

»» Ex-post evaluation

Preventing violence in poor urban neighborhoods - Mamelodi East, South Africa

Title	Preventing violence in poor urban neighborhoods - Mamelodi East		
Sector and CRS code	Urban development and administration, 43030		
Project number	2012 66 055		
Commissioned by	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development		
Recipient/ Programme executing agency	South Africa - Municipality of Tshwane		
Project volume/ Financing instrument	EUR 1.1 million grant (reduced from originally EUR 5.0 million)		
Project duration	2017 - 2021		
Year of report	2024	Year of random sample	2024

Objectives and project outline


As part of the FC program for the prevention of violence, social infrastructure measures and services were to be provided in the township of Mamelodi East. The objective at outcome level was to improve access to and utilization of urban infrastructure and quality services for children, young people, women and families. This was intended to improve the safety of particularly vulnerable population groups in selected disadvantaged areas through cooperation between public, civil society and neighborhood-based organizations (impact level).

Key findings

The objectives of the program could not be achieved as its main measures were not implemented by the executing agency. For these reasons, we rate the program as largely unsuccessful:

- The violence prevention concept was highly relevant, but with the large number of individual measures and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) envisaged, it was clearly too demanding for the weakened municipal administration of Tshwane (executing agency).
- The planned individual measures were not implemented by the executing agency and therefore could not contribute to the achievement of the objectives. Only consultant costs were financed, and the planning documents produced could theoretically be used at a later date. The effectiveness of this FC program can therefore be rated as largely unsuccessful. Due to the non-implementation of the FC program, its theoretical coherence can only be assumed.
- The non-implementation of the main measure is offset by increased consultant costs and a long implementation period, which is why we rate the efficiency as completely unsuccessful. The same applies to sustainability, which is clearly not given in view of the individual measures that were not implemented.
- Apart from the lessons learnt for follow-up projects, we consider the developmental impact of this FC project - due to its non-implementation - to be largely unsuccessful.

Overall rating:
unsuccessful



Conclusions

- A multisectoral package of measures that is to be implemented with the participation of several non-governmental organizations requires an experienced executing agency or an additionally supporting accompanying measure.
- If the executing agency continues to be weak in its decision-making, KfW should consider whether it would be better to work towards replacing those responsible persons locally instead of waiting.
- If necessary, it should be checked whether the bundle of measures originally envisaged in the program appraisal needs to be adjusted in line with requirements following the actual municipal elections.

Ex-post evaluation - assessment according to OECD DAC criteria

Overview of the rating per criterion:

Relevance	3
Coherence	3
Effectiveness	5
Efficiency	6
Overarching developmental impact	5
Sustainability	5
Overall rating:	5

General conditions and classification of the project

Even 30 years after the start of democracy, South Africa is still one of the countries with the highest rates of violence and crime in the world. In 2022, the murder rate in South Africa has risen to more than 25,000, from just under 20,000 in 2021.¹ The rate of assault, rape, homicide and other violent crimes is particularly high. This is attributed to several factors, including high levels of poverty, inequality, unemployment, social exclusion and the normalisation of violence.

Many South African cities - including the economically prominent province of Gauteng with the two economic centres of Johannesburg and the City of Tshwane (CoT) - are characterized by a massive influx of domestic and foreign migrant workers as well as a high level of drug- and alcohol-induced crime and violence. The rapidly growing townships continue to be characterised by a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate and high unemployment, particularly in the poor neighborhoods with little or no infrastructure.

Townships are products of the apartheid settlement policy. Remote and neglected in terms of public infrastructure and urban services, they often still do not meet the minimum requirements for residential areas even today - 30 years after the end of apartheid. Monotonous urban design, a crowded living environment and inadequate infrastructure prevent the creation of livable and safe neighborhoods. There is a lack of leisure, educational and employment opportunities as well as an inadequate supply of social services. Violence manifests itself in many different ways in public spaces (theft, assault), at schools (drug dealing, vandalism, bullying, etc.) and in the home (alcohol and drug abuse, violence against women and children). Around 40 % of victims of sexual offences are children, the majority of whom are female². The schools in the townships are also characterized by an above-average school drop-out rate, which is up to 80 % for young males.

In the project's target area, Mamelodi East, the number of "contact crimes"³ rose by around 80% between project approval (2012) and final monitoring (2022). During the same period, there was a slight decrease in the total number of contact offences at national level. Although the South African government has been formulating strategies for the prevention of violence since 1996, their practical implementation has so far brought only limited success despite the publicly propagated political weight, as they are primarily based on repressive approaches (e.g. increasing police presence). Little attention had previously been paid to measures to prevent violence.

The South African Constitution of 1996 is considered exemplary with regard to the promotion of equality and fundamental rights of citizens. Since then, South Africa has launched a variety of strategies and programs for the social and economic advancement of its citizens, for protection against violence and crime and for the improvement of urban infrastructure. However, the diverse support programs are often unable to achieve the desired results due to a lack of coordination, effectiveness and efficiency and in view of the immense challenges.

