


Ex post evaluation – Zimbabwe



Sector: Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (CRS code: 15220)

Programme: Participation in the investing Multi-Donor Trust Fund (ZimFund), BMZ no. 2009 67 208*

Implementing agency: African Development Bank



Ex post evaluation report: 2020

All figures in EUR million**	UWSSRP project (Planned)	UWSSRP project (Actual)	EPIRP project (Planned)	EPIRP project (Actual)
Investment costs (total)	32.79	32.73	29.78	26.54
Counterpart contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Funding	32.79	32.73	29.78	26.54
of which BMZ budget funds	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00

*) Random sample 2019 ***) At exchange rate of 1.33 USD/EUR

Summary: The programme made a financial contribution in the amount of EUR 20.00 million to the first phase of the multilateral Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund (ZimFund), which was established in 2010. The ZimFund was set up when a government of national unity was established after the severe conflicts in 2008 and 2009 and there was hope for political detente and the restoration of bilateral relations. The ZimFund was and still is managed by the African Development Bank (AfDB). The funds were used in two major projects – the Urgent Water Supply and Sanitation Rehabilitation Project (UWSSRP) and the Emergency Power Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (EPIRP) – to rehabilitate infrastructure in the water and energy sectors. In addition to Germany, financing was also provided by Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Australia, amounting to almost EUR 106 million in total by the end of 2015. Of this total, EUR 59.27 million was invested in the first phase of the two projects (UWSSRP: EUR 32.73 million / EPIRP: EUR 26.54 million). The remaining EUR 46.75 million was transferred to a second phase, though Germany was no longer involved at this stage.


Development objectives: The objective of the ZimFund was to strengthen the prerequisites for improving the health and material living conditions of the population in the acute crisis situation through the use of infrastructure provided in the energy sector and for the drinking water supply and wastewater disposal (module objective, outcome). As a result, the ZimFund contributed to creating the foundations for Zimbabwe’s economic recovery (ultimate objective, impact).

Target group: The entire population of Zimbabwe was defined as the target group of the ZimFund (2010: 12.7 million/ 2018: 14.4 million).

Overall rating: 3

Rationale: Both projects were highly relevant for the prospect of making quick and noticeable improvements to the population’s living conditions. They achieved the planned results with limited financing, though they were extremely delayed. And relatively good results (outcome) were achieved even under difficult conditions; in the project area, they contributed to tackling cholera and therefore saving lives. However, the results achieved could not be secured on a sustainable basis because the underlying political and economic framework conditions deteriorated again and because, among other reasons, the difficulties surrounding the continuous operation of the infrastructure could not be solved on a permanent basis.

Highlights: The joint financing was a promising approach to intervention against the background of development policy cooperation that had been suspended for years. Given this state of affairs and also in view of the AfDB’s inexperience with multi-donor trust funds, an agreement on the MDTF was reached remarkably quickly with a preparation period of around one year, and demonstrated the international community’s willingness to act at local level.



Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 3

Ratings:

Relevance	2
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	3
Impact	2
Sustainability	3

Relevance

In 2009, the Zimbabwean government under Robert Mugabe was subject to international sanctions. Bilateral cooperation had been suspended since as early as 2002. Germany's participation in the financing of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in 2009 was approved directly by Chancellor Merkel – as Germany's response, on the one hand, to the formation of a government of national unity between Mugabe's long-governing party ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC following successful peace mediation by the South African government and, on the other hand, to the exceptionally acute need to support the suffering population after more than ten years of crisis.

On the Zimbabwean side, the reference document for the national priorities at the time of the appraisal in 2010 was the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP). In 2011, the Zimbabwean government then passed a five-year plan, the Medium Term Plan (MTP) for the years 2011 to 2015. Since the period of hyperinflation had only just been overcome at this point, the STERP was primarily aimed at macroeconomic stabilisation, while the MTP pursued development policy objectives more strongly. In both strategies, investments in the water supply, wastewater supply and energy supply were among the priorities.


