

Ex post evaluation Regional programme for the improvement of living conditions in the Palestinian Refugee Camps Middle East REPAC V+VI, Palestinian territories



Title	REPAC V and VI		
Sector and CRS code	Multisector aid (CRS code 43010)		
Project number	BMZ no. 2014 68 628; 2015 68 054		
Commissioned by	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development		
Recipient/Project-executing agency	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)		
Project volume/ Financing instrument	EUR 20 million (REPAC V); EUR 30 million (REPAC VI) BMZ budget funds		
Project duration	December 2015 – December 2017		
Year of report	2021	Year of random sample	2020

Objectives and project outline

The objective of the FC projects at outcome level was to improve and speed up access to and appropriate use of housing for selected Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip. The overarching developmental objective (impact) was to rapidly improve living conditions in and around Palestinian refugee camps and to contribute to the preservation of peace and stability for Palestinian refugees in the areas of Gaza that benefited directly.


In addition to the reconstruction of heavily damaged or completely destroyed houses and housing units, temporary rental subsidies were paid out to beneficiary families in order to counteract a deterioration in the housing situation during the duration of the projects. REPAC V and VI were implemented as open programmes and, in contrast to the previous and subsequent projects, used a top-down approach. The involvement of beneficiary families nevertheless took place as part of a self-help component.

Key findings

The projects gave a total of 2,284 beneficiary families access to rehabilitated or rebuilt housing and 10,332 (including 8,265 very poor) families temporary rental subsidies. As a result, it was possible to contribute to improving the living conditions of the target group, which is why the projects were rated as successful overall.

- In view of the extensive destruction of housing as a result of the conflict in 2014 and the acute need for rapid reconstruction, the relevance of the projects and the appropriateness of the selected approach can also be rated as very high from today's perspective.
- The projects were consistent with the objectives of German DC in the Gaza Strip, had a complementary effect, and the financed measures were integrated into UNRWA's Emergency Shelter Programme, so that overall coherence is rated as good.
- The target values of the outcome indicators were exceeded immediately after implementation. However, the conflict-related damage and destruction in 2021, which endangered the permanent use of the created and rehabilitated housing, led to unclear target achievement for REPAC VI to some extent.
- The self-help component led in part to the use of higher-quality building materials and to faster implementation of the construction measures. However, there were delays due to the difficult framework conditions for material imports.
- Despite unavoidable high risks due to the continuing volatile security situation, it can be assumed that the beneficiary families have developed a high level of ownership and will continue to ensure the preservation of the construction measures in the future.

Overall rating:
successful



Conclusions

- The acute emergency of the Palestinian population as a result of the conflict in 2014 justified the choice of the top-down approach, as this ensured the required implementation speed.
- The addition of the self-help component to the top-down approach was able to appropriately address disadvantages compared to participatory approaches.
- Rental subsidies are a short-term instrument that does not have a sustainable impact and should only be used in combination with medium-term measures within the scope of DC.
- In conflict-ridden intervention contexts, the permanent preservation and use of created infrastructure is uncertain. Objectives should therefore be formulated realistically and adapted to the level of ambition.

Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 2

Ratings:

Relevance	1
Coherence	2
Effectiveness	2
Efficiency	2
Impact	2
Sustainability	3

Due to the same intervention context, the almost congruent implementation periods and the continuous joint reporting of REPAC phases V and VI, it is not possible to deduce a sufficient degree of differentiation between the impacts of the projects, meaning that the phases are not evaluated separately in this evaluation. The ratings are therefore identical and, overall, represent a good result that fully meets expectations, without significant shortcomings. The projects were able to contribute to improving the living conditions of the Palestinian population through the rehabilitation of destroyed housing and the temporary payment of rent subsidies, as well as rebuilding the Gaza Strip following the armed conflicts in 2014. In view of the major destruction and the acute need for rapid aid measures, the evaluation paid particular attention to the DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency.

General conditions and classification of the project

As a region, the Middle East has been in crisis since the beginning of the 20th century, but certainly no later than when the nation of Israel was established in 1948. Since then, new outbreaks of violence and armed conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians have continued, with unresolved conflicts about the borders and the existence of the State of Israel in the foreground.¹ Almost one third of the total of approx. 5.7 million registered Palestine refugees live in 58 recognised Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.² The living conditions of refugees in the camps are characterised by higher poverty rates, cramped housing, inadequate infrastructure, higher unemployment and increased potential for conflict compared to the population in the host countries. In particular, the ongoing war in Syria, the recurring violent escalations in Gaza (most recently 2022) and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank are contributing to the deterioration in the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees and population living there.³ After Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, Israel also imposed a land, air and sea blockade. This continues to have devastating effects on the movement of people and goods, especially in and out of Gaza, and continues to undermine the economy in the Palestinian Territories (PT), further increasing unemployment, poverty, and dependence on international aid.⁴

In 2011, Financial Cooperation (FC) was commissioned by the German Federal Government to develop and implement a regional programme to improve living conditions in Palestinian refugee camps and neighbouring areas. The “Regional Programme for the Improvement of Living Conditions of Palestinian Refugee Camps” (REPAC⁵) currently comprises twelve phases (phase XI and phase XII are still being

¹ Research services of the German Bundestag (2006): Der Nahostkonflikt – Geschichte und aktuelle Situation [The Middle East conflict – history and the current situation].

² UNRWA (2022): Palestine Refugees. Online: <https://www.UNRWA.org/palestine-refugees>; UNRWA (2022): UNRWA in figures. Online: https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/unrwa_in_figures_2021_eng.pdf

³ KfW/GIZ/BGR/PTB (2018): Joint reporting (BE) on the DC programme “Supporting Palestinian Refugees”.

