

# Ex post evaluation

## Strengthening rural resilience, Somalia



<b>Title</b>	Rebuilding Rural Resilience in Southern Somalia		
<b>Sector and CRS code</b>	Rural development (CRS code: 43040)		
<b>Project number</b>	BMZ-No. 2013 66 152		
<b>Commissioned by</b>	BMZ		
<b>Recipient/Project-executing agency</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)		
<b>Project volume/financing instrument</b>	EUR 8.03 million/BMZ budget funds		
<b>Project duration</b>	2013-2016		
<b>Year of report</b>	2021	<b>Year of random sample</b>	2020

### Objectives and project outline


The objective at outcome level was to boost and diversify income and to rebuild the target group's productive assets. At impact level, the aim was to contribute to strengthening the target group's resilience to future crises. In addition, medium-term income increases were intended to help mitigate conflict and alleviate poverty in the project areas. To achieve the objectives, measures were implemented to improve production, processing and marketing on smallholders' farms. However, the implementation of the measures was hampered by the extremely fraught security situation and prolonged by disastrous drought in 2016–2017.

### Key findings

We rate the project's relevance and coherence as good and its effectiveness, efficiency and impact as satisfactory. Deemed insufficient at the time of the evaluation, the project's sustainability is not included in the overall rating, as it was implemented with a limited sustainability remit.

- The project was relevant since the project region, Gedo, was highly significant for Somali agriculture and food security due to its fertility. For this reason, it was important to support medium-term approaches aimed at strengthening resilience and to initiate sustainable development.
- The project was coherently incorporated into the Joint Resilience Strategy for Somalia adopted by the FAO, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP), and it was in line with the German Federal Government's development policy objectives.
- The project's effectiveness was reflected in the 32,000+ people in roughly 5,000 households who benefited from it, significantly more than the 3,000 households with about 18,000 persons originally planned.
- The FAO's financing records showed a total cost of EUR 1,493 per beneficiary household, with relatively high execution and administration costs; however, the possibility of more cost-effective delivery by another executing agency was unlikely under the prevailing circumstances in Somalia.
- The satisfactory impact rating was mainly based on the Resilience Capacity Index designed by the FAO. At present, however, there are no signs of improvement with regard to conflict mitigation and poverty alleviation in the project region.

Overall rating:  
moderately successful



### Conclusions

- Effects of the approach used are noticeable in that the beneficiary groups' resilience statistics were always higher than those of the control group and also dropped less during the catastrophic drought in 2016 and 2017.
- However, donors and implementing organisations in Somalia had differences of opinion on how to understand resilience; structured donor dialogue was not implemented.
- Sustainability risks stemmed not only from the precarious security situation and political and economic instability, but also from the project's inclination towards value chains that were not climate-resilient.
- Neither positive nor negative evidence could be found for the hypothesis that medium-term income increases would help to mitigate conflict.
- Despite detailed implementation agreements, it was only possible to exercise a limited degree of control over the executing agency (FAO).

## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 3

#### Ratings:

Relevance	2
Coherence	2
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	3
Impact	3
Sustainability	4

We rate the project's relevance and coherence as good and its effectiveness, efficiency and impact as satisfactory. Overall, the project's rating is "moderately successful". Deemed insufficient at the time of the evaluation, the project's sustainability is not included in the overall rating, as it was implemented with a limited sustainability remit.

#### General conditions and classification of the project

Somalia has been regarded as a failed state since the early 1990s. The hopes for peace, security, state-building and poverty reduction associated with the 2017 presidential election have only partially come to fruition. The Islamist militant group al-Shabaab continues to control large swathes of the country, and the political, economic and social situation remains highly unstable. The country's precarious health system was slow and uncoordinated in its response to the coronavirus pandemic, which reached Somalia in spring 2020.<sup>1</sup> In carrying out the FC project Rebuilding Rural Resilience in Southern Somalia (BMZ-No. 2013 66 152) between 2013 and 2016, Germany assisted the Somalia Office of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) with implementing measures to strengthen poor rural households' resilience to future crises in the three districts of Dolow, Luuq, and Belet Hava in the project region of Gedo in south-western Somalia. The FC project was embedded in the FAO's Somalia Resilience Programme, in which other bilateral and multilateral donors were also involved.

