

# »» Ex post evaluation VPUU I-III, South Africa




<b>Title</b>	“Violence prevention in urban slums” (Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading – VPUU)		
<b>Sector and CRS code</b>	43030 Urban development and management		
<b>Project number</b>	BMZ no. 2002 66 056, 2008 66 939, 2010 66 778		
<b>Commissioned by</b>	BMZ		
<b>Recipient/Project-executing agency</b>	City of Cape Town		
<b>Project volume/ Financing instrument</b>	EUR 120.64 million, of which EUR 15.59 million in FC financial contributions, EUR 91.70 million in South African contributions, and EUR 13.35 million in third-party funding.		
<b>Project duration</b>	04/2004 – 09/2018		
<b>Year of report</b>	2021	<b>Year of random sample</b>	2020

## Objectives and project outline

The outcome-level goal was to contribute to preventing violence in Khayelitsha township. The intention was to achieve this goal by (i) improving the safety situation, (ii) providing infrastructure and services, (iii) strengthening civil organisations, and (iv) embedding the principles of urban planning that prevents violence. The innovative concept was continuously adjusted during the implementation phase. At impact level, the goal was to improve the prevention of situational, social and institutional violence and criminality in selected project regions.

## Overall Rating: Moderately successful



## Key findings

The measures had a development policy impact in the area of administrative reform. However, the safety situation and living conditions did not fundamentally improve. The project is rated as moderately successful:

- The promotional approach and individual measures were fundamentally relevant, though the breadth of the approach was to the detriment of depth and quality. The relevance is therefore rated as good but not very good.
- Based on the close link between the VPUU and the relevant state urban development strategies, the coherence is rated as very good.
- The effectiveness is rated as moderately successful. Important process innovations have been initiated (integrated spatial planning, civil participation). However, the expansion of infrastructure remained isolated, usage levels are insufficient, and informal settlements are not profiting much.
- Efficiency is rated as moderately successful. Costs for supporting measures were significantly below the investment costs; criminal gangs and vandalism are impeding production efficiency.
- The impact is rated as moderately successful; administrative reforms have been promoted but the safety situation was not improved and living standards were only improved in certain areas.
- Sustainability varies markedly for the various measures and is satisfactory overall.

## Conclusions

- Neighbourhood management and civil participation are effective for conflict-sensitive urban management and can temporarily increase the credibility of local administrative structures. To reduce conflicts on a substantial scale and close gaps in state supplies, the close involvement of security forces and sectoral authorities is essential.
- NGOs and local service providers can act as a bridge to the population; however, neutralising interests and costs are critical factors for success.
- Furthermore, local promotional measures with a broad base only have a limited effect on preventing violence; police investigation work and effective criminal prosecution are vital.

## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 3

#### Ratings:

Relevance	2
Coherence	1
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	3
Impact	3
Sustainability	3

#### General conditions and classification of the project

The project “Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading” (VPUU) and its two follow-up phases “Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading II” and “Municipal Violence Prevention Programme” (together: VPUU I–III) were aimed at employing an integrated and participative approach to the violence-sensitive planning, construction and operation of urban infrastructure in order to contribute to preventing violence and improving the population’s potential to help themselves in Khayelitsha township in the province of Western Cape.

The intention was to achieve this goal by (i) improving the safety situation in Khayelitsha, (ii) providing infrastructure and services geared towards preventing violence (situational violence prevention), (iii) strengthening civil organisations (social violence prevention), and (iv) embedding the principles of urban planning that prevents violence into the administration structures of cities and provinces (institutional violence prevention).

The project’s recipient and executing agency was the City of Cape Town. The interventions were designed as an open programme. Geographical planning, access to services close to inhabitants in selected areas, as well as cultural and social offerings were improved by means of citizen participation, smaller infrastructure measures and a wide array of financial contributions for micro-measures under the FC-financed Social Development Fund. In this process, NGOs, neighbourhood organisations and local service providers were brought in, a wide range of micro-measures were financed, and conflict mitigation mechanisms were offered.

The projects employed extensive consulting services and institutional complementary measures in an effort to advance administrative reforms in Cape Town’s urban management. The VPUU I–III programmes served as a model for FC-projects in townships in other areas of the Western Cape province and other provinces in South Africa.

The projects’ target group was the predominantly black population of Khayelitsha, particularly women and young people. At the start of the project, the township’s total population was estimated to be up to 700,000 people, around 300,000 of whom lived in the areas addressed directly by the projects, known as “Safe Node Areas” (SNA).

The three phases of the programme are evaluated as one unit since the measures under phase I related primarily to adapting the programme’s design and preparing for the measures under phases II and III. It therefore makes no sense to separate the phases.