Even from today's perspective, there was undoubtedly a need for action: the government of national unity had generated a glimmer of hope for political improvements for the first time in many years and the possibility for resuming development cooperation therefore also arose. The 2008/2009 cholera outbreak drastically documented the consequences of decades of misgovernment and dilapidated infrastructure for the population and the donor community demonstrated its willingness to provide concerted support.

In this situation, joint financing was a promising, if not the only possible, intervention approach, since according to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's (BMZ) requirements it had to be ensured that sanction requirements were met, that no funds flowed through the government system and that FC could not fall back on its own cooperative structures. The alternative of allowing funds to flow through emergency aid mechanisms, e.g. the UN, was excluded by the chancellor issuing direct approval to the prime minister. The World Bank, which was originally due to be responsible for managing the fund, did not think it was in a position to guarantee the various donors' range of sanction requirements. For this reason, gratitude can ultimately be extended to the African Development Bank (AfDB), who took on this role despite previously having no experience in managing MDTFs¹ and was also only able to engage with a very vague formulation when it came to checking the sanction lists, as Zimbabwe is one of its members.

Germany's participation in ZimFund did not just take place for political reasons; it was also guided by the intention of guaranteeing a consolidated, coordinated and, as a result, efficient and effective approach to using the provided funds as part of a community financing package with other donors.

¹ The AfDB's project documentation also rates the experience as "innovative" and positive on the whole.

From today's perspective, the original objective, especially the expectation of using the investments to contribute to the country's peaceful democratisation, was too ambitious. Moreover, it was premature in the political situation in which the sanctions were still in force, even though the wording probably reflects precisely the political expectations of the donors. The fragile situation did not arise from national uprisings caused by supply shortages, but came about as a result of long-standing totalitarian repression, corruption, human rights violations and economic decline. The ZimFund was unable to exert any influence over these causes. For this reason, the objectives were for this evaluation in line with the following overview:



Even given the lack of specific planning for measures, the target group was selected on a blanket basis to be the entire Zimbabwean population, and was not chosen in a conflict-sensitive manner as is the current state-of-the-art. Ultimately, the target group for the Emergency Power Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (EPIRP) was the population of the entire country, while the Urgent Water Supply and Sanitation Rehabilitation Project (UWSSRP) focused on six urban areas.²

Relevance rating: 2

Effectiveness

The module objective was to create “prerequisites for improving the health and material living conditions of the population through the use of the infrastructure provided” (outcome). The ZimFund financed two projects: the Urgent Water Supply and Sanitation Rehabilitation Project (UWSSRP) and the Emergency Power Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (EPIRP).

The focus of the UWSSRP water project was on rehabilitating existing infrastructure used for supplying drinking water and treating wastewater in the project area. The majority of the project’s objectives were achieved according to the outcome indicators, albeit not always in the planned scope (see table): access to the municipal water supply in the target communities was expanded further than originally planned. After the project, 56% of households in the target communities were connected to the drinking water supply, instead of the previous 40%. The production of clean drinking water was significantly increased (from 646,000 m³ / day to 768,151 m³ / day). Good progress was made in improving water quality (90% of samples met the national standard instead of the previous rate of 70%) and wastewater disposal rose from 76,325 m³ / day to 195,361 m³ / day. A negative development was only observed in the water losses in the distribution network (non-revenue water). This figure should have decreased, but instead it increased. This could either be the result of incorrect data at the beginning of the project, or be due to the fact the pump output was increased but not all pipes were refurbished. It is therefore possible that dilapidated pipes could not withstand the high pressure in some areas, which caused a rise in technical losses. Furthermore, illegal extraction could contribute to increased water losses. Efficiency in fee collection (collection efficiency) also developed positively.