#### Relevance

The FC project was deployed at the interface between emergency humanitarian assistance and longer-term development measures. It aimed to promote an initial series of medium-term approaches for building resilience to future crises as part of the Joint Resilience Strategy for Somalia, which was adopted by the FAO, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2012.<sup>2</sup> At the beginning of the project, food security still ranged from critical to distressed among some sections of the Somali population due to the drought in 2011.<sup>3</sup> As a result, humanitarian aid measures within the German Federal Foreign Office's remit were similarly relevant. Yet the project region, Gedo, was highly significant for Somali agriculture and food security due to its fertility. With this in mind, the aim was to break the cycle of vulnerability to recurring crises and dependence on food aid as well as setting independent sustainable development in motion with development cooperation support.

In implementing a variety of project measures related to production, processing and marketing in the agricultural and livestock sectors, the aim was to (i) increase production and productivity on smallholdings, (ii)

<sup>1</sup> Johns Hopkins University reported 21,998 infections and 1,208 deaths caused by COVID-19 for Somalia by the end of October 2021. We can assume a high number of unreported cases on account of the weak health infrastructure in the country.

<https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6> (26.10.2021)

<sup>2</sup> FAO, UNICEF, WFP 2012 [https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs\\_high\\_level\\_forum/documents/Brief-Resilience-JointStrat-Final\\_Draft.pdf](https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs_high_level_forum/documents/Brief-Resilience-JointStrat-Final_Draft.pdf) (14 June 2021).

<sup>3</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 2021, <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1036741/?iso3=SOM> (12 June 2021).

strengthen local value chains, and (iii) improve market access for the target group (output). At outcome level, this was intended to increase and diversify the target group's income in the medium term and allow them to build up productive assets. At impact level, the aim was to help strengthen resilience across five dimensions: productivity, access to basic services, social safety nets, adaptive capacity and vulnerability to shocks.

The project's results chain makes good sense with the set of components at output level covering almost the entire value chain. In addition, since all the components included building infrastructure, providing in-kind services and laying on training courses,<sup>4</sup> it also stands to good reason that this would empower the target group to generate income and build productive assets.<sup>5</sup> In turn, higher household income and asset ownership correlate positively with the resilience of agro-pastoral households.<sup>6</sup>

The FC project was intended to directly address the needs and requirements of the target group. This was to be ensured by following a community-based, participatory approach. The relevant measures and households that would benefit from them would be determined as part of a process involving local governments and traditional authorities. A comprehensive catalogue of criteria was drawn up in advance to ensure that the efforts were guided by do-no-harm criteria and that the selection process was sound in terms of conflict sensitivity, vulnerability, counterpart contribution and support from groups. Nonetheless, negative, unintended consequences cannot be ruled out with this type of approach.

That said, it proved beneficial that the FC project was carried out as part of an open programme, meaning that the implementation measures were only identified while it was being executed. Specifically, this made it possible to react to developments in a flexible manner – such as further donor commitments for specific districts – and to ensure the additionality of KfW-financed measures when compared to interventions by other donors. The choice of the FAO as executing agency also brought advantages, as it had extensive expertise and experience and was present locally. As a result, we consider it appropriate that the FC contribution was directly financed via the existing structures of the FAO.

As regards the goal of increasing resilience at impact level, the project particularly addressed the dimension of productivity. The fact that other resilience factors were also taken into account in an appropriate manner was ensured by embedding them in the Somali resilience strategy and by WFP and UNICEF implementing parallel projects, which aimed to improve access to basic services and develop social security systems. We see this as positive.

The dual objective at impact level underpinning the EPE was also aimed at helping to alleviate poverty and mitigate conflict in the project areas by increasing incomes in the medium term. For this type of conflict-reduction effort to succeed, there must be an inclusive benefit for a broad target group, and this will also come with conflict-inducing risks given that population groups will benefit differently from these activities. With political instability being the reality for society in south-western Somalia, it is considered unlikely that a community-based, participatory approach – the key foundation for inclusive implementation and allocation of the measures – could be carried out without encountering problems. Furthermore, there is little reliable empirical evidence and consensus on which measures actually help to mitigate conflict.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, the precarious security situation and the political and economic state of affairs were sometimes not sufficiently addressed in the project's conceptual design. Although a peace and conflict analysis was carried out, in some cases, too little attention was paid to identifiable risks. These include the ability to manage natural disasters and sustainably protect newly restored assets of beneficiary households from possible attacks in the project areas (see "Sustainability" section). Nor was there a focus on ensuring more climate-resilient value chains.