#### Relevance

In relation to the core problem, the interventions were generally relevant: the physical structures in the township designed as a satellite town for black workers were not developed in a functional way and the offices responsible for this worked in isolation from one another. There was a lack of social cohesion among newer members of the population, who had migrated into the area in the period of one generation;

police work was unprofessional and the police's relationship with the population had been shattered, which benefited petty crime and serious capital offences.

As a result of the VPUU's interventions, existing amorphous physical structures at selected transport hubs were supplemented and brought into order. Complementary interdisciplinary measures were designed with the aim of securing these areas, known as Safe Node Areas, and strengthening the feeling of belonging. As part of this work, mainly the areas surrounding central suburban train stations were developed, which met the mobility needs of workers living in Khayelitsha. However, concentrating on train stations also had some disadvantages, which became particularly apparent in the COVID-19 pandemic (see Effectiveness and Sustainability).

The extensive civil participation process before, the financing of micro-measures that could be implemented quickly, and the establishment of local committees were also plausible for creating social networks and a feeling of social belonging within the social fabric that had been heavily fragmented as a result of migration, for restoring the damaged trust between the population and state authorities, and for preventing the escalation of conflicts by using forward-looking communication. Multi-sectoral promotional measures reflected the very different and wide-ranging interests; the consideration of these different perspectives on living conditions and industry were very important for reducing Khayelitsha's functional deficits. Here, the line between generally unsatisfied needs and those needs that directly contribute to structural violence is not always apparent.

The city council departments, which previously worked separately from one another, were motivated to cooperate with one another by the integrated approach, which was of strategic importance given the need for administrative reforms. However, this project approach was not consistently innovative and was not always coherent. In the external presentation of the project there was heavy emphasis on topic-specific interventions that were indeed relevant but did not clearly fall within the remit of the cooperating planning department (e.g. early childhood development, football tournament equipment). An approach like this involves a risk of excessive demand being placed on the institutions involved, which can be detrimental to quality in particular. At the start of the project, FC already had extensive experience in other areas of conflict, though it is clear that this specific experience had not been compiled in a systematic manner.

The project approach did not involve any systematic liaison with security forces. Selective and individual attempts by both parties to cooperate while the programme was being implemented were limited due to a lack of institutional framework. This is regarded as a strategic weakness.

Given the weakness of state institutions, cooperating with NGOs and informal local service providers generally made sense. However, the very broad range of issues addressed in the promotional approach was detrimental to the project's depth and quality and involved a great deal of management (see Efficiency). The diverse range of topics and fields of assistance were not always thought through and governed to a sufficient extent. For local organisations, the criteria used for granting institutional support were not always apparent. As a result, pre-existing competition and fragmentation among NGOs and local service providers was rather reinforced.

From today's perspective, the relevance is assessed as good.

**Relevance rating: 2**

### Coherence

There is a close concept-related and personnel link between VPUU and the relevant state urban development strategies/the stakeholders responsible (internal coherence): the VPUU picked up measures previously started by the government under its Urban Renewal Programme (URP) and expanded the dimensions of integrated spatial planning by involving the citizens and civil organisations. Relevant planning tools were added, some of which have been adopted into the current MURP urban development programme.

The involvement of suitable personnel was ensured by deploying members of the former URP team into the project-executing unit. Subsequently, some members of this team (including previous consultants) were taken into the current MURP team. The relationship is described as a mutual learning process.

The various financing sources and financing instruments were combined in an efficient manner. South Africa’s own contribution was primarily financed using funds from intergovernmental grants, which were added to the City of Cape Town’s budget and then planned in the budget for measures in Khayelitsha as part of the normal budget process. Allowances from the South African Employment and Public Works Programmes (EPWP) were used as financial incentives for volunteers to encourage their transition to the formal labour market.

Since the details of the German DC programme were not formed until after VPUU started, liaison and cooperation between FC and TC was not very pronounced; German TC was not active at a local level in Cape Town. Later, VPUU publications were distributed using financing from TC funds by TC partners and, in its current promotional phase, the TC project issued a sub-contract to the now independent VPUU NPC.

In general, the coherence and synergy between VPUU and the strategies on the partner side are therefore rated as “very good”.

**Coherence rating: 1**

### Effectiveness

Given the very high rate of capital offences in public spaces (murders, robberies), the programme objective was to contribute to the prevention of violence. The target achievement at the outcome level is summarised in the table below.