¹ Source: [Murders in South Africa until 2022| Statista](#)

² g2-02-03 - Child Series Volume III: Reported crime against children https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1861&PPN=92-02-03&SCH=73965

³ The term "contact crimes" refers to offences in which the victims themselves are the target of violence or in which property is the target and the victims, who are in the vicinity during the commission of the offence, are exposed to threats of violence or violence is used against them.

Brief description of the project


As part of the evaluated program, infrastructure projects and services were to be implemented in Mamelodi East with the participation of state and civil society actors in order to improve the development opportunities of the target group. In particular, measures for early childhood development, counselling and care services for women and families, support services for young people in the areas of the labor market and social skills as well as the creation of the corresponding infrastructure were to be implemented. The target group comprised around 50,000 inhabitants of the eastern part of the former township of Mamelodi East, with an estimated 70 % poor population.

As a result of coordination problems in the city administration, which manifested themselves in multiple changes of mayor and new compositions of the city council, the main measures of the FC program were not implemented and only consultant costs were financed. The executing agency, the city administration of Tshwane, no longer wanted to continue this program from 2020, as a result of which it was suspended.

Breakdown of total costs

In EUR million	Investment costs (plan)	Investment costs (actual)
Total costs	10.8	1.08
Own contribution	5.8	0
External financing	5.0	1.08
<i>of which budget funds (BMZ)</i>	5.0	1.08

Map of the project country incl. project areas




Rating according to OECD DAC criteria

Relevance

1. Alignment with policies and priorities

Mamelodi was founded in 1953 by the apartheid government east of Pretoria (now City of Tshwane, CoT) as a township for "blacks-only" on land formerly used for agriculture and is now one of the largest settlements in South Africa. According to the 2011 census, Mamelodi was home to 334,577 inhabitants. It is estimated that the proportion of poor people in Mamelodi was at least 70%. Mamelodi can be divided into three sectors: the western part, which is now largely out of poverty, the developing central district and the underdeveloped eastern district of Mamelodi East. Within the Mamelodi East neighborhood, the eastern police sectors 3 and 4 in particular faced major challenges. The area was characterized by informal settlements, poor infrastructure and limited access to social services. There was also violence in public spaces, at schools and in the domestic environment. The number of contact crimes in Mamelodi East had risen from 1700 to 2900 per year between the appraisal period (2012) and the evaluation (2024):

Figure 2: Number of contact crimes in Mamelodi East



Data source: ISS Crime Hub <https://crimehub.org/terms-of-use> CC 4.0

In general, low-opportunity townships such as Mamelodi East often suffer from a lack of development prospects, high levels of violence and crime. In addition, there is high unemployment, drug and alcohol-induced crime and a lack of infrastructure. The CoT therefore aimed to provide townships with sufficient infrastructure and services in transform the disadvantaged neighborhoods into more livable working and residential areas. To this end, the city developed a special program in 2005, which was to be financed primarily from national grant funds through the Neighborhood Development Partnership Grant (NDPG). A strategy and master plan were also drawn up for Mamelodi East in 2010, which provided for the construction of a clinic, roads, sports grounds, community centres and the formalization of settlements. Ultimately, however, the quantitative - and also the qualitative - standard of the measures most recently implemented by the CoT fell far short of expectations. This was partly due to coordination problems within the municipal administration political developments since the time of the program appraisal.

The institutional difficulties within the municipal administration increased significantly, particularly after the local elections in 2016. A series of murders took place within the African National Congress (ANC) in the run-up to the elections. In Tshwane, too, internal ANC rivalries led to protests in which five people died.⁴ Ultimately, the ANC lost its power in Tshwane's local government in the wake of the elections. The 2016 election was the worst election for the ANC in Tshwane since the end of apartheid.

⁴ Wikipedia

The opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) won the elections with 43.58 % of the vote, however, it had to form a coalition in order to govern in Tshwane.⁵ It entered into a coalition with the growing small party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Although the EFF and the DA formed a coalition, there was no official coalition agreement, so the EFF only supported the positions and plans of the DA when these had a positive impact on its own goals. In addition, the EFF continued to support and organize uprisings and attracted attention through opportunistic behaviour⁶.

Since the change of government in the course of the 2016 elections, the municipal government in Tshwane has been subject to considerable criticism. The municipality has had three mayors in the five years following the elections alone, and these frequent changes continue to this day. Many residents have expressed concern about the problems in service delivery caused by the failure of the city council to meet to decide on important tasks such as the adoption of the capital's budget⁷. The ANC in Greater Tshwane was vindicated in its long-held view that the DA-led coalition was incompetent, corrupt and incapable of leading the capital city. The city was reprimanded for serious irregularities and failure to submit accurate financial statements to the Auditor-General for the financial year July 2021 to June 2022, resulting in an adverse audit finding. In a damning report in early 2023, the auditor general found a number of irregularities, overpayments to councilors and officials benefiting from supply chain processes.

2. Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders

The target area of the program was the two eastern police sectors 3 and 4 of Mamelodi East. The target group comprised around 50,000 inhabitants. This district was characterized by rapidly growing informal settlements of migrant workers. It is characterized by sparse and largely dilapidated infrastructure and limited access to social services. At the time of the audit (2012), around 40 % of residents had a household income of only around 1,500 rand/month (approx. EUR 110/month). The unemployment rate was around 32 % and therefore significantly higher than that of Tshwane City at around 26 %. Only around a third of school-age children regularly attended school.

The socio-economic structure of Mamelodi East reflected the lack of economic and social prospects and gave an explanation for the lack of prospects that could be observed, which increased drug and alcohol abuse, violence and crime. The police statistics for Mamelodi East showed high figures for assaults with bodily harm, theft and drug abuse. These incidents were particularly often linked to the use of the cheap and widely available fashion drug Nyaope, which can be bought for around 20 rand (approx. 1.40 EUR) and repeatedly led to violent and criminal behavior by its consumers. In addition, the widespread "macho culture" in South Africa and the associated disregard for women's right to self-determination as well as alcohol and drug abuse led to sexual and domestic violence, which is one of the reasons for the high number of HIV/AIDS infections.

The lack of public and private development opportunities was already noticeable in early childhood and continued through school and into adulthood. The lack of adequate jobs, even for people with little education, added to the lack of prospects and caused children, adolescents and young adults to quickly slip into crime.

The national Department for Social Development (DSD) and the relevant provincial and municipal departments were responsible for promoting early childhood development. Although registered institutions could apply for grants from the DSD, access to high-quality early childhood development was only occasionally provided through initiatives by non-governmental organizations, for example. The majority of often single parents in Mamelodi East placed their infants in unregistered, often unqualified crèches during the day. There was no state childcare provision in Mamelodi East. Children who started school therefore often did not have basic skills appropriate to their age and quickly lost touch and interest in school and education. This was the beginning of the vicious circle of crime.

Violence and the endangerment of women and children in particular continue to be a significant problem in Mamelodi East. This core problem was correctly recognized and, to a large extent, addressed at the time of the project appraisal. The South African government had explicitly asked German DC to support the CoT, Mamelodi East, to support networked approaches and procedures to improve opportunities for children, women and families. The FC program thus tackled a central obstacle to the development of the target group: the lack of development opportunities and the resulting precarious security situation.

⁵ Source: South Africa's ANC suffers worst election since taking power|Reuters

⁶ Consultant interview

⁷ Source: Tshwane residents divided about another coalition govt (ewn.co.za)

3. Appropriateness of design

In principle, the FC program geared towards the needs of the population to gain access to high-quality social services and an adequate public infrastructure in order to effectively escape the vicious circle of lack of opportunities and crime. This was to be achieved through the following outputs: the construction of safe public spaces (community centre, sports facility, repair of road surfaces, pedestrian paths, street lighting, safety-related rehabilitation of the public park), support for the institutional development of approx. 25 day-care centres and 6 schools, advice on employment prospects and the establishment of a violence prevention fund.

In principle, such a holistic approach to violence prevention is to be welcomed, as there were hardly any preventive approaches to avoiding violence in Mamelodi at the time of the evaluation. In retrospect, however, the question arises as to whether the frequently changing capacities of the city administration of Tshwane were sufficient to implement the multi-sectoral concept of the program with its extensive and very diverse individual measures at all.

The question also arises as to whether, after the 2016 local elections and the subsequent change of power should actually have adjusted the selection of individual projects according to the subsequently changed priorities. We received a contradictory answer to this question from the city administration to the information provided by the consultant, who affirmed this as a core problem. This is also supported by the fact that the consultant spoke of several threatening situations in which he needed police protection from the local population.

In our opinion, the program's concept also lacked an appropriate victim orientation, as women and children were often victims of sexual domestic violence in Mamelodi, and no contact points were provided for them.

The impact matrix was adjusted as part of this evaluation, as the logic of the target system in the module proposal was not entirely clear:

In the module proposal of 15 December 2014 under para. 4.01, the **outcome objective** was to "contribute to improving the *quality of life and security* in the target area through better access to quality services for children, young people, women and families". A contribution to improving *quality of life and security* is generally made at the overarching development impact level.

The outcome level is fundamentally concerned with the *utilisation* of the capacities created. We have therefore adapted the outcome objective accordingly. In its current formulation "Improving access to *and utilisation of* urban infrastructure and quality services for children, young people, women and families", the outcome objective of the FC project can be better understood. This use had to take place in particular via early childhood development measures, advisory and care services for women and families, support services for young people in the labor market and social skills, as well as corresponding infrastructure measures (outputs), as early childhood development measures generally increase the prospects for children to follow lessons at school and achieve better results. This should increase the number of children attending school and, in the medium term, reduce the school drop-out rate. Overall, the potential for violence and drug and alcohol abuse in Mamelodi East was to be reduced by showing children and young people alternative development opportunities. The achievement of the objectives was to be demonstrated by the indicators listed below and quantified using a baseline data survey as part of the detailed planning:

1. Perceived safety of the population, especially women and children
2. Available care and counselling services for children and young people in risk situations and use of the services
3. Use of the infrastructure facilities and care services supported by the program
4. Development of the school dropout rate

5. At the end of the program, the city administration will have improved interdisciplinary planning and implementation tools for target group-oriented urban (social) services and infrastructure, with a particular focus on social, situational and institutional violence prevention and safety.
6. HIV/AIDS status has been tested within the last 12 months and risks of infection and protection options are known to the women, children, young people and men who use the facilities and services of the program.