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<sup>4</sup> Training was to be provided on matters such as operating and maintaining infrastructure and conflict management in the context of company management.

<sup>5</sup> The target group included vulnerable, economically active agro-pastoral households, with a special focus placed on young people and female-headed households. Due to the urgency of the project, a detailed target group analysis was not conducted.

<sup>6</sup> Including Boudreau, Tanya 2013, cf. [https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/content/dam/global/reports/Reducing\\_the\\_Risk\\_of\\_Disasters.pdf](https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/content/dam/global/reports/Reducing_the_Risk_of_Disasters.pdf) (20 October 2021). To find out more about other factors influencing resilience, see also Department for International Development (2016) *EoD\_Topic\_Guide\_Measuring\_Resilience\_May\_2016.pdf* ([publishing.service.gov.uk](https://publishing.service.gov.uk)) (22 October 2021).

<sup>7</sup> Including Blattman and Miguel 2010, p. 3, <https://chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2010.CivilWar.JEL.pdf> (14 June 2021).

The fact we still rate the overall relevance as good is due to the focus on concrete development needs in the project region as well as the coherent raft of measures, which was fundamentally suitable for achieving the intended objectives.

**Relevance rating: 2**

### Coherence

In terms of internal coherence, the project was consistent with the objectives of German development policy in Somalia – specifically, to help advance sustainable conflict resolution, stability and peaceful development by sustainably improving life prospects and opportunities for economic prosperity.<sup>8</sup> The top priorities of the Somali-German bilateral development cooperation are sustainable economic development as well as agriculture, rural development and water management.<sup>9</sup> In line with these set objectives and priorities, other parallel projects have been implemented in Somalia under the aegis of German development cooperation that are intended to strengthen resilience in the same way as the FC project under review, such as the TC project Food Security by Strengthening Resilience in the New Settlements of Kisimayu (BMZ-No. 2017 18 485).

In terms of external coherence, the FC project was embedded in the FAO Resilience Programme in Somalia, whose largest donors during the period under observation included Germany, Norway, the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom. The aim of the FAO Resilience Programme under the FAO, UNICEF and WFP Joint Resilience Strategy for Somalia was to avoid donor proliferation and project fragmentation, particularly in the agricultural and food sectors. Although the adoption of a joint strategy and joint impact monitoring went far beyond the usual level of coordination by UN agencies, structured dialogue was not undertaken with all donors involved.<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, it was sometimes difficult to involve national, regional and local decision-makers in the FC project on account of the unstable political situation. However, resilience projects did have an impact on the preparation of national development plans by the Somali government, with resilience adopted as a fully-fledged pillar of the 2017–2019 National Development Plan. At the same time, resilience project donors did not have a consistent understanding of the concept, and not enough was done to adapt the concept to the Somali context. There was also increasing divergence in how donors and implementing organisations – as well as their offices in Nairobi and local forces in Somalia – understood resilience.<sup>11</sup>

But overall, the FAO Resilience Programme and FAO-UNICEF-WFP Joint Resilience Strategy projects have contributed to a more coherent approach in Somalia (external coherence). In addition, the FC project was well integrated into the overall German development cooperation portfolio in Somalia and was in line with the German government’s objectives for the country (internal coherence). Both aspects are key to us still rating the coherence as good.

**Coherence rating: 2**

### Effectiveness

The objective at outcome level was to boost and diversify income in the medium term and to rebuild the supported households’ productive assets.

A range of different measures was implemented in the agricultural and livestock breeding sectors to achieve these goals. Supplying material goods, rehabilitating infrastructure, and providing training and education was intended to increase productivity of small farms (component 1), strengthen local value chains (component 2) and improve the target group’s market access (component 3).

As part of component 1, economically active agro-pastoral households were provided with means of production and livestock, irrigation systems were rehabilitated and user committees established, and training

<sup>8</sup> German Bundestag, 2021, Document No. 19/27662 ([bundestag.de](https://www.bundestag.de)) (16 June 2021).

<sup>9</sup> German Mission to Kenya, Somalia and the Seychelles, <https://nairobi.diplo.de/ke-en/general-information/somalia/development-coop-somalia/1892010> (16 June 2021).

<sup>10</sup> FAO 2015, <https://www.fao.org/3/bd443e/bd443e.pdf> (16 June 2021).