Indicator	Status upon initial collection (2010)	Expected figure at end of project (planned for 2014) (Improvement planned)	Status EPE (Final check by AfDB, 2015)/ (Improvement achieved)
(a) Water sector: Urgent Water Supply and Sanitation Rehabilitation Project (UWSSRP)			
(1a) Access to the municipal water supply in the target communities, households with access (financing was used to fund access to connections in the communities)	40% (2010)	45% (+12.5%)	56%/ (+40%)
(2a) Supply of clean drinking water	646,000 m ³ / day (2013)	820,000 m ³ / day (2014) 174,000 (+26%)	768,151 m ³ / day (2015)/ 122,151 m ³ / day (+19%)

² Chegutu, Chitungwiza, Harare, Kwekwe, Masungu and Mutare.

(3a) % of samples that meet the water quality standard (national standard)	70% (2010)	95% (2015) (+36%)	90% (2014)/ (+28.5%)
(4a) Wastewater disposal	76,325 m ³ / day (2010)	298,000 m ³ / day (2014) (+290%)	195,361 m ³ / day (2015) (+156%)
(5a) Reduction in non-revenue water (NRW)	55% (2010)	62% (2014) (+12.7%)	Not achieved. 52% (2015)/ (- 6%)
(6a) Collection efficiency	40% (2010)	53% (2015)	60% (2014) (+ 65%)
(b) Energy: Emergency Power Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (EPIRP)			
(1b) Production of electricity by the Hwange power plant	3,133 GWh (2010)	3,850 GWh (+29%)	2015: 0/ 04/ 2016: 3,850 GWh (+29%)
(2b) Number of refurbished connections	0	11,632	11,382 (2015) (98% of target value met)
(3b) Number of newly connected households	0	20,010	Not achieved 11,888 (2015) (60% of target value met)
Source: African Development Bank, Project Completion Reports 2015			

the drinking water supply was considerably expanded, even in areas that had not been supplied with drinking water for years. The expansion to the wastewater treatment plants' capacity also led to almost 80% of the wastewater input from the project area being treated by the end of the project in 2015. However, on a nationwide level, the proportion of the population who were able to use at least a basic supply of drinking water as well as the proportion of the population who were able to use at least basic sanitation services fell in 2015 compared to 2010³ – though this is also a result of population growth.

To achieve more, the power supply would have had to be stabilised even further and the drinking water distribution network and wastewater collectors would have had to undergo much more extensive repairs. To address this matter, more funding would have been needed with better predictability at the start of the planning process. Delays were also caused by delays in the EPIRP.

As part of the EPIRP energy project, the Hwange coal power plant – Zimbabwe's biggest power plant – was refurbished, mainly by refurbishing the systems for treating waste ash and by replacing infrastructure in the transmission and distribution networks in many locations across the entire country. The most important issue linked to the EPIRP was to create the conditions required to operate the drinking water and wastewater treatment systems in the UWSSRP's project communities. This was achieved and the systems were operated. The power plant was working far below its capacity. The measures in the grid were able to contribute to the power plant increasing its output.

³ However, the percentage of the population who practise open defecation fell slightly, see <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/ZWE>

The degree of target achievement at outcome level according to the indicators described in the table is satisfactory: the Hwange plant's electricity production capacity was increased to 3,850 GWh as planned and, at the time of AfDB's final inspection in July 2015, almost the total planned number of power connections (11,532) had been refurbished, 11,382, and 11,888 new households had been newly connected, which corresponds to 60% of the original planned target. The plans were too optimistic in this case. Country-wide data shows that the percentage of the population with access to electricity increased greatly between 2015 and 2017; by 2016, this figure had risen by as much as 30% – it is plausible that the project contributed to this.

Both projects involved measures to embed the investments at institutional level: training was provided for the system operators at community level as well as extensive, albeit less than originally planned, training of various user groups. The communities received advice on strategic planning. An environmental and social compatibility management system was designed for the EPIRP. Nevertheless, the AfDB's final checks report a lack of ownership by local authorities – this demonstrates that individual responsibility cannot be substituted externally.