The indicators appear only partially suitable for the use-related **outcome level**. Indicator 1 fits the safety-related **impact objective**. Indicators 2 and 3 and 5 are access and utilization-related and thus outcome-relevant. The values of these indicators were only assigned retrospectively as part of the consultant assignment five years after the program appraisal (2017). They can be seen in the tables in the 'Effectiveness' and 'Impact' chapters. Indicator 4 was omitted from the detailed planning for 2017 and we do not consider indicator 6 to be meaningful due to the lack of HIV relevance of the individual measures to be financed. We then assigned the remaining indicators to the respective levels (**outcome and impact**).

As far as the intended outputs (a broad package of measures involving many NGOs) are concerned, the program design appears to us to be far too broad. This is consistent with the consultant's perception - even without the administrative weakness of the municipal administration, which was not foreseeable to this extent at the time of the program appraisal, the FC measure - without additional complementary measures - could probably hardly have been implemented. The assumption that the municipal administration was massively overburdened was confirmed by the consultant working in the project area.

The **development policy objective (impact objective)** was to improve the security of particularly vulnerable population groups in selected disadvantaged areas through cooperation between public, civil society and neighborhood-based organizations. The program proposal did not include indicators. However, as the two safety-related indicators from the 2017 detailed planning fit into the impact level (perceived safety of the population, trust in the city administration), we have moved them to the impact level.

This results in the following **results chain**: The following **outputs** were to be provided with the financing of a multi-sectoral package of measures: Construction of safe public facilities (community center, sports facility, paths with street lighting, green spaces), support for approx. 25 day-care center's and 6 schools in institutional development, advice on employment prospects, establishment of a violence prevention fund. This should enable access to and utilization of quality services for children, young people, women and families (**outcome**). In addition, the development of corresponding capacities and the networking of the various service providers (city, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), so-called community-based organizations (CBOs), possibly the private sector) should ensure the efficiency and sustainability of the services offered. This should improve the safety of particularly vulnerable population groups in selected disadvantaged areas (**impact**). The impact chain on which the project concept is based now appears plausible and is illustrated once again in Figure 3:

Figure 3: Impact chain



4. Adaptability – response to change

While the assumptions on which the impact hypothesis is based are still considered plausible, the executing agency ran into considerable difficulties, particularly after the local elections (2016) and the corona crisis (2020/21) with one of the world's most severe lockdowns. Frequent changes of mayors and new elections led to changing coalitions in an unstable city administration characterized by an inability to make decisions. The adaptability that would have enabled the implementation of the FC program was no longer given. As a result of corruption and insolvency, the municipal administration was placed under receivership in 2021. These difficulties were not foreseeable at the time of the program appraisal in 2012.

Rating summary

The violence prevention program concept was highly relevant for combating crime in Mamelodi East, but with the large number of very different individual measures - and the planned cooperation with several NGOs - it was far too demanding for the weakened city administration of Tshwane.

However, even without the two external cuts (local elections in 2016 and the coronavirus pandemic), the city administration would have found it difficult to implement the extensive multi-sectoral program, especially without supportive accompanying measures.

Relevance: 3

Coherence

5. Internal coherence

The DC programme supported the South African government in its efforts to increase the safety of the population and reduce crime. Accordingly, the DC programme objective is: *Girls and boys, women and men living in South Africa are and feel safe at home, at school and at work, and enjoy a community life free of fear* (see Part A,

29.05.2018, Point 1.). TC and FC support the government at various levels through integrated approaches, particularly in disadvantaged settlement areas (former townships), to break the vicious circle of child and youth neglect, lack of prospects, unemployment, alcohol and drug abuse, violence and crime and to replicate these approaches.

As part of previous FC projects (prevention of violence in urban poverty areas Cape Town/Khayelitsha, BMZ No. 2002 66 056, 2008 66 939), Western Cape (BMZ No. 2010 67 008), Helenvale (BMZ No. 2010 65 986) and the community violence prevention program (BMZ No. 2010 66 778), the first sustainable successes of the holistic approach to violence prevention, which is new for South Africa, have been achieved, particularly in the township of Khayelitsha in Cape Town approach to violence prevention and urban development, which this FC project was intended to build on.

In the TC project on violence prevention, the experiences gathered in the townships of Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, Western Cape and CoT up to 2020 were compiled in the summarizing report 'Violence Prevention and Case Studies' and prepared for interested experts. The TC and FC projects can be seen as complementary in this context.