<sup>11</sup> Hall, Samuel, 2016, p. 39, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IHDG-Adkaysi-Nov-2016.pdf> (14 June 2021).

was provided on agricultural production, crisis preparedness and veterinary services. While it was possible to increase productivity in certain activities, such as sowing crops, the production of agricultural goods (e.g. maize) declined during the period under review. This was a consequence of extreme weather events, such as flooding in 2015 and a severe drought in 2016–17.

Setting up and equipping cooperatives for marketing agricultural products and giving beneficiaries training on processing methods, marketing and administration strengthened local value chains under component 2. And in the course of component 3, market access was improved for the target group by establishing market infrastructure and market information systems. In addition, members of marketing and farmers' organisations were trained on how to operate the infrastructure.

All three components involved selecting measures that were easy to implement and would act as a peace dividend, making a rapid and visible contribution to directly improving the public's living conditions. The measures benefited 5,375 households comprising around 32,250 people. This exceeded the number envisaged in the programme proposal of around 3,000 households and about 18,000 people. However, the FAO did not document whether predominantly vulnerable, women- and youth-headed households benefited, as envisaged in the project design. Nor did it specifically detail how the community-based process for selecting beneficiary households was designed. In relation to the community-based participatory approach, interviews indicate that there were conflicts in the selection of beneficiary households and localities.<sup>12</sup>

The FAO used the FAO-UNICEF-WFP Joint Resilience Strategy for Somalia's impact monitoring as a basis for tracking target achievement at outcome level. Although this consisted of baseline, midline, and endline studies, the random samples taken for impact monitoring purposes did not perfectly match the FC project's beneficiary target group and exhibited some methodological weaknesses.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, due to similar characteristics between the random sample populations and the project target group, it is possible to apply these to the FC project's target achievement – albeit with some limitations. In addition, the data collected in the studies laid the foundation for impact monitoring in the context of the FC project's planning and oversight.<sup>14</sup> Despite this methodological limitation, the data from the studies suggests a positive initial development for many indicators, though this did not last (see table). Between the midline and endline studies the target achievement worsened – in some cases significantly – owing to the impact of the drought in 2015 and 2016.<sup>15</sup> For example, between 2016 and 2017, the average income of beneficiary households and the average number of income sources in these households fell. Likewise, there was a decrease in the average number of productive goods and assets per household, measured in tropical livestock units (TLUs) and an agricultural assets index (AAI), as well as in the households' average amount of cropland.<sup>16</sup> Even though all the endline indicator values continued to worsen relative to the midline values, the AAI and average cropland area improved overall from the baseline values. Consequently, there was only partial success in target achievement, although this was attributable in no small part to the drought that struck. We can assume that without the FC measures implemented as part of the FAO Resilience Programme, the drought would have had an even more severe impact in the project areas. As a result, it

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<sup>12</sup> This information is provided in the FAO-commissioned Peace and Conflict Assessment of the Resilience Programme in Gedo. The basic conclusion of this assessment was that FAO interventions had an impact on competition between population groups and was potentially able to play a role in escalating or de-escalating conflicts.

<sup>13</sup> While the FAO, UNICEF and WFP Joint Resilience Strategy for Somalia largely overlapped with the FAO Resilience Programme, it encompassed a larger number of interventions and target groups overall through the additional priority areas promoted by UNICEF and WFP. The main methodological shortcomings stemmed from the random sample's high degree of variance in size between the different data collection times and the intervention and control groups. In 2013, the baseline study collected data from 713 households in the Dolow District that had received interventions from the Joint Resilience Strategy and, as a control mechanism, data from 301 non-intervention households in the Luuq District. Two years later, the midline study analysed data from 423 households in the baseline random sample and 209 households in the control group. The endline study then went on to evaluate data from 532 households in the 2013 random sample and 214 households in the control group. Compounding this, no FAO interventions were carried out in the control areas, but interventions by other donors were. As a consequence, we cannot rule out the possibility that this may have distorted the results.

<sup>14</sup> For more information, see the programme proposal from 2012 and the final inspection from 2018.

<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, the impacts of the drought were more severe for the control group than for the project beneficiaries (see also FAO, 2018).

<sup>16</sup> In addition, poor pastoral households lost 60% of their livestock herds due to the drought – and, by extension, a large proportion of their productive assets (FAO Follow-Up Analysis, 2018: p. viii).

seems plausible that the FC project has played a role in maintaining the status quo in the project areas despite the target achievement only being partially successful.