⁴ Research services of the German Bundestag (2006): Der Nahostkonflikt – Geschichte und aktuelle Situation [The Middle East conflict – history and the current situation].

⁵ REPAC – “Regional Programme for the Improvement of Living Conditions of Palestinian Refugee Camps”

implemented)⁶ and is being implemented by the project-executing agency UNRWA through⁷ FC solely through grant financing from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). In addition, all REPAC phases are integrated into the DC programme “Supporting Palestinian Refugees”.

Specifically, REPAC projects include the structural design and implementation of social and economic infrastructure in selected Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza to improve living conditions there. The regional programme differs in terms of its implementation in measures that are identified on the basis of participatory processes by camp residents or working groups (e.g. REPAC Phase I, II, IV and IX, XI, XII) as well as measures to cover immediate basic needs that run without upstream involvement of corresponding participatory processes on the basis of a top-down approach. The latter category also includes phases V and VI, which were embedded in the REPAC programme as special phases and aimed at the speed of support measures in the context of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in 2014 and are the subject of this evaluation.⁸

Relevance

Due to the years of conflict, the political crisis and division as well as the blockade, the situation in Gaza was already precarious before the 2014 riots. Public supply services such as health care, electricity, water and wastewater supply were increasingly unable to meet the basic needs of the population.⁹ In addition, there was already a deficit of over 71,000 housing units at that time.¹⁰ Around 80% of the population in the Gaza Strip was and still is dependent on international aid. The economy and its ability to create jobs have been destroyed, leading to the impoverishment and regression of a well-educated society. According to a World Bank¹¹ report, the 2014 war cut Gaza’s GDP by some USD 460 million. Even back then, the unemployment rate in Gaza was one of the highest in the world at 43%¹² and has since risen to 46.6% in the first quarter of 2022.¹³ The socio-economic opportunities of young people in Gaza in particular are significantly limited due to the precarious conditions. The youth unemployment rate in 2020 was 70% (2014: over 60%),¹⁴ with 58% of unemployed young people being young graduates.¹⁵ The framework conditions within Gaza have not improved since the end of the project, but have deteriorated continuously and the volatile security situation and precarious living conditions of the population continue. A peaceful end to the conflict is still not foreseeable.

In mid-June 2014, the rise in violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reached a new peak with the start of the armed conflicts in Gaza on 8 July. In July and August, extensive air, sea and artillery attacks took place in all governorates of the Gaza Strip, as well as a ground offensive that cost many lives and livelihoods, and continued to severely damage the already weak public infrastructure. An indefinite ceasefire was finally agreed on the 50th day of military escalation and entered into force on 26 August.¹⁶ According to a Damage Assessment Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)¹⁷, at least 2,145 Palestinians died, including 581 children. Agriculture, industry and trade came to a standstill and the already severely stricken public supply was also further devastated, which led to an additional shortage of water, electricity, food and, above all, housing. Numerous houses and apartments of Palestinian refugees have been partially or completely destroyed. According to UNRWA, a total of 141,650 houses suffered damage. Of these, 7,400 were completely destroyed, 5,500 suffered severe and 3,700 major damage;

⁶ KfW (2021): REPAC Mid-term Evaluation 2020/21.

⁷ United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

⁸ Implementation periods: REPAC V: 2 December 2014 – 30 June 2018; REPAC VI: 1 September 2015 – 31 December 2017

⁹ KfW/GIZ/BGR/PTB (2018): Joint reporting (BE) on the DC programme “Supporting Palestinian Refugees”.

¹⁰ UNDP (2015).

¹¹ World Bank (2015): Gaza Economy on the Verge of Collapse, Youth Unemployment Highest in the Region at 60 Percent. Online: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/05/21/gaza-economy-on-the-verge-of-collapse>.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ OCHA (2022): Gaza Strip | The humanitarian impact of 15 years of the blockade – June 2022. Online: <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022-enarhe>.

¹⁴ World Bank (2015).

¹⁵ Islamic relief (2020): On the brink: Gaza’s youth are turning to suicide amid growing desperation. Online: <https://www.islamic-relief.org/on-the-brink-gazas-youth-are-turning-to-suicide-amid-growing-desperation/>.

¹⁶ UNRWA (2016): Project Completion Report.

¹⁷ UNDP (2015): Detailed Infrastructure Damage Assessment GAZA – 2014.

around 125,000 houses suffered minor damage. As a result, there were over 100,000 people without a home.¹⁸ The conflict in summer 2014 led to a massive displacement crisis in the Gaza Strip, with almost 500,000 people internally displaced at the peak.¹⁹

The limited and predominantly precarious housing supply is one of the most serious problems in Gaza,²⁰ which is why the objectives of REPAC V and VI were aligned with this core problem. The objective of the FC measures defined at outcome level at the time of the project appraisal (PA) was “improved access to and appropriate use of social and economic infrastructure for the population in and around Palestinian refugee camps”. As part of this EPE, the original target formulation was adjusted to reflect the geographical focus on the Gaza Strip and the access and use of housing. The original target system did not explicitly reflect the immediate intervention objectives (outcome level) of the REPAC special phases V and VI, but was generally based on the objectives of all REPAC projects. On the one hand, the family houses that were severely damaged or completely destroyed as a result of the conflict were to be rebuilt and “Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance” (TSCA) also paid out to the beneficiary families. The latter should serve as a temporary rent allowance for displaced families who need to rent an apartment as a temporary solution while their house is being rebuilt/rehabilitated, or as a support package for those temporarily taken in by another family.

