in the Jaffna region devastated by the civil war. The project was implemented during the peace negotiations and cease-fire in the years 2002 to 2005. As early as 1996, the Sri Lankan army had conquered the northern peninsula of Jaffna, but had not triumphed over the Tamil freedom movement Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which continued to operate from the northern jungle. In February 2002, there was a cease-fire and subsequent peace negotiations, which, however, suffered a setback in 2006 due to the renewed civil war.

The programme was in accordance with the BMZ cross-sector concept of crisis prevention, conflict management and peace-building, as well as the EC focus agreed for Sri Lanka, "Poverty Alleviation and Conflict Transformation" (PACT). It also corresponded to the needs of the country in that it financed the restoration of schools, warehouse and sanitary facilities, as well as the wing of a hospital, at a time in which it was almost impossible to transport construction materials to Jaffna due to the civil war. Reconstruction of the infrastructure destroyed by the war was an absolute necessity.

The programme approach was appropriate in that it mobilised refugee families in reconstructing their homes themselves, thus promoting a high degree of personal responsibility. The assumed results chain, according to which the permanent settlement of displaced refugees (outcome) contributes to the social and economic resettlement of Jaffna (impact) with the active inclusion of those involved, was feasible in the context of this programme. The underlying problem analysis is still coherent and comprehensible today. The expected and achieved contribution to social and economic promotion of the peace and reconstruction process in Jaffna, however, remains difficult to quantify, due in part to the absence of quantitative information on the initial position in the appraisal document.

**Sub-Rating: 1**

### Effectiveness:

The programme goal defined at the beginning of the programme was intended to contribute to the improvement of living conditions and the living environment by rehabilitating housing and social infrastructure (e.g. schools).

The achievement of objectives measured using indicators is summarised in the following table. Two indicators are taken from the appraisal report, while two other indicators are added to better capture results.

Indicator	Status of ex post evaluation
After reconstruction, houses are occupied to at least 80% by representatives of the target group.	This indicator was fulfilled for the areas not affected by the tsunami. Overall, FC financed construction of 1,074 houses. According to the final report (AK), 97% of the homes were occupied in 2010. On the basis of interviews, a survey and random checks on houses and villages in 8 of a total of 15 districts, the evaluation mission came to the conclusion that in the villages visited, the original target group members still lived in their rehabilitated homes. In villages selected at random, in which every new house built was compared to the planning documents, 95% of the houses were in good condition and occupied by the original target group. The villages affected by the tsunami of 2004, however, are an exception. The 37 houses (or 3% of all FC-financed homes) in villages on the coast are still standing, but their owners use them to store their fishing equipment. House owners had to be relocated away from the coast according to the government's rules, which implemented a safety zone of 300 m along the coast.
After reconstruction, at least 80% of the schools are in operation.	Exceeded. The mission visited 10 of a total of 32 schools and verified that in the 10 schools, 100% of the rehabilitated classrooms and equipment were being used. The newly installed sanitary facilities were found to be clean and well maintained. Only one toilet block was temporarily closed for construction.
The reconstructed warehouse is in use.	Only partially met. The overhauled warehouse was used for storing construction materials during the building phase, and these were directly delivered by ship from Colombo, since road and railway connections were disrupted due to the civil war. Now, travel groups from the south of Sri Lanka visiting Jaffna use the warehouse for mass lodgings. The evaluation mission found the warehouse to be clean and well maintained; however, it was empty during the time of the visit.
After reconstruction, the rehabilitated hospital wing is being used.	Met, but with delay. The hospital could only be reopened after the opening of the restricted military area and treats patients on an outpatient basis. Psychiatric patients located in areas rehabilitated using FC resources receive occupational therapy, psychological treatment and meals.

The concept of the homebuilding component provided for rebuilding homes as *in situ* reconstruction managed by the owners with technical support from the GIZ (German International Cooperation) and partner organisations. Construction materials and their transport were financed with FC resources, as were wages for local professionals and

craftsmen (*skilled labour*), and not as initially presumed as an independent contribution from the Government of Sri Lanka). Handyman work (*unskilled labour*) was provided by the owners themselves. While approximately 66% of the FC funds financed residential construction, 25% were used for infrastructure and 9% for administrative costs.

Separate indicators to map the objective of "stabilisation and peace building" were not completed, since this aspect appears to be sufficiently covered by the requirement that houses need to be occupied by the original target group, which also actively participated in housing reconstruction.

### **Sub-Rating: 3**

#### Efficiency

The programme was cost-efficient in that it financed expandable core houses of 36 m<sup>2</sup> (consisting of one lockable room, a living room and a roofed terrace). Refugees displaced due to the conflict were mobilised and encouraged to organise and monitor the home construction themselves. Average costs per house were EUR 1,840, which is low compared with the EUR 2,289 (2007) for the houses in Jaffna financed by the World Bank and the EU, or with the tsunami reconstruction programme on the east coast of Sri Lanka financed by German FC funds (Batticaloa and Kalmunai, BMZ no. 2005 65 614). There, a house of the same size cost almost twice that figure (on average EUR 3,660).