Indicator	Actual baseline value (2013) <sup>a</sup> ; target	Actual midterm study value (2016) <sup>a</sup> ; Actual endline study value (2017) <sup>a</sup>
(1) Monetary income of the target group increases at household level (objective: increase in income).	N/A; target value: N/A.	USD 931 p.a. on average → unable to determine trend; USD 802 p.a. on average → decrease from 2016.
(2) The number of income sources increases at household level (objective: diversification of income).	2.08 on average; target value: N/A.	2.25 on average → achieved; 1.77 on average → not achieved.
(3) The number of productive goods/assets per household increases (objective: rebuilding of productive assets): a) Tropical livestock units b) Agricultural assets index c) Average cropland area (ha)	(a) 4.04; target value: N/A. (b) -0.12; N/A. (c) 0.31; target value: N/A.	a) 4.47 – achieved; 3.3 → not achieved. (b) 0.1 → achieved; 0.07 → achieved, albeit with decrease from 2016. (c) 2.7 → achieved; 1.75 → achieved, albeit with decrease from 2016.

a) The FAO baseline study is the source for these figures. The data was collected in 2013, although it was not published until the study was conducted in 2014.



Despite the drought's negative external influence on target achievement at outcome level, we can assume that the FC project (in particular component 1: increase in production and productivity) has had positive effects, some of which have continued until the present day. We can compare satellite images of one of the two irrigation pumping stations in Dolow rehabilitated with FC funds. These were taken one year before completion and three years after, respectively, and show clear dynamics around the pump perimeter, which was in active use by that time. The agricultural plots in Figure 1 appear to be very large and poorly structured, whereas three years after completion of the pump perimeter on the Bantal Canal, Figure 2 shows more efficient land use through clearly delineated parcels of agricultural land. The visual change in vegetation density in the individual plots also suggests more targeted cultivation. In addition, the images reveal increasing urbanisation of the area during their seven-year timespan. It therefore appears plausible that the rehabilitated pump perimeter had positive effects on agricultural production, incomes and income sources among the residents in the immediate vicinity. Nevertheless, this visual comparison only allows us to reach an approximate conclusion regarding the achievement of component 1 at outcome level, as the changes that have occurred cannot be causally attributed to the FC project.



Figure 1:  
Bantal Canal Intake Pump: Google Earth imagery, September 2012



Figure 2:  
Bantal Intake Pump: Google Earth imagery, August 2019

Evaluations of comparable projects also show that many of the planned outputs have been achieved, such as the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the associated improvement in market access.<sup>17</sup> In addition, due to the logically sound results chain, we can assume that the FC project has made an effective contribution at outcome level. Despite limitations surrounding data and the partial non-achievement of the targets for the indicators adopted, we still rate the project as satisfactory, as the negative results do not outweigh the discernible positive results.

**Effectiveness rating: 3**

### Efficiency

As the executing agency, the FAO was not required – as is standard when cooperating with UN specialised agencies – to submit detailed cost accounting for the activities carried out. The cost structure gleaned from the evidence available shows that the FC funds used for the implementation of FAO measures, amounting to EUR 4.8 million, were predominantly allocated to Component 1 (69%) – i.e. to measures aimed at strengthening smallholders' production and productivity. 14% was allocated to component 2 and 17% to component 3. A further EUR 2.5 million was used by the FAO to cover its execution costs. In addition, the FAO charged EUR 0.73 million as an administrative fee, which accounted for 10% of the component measures and execution costs (EUR 7.3 million in total). If the execution costs and administrative fee are added proportionately to the implementation costs in the three components, the FC funds' utilisation structure is 69.02% for component 1, 14.05% for component 2 and 16.9% for component 3. This means that the FC funds were mainly used to strengthen the production and productivity of small farmers.

A reliable conclusion on production efficiency cannot be drawn from this data, as benchmark figures were not available for minimum-cost use of funds in comparable projects undertaken in conditions similar to the intervention areas in Somalia. When assessing efficiency, it is necessary to take into account the relatively small-scale nature of the measures implemented, which tends to increase cost, as well as the community-based, participatory approach of identifying the measures to be implemented with accompanying execution costs. The FAO's administrative fees and execution costs were relatively high, but it is unlikely given the security situation that another executing agency with experience in the intervention areas could have implemented the FC project more cost-effectively.