The developmental objective of the projects examined by this EPE (impact level) was to rapidly improve living conditions in and around Palestinian refugee camps and to contribute to ensuring peace and stability for Palestinian refugees in the areas of Gaza benefiting from the programme directly. The objective set at impact level at the time of the PA of “contributing to the preservation of peace and stability in the camps and the region as a whole” appeared to be too ambitious and was narrowed as part of the EPE to the specific intervention area of REPAC V and VI, the Gaza Strip. The operationalisation of the projects as open programmes²¹ was intended to ensure that rapidly changing framework conditions and needs in the post-conflict context of the Gaza Strip in 2014 can be addressed and given an adequate response, which is also assessed as appropriate from today’s perspective. Although the measures were financed without prior involvement in a participatory process, the families were to be closely involved in the design and implementation of the construction measures as part of a self-help component (“self-help approach”). For example, the beneficiaries were given the opportunity to incorporate their own material or design wishes into the reconstruction process.

The target group for all REPAC programmes included residents in and around Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the PT (West Bank and Gaza Strip). However, in the specific case of phases V and VI, the target group is geographically limited to Gaza. Due to the primary focus on a target group severely affected by poverty and unemployment as well as a lack of housing, the project objectives are based on the national development strategies of the Palestinian Authority (PA) “National Development Plan 2014–2016” and “National Policy Agenda 2017–2022”. In addition, the objective of REPAC V and VI was consistent with the objectives of the German Federal Government to contribute to the United Nations SDGs 1 “No poverty” and 10 “Reduce inequality within and among countries”.

From today’s perspective, the impact chain underlying the projects to achieve improved access to housing through rapid and targeted reconstruction of heavily damaged or destroyed residential buildings and units, as well as to financially support the beneficiary families with rental subsidies for the duration of the construction work, is also rated as comprehensible and plausible. A rapid improvement in living conditions through access to housing can also be logically concluded. Housing is essential for the well-being and development of most societies. It is a complex asset linked to livelihoods, health, education, security and social and family stability. Destruction of houses or their loss due to displacement or expropriation is one of the most visible effects of conflicts and natural disasters. In post-conflict contexts, housing reconstruction can be a key incentive for remigration and resettlement, as well as for the reconstruction of

¹⁸ KfW/GIZ/BGR/PTB (2018): Joint reporting (BE) on the DC programme “Supporting Palestinian Refugees”.

¹⁹ UNRWA (2022): 2014 Gaza conflict. Online: <https://www.unrwa.org/2014-gaza-conflict>.

²⁰ Barakat et al. (2004): The reconstruction of housing in Palestine 1993–2000: a case study from the Gaza strip. In: *Housing Studies*, 19(2), 175–192.

²¹ In this context, an open programme means that, at the time of the PA, it is not yet finalised which concrete measures are to be implemented. The individual programme measures are only identified in the course of implementation, based on current circumstances and the needs of the target group.

communities as part of wider peace efforts.²² Thus, a potentially stabilising effect of the reconstruction at the time of the EPE also appears plausible. The core problem of missing housing space has been correctly identified and is still relevant today. The concept of the project approach is therefore assessed as suitable for adequately reaching the target group and contributing to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and to improving the living conditions of Palestinian refugees.

The project-executing agency UNWRA was founded in 1949 based on UN Resolution 302 with the mandate to ensure the provision of basic services for Palestinian refugees in the Middle East region. Since then, the organisation has provided support in meeting the basic needs of Palestinian refugees in the areas of healthcare, humanitarian measures and education, as well as improving camp infrastructure. The choice of UNWRA as the executing agency also appears appropriate from today's perspective; there would not have been more suitable alternatives at the time due to the mandate specifically tailored to the needs of Palestinian refugees.

The classification into the respective damage categories (minor, major, severely damaged, or totally destroyed) as well as the selection of the beneficiary families was intended to take place on the basis of inventories as well as a catalogue of criteria, which was developed and coordinated in cooperation with UNRWA, UNDP and the Shelter Cluster and Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MoPWH) following the armed conflicts in summer 2014. The intent was to transparently publish criteria for the damage classifications and make assessments in the presence of the homeowners. It can therefore be assumed that the selection of beneficiaries was based on urgency and necessity, as the intent was to only select families whose houses were completely destroyed or severely damaged. Temporary rental allowances were also to be based on the size of the family.²³

Due to the acute emergency and the urgent need for action as part of the reconstruction of housing in the Gaza Strip, the choice of the top-down approach seems appropriate²⁴ compared to the usual participatory approach under REPAC, both from the perspective at the time and today. On the one hand, it was important that destroyed housing infrastructure was re-introduced in a timely manner; rapid implementation was therefore essential and could not have been guaranteed by a participatory approach that would have been more time-consuming by comparison. On the other hand, the houses and housing units rebuilt under REPAC V and VI were privately owned without additional communal uses, which did not require broader participation of potential beneficiaries.

Even from today's perspective, the design of the projects addressed a central core problem of the intervention context. Due to the dual implementation approach of providing indirect solutions both through rental subsidies and the reconstruction of housing, the project approach was very well suited to improving the living conditions of the Palestinian population in the areas that benefited directly. The precarious conditions in the Gaza Strip, which still prevail to this day, underscore the relevance of the approach chosen at the time and today. The combination of the top-down approach with the self-help component was a targeted concept that exceeded expectations in order to quickly implement effective measures while taking into account the needs of the target group, so that the overall relevance of the projects is rated as very good.

Relevance rating: 1

Coherence

In terms of internal coherence, Germany has been supporting the PT since the early 1980s as part of German development cooperation (DC). The aim is to improve living conditions for the Palestinian population, particularly in Gaza and East Jerusalem. On the other hand, comprehensive development prospects are to be created for the people living there as well as the foundations for the development of a Palestinian state.²⁵ The REPAC measures financed from FC funds complemented the German Federal Government's

²² Barakat, S. (2003): Housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster. Humanitarian Policy Group, Network Papers, 43, 1–40.