The programme exhibited high allocation efficiency, since it activated neighbourhoods to identify the 15 poorest families in the village who should receive a programme-financed house. The population was mobilised with the support of a local NGO, which had gained credibility and trust among the local population during the civil war due to its commitment to human rights. Therefore, one can assume that the effects in particular benefitted the poorest people and the selection was at the same time sensitive to conflict and supported by the population.

### **Sub-Rating: 2**

#### Impact

The programme's primary goal according to the appraisal documents (PV) was to contribute to the reconstruction and peace process of the Jaffna peninsula by creating the foundation for a permanent resettlement of the region.

No indicators for measuring the primary goal were specified in the appraisal documents. However, the ex-post evaluation established that the primary goal was achieved, with this achievement being measured based on resettlement and school performance. In 2013, four years after the end of the civil war and three years after the end of the programme that lasted ten years, the programme region in Jaffna was resettled once again. The mission did in fact

still see bombed-out houses and restricted land mine areas, as well as restricted military zones, but the original members of the target group or their children were found in the houses financed by the programme and in some cases had opened new small businesses (such as a store, a bicycle repair shop and a bakery), which offered them a new livelihood. This represents a considerable success compared to the point of departure for refugee camps.

The programme also contributed to the peace process in that it financed the infrastructure, such as houses and schools, under the most difficult circumstances during the warlike confrontations. This allowed the population to find a new home after having been displaced by the conflict.

The building of physical infrastructure, however, can only support the pacification process, but not influence it significantly. The central government in Colombo made no concessions regarding autonomy to the northeast of the country after the end of the civil war; autonomy was seen as a necessary prerequisite for pacification by the Tamil and Muslim population. When asked to assess the peace process at the time of the mission on a scale of one to ten, with one representing civil war and ten sustainable peace, the average rating on the part of the government representatives, donors, professors, NGO representatives and target group members in the north and northeast was a two in the earlier conflict area of Sri Lanka. This extremely low rating makes it clear that the conflict has not yet been resolved politically. In fact, international fragility indices categorise Sri Lanka as fragile. In the 2012 "Failed States Index<sup>1</sup>" Sri Lanka ranks 29th out of 30 countries with a fragility rating of 92.2 (on a scale from 114.9 for Somalia to 87.5 for Uzbekistan). In the 2011 State Fragility Index<sup>2</sup> Sri Lanka received a rating of 13 (compared to 25 for Somalia and a rating of 13 for other countries, such as Uzbekistan, Laos and Togo).

Schools and health centres were severely damaged during the conflict and teachers, doctors and nursing staff had been displaced. After the end of the conflict, FC-financing contributed to the rehabilitation of schools and hospitals with the help of returning staff that had been displaced by the war.,. The most recent census of 2011 established that in fact 90.9 percent of school-age children attended school. With respect to learning results, the *National Assessment Centre* determined that the gap between the northeast and the rest of Sri Lanka decreased between 2003 and 2009. Grades of fourth-graders improved in the north by 19% in the mother tongue, 22% in mathematics and 81% in English. In the eighth grade, however, the gap between the northeast and the rest of Sri Lanka was barely reduced. An absence of fundamental knowledge due to cancelled classes and displacement during the conflict could be responsible for this situation.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Failed States Index 2011. In: [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed\\_states\\_index\\_2012\\_interactive](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive).

<sup>2</sup> State Fragility Index from 2011. In: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/SFI/matrix2011c.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> UNDP. 2012. Sri Lanka Human Development Report 2012. Bridging Regional Disparities for Human Development. Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka is on its way to reaching the millennium goals with respect to drinking water supply and access to sanitary facilities. The programme has also made a significant contribution in terms of sanitary facilities.

The programme served as a model with respect to its homeowner-driven approach. This approach was later adopted by other organisations, such as the World Bank. Several tsunami reconstruction programmes also drew on this model.

**Sub-Rating: 2**

Sustainability

This evaluation rates the programme as satisfactory with respect to sustainability. The information collected during the mission indicates that, with the exception of 37 houses in the tsunami region, approx. 95% of the original homeowners still live in their homes and that a large majority (approx. 70%) have expanded houses by constructing additional rooms, or kitchens. The additional rooms have been constructed using simple materials such as boards or corrugated metal.

Repair of the renovated classrooms, however, is problematic. Schools are dependent on the Ministry of Education with regard to maintenance costs. In the past, students had to make contributions for repairs and some schools have continued this approach. The central government in Colombo, however, has decided to eliminate these fees and fully finance maintenance. Since this decision had just been decided at the time of the mission, the actual allocation of resources could not yet be observed. The practice of charging maintenance fees differs between private and public schools; this is a possible reason for the greater maintenance needs that were observed by the mission when comparing public to private schools. The sanitary facilities were all clean and had running water.

**Sub-Rating: 3**

## Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and overarching developmental impact. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Ratings 1-3 denote a positive or successful assessment while ratings 4-6 denote a not positive or unsuccessful assessment

### **Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:**

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Ratings 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while ratings 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (rating 3).