The FAO's financing documents list the total cost per beneficiary household as EUR 1,493 for all measures in the project's three components.<sup>18</sup> However, this broad "unit cost" calculation does not tell us whether the module objectives were achieved at reasonable cost or how utilisation of the outputs was to be evaluated from a microeconomic and macroeconomic standpoint. An indirect impression of the FC project's production efficiency can be gained from the beneficiary figures (around 32,250 beneficiaries and 5,375 beneficiary households), acting as quantitative indicators of output utilisation. We consider this degree of coverage appropriate from the FC-financed services offered by the FAO with a budget of EUR 8 million, even if we cannot come to any conclusions on this basis about how intensively the measures were utilised.

The FC project ran for a total of 34 months rather than the originally planned 30 months. This four-month extension had no impact on costs. We rate the project's time efficiency as good considering the difficult general conditions.

Overall, the results of the project came in below expectations. However, the results were adequate when we take into account the natural disasters beyond any human control and the extremely difficult overall situation, so that we rate the project's efficiency as satisfactory.

**Efficiency rating: 3**

<sup>17</sup> USAID, 2021, <https://www.usaid.gov/results-data/success-stories/why-somalia-right-place-focus-building-resilience> (18 June 2021).

<sup>18</sup> This calculation does not take into account variable sizes of beneficiary households.



## Impact

The objective at impact level was to strengthen resilience to future crises among the population in the project areas. In addition, medium-term income increases were intended to help mitigate conflict and alleviate poverty in the project areas.<sup>19</sup>

To measure resilience, the FAO sought to use the Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) to determine the impact of the measures implemented. The RCI models the hypothetical relationship between the multi-dimensional theoretical construct of resilience and 28 empirically measurable social indicators, then aggregates the information in this statistical data into an index.

The RCI figures determined by the FAO initially indicated increased resilience, which subsequently declined (see table).<sup>20</sup> One interpretation is that the lower RCI value – and the decrease in the indicator values at outcome level – was a consequence of the catastrophic drought in 2016 and 2017, which particularly affected the project region. However, effects of the FAO’s approach are noticeable in that the beneficiary groups’ figures were always higher than those of the control groups and also dropped less during the catastrophic drought in 2016 and 2017. On a positive note, despite the crisis, the resilience level measured among the target group remains above the baseline values from 2014. It therefore seems plausible that the FC project was able to improve the target group’s resilience to some extent, although we cannot completely rule out the possibility that other factors aside from the FC project also helped to increase resilience among the target group (attribution problem).<sup>21</sup>

Indicator	Baseline values (2013) <sup>a)</sup>	Midterm values (2016) <sup>a)</sup> ; Endline values (2017) <sup>a)</sup> ; EPE
Resilience Capacity Index (RCI)	18.64 (control group: 19.51)	41.5 (control group: 25.1) 24.16 (control group: 21.9)
Proxy indicator: number of people killed as a result of non-state violence <sup>b)</sup>	Dolow: 0 Luuq: 0 Belet Hava: 6	2016, 2017, 2020: Dolow: 0, 0, 0 Luuq: 0, 0, 0 Belet Hava: 0, 0, 2

a) The FAO baseline study is the source for these figures. The data was collected in 2013, although it was not published until the study was conducted in 2014.

b) The source for these figures is the Uppsala Conflict Data Program; [UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program \(uu.se\)](http://ucdp.uu.se) (20 December 2021). We have only included deaths caused by non-state or one-sided violence.

There is no data available on resilience that would yield conclusions about the current situation. At present, however, there are no signs of improvement with regard to the objective of conflict mitigation and poverty alleviation, specifically in terms of combating hunger – sufficient food supply in the Gedo project region remains under strain, as it was at the beginning of the project.<sup>22</sup> In addition, relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and Gedo have deteriorated following disputes over the 2021 parliamentary and presidential elections, and violent clashes with civilian casualties have increased.<sup>23</sup> Based on conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, there was no increase in the number of people killed as a result of non-state violence in the project areas of Dolow, Luuq and Belet Hava during the implementation period. When the EUR 8 million in FC funds used is viewed in the context of the relatively

<sup>19</sup> The dual peace and security objective was adjusted as part of this evaluation.

<sup>20</sup> However, the RCI values are not comparable across different time periods due to a change in the set of indicators used. Here, these values were not collected for the target group, but for a random sample in several settlements in Dolow District (see “Effectiveness” section).