Indicator	Status PA, target PA	Ex post evaluation
(1) Infrastructure: Sustainable use and operation (number of systems and facility management committees – FMC).	Status PA: 0 Target value: Usage agreements and facility management committees exist in 90% of the facilities; 3 departments contribute financially to O&M.	Partially achieved <sup>1</sup> : Depending on their type and purpose, facilities and systems used at very different rates; limited opening hours; role of FMCs not known.
(2) Infrastructure: At the time of the EPE, the facilities are actually efficient and effective, and are well maintained (rental income may need to be examined).	Status PA: 0 Target value: 90% of the facilities are efficient and effective, and are well maintained; rental income covers costs.	Partially achieved: Facilities are efficient and effective with deficiencies in maintenance; rental income only covers a portion of operating costs; responsibility for O&M has not been clarified; Significant sanitation problems in the areas surrounding flats and social facilities (wastewater and solid waste), vandalism in public spaces within project areas.
(3) Micro measures (Social Development Fund): Sustainable use and running of activities financed using the Social Development Fund.	Status PA: 0 Target value: 225 measures financed and run in a sustainable manner (all 3 phases):	Achieved <sup>2</sup> : Planned process implemented and popular; Contacted recipients still based in the project area;

<sup>1</sup> Small random sample visited during EPE; results may be distorted due to COVID-19; no data recorded systematically by the executing agency or project.

<sup>2</sup> Small random sample during EPE and final review, data not collected on a systematic basis.

	<p>Evidence of use of small investments (investments can be identified and used). Participants remember benefits of training courses and similar measures (participants can be identified and can remember training content).</p>	<p>Promotional measures remembered by intermediary NGOs; Financed consumer goods now no longer in use due to short useful life.</p>
<p>(4) Accompanying measures: Principles of urban planning that prevents violence and crime are embedded in the city council and provincial administration structures.</p>	<p>Status PA: 0 Target value: City council and provincial administration bodies approve of VPUU's concept for violence prevention, are integrating it into their integrated development plan (IDP) and use it in other projects.</p>	<p>Achieved: Elements from VPUU adopted into city council's organisational structures and procedures; staff employed at a local level; citizen participation expanded into planning processes and needs assessment.</p>
<p>(5) Accompanying measures: Number of civil organisations active in the area of violence prevention.</p>	<p>Status PA: 0 Target value; no quantitative target; quality of output compared to user perception (selected interviews).</p>	<p>Substantial appraisal not possible:<sup>3</sup> Presence of a large number of NGOs, some of whom are very competent; Level of awareness of VPUU and NGOs among by-passers differs; distinction and results chain for violence prevention not clear.</p>
<p>(6) Accompanying measures: Proportion of trained young people and promoted/advised small business owners and resulting employment and income effects.</p>	<p>Status PA: Target value (refined): Proportion of trained young people in employment. Proportion of trained small business owners who have created jobs.</p>	<p>Achieved for a small number:<sup>4</sup> Promotion from voluntary patrols to full-time security forces and caretakers verified; Presence of some promoted small businesses verified; Conversion of a childcare centre into a small business verified.</p>

The target group – the population of Khayelitsha – was involved in the measures' planning using a range of instruments (participation offers) and was also reached by the measures to differing extents. It is plausible that a significant portion of the measures benefited women and children or that women/children were responsible for these measures and continued them. Some examples here include clearer routing on public roads, road lighting, childcare centres, legal advice for divorce, support in gardening projects and use of neighbourhood meeting points. However, it is not clear how many people specifically profited from which measure and to what extent.

The planning documents created during the participative process (local action plans, safety plans) and available during the EPE were too general to facilitate a specific comparison between gaps in supply and the project's specific contribution to improvements. Furthermore, significant dimensions of the problem did not fall within the remit of the executing agency's planning department and/or were only marginally addressed by VPUU (e.g. lack of toilets, dysfunctional wastewater system, solid waste disposal).

<sup>3</sup> Small number of NGOs contacted at time of EPE; roles of contribution recipients versus local service providers versus strategic partners are not always clear and are not systematically documented.

<sup>4</sup> Plausibility verified in conversations with project managers, no specific numbers in project's monitoring and evaluation.

Most of the positive results relate to the area of administrative reform. The tested process innovations relate in a broader sense to the conflict-sensitive urban planning included in the target system. However, this is not consistently reflected in improved employment opportunities for the target group or any other use of public space within the entire township<sup>5</sup>.

The measures for expanding social and local economic infrastructure were situated in a relatively low number of small focus areas close to the central transport axes in Khayelitsha (Harare and Kuyasa Station). Informal settlements, where the population has increased significantly over the last 20 years, benefited from small pilot measures (e.g. near the Monwabisi Park).

When renting commercial spaces, the city council aimed only to achieve 20% coverage of operating costs (known as the “improved sustainability model”). Renting out affordable commercial space was regarded as a measure to help improve equal opportunities among local business people. Despite the fundamental importance of reviving public spaces through social facilities and local economic development, this low cost recovery ratio is a rather less purposeful approach for subsidising tenants whose situations changed to varying degrees and, in some cases, clearly for the better during the course of the project, e.g. by re-purposing a childcare centre into a bed and breakfast.

