

Ex post evaluation – Senegal



Sector: Participation in international peacekeeping operations (15230)
Project: Promoting peace in Casamance I (BMZ No. 2004 65 492*)
Implementing agency: Agence d'Exécution des Travaux d'Intérêt Publique (AGETIP)



Ex post evaluation report: 2017

		Planned	Actual
Investment costs (total)	EUR million	6.80	6.95
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	0.80	0.86
Funding	EUR million	6.00	6.09
of which BMZ budget funds	EUR million	6.00	6.09

*) Project in random sample 2017

Summary: The Financial Cooperation (FC) measure was part of the Senegalese programme to promote the socioeconomic development of Casamance (Programme de Relance des Activités Économiques et Sociales en Casamance, PRAESC), which has been blighted by an armed conflict over its independence since the 1980s. The rehabilitation and expansion of economic and social infrastructure were intended to deal with damage from the conflict in Casamance, boost economic and social development, and support the region's general stabilisation. On the one hand, tracks were financed, along with agricultural dams for water and soil salinity management. On the other hand, community socio-economic infrastructure was financed to support the decentralised territorial authorities.


Objectives: The FC project's objective was to help to restart economic and social activities in areas of Casamance that were especially affected by the conflict (outcome). On the whole, this was intended to make a contribution towards promoting socio-economic development and for peace in Casamance (impact).

Target group: The target group consisted of around 600,000 people in the rural localities of Casamance heavily affected by the conflict; in particular women, who assume a stabilising role in the village communities. The programme region encompassed the three regions of Ziguinchor, Sédhiou and Kolda.

Overall rating: 2

Rationale: The measures implemented during the course of the project addressed relevant shortages and made an important contribution to improving the general socio-economic conditions in rural communities of Casamance that were especially affected by the conflict. All the facilities are fully functional and are utilised, even after multiple years in use. However, their upkeep poses a challenge in the medium term. Based on the precarious poverty situation in large parts of Casamance, it is to be expected that it will not be possible to maintain infrastructure facilities just with user payments – especially with regard to larger repairs required in particular cases.

Highlights: Despite the context of conflict, the project was not appraised under Note 47 of the FC-TC Guidelines (expedited process). The target group's high level of appreciation for the project is particularly noteworthy. The population and their representatives repeatedly emphasised that the project has noticeably contributed to the region's stabilisation. They state that the programme's work was pioneering, concentrating as it did on areas that were particularly neglected and affected by the conflict. The intervention served as an example for other donors, who followed suit with their involvement.



Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 2

Ratings:

Relevance	1
Effectiveness	2
Efficiency	2
Impact	2
Sustainability	3

Relevance

Senegal is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a national poverty rate of 47.5 % (World Bank, 2013). With poverty rates as high as almost 80 %, the situation is even more precarious in the intervention area of Casamance and its three administrative units of Ziguinchor (average of 67 %), Sédhiou (70 %) and Kolda (78 %; Senegal’s poorest region). Given the armed conflict for Casamançais independence which has flared up repeatedly since the early 1980s and years of investment in public infrastructure having been neglected by the central government, the economic and social infrastructure has increasingly fallen into disrepair or been destroyed outright during clashes. This led to a downturn in economic activity followed by impoverishment, as well as popular disaffection from the central government, growing secessionist efforts and increased willingness for violent conflict. Around 73,000 of the region’s inhabitants had to leave their villages, temporarily fleeing to Gambia or Guinea-Bissau.

The programme for reconstruction and revival of the economic and social activities in Casamance (Programme de Relance des Activités Économiques et Sociales en Casamance, PRAESC) was worked out by the Senegalese government with involvement from international donors, and was intended to counteract this downward spiral. Alongside measures to clear land mines, as well as demobilising and reintegrating combatants, the strategy included an investment programme to i) rehabilitate the infrastructure and ii) promote local development. Socio-economic community infrastructure (schools, health stations, maternity centres, water supply, markets, bus depots) was rehabilitated or created in parallel to PRAESC as part of an additional investment programme (Programme National d’Infrastructures Rurales, PNIR) or the successor programme, PNDL (Programme National de Développement Local). PNIR had already been concluded by the time the Financial Cooperation (FC) measure started; PNDL had not yet started. The rehabilitation and expansion of economic and social infrastructure aligned the FC programme’s design with the strategies of the Senegalese government and of other donors. The project was also consistent with the priority area strategy agreed between Germany and Senegal in 2003 to promote socio-economic development for peace in Casamance and, in particular, the objective of developing the peacetime economy (*économie de paix*). The project was designed as a cooperative programme with GIZ. Until 2012, GIZ was active within the scope of the peace-building programme (ProCas/Technical Cooperation) alongside the FC project, and supported the implementation of the FC components, e.g. by assisting with the creation of community development plans.