Effectiveness rating: 3

Efficiency

The implementation of the planned investments was accompanied by a large number of difficulties, which primarily led to delays⁴ but also resulted in increased costs, at least compared to the very first plans⁵: in the EPIRP in particular, quick planning studies were drawn up but no in-depth feasibility studies were completed in the early stages due to time pressure, which also came from the political side. This has led in part to increased expectations and inaccurate cost estimates.⁶

According to the framework agreement concluded between the AfDB and the corresponding donors, the AfDB was responsible for managing the ZimFund. To this end, it set up a 6-member Management Unit (MMU) in Harare. The selection, appraisal and conceptual design of the individual projects and the coordination, monitoring and management of the implementation phase, including reporting and proper use of funds, were therefore delegated to the AfDB, who applied their own standards and procedures. It commissioned a procurement agency based in London to award any contracts for goods and services. A project oversight committee, which included representatives from the Zimbabwean government and the donors, monitored the ZimFund. The communities and utility companies were responsible for executing the individual projects. These implementing agencies were supported by an international consultant.

This implementation structure with non-local procurement agencies and contract partners – e.g. companies in the UK and South Africa in the EPIRP project – led to organisational difficulties, such as contracting an Asian company without any local knowledge and, above all, without registration in Zimbabwe. Delays and too insufficient involvement of the individual implementing agencies in Zimbabwe led to overlaps with their activities (for example, the water company's own refurbishment work). Better predictability regarding the funds available in the short term (phase 1) and later in the medium term (phase 2) would have allowed for more anticipatory and in-depth planning.

Donor coordination was mainly rated as good by those involved and in the reports. The donors were unable to influence the implementation of the financed projects because the selection of the projects was decided early on, i.e. after the initially difficult definition of the cooperation framework between AfDB and KfW the project tended to be accompanied by low management costs on the donor side. Nevertheless, the donors have played an active role. While the AfDB provided regular progress reports, these mainly related to the activity level and the outflow of funds. For this reason, there was pressure to improve the monitoring of impacts – this was not part of the implementing company's service package and was therefore not designed in line with DC standards during the implementation⁷ and did not take place on a regular

⁴ The UWSSRP project was originally planned to run for three years from 2011 to 2013 but it actually ran until 2015 and the last work in the EPIRP project was not completed until early 2016.

⁵ The early assumptions for the first phase of the EPIRP were around EUR 26 million (Norad 2014, p.10).

⁶ See the AfDB's final reports.

⁷ Monitoring of contract fulfilment / unspecific indicators at outcome level / lack of base figures

basis. In 2014, during the main implementation phase of both projects, KfW was the lead of the donor group and took steps towards improving the monitoring approach.

The AfDB's administrative expenses amounted to 5% (EUR 3 million). This meets expectations regarding the administrative expenses for MDTFs in the context of conflict, fragility and violence.

The AfDB assesses the profitability of both of the funded projects as positive. The AfDB calculates the EPIRP project's economic profitability with an internal rate of return of 38% and recorded a capital value of USD 271.60 million in 2013.⁸ According to the AfDB, this development was also the result of more efficient collection of revenue, higher tariffs and the avoidance of penalties being paid to the environmental authorities by the communities thanks to their adherence to environmental standards in the water supply and wastewater disposal sectors.

Efficiency rating: 3

Impact

The programme was designed to contribute to creating the foundations for Zimbabwe's economic recovery. During the project planning stage, neither KfW nor the AfDB⁹ developed indicators for the impact level. To evaluate the impact, indicators were therefore selected on a retrospective basis for this EPE; as also presented under "Relevance", these indicators correspond to the overarching objectives of the UWSSRP and EPIRP projects and are also available with starting and target values for the relevant period 2010–2016/17/18. The development of the impact indicators cannot be credited solely to the projects' contributions. However, Hwange is Zimbabwe's largest power plant and the six urban areas supplied by the UWSSRP contain around one third of the population of Zimbabwe. This means that the interventions are relevant enough to at least assume that the development of nationwide figures can partly be traced back to the programme's interventions. Furthermore, there were no additional externally financed investment projects in the water or energy sector during the implementation period.