At the time of the EPE, no data was available on the condition, rental and use of the created facilities for a comparison over time. Observations made during the on-site visits suggest that not all of the commercial spaces have been rented out and that social infrastructure facilities are used for very limited periods of time. Due to the lack of data, it is not possible to compare the situation directly with assessments made at the end of the project. While the leasing process is dealt with by an external service provider, it was not possible to determine during the EPE which local stakeholders ultimately decide which spaces are used or not. The failure to make use of the full capacity and other usage restrictions impede the facilities’ benefits for the population and therefore also have an adverse effect on all other impacts<sup>6</sup>.

The mainly consumptive micro measures under the Social Development Fund achieved an identifiable purpose: Non-repayable financial contributions and contributions-in-kind (known as “lost” contributions) were issued to changing thematic focuses (e.g. culture, sport, early education) in a transparent process, and according to the field staff, made a significant contribution to the programme’s popularity. Some of the beneficiaries contacted during the EPE also expressed positive impressions.

The experience with the SDF can be regarded as an indirect contribution to the administrative reforms since the city of Cape Town had no previous experience with the instrument “local funds for self-help and micro measures”. Due to the consumptive nature of the measures, the effects are still limited in terms of time (e.g. sports equipment, grants for food in childcare centres, financial contributions for cultural events)<sup>7</sup>.

The promotion of NGOs and local service providers implemented as part of the complementary measures was successful, though there were limitations: The contacted NGOs and some of the service providers who benefited from the local economic development measures are still active and operate with a clear service profile. However, some of the promoted groups have also disbanded (including a women’s group responsible for conducting household surveys for the programme).

According to information from assessments performed in 2016 (prior to the end of the project), a range of civil organisations, associations and non-governmental organisations were active in the VPUU’s focus areas with the aim of preventing violence, focusing particularly on gender-based violence. This was still the case at the time of the EPE five years later. One of the organisations that received contributions at the time of implementation provided a plausible explanation of its interventions.

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<sup>5</sup> It is possible that these results from the field studies during the evaluation were adversely affected by the “coronavirus effect” (less mobility, less work, lower incomes, lower rents, etc.).

<sup>6</sup> Example: Closed toilets limit the use of neighbourhood centres; while the conversion of a childcare centre into a commercial accommodation facility may be beneficial for local economic development, it does not correspond to the agreed usage and the rent agreed for this was very low.

<sup>7</sup> However, from the fiscal policymakers’ perspective, the financing of temporary initiatives without their own legal personalities and manual record keeping make it difficult to track the actual status of the promotional project.



The so-called “strategic partnerships” of the VPUU are to be distinguished from this. These are civil organisations that were managed as cooperation partners but did not directly receive any contributions. It is plausible that the promotion of groups or individuals who are supervised by NGOs with a professional setup may achieve better results than the promotion of individuals who receive no advice (one positive example is the promotion of gardening groups, who were supervised by the well-established NGO Abalimi). However, the programme’s contribution to the overall outcome is limited in this case.

On the whole, the atmosphere between the many NGOs active in the programme area is not a cooperative one and is instead shaped by jealousy and resentment in some cases. This cannot be attributed directly to the VPUU but instead is primarily down to the confrontational political climate in Cape Town. However, the low-threshold promotion and the lack of clear performance criteria for NGOs gave rise to doubts among those who were left out in spite of the broad range of topics addressed by the promotion.

There is clear indication that jobs were both created and secured as part of the VPUU. An estimated 30 jobs were created from neighbourhood patrols that were initially conducted by volunteers. The participants in these patrols gained access to state-funded job creation schemes and can now apply for any vacant roles in the official security sector. A further 20 former volunteers are now employed as caretakers with the service provider NPC (the proportion of these caretakers responsible for buildings from phases I–III cannot be clearly defined). Around 200 workers are employed by tenants of the FC-financed commercial spaces<sup>8</sup>.

The majority of the proposals made as part of the complementary measures for Cape Town planning department’s organisational structures and procedures were implemented. MURP specifically promoted the dialogue between the local population and the specialist departments; this dialogue was managed by the planning department.

When viewed as a whole, the indicators were partially achieved, partially not achieved, and, in some cases, achievement could not be measured. This is clearest when looking at the benefits of the programme’s outcomes for the city council’s administrative reforms. Overall, target achievement is rated as just about satisfactory.

**Effectiveness rating: 3**

### Efficiency

Strictly speaking, the construction costs were appropriate and the quality in relation to expenditure was good. According to the information provided by all stakeholders in the conflict-ridden local environment, the fact that some of the building projects had to be terminated was unavoidable. According to the partner’s estimates, the number of successfully planned projects in Khayelitsha that are subsequently blocked is low compared to other areas of the city<sup>9</sup>.

More serious adverse effects on efficiency stemmed from the ever-heightening safety situation over the years. An increasing number of gang-related crimes resulted in building projects taking longer, becoming more expensive and involving more risks. In some large-scale projects in Khayelitsha financed using South African funds – such as two large libraries – and to a greater extent since the end of the programme, construction costs rose as a result of extortion. According to the executing agency’s estimates, this severely impaired the production efficiency and shows that the suitability of the open programme approach to preventing violence is limited.