²³ Family size 1–5 people: USD 200 monthly; 6–9 people: USD 225 monthly; 10 persons and more: USD 250 per month.

²⁴ In this context, top-down means that UNRWA itself selected the beneficiary families on the basis of taking stock of the situation and previously defined criteria, and did not follow an upstream municipal procedure.

²⁵ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 2022: Palestinian Territories. Online (German only): <https://www.bmz.de/de/laender/palaestinensische-gebietel>.

commitment to rebuilding the Gaza Strip and were well integrated into the “Supporting Palestinian Refugees” DC programme. UNRWA has ensured that the activities financed from FC funds from German Federal Foreign Office (AA) grants and direct grants from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to UNRWA as part of the transitional development assistance (ESÜH)²⁶ at the time were clearly defined in terms of content and financial processing as well as synergistically used in the activities. For example, the ESÜH funds were used to rehabilitate marginally damaged housing, while FC funds were only used to finance reconstruction measures on houses that were heavily or severely damaged or completely destroyed. In addition to the REPAC projects, the TC programme “Strengthen the Social Participation of Palestinian Refugees” (FASPAR) and the CPS measure “Opportunities for Ex/Change” (OfEC) also provided complementary support to improve the living conditions of Palestinian refugees. In the education sector, UNRWA also received support in the construction of new schools in the Gaza Strip (BMZ no. 2011 66 917 and 2012 67 277). In addition, since 2002, the EGP programmes (“Employment Generation Programme for Pro-Poor Infrastructure”) in cooperation with UNDP have contributed to the rehabilitation and construction of social infrastructure in smaller communities and refugee camps as well as to the temporary promotion of employment in the PT. Furthermore, an FC project closely linked to REPAC Special Phases V and VI for the reconstruction of housing in the Gaza Strip (BMZ No. 2016 18 586) via UNRWA and UNOPS²⁷ complements the projects evaluated here.

The follow-up financing from REPAC VI of Phase V measures reasonably ensured the continuation of the reconstruction and rehabilitation commitment, although the measures had less of a complementary effect than a continuity effect. Since the Gaza Strip was only included in the REPAC programme from 2014 onwards and the previous phases focus primarily on measures in refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan, the phases considered here complemented the other previous and subsequent phases by expanding the geographical focus to the Gaza Strip and the thematic focus to housing construction and rehabilitation. The interaction of the German DC instruments within the scope of the DC programme takes place through strategic and content-related coordination between the German implementing organisations. At least once a year, a joint meeting is held, which is convened by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).²⁸

As part of the external coherence, REPAC phases V and VI were coordinated at UNRWA level by the Gaza Field Office and the Field Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Department (FICIP) there, and thus was also integrated into the UNRWA Emergency Shelter Programme for the Gaza Strip.²⁹ The main concerns of other UNRWA donors also included improving the living conditions of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip, for example by providing access to clean water and electricity and creating job opportunities.

The MoPWH is responsible for general donor coordination in the intervention context between various multilateral and civil society organisations.³⁰ However, bilateral agreements between the various regionally active international organisations such as UNRWA, UNDP, UNOPS and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) take place on a regular basis, which prevent duplicate financing and encourage synergies. While UNRWA holds the mandate for the care of Palestinian refugees, UNDP also supports the care of the local population without refugee status. Under the mediation of UNSCO (The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process), the Israeli and Palestinian government established the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), which contributed to a more transparent monitoring system for the import of materials into the Gaza Strip, which is central to residential construction. The NRC is an independent private trust that specialises in the PT’s programme-related work in the area of information, advice and legal support, among other things. This means that there are overlaps with REPAC, which make inter-institutional coordination necessary.

Regarding internal coherence, REPAC V and VI aligned themselves to a high degree with the objectives of German DC in the PT and were therefore compatible with the strategic orientation of the policy area.

²⁶ The ESÜH political instrument from 2013 was replaced by the transitional aid (ÜH) in 2020. However, the projects are also in line with this conceptually enhanced Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) strategy.

²⁷ UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services

²⁸ KfW/GIZ/BGR/PTB (2018): Joint reporting (BE) on the DC programme “Supporting Palestinian Refugees”.

²⁹ KfW/GIZ/BGR/PTB (2018): Joint reporting (BE) on the DC programme “Supporting Palestinian Refugees”.

³⁰ KfW (2021): REPAC Mid-term Evaluation 2020/21.

The two special REPAC phases considered were also designed to complement the other REPAC phases, which are more heavily focused on refugee camps and are active across a broader geographic area, thus complementing the different needs for action in the intervention context and were embedded in an overarching DC programme. With regard to external coherence, the measures were integrated into UNRWA's Emergency Shelter Programme and appropriate donor coordination between the various regionally active multilateral organisations took place in the context of the intervention. The result is therefore fully in line with expectations and shows no defects. The relevance is therefore rated as good in summary.

Coherence rating: 2

Effectiveness

The objective of the two FC projects examined by this EPE at outcome level included improved and rapid access to and appropriate use of housing for selected Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip. The formulation of the outcome indicators was also adjusted accordingly.




Figure 1: Concentration and extent of conflict-related damage and destruction in the Gaza Strip after the 2014 riots and number of individual measures.

The measures were implemented within the programme governorates of Gaza City, Khan Younis, Rafah, Deir El Balah and North Gaza, thus demonstrating a high level of coverage of areas acutely affected by destruction and damage. As can be seen in Figure 1, the damage caused by the conflict spread over the entire area of the Gaza Strip, with the greatest amount of damage occurring in the governorates of North Gaza, Gaza City and Khan Younis. The areas coloured red represent the respective concentration of damage and destruction events. The darker a region is coloured on the map, the higher the spatial

concentration of damage and destruction. Full georeferenced location data for the individual measures were not available at the time of the evaluation, which is why only the total number of individual measures could be displayed in the respective governorates. Nevertheless, the geographical orientation of the implemented measures is assessed as reasonably effective as, on the one hand, all acute damage was considered in its spatial distribution and, on the other hand, no governorates were neglected in accordance with the do-no-harm principle.