Indicator	Value at the start of the project	Value as at ex post evaluation
(1) Mortality rate for children under the age of 5, number of deaths per 1,000 live births*	86.3 (2010)	46.2 (2018)
(2) Death rate as a result of diarrhoeal diseases**	56.3 per 100,000 deaths (2010)	44.97 per 100,000 deaths (2017)
(3) Death rate as a result of unsafe sanitation facilities**	32.64 per 100,000 deaths (2010)	25.5 per 100,000 deaths (2017)
(4) Death rate as a result of unsafe sources of drinking water**	46.51 per 100,000 deaths (2010)	37.03 per 100,000 deaths (2017)
(5) Percentage of households who live less than 500 m away from the nearest safe source of drinking water***	55.77% (2012)	62.82% (2017)
(6) Air quality, mean annual pollution in micrograms / m ³ **	23.32 (2010)	21.73% (2015)

⁸ However, this was not checked under the same conditions at the end of the project; as such, it is not possible to make a statement regarding the development of profitability.

⁹ The AfDB performed an evaluation in 2017 and recorded a status for a number of indicators, for which there are no initial values, so no development can be tracked.

(7) Percentage of households who use wood as a primary source of energy***	68.9% (urban: 19.8%, rural: 93.9%) (2012)	67.8% (urban: 8.4%, rural: 91.6%) (2017)
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*) <https://data.unicef.org/country/zwe/>

**) <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/diarrheal-disease-death-rates?tab=chart&country=ZWE>

***) Zimbabwean Office of Statistics – Census 2012 and Census 2017, own calculations

In relation to the health effects, the indicators reveal consistently positive developments: the number of deaths among children under the age of 5 (per 1,000 live births), which are frequently caused by water-induced diarrhoeal diseases, fell despite a growing population. Death rates for diarrhoeal diseases, unsafe sanitation facilities and unsafe sources of drinking water all fell significantly. In February 2017, the AfDB’s evaluation team ascertained that the health-related results exceeded expectations as the indicator for cholera and other water-borne diseases had fallen. According to the team, there had been a complete stop on untreated wastewater being discharged into rivers and lakes in the project areas.

Drinking water is also more accessible: the percentage of the population who has to travel less than 500 m to the nearest safe source of drinking water grew from almost 56% in 2012 to just under 63% in 2017. It can be assumed that these changes relate particularly to the socially deprived and residents of rural areas, who are less likely to have direct access to drinking water. In all project areas, women benefit most from these developments (AfDB 2017, p. 35).

Both the percentage of the population who use at least a basic supply of drinking water and the percentage of the population who are able to use at least basic sanitation services fell in 2015 compared to 2010¹⁰.

The work in the EPIRP project was needed mainly to ensure the effectiveness of the measures in the water and wastewater sector. Furthermore, the work also contributed to other effects: Air quality, measured as the mean annual pollution in micrograms / m³, improved from 23.32% (2010) to 21.73% (2015). The percentage of households that use wood as a primary source of energy decreased slightly from 68.9% on average (19.8% in cities and 93.9% in rural areas) in 2010/2011 to 67.8% (8.4% in cities and 91.6% in rural areas) in 2017.

However, a visual comparison of light intensity at night in Zimbabwe reveals a slight downturn from 2012 to 2016. The percentage of the population with access to electricity fell initially between 2010 and 2015 (from 40.14% in 2010 to 33.7% in 2015) before returning more or less to the 2010 level in 2017 – and the EPIRP also contributed to this development.

Democratisation, which was one of the original objectives, had not been established in Zimbabwe before Robert Mugabe’s death in 2019. Almost all of the relevant indicators in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index developed on a negative trajectory during the project period and beyond.