When looking at the cost structure of the three programme phases, it is worth noting that only around 42% of the EUR 15.5 million in FC funds was issued for infrastructure, while 45% was provided for international consulting services (EUR 6.9 million). A good EUR 2 million was disbursed for supporting measures (including the SDF micro measures, neighbourhood patrols, NGO promotion and advanced training). This ratio of costs is also highly unusual for FC projects that are close to the target group, including

<sup>8</sup> This figure includes the commercial spaces from all of the programme phases, covering both secured jobs and newly created jobs. The final review report for phases I–III refers to additional temporary workers.

<sup>9</sup> The appropriateness of the unit costs for the large number of small interventions can no longer be verified but also has very little effect on the overall programme’s costs. Due to the wide range of different measures promoted (food, gardening equipment, sports clothing, cultural events, toys, etc.), it is not possible to calculate any meaningful averages.

comparable urban development projects in other partner countries, and indicates that the selected promotional approach led to a high need for support.

The consulting costs also include supporting costs for construction planning, while the supporting measures also include some maintenance expenditure. Some of the international consultants were involved in the acquisition and implementation of South African funds. However, the overall ratio shows that the programmes involved huge expenditure on personnel for planning, design and implementation.

This high level of expenditure can be explained by the very broad but also experimental promotional approach, which was modified and adapted multiple times. This had an adverse effect on production efficiency at programme level but did not translate into outstanding results (see Effectiveness and Impact) and does not encourage its repeated application in other programmes. Clearer limits on fields of assistance and partners – particularly in relation to NGOs and local service providers – could have reduced expenses and made it easier to track results.

An ambivalent stance is also taken regarding the programme's creation of parallel structures. These relate to separate participative structures, which in turn developed their own participative plans. In addition to existing committees (Community Development Forum and Community Police Forum), new Safe Node Area Committees (SNAC) – which performed a wide range of networking duties in the neighbourhoods – were created in areas selected to form safe zones<sup>10</sup>.

Using open planning processes, so-called Community Action Plans (CAP) were developed, which reflect local inhabitants' priorities and are designed to give the population the feeling of being heard. For each individual plan, the supervision and tracking of such processes must be continued for several years and budget cycles, though this does not always generate planning-relevant results. Precise communication is required between the neighbourhood, the municipality (which does not have budget funds) and the overarching layers who are skilled in expenditure. Here, the extent to which the project referred back to previous experience in neighbourhood management from other countries and municipalities is not clear, some of which have clearer structures relating to the reach of citizen participation<sup>11</sup>.

As such, plans were made with limited prospects of implementation in some cases, which has an adverse effect on efficiency. Some of the measures prioritised in the civil participation processes required official and political decisions, which in turn required a number of intermediate steps and large investments in development (e.g. land use planning with designation of residential, commercial and mixed use areas, implementation of sectoral standards for resident-related services, wastewater disposal).

Significant needs, like hygiene facilities for example, could not be addressed within the executing agency's area of responsibility. As a result, the development plans drawn up at neighbourhood level could not be implemented either quickly or completely, despite the large amount of effort involved in preparing them. There is the risk that some of the parties involved may be left frustrated, which would be counter-productive with regard to conflict prevention.

For Cape Town city council, the availability of financial and human resources was beneficial for the innovative project: setting up a separate flexible account for the FC funds enabled the South African administrators to argue for the acceleration of the corresponding South African funds, which were used to jointly finance some of the larger measures. All phases of the VPUU are managed by the same leaders on the South African side for their entire term. This facilitated both communication and the recording of (positive and negative) lessons learned, which benefited the efficiency of sharing experiences and creating coherence in content. In this regard, efficiency is deemed positive<sup>12</sup>. Viewed as a whole, efficiency is rated as just about satisfactory.

### Efficiency rating: 3

<sup>10</sup> The reason for this approach was the existing committees' strong links to the governing party at national level (ANC).

<sup>11</sup> For instance, Columbia with the urban areas of Bogota and Medellín, Rwanda and Berlin, which have broad experience in district management. There are a number of municipalities in various regions around the world that have experience with participatory budgets (Bürgerhaushalt, presupuesto participativo, orcamento participativo), which involve a clearly defined volume of funds being assigned to a participation process.

<sup>12</sup> One example for the long-term increase in efficiency by recording lessons learned is the reduction of margins for external service providers in new management contracts awarded by the city council.



## Impact

The project's overarching development objective was: "The prevention of situational, social and institutional violence and criminality has improved in selected project regions".