The division of the housing units into the respective damage categories (minor, major, severely damaged or totally destroyed) as well as the selection of the beneficiary families was carried out as intended on the basis of inventories and a common catalogue of criteria between UNRWA, UNDP, the Shelter Cluster and the MoPWH. Extensive information campaigns have enabled all potential beneficiaries to be informed about the aid offered. The reconstruction or repair of the residential units was carried out on the basis of a UNRWA needs analysis and was closely monitored by UNRWA engineers. Both the support for the repair of housing and the disbursement of rent subsidies were made in several tranches after UNRWA had assessed the fulfilment of the respective requirements. Disbursements for the reconstruction of the housing units were made in up to four tranches according to the progress of the project and UNRWA assessment. Access to a database managed by the NRC (Shelter Cluster) ensured that families did not receive benefits twice. Each family or person will be given their own ID in the database and, once a measure has ended, it will be recorded in the database as no longer eligible for the same or similar measures.

Indicator	Target value at PA (2014/2015)	Actual value at final inspection (2018)	Actual value at EPE (2022)
REPAC V			
(1) Around 500 Palestinian refugee families (approx. 2,750 individuals) permanently use the newly created and rebuilt housing in Gaza	500	688 families (approx. 3,100 individuals); achieved	683 families benefiting from still intact but partially damaged housing; achieved 616 families benefiting from still intact and undamaged housing; achieved
(2) Around 3,200 Palestinian refugee families (approx. 17,400 individuals) in the Gaza Strip have received temporary rental subsidies (12–18 months)	3,200	3,252 families (more than 18,000 individuals), of which more than 2,600 are very poor families; achieved	see AK value; achieved
REPAC VI			
(1) Around 1,508 Palestinian refugee families (approx. 8,100 individuals) permanently use the newly created and rebuilt housing in the Gaza Strip	1,508	1,596 families (more than 8,000 individuals); achieved	1,586 families are benefiting from housing that is undestroyed but partially damaged; unclear target achievement

			1,463 families are benefiting from still intact and undamaged housing; not achieved
(2) Around 3,300 Palestinian refugee families (approx. 17,600 individuals) in the Gaza Strip have received temporary rental subsidies (of which 3,000 for 12 months and 300 for 18 months)	3,300	7,080 families (approx. 38,000 individuals), of which approx. 5,665 very poor families; achieved	see AK value; achieved

For example, in order to give the beneficiary families the opportunity to follow their own wishes when designing or selecting materials, despite the top-down approach, and not to specify all the details, an element known as a self-help component was used in the projects. This allowed the beneficiaries to have a say in the design and implementation, thereby increasing the ownership of the beneficiaries. Due to the acute needs and the many people who became homeless as a result of the destruction and had to live in precarious conditions for sometimes high rents, the choice of the top-down approach in this particular case still appears to be an effective instrument today for providing fast and effective aid. The construction quality was also rated as good overall for both phases as part of the final inspection.

The funds from phase V directly financed the repair of 436 heavily damaged housing units, for which around USD 4.5 million was disbursed. In addition, it was possible to use funds amounting to approx. USD 9.8 million, to rebuild a total of 252 completely destroyed residential units. Due to lower construction costs than originally assumed (see Efficiency), it was possible to rehabilitate significantly more housing, which consequently also benefited more families than originally expected. A total of 688 families (approx. 3,100 individuals) use the newly created and rebuilt housing. This exceeded the original target of at least 500 families by around 37%. In addition, the disbursed rent subsidies totalled USD 8.8 million, directly benefiting 3,252 families, more than 2,600 of which were very poor families, and more than 18,000 individuals. As a result, the target values of the outcome-level indicators for REPAC V were fully achieved at the time of the final inspection. All construction work was successfully completed by the end of October 2016 and the rental subsidies were paid out in the period from October 2014 to March 2016.

The target achievement of the outcome indicators in phase VI is similarly good. The funds from this phase were used to rehabilitate a total of 1,292 heavily damaged housing units, for which more than USD 10.9 million was disbursed. In addition, it was possible to rebuild a total of 301 completely destroyed housing units using funds amounting to approx. USD 10.6 million, and three additional residential units were rebuilt through the use of accrued interest income. Consequently, 1,596 families (more than 8,000 individuals) benefited from access to housing under REPAC VI. Thanks to the temporary payment of rent subsidies (amounting to USD 8.9 million), 7,080 families (around 38,800 individuals) were also able to benefit, including 5,665 very poor families. More than twice as many families benefited from the temporary rental subsidies, and the original target of 3,300 families was exceeded by around 133%. Overall, the objectives at outcome level were exceeded in both phases at the time of the final inspection. The construction work under Phase VI was completed in August 2017, and the rental subsidies were paid out in the period from January 2016 to the end of June 2016³¹.

As a result of the riots and extensive destruction in the summer of 2014, the situation in the housing sector increasingly worsened. According to UNRWA, a total of USD 720 million would have been required to cover the need for housing as a result of the conflict.³² Although the FC contribution in the context of REPAC phases V and VI did not eliminate the problem of housing shortages, the measures enabled access

³¹ UNRWA: Completion Report

³² UNRWA (2016): UNRWA in figures as of 1 January 2016.

to new or rebuilt housing for a total of 2,284 families. The rent subsidies paid out to 10,332 families also ensured that the housing situation of these people did not deteriorate further during the reconstruction period. The FC projects thus contributed to alleviating the acute emergency situation of the beneficiary families at the time of the final inspection. Furthermore, it seems plausible that other, additional households were able to see indirect partial relief in some cases by benefiting from the rental subsidies when taking in affected families for the duration of the reconstruction.