The promotion of the peace process continues to be a priority for the central government and is in line with the majority of the population’s wishes. Reducing poverty and promoting social and economic development are also consistent with the country’s general priorities and the local population’s needs, as representatives of the target group repeatedly emphasised to the delegation. The project assumed a leading role in this regard in areas of the country that previously did not receive support from the central government or from donors on account of the strained security situation. The “do no harm” approach was always followed in the process. This included inter alia not implementing any projects against the wishes of the parties in conflict (for instance, a planned track was not built because local rebel groups had spoken out against it). The local authorities themselves selected the respective projects on the basis of the community development plans within the “major infrastructure” component (Component 1: irrigation/desalination

perimeters and tracks) with involvement from the sector ministries responsible (sectoral approach), in addition to the projects for the “local development” component (Component 2: schools, latrines, wells, health stations, markets, bus stops, etc.) This way, the project directly supported the decentralisation process in the country.

Taking into account this particular political environment and context of conflict, the target group's precarious socio-economic situation, and Senegal's development strategies and priorities, the problem analysis and the selected approach are correct and make sense from today's perspective. The project is based on the two following results chains¹: i) economic growth/economic support: provision of socio-economic infrastructure → higher economic growth → improved incomes/living conditions → falling motivation for violence as a solution for conflicts → decrease in the risk of the conflict breaking out again on the macro-level; ii) peace dividend: basic services are visibly restored or improved following an armed conflict → the improvements highlight the value of peace for the beneficiary population while boosting government legitimacy → stronger rejection of violence as an option, which would put the peace dividend at risk (opinion shift) → support for violence as an option falls (behaviour shift) → the risk of conflict decreases → stabilisation (contribution towards peace/peaceful outcome).

The project stands out due to its very high relevance – even considering its design as a pilot project.

Relevance rating: 1

Effectiveness

The FC project aimed for economic and social activities to restart in communities of Casamance that were especially affected by the conflict. To this end, around EUR 4.3 million was used within the scope of Component 1 (four tracks with a total length close to 50km and five irrigation or desalination perimeters), with around EUR 2 million used on Component 2 (socio-economic infrastructure) for building works and supervision. Altogether, Component 2 encompassed 111 items of infrastructure, which break down into the following areas: 75 for education (including classrooms, offices, latrines), 11 for water supply (including wells, distribution networks), 8 for health (health stations and staff accommodation), 5 for social, youth and women's centres, 9 for sport, and 3 for economic infrastructure (market, bus stop, granary).

There is no data available that can be used with regard to economic development, the situation around nutrition (e.g. number of meals consumed per day during the period before the harvest; the “*période de soudure*”), tax receipts from local levies (increased tax revenue points inter alia to economic growth, for instance), return migration or infrastructure usage levels. A reporting system is practically non-existent.

In the absence of data, the following outcome indicators were therefore identified based on discussions with the target group, local authorities, AGETIP and NGOs, and defined within the scope of the ex post evaluation.

Indicator	Status PA, Target value PA	Ex post evaluation
(1) At least 75 % of the infrastructure financed is in use	0, target value unquantified	Almost 100 % with a few limitations concerning the market and youth centre
(2) Increase in agricultural production/expansion of agricultural land area	1.5 tonnes per hectare (rice cultivation), target value unquantified	4 tonnes per hectare (rice cultivation); reclamation of cropland; diversification of crop products

¹ See study by Analysis Research Consulting (ARC): Operationalisierung konfliktbezogener Wirkungsbeobachtung bei FZ-Vorhaben in fragilen und Konfliktstaaten (“Operationalisation of conflict-related impact assessment of FC projects in fragile countries and countries in conflict”).