Target achievement at the impact level is summarised below:

Indicator	Status PA, target PA	Ex post evaluation
Perceived situation: A significant and sustainable improvement to the safety situation in the Safe Node Areas has been noted by the population, and by women in particular.	Status PA: - Target value: 3 on a scale of 1–5, efficient and effective neighbourhood patrols in each Safe Node Area.	Partially achieved: Achieved for the random sample of household surveys conducted by the project after the end of the project (data is not particularly informative). Not generally achieved for the spontaneous interviews conducted with tenants and passers-by during the EPE <sup>13</sup> .
(2) Actual safety situation: Actual incidence of petty crime and capital offences.	Status PA: Phase I: Homicides (300 per 100,000 inhabitants/year, with a national average of 48/100,000 (PAR I) Phase II: 171 murders and 166 rapes per 100,000 inhabitants with a national average of 39 and 76 per 100,000 respectively (2007/08 PAR phase II) Target value: Decreasing trend over the years or stagnating trend after the end of the project.	Not achieved: Significant increase in all types of capital offence in 2 out of 3 police departments in Khayelitsha since 2011 and spread of criminal gangs and organised crime in Khayelitsha (official data based on police statistics).
(3) Socio-economic situation: Further socio-economic indicators, e.g. unemployment, new business registrations, access to jobs.	Status PA: Not recorded Target value: Positive trend over the years or stagnating trend after the end of the project (comparison over time).	No assessment: Qualitative indication of around 50 new jobs in commercial and security sectors versus loss of jobs and income caused by COVID-19 in 2020/21.

The data recorded for monitoring and evaluation purposes and by the VPUU cooperation partners is limited in terms of its informative value; too little attention was paid to the measurability of effects and the ability to isolate them<sup>14</sup>. As part of a study conducted by the University of Cape Town (cooperation partner) for the period 2013–2016 (phase III until the completion of most building works), people in the VPUU programme areas (Harare, Kuyasa, Monwabisi Park) stated that they had been less personally affected by violence in public areas in the last 12 months (14% of those asked) than those questioned in a comparable group in non-VPUU areas (24%). These positive results could not be confirmed by the small random

<sup>13</sup> Respondents did not apply a specific scale for the EPE.

<sup>14</sup> Monitoring of the VPUU, which was based on random samples of local household surveys, revealed an improvement to the perceived level of safety within the target scale. However, both the design and evaluation of the questionnaires were deficient in terms of the methodology used.

sample of interviews with passers-by and VPUU infrastructure users conducted during the EPE, and the city council also assumes an increasing subjective burden.

One possible reason is that the project measures were only concentrated on a comparatively small area within Khayelitsha, while the perception of the prevalence of violence may be different in neighbouring residential areas. Furthermore, it would be plausible that a large number of the inhabitants that have recently moved into the area did not experience the common plans and initiatives (empowerment), which is why they have a different view of the current reality. It is also very likely that the new crimes added during the coronavirus pandemic had a negative impact on the overall perception<sup>15</sup>.

An analysis of the actual level of safety reveals the following: according to a comparison of the figures generated by the project for the district of Harare, the murder rate in Harare fell from 120/100,000 in 2006 to 62/100,000 in 2016 over the term of the programme. By contrast, the official crime statistics prepared by the Western Cape Department of Community Safety show that, since the end of the project, the trend for the most common capital offences has fluctuated heavily but is generally on an upward trajectory for at least two out of Khayelitsha's three police departments and for all serious criminal offences. The same trend has also been observed in other areas of Cape Town<sup>16</sup>.

It seems plausible that other factors overlap with the project's effects here and the FC project was unable to have a big enough impact that could have neutralised the other influencing factors. Furthermore, a comparison of the annual statistics on capital offences offers only limited informational value as no short-term shifts in violence can be identified: one typical trend is that persons with a propensity for violence tend to withdraw from particularly secure neighbourhoods or transport hubs and look for other areas of activity.

According to estimates by the city council, important crime and violence data is consolidated by the volunteer-run Community Police Forum (CPF) in Khayelitsha but no statistical analyses are conducted using this data. Politically motivated mistrust between the ANC-influenced CPF and the Democratic Alliance-run city council makes it more difficult to exchange information.

The business climate in Khayelitsha has suffered as a result of this: according to the city council, fewer businesses are active than in the past and the presence of gangs and organised crime in Khayelitsha has increased significantly since the end of the project. Building companies have to protect themselves by paying protection money and several groups of local tradespeople have gained a reputation of acting like organised gangs.

The development of crime shows that, over the long term, it was a disadvantage not to encourage the city council and police to work together constructively on a permanent basis. Despite several initiatives on both sides, this can generally be attributed to the confrontational political climate in the Western Cape province.

On the whole, the project's effects on living standards remain limited: on the one hand, the measures for local economic development were very selective, while on the other hand, migration from the Eastern Cape province further accelerated before and after the VPUU's implementation period, making it difficult to achieve suitable geographical planning and curb crime. Neither the programme nor the city council are to blame for this, though it does prevent the project from achieving its full effects.