<sup>21</sup> The accompanying evaluation that was carried out exhibits clear methodological weaknesses that do not allow for a specific attribution of impact to the FAO-WFP-UNICEF Joint Resilience Strategy. Plus, due to the different target groups, this also prevents us from clearly attributing the impacts to the FC project.

<sup>22</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 2021, <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1036741/?iso3=SOM> and <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1153010/?iso3=SOM> (18 June 2021).

<sup>23</sup> Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/somalia> (18 June 2021)

large Gedo intervention area, which is roughly the size of Portugal, it also seems implausible that large-scale conflict-reduction effects can be causally attributed to the project. The relevant conflict drivers for Somalia are the clan dynamics, on which the project's resilience-building measures only have an indirect influence. Positive effects in terms of reduced potential for soldier recruitment, on the other hand, seem plausible. A dedicated review of the conflict-mitigating effects of similar projects can only be performed reliably based on case-specific monitoring data. The proxy indicator used here, on the other hand, is only able to provide an approximate suggestion of impact.

The project's approach is currently being replicated in part by the FC follow-up project "Integrated Programme for Promoting Resilience in Somalia" (BMZ-No. 2020 18 430 (UNICEF), 2020 18 448 (WFP), 2020 18 422 (FAO)) and will continue to be developed within the joint programming framework. As a result, the project had an impact on subsequent projects beyond the implementation period, including some broad-based effects.

Since we can plausibly surmise that the FC project had resilience-building effects and since there is no indication that the measures under the FC approach were too small-scaled or lacked impact, we still rate the project's overarching developmental impact as satisfactory.

### Overarching developmental impact rating: 3

#### Sustainability

In the context of the evaluation, this project has a reduced sustainability remit. This means we consider the criterion of sustainability, but it is not included in the overall rating. In the 2012 programme proposal, the FC project was already considered to have limited sustainability status. In 2018, the final inspection came to the conclusion that the risk associated with this limited sustainability remit – in particular, in ensuring reliable operation and maintenance of the infrastructure financed – appears only to have materialised to a limited extent so far. However, it added that it is not possible to assess whether long-term maintenance can be ensured. From today's perspective, the project measures' focus on existing local structures of value creation in agriculture and livestock breeding was a particular factor presenting a high sustainability risk. Although the associated agro-pastoral production processes and methods were familiar to the target group and improved how they received the project, they proved unsustainable in the face of extreme climatic shocks (floods, droughts) and the resulting destruction of productive assets. With a view to sustainably enhancing the target group's resilience to crises of this kind, the measures should have focused more on building and establishing climate-resilient value chains.<sup>24</sup> For instance, this would have entailed switching from cereal and vegetable cultivation to varieties that could better withstand droughts and heats, or in agro-pastoral production, introducing livestock breeds adapted to climate change. However, such changes would have required significantly more time, including for efforts to convince the target group of their merits.

The positive effects temporarily observed at outcome level during the FC project's implementation period did not last. There was only temporary success in increasing and diversifying beneficiary households' incomes and in rebuilding the target group's productive assets, with flooding and a devastating drought in 2016 and 2017 causing these gains to be partially reversed or even to fall below the values in the baseline sample. As shown by the FAO's RCI, it was only possible to strengthen resilience to future crises among the population in the project areas on a temporary basis. With the FC project discontinued after 2016 and no more data collected on the target achievement indicators, it is not possible to assess which household types the temporary positive effects were still observed for after the financial support came to an end.

Realistically, an exit strategy was not formulated for the FC project, as the need for further humanitarian aid and longer-term development measures was obvious in light of the precarious wider circumstances. However, at the time of the evaluation, it was not possible to adequately assess whether FC follow-up projects aimed at promoting resilience in the Gedo region could build on the temporary positive development effectiveness of the project under review. In any case, the restrictions and limitations brought about by the coronavirus pandemic have affected the target group's economic activities and, with them, the sustainability of the impacts achieved. Irrespective of this, there are considerable sustainability risks due to

<sup>24</sup> In any case, according to the results of the FAO analyses, access to basic social services and new livelihoods were more important for the resilience of the target group than the stock of productive assets; see FAO Follow-Up RIMA Analysis, 2018: p. 15.

the precarious security situation as well as the political and economic instability in Somalia. Against this backdrop, the development effectiveness of the project will not improve, but is rather likely to weaken. As a consequence, we rate the project's sustainability as unsatisfactory, as the discernible positive results are outweighed by the negatives.

**Sustainability rating: 4**

### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).