Based on interviews with UNRWA employees, all houses and housing units continued to exist until the renewed clashes in May 2021, were inhabited by the families and were in good condition. However, five (REPAC V) and ten (REPAC VI) of the financed housing units were completely destroyed in the course of the conflict in 2021, and repair works must be carried out again on 67 (REPAC V) and 123 (REPAC VI) houses. Accordingly, a lower number of beneficiary families is used as a basis for assessing the target achievement of the permanently used and newly created housing (indicator 1 in each case) at the time of the evaluation for both phases. In principle, it is assumed that every newly created or rehabilitated housing unit will be used by a³³ family, so that only around 616 (REPAC V) and 1,463 (REPAC VI) were able to benefit from the measures based on the above information at the time of the evaluation in 2022. Due to the significant overachievement of indicator 1 under REPAC V at the time of the final inspection, the target of at least 500 with 616 families actually benefiting has still been achieved despite the conflict-related damage and destruction of a total of 72 housing units. In the case of REPAC VI, the objective of indicator 1 with a total of 1,586 families with a target of 1,508 has still been achieved despite the complete destruction of 10 housing units, but this is also only assuming that the damage to the additional 123 housing units continues to permit permanent use of the housing. If damage to and destruction of housing in phase VI is considered cumulatively, the objective of indicator 1 was not achieved and missed by around 3% with total of 1,463 beneficiary families. As part of the evaluation, the achievement of indicator 1 under REPAC VI is therefore classified as unclear, as a detailed validation of the housing use cannot take place. Overall, however, it is assumed that some housing can still be used despite existing damage, meaning that the unclear target achievement relevant for indicator I only has a moderately negative impact on the effectiveness assessment.

Targeted implementation of the “do-no-harm” approach in the selection of housing units or families is not mentioned in the project documents. However, as part of the qualitative interviews with UNRWA employees, it was pointed out that the approach was known to all persons involved and was pursued in the planning and implementation. The selection of families receiving benefits was also based on vulnerability criteria, such as poverty. There is also no evidence that potential lines of conflict were intensified within the target group due to the FC projects.

The implementation of the measures by UNRWA can be described as effective overall. UNRWA’s tasks included the announcement of the programmes, the definition and coordination of the criteria for damage classification of the destroyed or damaged housing units as well as for the selection of the families to benefit from the measures. UNRWA also supervised the progress of the project and supported the import of construction materials into the Gaza Strip.

Due to the self-help component, the beneficiary families were able to commission companies or workers on their own behalf. According to UNRWA, construction measures amounting to around 2,700 full-time jobs (1,400 phase V; 1,300 phase VI) were carried out; around 75% was due to the reconstruction component as part of phase V, with the remainder due to that phase’s repair component; around 65% was due to the repair component in phase VI, and the rest to the reconstruction component. In addition to the construction measures and rental subsidies, an (indirect) contribution was also made to promoting employment and alleviating poverty for local workers and construction companies, which is rated positively as an unintended effect when considering effectiveness.

Even though the indicators were only partially achieved at the time of the evaluation, the positive results clearly prevail. More people were able to benefit from the quickly effective rental subsidies than originally planned and the target indicators were exceeded. Due to the comparatively lower valuation of the FC funds for the rental subsidy measures, which accounted for around only one third of the total financing in both phases, the respective target achievement of indicator 2 is weighted lower than the respective target

³³ An average household size of 4.5 people per household is assumed for the calculation.

achievement of indicator 1. At the time of the final inspection, 1–2 years after the construction work was finalised, more families were able to benefit from the permanent use of the new and rehabilitated housing than was originally planned as part of the two REPAC phases. At the time of the evaluation, however, the target of permanently used housing in REPAC VI was still unclear due to conflict-related damage and destruction. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the damaged housing can continue to be used for the most part, although no reliable data is available for validation. Overall, the direct impacts of the two FC projects were therefore fully in line with expectations at the time of the final inspection, but the aspiration of permanent use of the housing created is at risk at the time of the evaluation. As a result, the effectiveness will continue to be assessed with a favourable but marginal result, which appropriately considers the damage and destruction of the housing resulting from external factors.

Effectiveness rating: 2

Efficiency

From today's perspective, the time schedule set at the time of the PA (24 months for REPAC V; 20 months for REPAC VI) can be regarded as too optimistic for both projects and was significantly exceeded (42 months for REPAC V; 27 months for REPAC VI). In addition, despite the larger financing scope of REPAC VI, which enabled a larger number of individual measures and was thus associated with more time-consuming implementation, a four-month shorter implementation period was estimated than for REPAC V. From today's perspective, this calculation cannot be reproduced. In view of the considerable restrictions on the movement of people and goods due to the Israeli blockade and the associated dependence on permits for material imports, in particular for items known as "dual-use" materials³⁴, the Israeli authorities nevertheless consider the delayed implementation period of both projects to be appropriate.

The projects were implemented as part of the opening of the "residential stream" of the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), a temporary agreement between the Palestinian and Israeli governments, mediated by the United Nations in September 2014 and introduced in June 2015. The GRM is a temporary monitoring mechanism that allowed large quantities of dual-use materials (e.g. cement and steel) to be imported into the Gaza Strip for post-conflict reconstruction in 2014. In parallel with the introduction of the GRM "residential stream", the average costs for housing repairs estimated at the time of the project appraisal for phase V were reviewed and it was found that the construction costs were significantly below the estimated costs at an average of USD 10,000/apartment. This made it possible to rehabilitate approx. 45% more heavily damaged housing units than the 300 originally planned. In addition, 252 completely destroyed housing units were rebuilt, with the construction costs for housing reconstruction amounting to an average of USD 39,000 per housing unit. In this case too, the actual construction costs were significantly lower than the originally estimated costs (USD 50,000/housing unit), which is why more than 200 residential units could be rebuilt.