(3) Commercial activity has increased in the intervention zone's rural communities	Target value unquantified	Achieved
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On a positive note, even after several (5 to 8) years in use, all infrastructure measures inspected are still in satisfactory-to-good condition, fully functional and used appropriately as intended. The accomplishments were very well received by the population on the whole, as all the interview partners repeatedly emphasised. During a stakeholder workshop at the end of the delegation's stay in the intervention area, the mayors of the communities in question expressed their gratitude for the support and requested that the programme be continued (Phase 2). In particular, they valued the FC project's pilot nature as a pioneer in areas affected by the conflict. This fact anecdotally reinforces the programme's effectiveness.

The construction measures were carried out by locally based companies. The visits to the financed infrastructure, made on a random sample basis, found that at least two of the five irrigation or desalination systems used in agriculture were damaged in the course of heavy rain events. These were provisionally repaired during the project implementation and are intended to be expanded as part of a new project. According to AGETIP and an implementation consultant, the damage is primarily attributable to a design flaw – underestimating rainfall levels in terms of heavy rain events related to climate change – and not to failures from the user groups, as was suspected for the project completion report.

According to the communities and users, the track construction or rehabilitation had positive impacts on the local economy (e.g. trade with Guinea-Bissau) and made it easier to access public facilities (e.g. health stations). They further state that the security situation has improved considerably due to stronger use of the tracks. The smaller-scale facilities that were financed during Component 2 were selected with input from the community development plans (which were developed in a participatory process) and these met local needs according to the target group. Only one market appeared to be oversized compared with its catchment area at the time of the ex post evaluation. A youth centre can still be rated as effective despite low utilisation (around eight events a year), as it is also used as a place of assembly, aside from its main function. There is no alternative building in the community, for instance to hold public meetings.

Effectiveness is judged to be good, taking into account the use of the infrastructure as intended over multiple years and the resulting visibility of public services.

Effectiveness rating: 2

Efficiency

The actual programme launch was delayed by 18 months. The implementation was also extended by 2 years, from 4.5 years to 6.5 years. Key reasons for the delay were: i) the intended executing agency for Component 2 (socio-economic infrastructure), PNIR, being wound up, ii) delays in the awarding of contracts (Component 1) due to a new Senegalese procurement law (2009) which presented the executing agency with new challenges, iii) damage to dam structures resulting from extreme weather events and iv) the serious security situation. The share of the total budget made up by consulting services was only 8.5 % (2.7 % for international implementation consultant, 5.8 % for AGETIP, including audits). This can be regarded as extremely efficient. The estimated total costs were only exceeded by 2 %. Considering the delays to implementation and added costs resulting from these, this small budget overrun is to be rated as a positive.

A general profitability calculation does not appear to make sense, due to the wide variety of individual projects financed (120 altogether). In addition, this is predominantly social infrastructure, which is hardly apt to be ranked in terms of profitability and with preservation of peace in the background. According to the international consultant working locally and the project executing agency, AGETIP, the construction costs for the individual measures were reasonable and within a normal range for the area. The respective costs for the socio-economic infrastructure, such as health centres and including equipment, classrooms and the market, are in line with national standards. The water connections financed cost EUR 25 per person on average (range of up to EUR 50 per person according to quantified access target (QVZ) of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – BMZ). Between EUR 30,000 and 35,000

was spent per kilometre on average during track construction. The average costs per hectare vary between EUR 1,500 and 4,500 for the irrigation and desalination systems, depending on their type, size and scale of the works.

The profitability of the irrigation perimeters, depending on the yields (rice cultivation only), varies between 17 % (4to/ha) and 4 % (2to/ha) with investments depreciating over 20 years.² For the most part, the capacity levels created are of the right order of magnitude, are fully utilised, and have contributed to a noticeable improvement in the target group's living conditions. Only one market appears to be oversized compared with its catchment area. However, since this is a single case, the allocation efficiency is considered to be good overall.

Overall, we rate the efficiency of the project as good.