If implemented, the FC project could have made a direct contribution to the UN Convention on Human Rights, in particular. Art. 6 (right to life) and Art. 9 (security of person), Art. 12 (right to physical integrity) and Art. 25 (right to participate in public affairs), Art. 3 (equality) and Art. 24 (protection of children) as well as to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

6. External coherence

The FC measure aimed to support the partner's own efforts to prevent violence in urban planning. The declared aim of the CoT was to provide townships with an adequate supply of public infrastructure, social and commercial services and housing. To this end, the city presented a comprehensive urban development strategy in 2004, which led to a strategic development plan for Tshwane 2055 and was intended to transform the city into an exemplary metropolitan region.

In 2005 the CoT launched a comprehensive special program for the rehabilitation and renewal of townships (Tsosoloso). The aim of the Tsosoloso program was to transform disadvantaged urban areas into more livable working and residential areas. An integrated strategy and master plan for spatial development was drawn up for Mamelodi in 2010. This master plan was embedded in the CoT's overarching spatial planning strategy of 2007 and provided for a clinic, roads, sports grounds, community centers and the formalization of settlements for Mamelodi East. However, the quantitative - and also the qualitative - The overall ambition of the measures implemented here fell far short of expectations. The FC measure was planned to complement the measures of other donors, but grant funds in South Africa were generally declining at the time of the appraisal. In addition to Germany, the most important development partners were the EU and the World Bank. German DC was the most important partner in the area of violence prevention.

Rating summary

Due to the non-implementation of the FC project, only a theoretical complementarity can be assumed here, which could presumably have been successful if the partner had been adequately designed and cooperated, but which must be assessed as having limited success due to the non-implementation of this FC project.

Coherence: 3

Effectiveness

7. Achievement of (intended) objectives

The outcome objective of the program was to improve access to and use of urban infrastructure and quality services for children, young people, women and families. This was to be achieved in particular through the provision of appropriate infrastructure measures, early childhood development measures, counselling and care services for women and families and support services for young people in the labor market. In addition, the program was to strengthen the networking of the various relevant departments within the city administration with local stakeholders (NGOs and CBOs) in the long term.

The outcome objectives of the program were not achieved as - apart from consultant services - no individual measures were implemented in the target area of Mamelodi East. The indicators were also no longer measured due to the cancellation of the project prior to the final inspection and the associated discontinuation of consulting activities. In the event of a resumption of cooperation, the target value for 20xx should be replaced by a suitable, concrete annual value.

Figure 4: Table Target achievement Outcome:

Indicator	Status at Project Appraisal (PA)	Target value according to PA	Actual value at PCR (optional)	Actual value at EPE
Indicator 1: Programme facilities that are fully used and well maintained according to safety principles and with community participation.	The base value should be defined in the detailed planning.	Base value: 0 (2017) Target value (2017): five built facilities at 3 locations/100 % fully utilised / 90 % well maintained (20xx).	As a result of the project cancellation in 2020, no more measurements were taken.	As a result of the project cancellation, no more measurements were taken.
Indicator 2: Fewer incidents of violence and crime in schools reported by headteachers, learners make extensive use of extracurricular activities.	The base value should be defined in detailed planning.	The base value has not been determined. Target value (20xx): Number of incidents reported by the head teachers of the 3 participating schools in 20xx decreased by 30 % compared to 2017	As a result of the project cancellation, no more measurements were taken.	As a result of the project cancellation, no more measurements were taken.
Indicator 3: The city uses better interdisciplinary planning and implementation instruments for targeted social interventions and services.	The base value should be defined in detailed planning.	Baseline (2017): Low to moderately comprehensive integrative planning and implementation between departments - information based on qualitative/descriptive self-assessment (on a scale of 1-6) by the participating departments Target value (20xx): medium to high Comprehensive integrative planning and implementation between the departments - information based on qualitative/descriptive self-assessment (on a scale of 1-6) by the participating departments	Due to a lack of program implementation, no more measurements were taken.	Due to a lack of program implementation, no more measurements were taken.

8. Contribution to the achievement of objectives

The following individual measures were planned as part of the FC program:

Safe public spaces (infrastructure)

- Safety-related measures along the two main traffic routes in the project area (construction of pedestrian paths, street lighting, repair of the road surface, traffic calming, green space design),

- Construction and equipping of a community center (including rooms for counselling and training as well as for a library, access road, exterior design),
- Construction and equipment of a municipal sports center,
- Safety-related rehabilitation of the public park and the area around the railway station (including construction stalls, toilets and lighting as well as landscaping).

Early childhood development

Supporting around 25 daycare centers in the project area with institutional development, including official registration, and improving the quality of their services ensure adequate early childhood development. Development and introduction of a screening tool to identify early childhood maldevelopment and establishment of referral structures. Implementation of appropriate training and awareness-raising measures for informal and formal social workers and families.

Safe schools

Support for 6 schools in the project area in the development, implementation and monitoring of school safety policies and safety action plans, including the establishment of the necessary structures and training in mediation, non-violent communication and conflict resolution for teachers, pupils and parents. In addition, the development and implementation of extracurricular activities (sport, culture, art) and awareness-raising measures, including on drug abuse.

Employment prospects for young people

Provision of information and counselling on finding a job and career development opportunities, including personal development training. In addition, counselling and support in finding a job or setting up a micro-enterprise.