Regardless of the achievement of indicators, the project generated a series of interesting institutional lessons learned for the city council, which had not been explicitly planned in this form (positive unintended impacts), and initiated important administrative reforms across the departments.

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<sup>15</sup> From the eleven passers-by spontaneously interviewed during the EPE, four of them perceived safety to be a 4 or 4–5 on a scale of 1 to 6 (with 1 being the best, and 6 being the worst). Two of them gave an average value of 3, and a further four gave the situation a score of 1–3 depending on the type of crime. Everyone interviewed who was of working age complained about a lack of jobs, overpopulation and the deterioration of the situation since COVID-19.

<sup>16</sup> The number of murders in Harare and Khayelitsha police districts rose from 119 to 142 and from 121 to 192 respectively between 2008/09 and 2017/18. In the same reference areas, the number of armed robberies rose from 487 and 556 to 616 and 681 cases respectively between 2008/09 and 2015/16, before then falling to 455 and 551 cases respectively by 2017/18. Only Lingeletu West police district saw its murder rate stagnate at 42–44 cases, while the number of robberies fell from 179 to 144 cases. The Institute for Strategic Studies (ISSA) comes to the same conclusions.

According to the city council, the coordination processes trialled as part of VPUU made it easier to plan and implement quick and specific emergency measures for COVID-19 (e.g. food aid) at a local level. With regard to working with informal settlements, it was ascertained that neighbourhood centres could serve as starting points for formalising and mapping unplanned settlements, e.g. using low-threshold measures such as building post boxes, which are more positive and have a more subtle effect than clearing occupied land.<sup>17</sup>

Viewed as a whole, the impact including the prevention of violence and conflict is only just rated as satisfactory.

**Impact rating: 3**

### Sustainability

The sustainability of the promoted measures differs depending on the instrument and subject area in question:

The functional restructuring of public spaces around train stations and central squares was successful and remains in place. However, only a relatively small proportion of the public spaces in Khayelitsha actually benefits from this. The infrastructure has proven to be relatively robust and suitable for long-term use. Smaller repair measures are financed by the city using the budget for recurring expenditure. However, there is a lack of funds for larger repair measures that are required on a periodic basis; the institutional responsibility for this work has not been clarified in full.

Bigger risks to the sustainability of infrastructure stem from deficiencies that are located outside of the project's sphere of influence but still have a negative effect on it: (i) too little funding is mobilised on the South African side for the refurbishment of water and wastewater infrastructure. Defects in the outdated wastewater system pose a risk to the use of nearby social infrastructure. The permanent overloading of these systems may devalue some of the investments under the VPUU; (ii) population density has increased even further as a result of unbridled migration from other parts of the country; the VPUU may have created additional incentives for this; in the population's perception, supply deficiencies have not been dealt with or have only partially been dealt with and new safety risks have arisen as a result; there are new ecological risks resulting from the occupation of protected dune areas; (iii) interruptions to railway services due to coronavirus have made it easier for criminal gangs to vandalise public facilities and made it more difficult to convict anyone for these crimes. Some of the infrastructure (lighting) financed by FC has been affected by this.<sup>18</sup>

The institutional promotion of NGOs and local commercial service providers has proved to be sustainable in some cases. Some providers are still on the market and could be contacted. For them, the promotion of predominantly running costs and low-value economic goods was useful at the time. Since it is normal for market participants to drop out of dynamic environments, the sustainability of the achievements in this area is regarded as sufficient. A more critical stance is taken of the very broad approach to promotion; the quality of output here after the end of the project is not easy to review and also has not been clearly documented since most of the recipients of financial contributions are not required to disclose any information.

The institutional effects of the complementary measures on the council and administrative structures are sustainable in terms of their learning effects and partially sustainable in terms of the adoption of the propagated instruments. The VPUU temporarily served as a pilot project for the city council; a wide range of promotional approaches were trialled but not all of them were adopted into regular operation. There are fundamental learning successes related to the city council's awareness of the need for and benefit of measures that encourage trust before larger sums are invested in areas of conflict in order to counteract any possible blockades by local stakeholders on a preventive basis. Conversely, it has also been

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<sup>17</sup> However, this has resulted in a trade-off: this tolerance has meant that an increasing number of conservation areas in the dunes around Cape Town are being occupied as places to live. This negative, unintended effect was not addressed by the project and has yet to be resolved.