However, it can generally be stated that both projects still collectively had significant impacts on the population in a very difficult initial situation with complicated implementation constraints.¹¹

Impact rating: 2

Sustainability

In 2010, the programme was subjected to a restricted and reduced appraisal according to Note 47 in the FC/TC Guidelines (expedited process). With regard to sustainability, it was stated at the time of appraisal that due to Zimbabwe's low national budget, but also to the declining technical capacities and the fragile situation of the country, a lower level of sustainability requirements for the individual measures must be

¹⁰ However, the percentage of the population who practise open defecation fell slightly, see <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/ZWE>

¹¹ “This project [UWSSRP] has solved a serious challenge and has saved lives.” (AfDB 2015, UWSSRP PCR, p.11)

accepted. For this reason, expectations for sustainability are also lower than usual in the ex post evaluation.

From today's perspective, the programme's developmental effects were not sustainable and did not have a noticeable effect on the entire country. Cholera broke out in Zimbabwe once again in 2018.¹² In autumn 2019, inflation returned to 300%¹³ and the government's financial opportunities to build and maintain infrastructure are still limited. The political and economic conditions under which the epidemic originated and flourished in 2008 remained in place or deteriorated during the project period and afterwards. On the whole and on average across the country, neither the drinking water supply and wastewater disposal nor the electricity supply were significantly improved, although the increasing population must also be taken into account.

There is some evidence that more continuous projects with better integration into national systems could have achieved more permanent and wider-scale results: (a) Hwange power plant is working far below its capacity: it is designed for an installed capacity of 920 Megawatts but it actually only produces 400–500 Megawatts annually. It was flooded in early 2020 and shut down completely. (b) More pipelines would have had to be refurbished for a more wide-scale impact. (c) Neither follow-up financing for further necessary investments nor future expenditure for operations and maintenance have been secured for either sector. (d) Connections to local administration structures were only established in some areas: the creation of concepts (environmental and social standards for Hwange, investment and financial planning for the drinking water supply and wastewater disposal) and a limited period of time for the external training of operators and the population cannot replace the development of capacity at institutional level. While the communities and utilities were officially responsible for implementing the projects financed with the ZimFund, the impression remains that projects were implemented more “for the local structures” rather than “by the local structures”.

However, this would place demands on the programme that would not be suitable for the emergency-aid-type situation. The investments in refurbishing the Hwange power plant were likely the only option for increasing power production at short notice. From today's perspective, this approach no longer meets the criteria for approving support for coal-based power plants; nowadays, the efficiency rate would have to be improved significantly instead of just restarting operations at the plant.¹⁴ However, the EPIRP project's environmental effects are deemed positive as the power plant's environmental pollution was reduced.

The AfDB also expected the ZimFund to contribute to donor harmonisation in Zimbabwe.¹⁵ This was not achieved sustainably: Even though the cooperation was found to be positive overall in retrospect, there have been no further contributions, and important bilateral donors such as the UK, the Netherlands and Canada are withdrawing completely from cooperation with Zimbabwe. Despite this, a second phase of the ZimFund was still implemented. The measures of the second phase were also hoped to have positive effects on the sustainability of the measures of the first phase.

Sustainability rating: 3

¹² <https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-october-2018-cholera-zimbabwe/en/>

¹³ <https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/imf-zimbabwe-highest-inflation-rate-world-190927004536305.html>

¹⁴ See BMW 2014

¹⁵ This is formulated as an objective on the website: <https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/zimbabwe-multi-donor-trust-fund/about-zimfund>

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency** and **impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's developmental effectiveness. The scale is as follows:

Level 1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
Level 2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
Level 3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
Level 4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
Level 5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
Level 6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall (this is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain more or less positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental effectiveness.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental effectiveness of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a “successful” project while rating levels 4-6 denote an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the development objective (“impact”) **and** the sustainability are rated at least “satisfactory” (level 3).