Social violence prevention

Establishment of a community development fund for the implementation of community-initiated micro-projects and conflict prevention initiatives as well as training measures for CBOs in project design, reporting and financial management in order to qualify them for the long term.

After commencing consulting activities in May 2017 and completing the preparatory measures (baseline survey, stakeholder analysis, participatory selection and planning of interventions, community mobilization, preparation of a project manual), the city laid the essential organizational, administrative and financial foundations for the implementation of the project with considerable delays in 2018/19. This included the nomination of a project manager and a financial manager as well as the members of the steering committee, the administrative integration of the FC program into the city's systems and the inclusion of the required partner contribution in the budget planning, which at EUR 5.8 million amounted to 54% of the total funding.

The inception report finalized by the consultant and thus the identified activities, including their implementation planning, were also accepted by the municipal administration in Tshwane. However, none of the planned individual measures were actually implemented by 2020, meaning that the program was unable to achieve the intended objectives.

The main reason for this appears to be the inability of Tshwane's municipal administration to act, which can also be attributed to repeated reorganizations due to political changes. In the first five years after the elections alone, there were three mayors in Tshwane; there are now seven. This has led to constant reorganizations of the city council with corresponding dismissals and vacancies. These institutional difficulties have increased significantly, especially after the 2016 municipal elections.

9. Quality of implementation

The quality of the management of the FC measure by the executing agency, the municipal administration of Tshwane, was clearly inadequate. Even after the end of the planned 4-year term in April 2021, none of the necessary tenders for the implementation of the planned measures could be initiated. The background to this was the ongoing political differences between the various parties in the city council, which led to a continuous change of the mayor and the city manager reporting to him. The city administration had been undergoing an ongoing

reorganization process since 2016. The situation escalated in 2019, forcing the city to be placed under receivership by the province. From 2020, the COVID pandemic posed an additional challenge with a strict lockdown and a decline in economic activity in the city of Tshwane. At times, the city council did not meet at all and those responsible were unavailable for long periods of time. The ongoing instability in the city administration meant that important decisions not made. Political disputes were on the agenda. As a result, there was little interest in the swift implementation of the project. This was also reflected in the inadequate presence of the project managers at the coordination meetings, which were less and less frequently as a result of the pandemic. Employees were unmotivated and avoided making decisions, partly for fear of negative consequences. According to the consultant, the program manager responsible in the city administration, who was still in charge of this FC project after the change of government in 2017, blocked important decisions.

To make matters worse, the consultant's dedicated project manager resigned in 2020 and was replaced by her experienced team leader for the analogue FC projects in Cape Town and Western Province. Despite repeated interventions by BMZ, the embassy, KfW and the consultant and the threat of a 'phasing out' of the FC financing, no visible acceleration of the project implementation could be brought about. Even with intensive interventions at all political and administrative levels of the CoT, in particular by the ambassador to the mayor, there no feedback from the city administration for a long time on the further procedure regarding a possible continuation of the FC project. After renewed intervention by the new ambassador, the new mayor explained that he had to set other priorities due to the precarious situation of the city (corruption, insolvency) and therefore could not provide any human and financial resources for the implementation of the project in the foreseeable future. The own contribution of EUR 5.8 million, which had already been deposited in a special account, was reallocated by the city administration to other priorities in the course of the insolvency administration.

In consultation with the BMZ, it was therefore decided to suspend the project from October 2020. Due to the lack of prospects for a resumption of the project, it was decided that KfW would make use of its contractual right to cease disbursements for the project after 4 years from the signing of the contract and close the project. Overall, the FC financing created the planning basis for the implementation of the project, so that the municipal administration of Tshwane could also implement the project from its own funds in the future.

10. Unintended effects (positive or negative)

The frequent uprisings in the region posed a security risk for the FC project. The riots were organized by the EFF. Some appointments with the city administration had to be cancelled due to protests in front of the building. At times, the consultant's project managers feared for their lives and had to be protected by security personnel, while employees of the consultant were threatened at the project site. After corresponding discussions with the city manager, it was decided that a person from the city administration would always have to be present during visits to the project site.

Although this served to ensure the safety of employees, it also made planning more difficult, as even simple visits had to be coordinated with the city administration in advance.

Rating summary

The planned individual measures of the FC program were not implemented by the executing agency and therefore could not contribute to the achievement of the objectives. Only consultant costs were financed for the planning documents, which could theoretically also be used for the implementation of planned individual measures in due course. However, this is currently not demonstrably planned by the city administration in Tshwane. The effectiveness of this FC program can therefore be assessed as largely unsuccessful.

Effectiveness: 5

Efficiency

11. Production efficiency

The production efficiency, which describes the relationship between inputs (FC financing and co-financing by the municipal administration) and outputs (individual measures in the above-mentioned areas and consulting activities), is clearly inadequate. The FC program's relatively high counterpart contribution of EUR 5.8 million (54% of the total costs) was withdrawn by the city administration in 2020 for other priorities. The FC financing was limited to the consultant activities until the planning and, in part, tender documents were finalized, which could also be

used by the city administration for other projects in due course.