Even in phase VI, the construction costs, at an average of USD 8,500 per housing unit, were slightly below the originally assumed costs of USD 9,000. In addition, accrued interest income totalling USD 95,696 was used for the project, which ultimately enabled the repair of more than the 1,208 residential units originally planned. Furthermore, it was possible to rebuild 301 completely destroyed housing units. Around USD 10.6 million were used for this purpose. This had an overall positive impact on production efficiency, as the constant use of inputs created far more outputs and more families benefited than originally assumed.

The implementation by UNRWA also made it possible to access existing professional implementation structures and experience. UNRWA was thus able to obtain all necessary official permits within a reasonable period of time and the beneficiaries were able to import building materials through official channels after a corresponding import mechanism was established. After an almost eight-week suspension of private imports of cement into Gaza starting on 3 April 2016 and the subsequent price instability, beneficiary families were no longer able to buy the materials they needed and were forced to stop or slow down their reconstruction and repair work. UNRWA supported eligible families during the period of suspension,

³⁴ "Dual-use" goods are goods, in this case construction materials, that were actually produced or are required for a civilian purpose, but could also be used for military purposes (e.g. for the construction of weapons) due to their properties. As a result, the Israeli authorities severely restrict the import of such materials into the Gaza Strip.

helping them to prepare their documents and sending them to the GRM for approval. As part of the GRM, all families identified for repair and reconstruction measures and who require restricted dual-use materials are recorded via a coordinated Palestinian government database managed by the MoPWH. The PA continued to feed the family data submitted by UNRWA into the system and the UNRWA beneficiaries were approved by the Israeli government. This allowed these families to be prioritised when building material imports resumed, which allowed construction work to be completed.³⁵

The FC projects were financed by FC grant funds totalling EUR 50 million (EUR 20 million REPAC V; EUR 30 million REPAC VI). Even in Phase V, the share of rental subsidies was below the 40% mark, amounting to less than 36% of the total costs of USD 8.8 million. In Phase VI, as requested by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the share of rental subsidies in the total costs was less than 31%, amounting to around USD 8.9 million. Despite the comparatively lower share of rental subsidies in total expenditure, it was possible to target almost twice as many beneficiaries with the rental subsidies in the case of REPAC VI (see Effectiveness). This is mainly due to the shorter period of only six months during which the rent allowances were granted, while under REPAC V the rent subsidies were paid over a period of 17 months.³⁶ Since the rental subsidies only contributed to a lesser extent to the development policy objective of improving the living conditions of the target group, while the reconstruction of housing also has indirect effects on living conditions, the reduction of the proportion of rental subsidies in the total costs is rated as a positive aspect in terms of allocation efficiency.

The funds approved for Phase V were disbursed as planned in a tranche in December 2014, the funds for phase VI were disbursed in two tranches, in December 2015 (EUR 10 million) and January 2016 (EUR 20 million). It was possible to use the interest income of EUR 91,485 accrued for the second tranche for additional project measures. The average promotional contributions³⁷ also appear appropriate from today's perspective. The overestimation of the actual construction costs led to significantly more families benefiting from the projects than originally planned, which is also rated positively.

As a UN organisation, UNRWA is subject to what is known as the "single audit principle", according to which the UN Board of Auditors alone conducts financial audits. To account for the use of the funds, FC received semi-annual project reports as well as a final report after the measures were completed. There were no indications of misuse of funds. Both the margin of the implementation costs (personnel, construction supervision, communication, visibility, etc.) of 0.3% (Phase V) and 1.2% (Phase VI) and the UNRWA management fee of 7% (both phases) seem appropriate in view of the complex framework conditions in the Gaza Strip. Due to the specific mandate and years of experience in supporting Palestinian refugees, the choice of the project-executing agency also seems appropriate from an efficiency perspective. In Gaza, UNRWA's work is also characterised by 16 local offices, which are easily accessible to the target group due to their decentralised nature.

Thanks to the selected top-down approach, it was possible to plan and implement the measures in a targeted manner with the required speed in view of the urgent housing shortage in the Gaza Strip. Due to the design of the projects as open programmes, it was possible to ensure that acute needs in the programme areas were addressed and that it was possible to respond to changing framework conditions. In addition, the self-help component proved to be very profitable for the efficiency of the projects. Since the beneficiary families and later users of the construction measures were themselves responsible for renovation and rehabilitation measures, they were able to make decisions based on their own preferences and therefore provided their own additional funds in some cases. In addition, it was possible to accelerate the processes to some extent and save costs, as beneficiaries carried out work themselves with existing expertise, which had a positive effect on the production efficiency of the projects.

The allocation efficiency of the project is rated as high overall, as the open programme primarily selected measures within the projects based on needs, and the focus was on rebuilding and rehabilitating housing units instead of paying rent subsidies.

³⁵ UNRWA (2017): Final Project Report; UNRWA (2016): Gaza situation report 145.

³⁶ REPAC V: October 2014 – March 2016. REPAC VI: January – June 2016.

³⁷ REPAC V: USD 10,000/housing unit in the event of severe damage; USD 39,000/housing unit in the event of reconstruction; REPAC VI: USD 8,500/housing unit in the event of severe damage; approx. USD 35,000/housing unit in the event of reconstruction.

Despite significant delays in implementation, which, however, are difficult to calculate in advance due to the sometimes-arbitrary material import regulations and are often common in conflict-ridden contexts, the efficiency of the projects is still rated as good, also due to the positive implications of the self-help component and the increased production efficiency.