Efficiency rating: 2

Impact

The programme aimed to improve the regional authorities' supply of socio-economic infrastructure, which was intended to promote socio-economic development (resulting in living conditions improving; infrastructure aim) and to promote peace (stabilisation aim). The following, clear results chains are used as the basis for these dual aims: 1) use of the socio-economic infrastructure contributes to development and improvement of living conditions and 2) by improving access to and functionality of community and other public services, the infrastructure provided contributes to strengthening the legitimacy of decentralised structures and thus to promoting peace. Indirectly, the legitimacy of the central government is also improved, as, in turn, is the intervention zone population's sense of belonging with the government of Senegal.

From today's perspective, the dual aims inherent in the project are to be explicitly stated at impact level. Acquiring reliable and instructive data, as already mentioned, presented a major challenge. The following indicators were defined within the scope of the EPE:

Indicator	Status PA, Target value PA	Ex post evaluation PA
(1) All travel restrictions to be lifted by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (stabilisation aim)	Not achieved	Achieved (since 2016)
(2) Decrease in armed incidents (stabilisation aim)	According to various estimates, the conflict claimed between 3,000 and 6,000 lives (up to 2005)	Achieved; no armed incidents reported since 2012
(3) Two flights a day between Dakar and Ziguinchor, and two a week between Dakar and Kolda (stabilisation aim)	Not achieved	Achieved
(4) Regular ferry service between Dakar and Casamance (three ferries; stabilisation aim)	No ferry service since the sinking of Le Joola in 2002	Achieved; Aline Sitoë Diatta commissioned in 2007 (FC financing), with two more ferries added in 2015

² Assumption: EUR 0.19/kg rice paddy, repair costs amounting to 5 % of the investment, 10 % of gross income used on equipment.

(5) School enrolment rate in Casamance comparable with the national level (infrastructural aim)	77 % (nationally), (data for Casamance in 2005 unavailable)	98 % (Casamance) vs. 82 % (nationally)
(6) Increase in power connections in the city of Ziguinchor (infrastructural aim)	Approx. 20,000 (2005)	Approx. 36,000 (2015)

With regard to the objective of consolidating peace, all the interviewees confirmed the assumption that the investments had a positive effect against the feeling of exclusion and neglect, which can be understood as one of the causes of the conflict. For instance, not only important urban areas in Casamance (such as the commercial centre of Ziguinchor) are connected to Senegal’s capital again with regular flights and ferry connections. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs lifting the travel restrictions indicates that the security situation is also internationally classified as having significantly improved. The school enrolment rate increasing to a level above the national rate and power connections almost doubling suggest better living conditions. The investments also brought a perceptible improvement in living conditions, according to information from the target group. In summary, it seems plausible that despite the programme’s limited scope, the project has contributed to improving living conditions and stabilising the region – even if the causality cannot be measurably proven. The pioneering nature of the FC project is especially noteworthy in this regard. Against the background of its enormously positive resonance among the target group and the improved security situation, the overarching development impact is rated as good overall.

Impact rating: 2

Sustainability

At the time of the ex post evaluation, all the financed facilities were in operation and in acceptable condition overall. Schools and larger health stations were integrated into the central government system (including payment of staff). Other socio-economic investments, such as smaller health stations, community centres, sports and youth facilities, irrigation/desalination systems and wells, rely on the localities and/or volunteer services for their operation. The delegation’s observations indicate that these live up to their roles. However, there is a high risk in terms of the facilities’ maintenance. Limited central government transfers and low user fees give rise to the assumption that there will not be sufficient financial resources available if larger-scale repairs are needed. The user fees are collected and meticulously accounted for, but are too low to ensure sustainable operation, also in light of the precarious poverty situation. Upkeep of the tracks is the responsibility of the road maintenance authority, AGEROUTE, which has a relatively larger budget. However, it is not possible within the scope of the EPE to judge whether the funds are sufficient. Consequently, we can infer that the development effectiveness of the individual investments (which has been enormously positive to date) will decrease significantly in the event of larger-scale damage, but will remain positive overall (assuming a useful life of 15 to 20 years).

We rate the project’s sustainability as fully satisfactory in view of the particular political circumstances and conditions of poverty at hand.

Sustainability rating: 3

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

Level 1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
Level 2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
Level 3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
Level 4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
Level 5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
Level 6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).