The time efficiency of the FC program must also be viewed negatively - communication difficulties with the Tshwane municipal administration had already led to considerable delays in the run-up to project implementation. The start of the consultant's work, originally planned for the beginning of 2015, was delayed until May 2017; by the time the project was scheduled to end (2021), only the planning documents and a few tender documents had been prepared (for the community center and the sports field). Ultimately, the FC project financed a roughly 25% increase in consultant costs (from the planned EUR 0.8 million to EUR 1.1 million).

12. Allocation efficiency

In retrospect, the question arises as to whether the FC program could have had a positive impact if the funds had been reallocated to other individual measures, which might have been more in line with the priorities of the new government in Tshwane from 2017. However, this question remains speculative, as such a consideration was not seriously considered by KfW in view of the advanced project term and was also not demonstrably initiated by the municipal administration.

Rating summary

The non-implementation of the main measures and the resulting lack of impact are offset by significantly higher consultant costs and a long, unsuccessful implementation period. We therefore rate the efficiency as completely unsuccessful.

Efficiency: 6

Overarching developmental impact

13. Overarching (intended) developmental changes

The achievement of the objective at impact level was to improve the security of particularly vulnerable population groups in selected disadvantaged areas through the cooperation of public, civil society and neighborhood-based organizations. However, it is obvious that an FC program whose main measures were not implemented could contribute neither to the achievement of the outcome nor the impact objective.

Table Target achievement Impact:

Indicator	Status PA	Target value according to PA	Actual value at PCR (optional)	Actual value at EPE
Indicator 1: Perceived safety of the population increases to 60 % during the day and to 40 % at night	The base value should be defined in the detailed planning	Base value (2017): 49 % (during the day) 30 % (at night)	Due to a lack of program implementation, no current measurement has taken place.	No current measurement has been carried out due to a lack of program implementation. However, we do not expect the figures having improved - due to the increased crime rates in the meantime.
Indicator 2: The population's trust in urbanization is increasing	The base value should be defined in the detailed planning	Base value (2017): 44 % (city administration) 28 % (police service)	Due to a lack of program implementation, no current measurement has taken place.	No current measurement has been carried out due to a lack of program implementation. However, due to the disputes in the city

				administration, which led to repeated changes of responsibilities and ultimately to compulsory administration, we do not expect improved values.
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14. Contribution to overarching (intended) developmental changes

Since the planned individual measures were not implemented, no developmental changes to which the FC measure was intended to make a significant contribution can be identified at the level of the low-opportunity beneficiaries of Mamelodi East. The main reason for this was the instability, coordination and communication difficulties of the municipal administration of Tshwane, exacerbated by the political developments described above and the corona crisis.

15. Contribution to overarching (unintended) developmental changes

It is understandable that the main measure that was not implemented was also unable to contribute to development policy changes (human rights, gender equality, inclusion, poverty reduction, inequality reduction, environmental and climate compatibility, digitalization, anti-corruption, integrity and conflict sensitivity).

Rating summary

Apart from a learning experience for follow-up projects, we consider the developmental impact of this FC program to be largely unsuccessful due to its non-implementation.

Overarching developmental impact: 5

Sustainability

16. Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders

Like the rest of South Africa, the municipality of Tshwane suffered disproportionately from the coronavirus pandemic and experienced one of the most far-reaching lockdowns in the world in 2020. In the same year, the city administration was placed under compulsory administration by the national government. As a result, the economic situation deteriorated, and financial restrictions increased. As a result, several projects were scaled back and budgets have been cut, including for this FC project. The institutional and financial situation of the municipal administration of Tshwane Municipality is still very unstable.

The capacities of Tshwane's municipal administration continue to be weakened insofar as a coalition of four parties (ANC, ActionSA, EFF and GOOD) is currently in power, with no party having an absolute majority. The differences between these parties regularly lead to conflicts and disagreements. The parties often disagree on issues, making it difficult to achieve goals efficiently.

According to the representatives of KfW and the consultant the affected population was interested in the FC project. The city administration of Tshwane hopes to be able to implement some of the planned individual measures in the future. This depends on the financial resources of the city of Tshwane, which are necessary for their realization. However, at the time of the evaluation, the financial situation in Tshwane had not yet recovered and the implementation of the planned measures is not in sight.

17. Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

With the completion of the planning and, in some cases, tender documents for the planned individual measures, FC funds made a small contribution to supporting the sustainable capacities of Tshwane's municipal administration. It is now up to the city administration to decide whether it can and wants to overcome its administrative and

financial difficulties and continue some of the individual measures.

18. Durability of impacts over time

The sustainability of the effects over time is currently not given, as no individual measures were financed under the FC project. Therefore, these cannot unfold any lasting effects. The executing agency was promised the prospect of resuming cooperation with FC under certain conditions, but we consider the probability of this to be low.

Rating summary

As the project measures were not implemented, it was not possible to analyse their sustainability. We therefore currently rate the sustainability of this FC program as largely unsuccessful.

Sustainability: 5

Overall rating

Overall, we rate this FC program as largely unsuccessful, as no individual measures were implemented. As a result, no effects could be achieved at outcome and impact level. There is a small chance that the prepared documents will be used by the city administration at a later date.