<sup>18</sup> According to project participants, this is a relatively new phenomenon in Khayelitsha, meaning that its link to the pandemic is plausible.

ascertained that coherence and reliability in the implementation phase increase the likelihood of state measures being a success<sup>19</sup>. Sustainability is achieved as follows for the various funding instruments:

- The efforts to structure public spaces in a functional manner and dovetail the topics covered by local plans across each specialist department’s area of responsibility have been continued and are pioneering for improving the performance of public administration offices.
- Elements of participative planning have been adopted for the long term, expanded to other areas of Cape Town and are also personally supervised. The community action plans are particularly noteworthy examples of plans that are followed by detailed specialist plans<sup>20</sup>.
- The current budget for participative plans and other so-called “soft measures” was increased from 80 to 100 million rand (roughly EUR 6 million) in 2021.
- The financing of micro measures under the Social Development Fund is not sustainable due to the instrument’s impact radius. However, public perception of the city council has improved since for many people in Khayelitsha it is seen as identical to the VPUU programme. The implementation of these types of micro measures has not been adopted into regular use by the city council<sup>21</sup>.
- In the social hot-spots in all of Cape Town’s 24 sub-councils, specific staff have been deployed to form Area Coordinating Teams (ACTs) and Community Based Teams (CBTs) for several years in order to record local needs and states of mind and, as a result, improve the accuracy and effectiveness of state measures. Since then, this new specialist job role has been officially established following the successful experience in Khayelitsha and expanded across the city, though not to the same extent as at the time of the VPUU.
- The deployment of an (initially semi- and in the follow-up phase completely) independent implementation unit has been adopted by the city council with some modifications. It is seen as positive that it is easier for a virtually autonomous external service provider to think and act on a holistic basis beyond the boundaries of each department. However, the need to limit the dependence on this type of external implementing organisation and the influence of individual providers through increased competition has been identified to enable the council to ensure effective specialist supervision. Since the end of the project, this has been purposefully established through restructured tendering procedures.<sup>22</sup> This approach also recognises that specialist service providers are better suited to managing buildings than organisations with a broader base and strong social focus.
- Since the end of the project, consultation-based citizen participation on a wide range of topics and interaction with local stakeholders has established itself as an independent field of business for external service providers. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that the VPUU’s former implementing organisation now employs 200 specialists and manages other projects both for FC and other donors.

One interesting detail is the qualification effects within the NGOs promoted by the programme: one good quality example of this is the “Legal Aid” measure promoted by the VPUU, where young black lawyers are used in a number of important civil court cases. This legal aid clinic is now promoted by the National Department of Justice and full-time positions have been created as a result of the involvement<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> All programmes have been managed by the same leaders on the South African side for a number of years, which promotes coherence in content along with efficiency and sustainability.

<sup>20</sup> This is regarded as positive from a sustainability perspective, even though the quality of the individual plans is not always convincing.

<sup>21</sup> It is acknowledged that the concept has increased the VPUU’s credibility; but following a change in political direction, an increasing number of fiscal policymakers are voicing fears that funds are being used improperly by informally organised recipients. A small budget has been assigned to an external service provider for this type of measure in the VPUU’s follow-up phase in order to keep the instrument alive.

<sup>22</sup> For the upcoming tender for the follow-up sub-council management orders, the service catalogues and requirements have been refined in order to give other providers a chance – beyond the follow-up VPUU implementation unit – and limit the initially privileged bidder to its core expertise. In particular, the management and maintenance of buildings is due to be transferred back to the specialist departments in future or supervised by specialist facility management agents in order to rectify any points that are currently unclear.

<sup>23</sup> The VPUU’s contribution to this development as perceived by the public was isolated, since in financial terms, the institutional promotion was relatively low. Legal aid could develop on a sustainable basis for a wide range of factors and, in particular, due to institutional promotion from another party.

In comparison to the implementation phase for the VPUU I–III programmes, the city council has placed much greater emphasis on the formulation of clear performance criteria for a number of years; a system of indicators for the quality of public services is in preparation. Furthermore, the management of public properties is being reformed. A systematic audit on the use of public buildings (facility audit) is in preparation; a new app is intended to enable citizens to quickly report damage caused by vandalism and other causes. These are topics that were not dealt with by the VPUU but could in future have a positive effect on the sustainability of the new facilities (particularly neighbourhood centres).

One positive aspect worth noting is that the transfers between regional authorities have been fundamentally reformed and simplified in order to allocate more funds to municipalities for flexible use (discretionary grants, neighbourhood development partnership grant NDPG). This is an indirect consequence of the VPUU because a number of activities arising from these transfers were co-financed following in-depth liaison with the province authorities. During this process, it became clear that the system needs to be simplified.

Similar to the very limited effects on violence prevention, the VPUU was unable – despite all offers of dialogue – to sustainably change the extremely confrontational political culture in Khayelitsha between organisations that are influenced by the governing ANC party and institutions that are influenced more by the Democratic Alliance that dominates the Western Cape. The need for citizen participation to concentrate on a limited number of processes and locations restricts public perception and memory to a relatively small number of people. Furthermore, not all plans were implemented, a number of civil initiatives are in competition with one another instead of cooperating.

Given the difficult environment and the wide range of interventions, the sustainability is rated as just about satisfactory.

**Sustainability rating: 3**

### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).