Project-specific strengths/weaknesses and general conclusions/lessons learned

The strengths and weaknesses of the project include in particular

Strength:

The city administration of Tshwane made a large contribution of 54% of the total costs and placed it in a special account. This demonstrated the political will to implement this FC project - at least until 2020, when it withdrew the funds again.

Weaknesses:

However, the repeated tensions in the city administration led to blockades, as the program manager responsible for many years did not want to make any decisions. In retrospect, KfW should have considered working towards the removal of the person responsible and the appointment of a new program manager. There was growing evidence that the program had not progressed, primarily due to her inability to make decisions.

The interdisciplinary, participatory design of violence prevention projects and the associated advisory services at several levels were not yet among the core competencies of the Tshwane municipal administration prior to the program appraisal. At program appraisal, however, KfW assumed that the consulting support planned for the FC project would be sufficient to strengthen the capacities required - a complementary measure had not been considered. In retrospect, the large number of planned individual measures with different implementing organizations was clearly too overwhelming for the weakened municipal administration of Tshwane.

It is possible that the planned package of measures from 2017 onwards should have been adapted to the changed priorities of the city administration after the elections. However, this is only a speculation - there was no clear evidence of this. The consultant affirmed this, the program manager denied it. However, it is also understandable that KfW was not overly interested in rescheduling the individual measures after 5 years of implementation, as this would have entailed a further 5 years of implementation with additional 'sunk costs'.

Conclusions and lessons learned:

A multi-sectoral package of measures, which was to be implemented with the participation of several NGOs, generally requires a strong and experienced executing agency or an additional supportive accompanying measure. This had not been sufficiently anticipated when designing this FC program. Subsequent difficulties (weakening of the administration due to the election results, corona crisis with lockdown) could possibly have been mitigated as a result.

It is possible that the continuation of the program could also have ensured by courageous intervention on the

part of KfW. This concerns the necessary replacement of the program manager who was unwilling to make decisions and possibly also the adjustment of the planned individual measures after the 2016 elections.

Evaluation approach and methods

Methodology of the ex-post evaluation

The ex-post evaluation follows the methodology of a rapid appraisal, i.e. a data-supported, qualitative contribution analysis and represents an expert judgement. This involves attributing impacts to the project through plausibility considerations based on the careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. This also includes - where possible - the use of digital data sources and the use of modern technologies (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). Causes of any contradictory information are investigated, attempts are made to eliminate them and the assessment is based on statements that are confirmed by several sources of information where possible (triangulation).

Documents:

Reporting to the BMZ (program appraisal and final monitoring report, BE, return notes), consultant reports, strategy papers, sectoral evaluations by KfW and GIZ, media reports.

Data sources and analysis tools:

Monitoring data from the partner and consultants, surveys, digital analysis tools

Interview partner:

Project organizer, former project manager and project manager of the consultant, representative of GIZ, team leader and office manager of KfW

The analysis of impacts is based on assumed interdependencies, documented in the impact matrix developed during the project appraisal and, if necessary, updated during the ex-post evaluation. The evaluation report presents arguments as to why which influencing factors were identified for the identified results and why the analysed project presumably made which contribution (contribution analysis). The context of the development project is taken into account with regard to its influence on the results. The conclusions are set in relation to the availability and quality of the data basis. An evaluation design is the reference framework for the evaluation.

For project evaluations, the method offers a - on average - balanced cost-benefit ratio, in which the knowledge gained and the evaluation effort are in equilibrium, and allows a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of FC projects across all project evaluations. The individual ex-post evaluation

The following aspects limited the evaluation:

Permanent unavailability of the senior project manager who had supervised this FC project over the last few years and also carried out the final inspection.

Methodology of the performance evaluation

A six-point scale is used to assess the programme according to the OECD DAC criteria. The scale values are assigned as follows:

- Level 1** Very successful: result significantly above expectations
- Level 2** Successful: result fully in line with expectations, without significant deficiencies
- Level 3** Moderately successful: below expectations, but positive results dominate
- Level 4** Moderately unsuccessful: is significantly below expectations and negative results dominate despite recognisable positive results
- Level 5** Unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
- Level 6** Highly unsuccessful: the project is useless or the situation has worsened

The overall rating on the six-point scale is based on a project-specific weighting of the six individual criteria. Levels 1-3 of the overall rating indicate a "successful" project, while levels 4-6 indicate an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally "successful" if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness") and the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") as well as the sustainability are rated as at least "moderately successful" (rating 3).

The annex to this report is available upon request (Germany only).

List of abbreviations:

AK	Final inspection
ANC	African National Congress
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CBO	Community Based Organisations
CoT	City of Tshwane
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DSD	Department for Social Development
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EUR	Euro
FC	Financial co-operation
FC E	FC Evaluation
HDI	Human Development Index
NGO	Non-governmental organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PP	Project appraisal
PPB	Project appraisal report
PV	Project proposal
KEUR	Thousand Euro
TC	Technical co-operation
USD	US Dollar

Imprint

FC E

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