Efficiency rating: 2

Impact

Indicator	Actual value at PA 2014/2015	Actual value at EPE (2022)
(1) HDI PT*	0.697; rank 109 of 189 (2014) 0.701; rank 108 of 189 (2015)	0.708; rank 115 of 189 (2019)

*) UNDP

The developmental objective of the projects evaluated by this EPE was to rapidly improve living conditions in and around Palestinian refugee camps and to contribute to ensuring peace and stability for Palestinian refugees in the areas of Gaza benefiting directly.

REPAC V and VI were prepared as immediate measures in line with the “Emergency procedure for natural catastrophes, crises and conflicts” in accordance with TC 47 of the FC/TC guidelines and were not subordinate to long-term overarching development policy objectives but aimed at quickly and visibly improving the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip. The impact objective of special phases V and VI largely corresponded to that of the overarching DC programme “Supporting Palestinian Refugees” (SPR). The latter was “The overarching goal of all the measures involved is to improve the living conditions and the constructive coexistence of Palestinian refugees in the region and the population in Gaza”. It can therefore also be concluded that the measures implemented under REPAC V and VI made a valuable contribution to achieving the DC programme objective. In view of the partially achieved target indicators at outcome level, it can also be assumed that the rehabilitation of the housing units and rental subsidies led to a rapid improvement in the living conditions of the beneficiary population in the direct project areas.

No indicators were defined at impact level during the project appraisal, meaning that the Human Development Index (HDI) is used as a proxy indicator for achieving the objective of improving living conditions as part of this evaluation and as part of a contribution analysis. It becomes evident that the value has already improved from 2014 to 2015 and has risen further up to the time of the EPE, making it possible to derive an improvement in living conditions. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out here that this value is only assigned for the entire PT and therefore cannot map the specific developments in the programme areas, which results in an attribution problem. Furthermore, although the value for the PT improved, its ranking decreased, which means that other countries saw greater improvement in their average performance in the most important dimensions of human development than the PT did during the same period. Nevertheless, the critical framework conditions in the PT should also be considered when interpreting these values.

Losing one’s own home means not only physical loss, but also loss of dignity, identity, and privacy. It can cause psychological trauma, call into question the perception of cultural identity, disrupt social structures, pose a threat to one’s own safety and have significant negative economic effects. In return, housing and related activities can improve the capacity of affected communities by strengthening their physical, emotional and practical skills, providing security and shelters and, in short, increasing their resilience.³⁸ After conflicts, the reconstruction of housing can be a decisive incentive for remigration and resettlement, as well as for the reconstruction of communities in the context of wider peace efforts.³⁹ Families who had lost their homes after the end of the conflict in 2014 or could no longer live there due to severe damage were given a way out of informal or unsafe accommodation and were able to return to their own homes. Rebuilding housing thus provided the target group with a way out of internal displacement and improved precarious living conditions, for example in overcrowded camps or shelters, and also contributed to

³⁸ Barakat, S. (2003): Housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster. Humanitarian Policy Group, Network Papers, 43, 1–40.

³⁹ Ibid.

stabilisation and development by stabilising the social and economic lives of Palestinian refugees affected by the conflict and the social fabric.⁴⁰ Vulnerable people in particular benefited from the projects' measures, as the socio-economic context in the Gaza Strip is strongly influenced by precarious living conditions due to the loss of housing and displacement.

The overall REPAC programme is currently in the 12th phase and, due to the long implementation period and the regional focus on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and the Gaza Strip, has developed broad impact in the region, to which REPAC phases V and VI also contributed. Due to the continuing high demand for housing reconstruction, the TA-financed "successor project", "Reconstruction of housing in Gaza" was partly based on lessons learned from the special phases and the project approach was replicated to some extent. For example, the self-help component was retained and the catalogue of criteria for selecting beneficiaries was expanded, but the rent subsidies were discontinued due to excessive costs. Another change is the expansion of the target group to non-refugees, which was made possible by the involvement of UNOPS as a further project-executing agency alongside UNRWA. In addition, the target group receives legal support in obtaining land, ownership and construction rights. The import mechanism through the GRM continues to be used in part, depending on locally available building materials and import regulations, and has also proven to be useful for subsequent phases since the completion of REPAC Phases V and VI.

Due to the contribution made by the reconstruction to improving the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees and the longer-term stabilising effect of the reconstruction measures, the impact of the projects can be rated as good. In addition, it can be assumed that all REPAC projects and follow-up projects will have a broad impact.

Impact rating: 2

Sustainability

Unlike other aid such as food aid or medicines, housing is an important, long-term and non-consumable commodity.⁴¹ Despite the high risk in Gaza due to possible new escalations of violence at any time and thus damage to the construction measures, no new damage or destruction occurred until May 2021. However, as already explained in the Effectiveness section, since that time, some of the buildings or housing units rehabilitated or rebuilt under REPAC V and VI have been destroyed again or required repair work. The volatile security situation in the Gaza Strip cannot be influenced by FC projects and an end to the conflict can only be achieved through political solutions or negotiations, which is currently not foreseeable. For this reason, the fragile context will remain a risk to the continued existence of the infrastructure in the future.

Due to the high level of ownership within the scope of the self-help component, according to the UNRWA employees interviewed, not only were higher-quality materials and equipment used in some cases, but the families also regularly carry out maintenance and minor repair work on their own. This has a positive effect on the sustainability of the construction measures and is another positive side effect of the close involvement of the beneficiary families. The construction quality was rated as good overall for both phases as part of the final inspection. Because UNRWA uses common and durable construction methods and materials (e.g. concrete, block walls, plastering and tile laying), it can be assumed that the construction quality of the measures is low-wear and, in some ways, also sustainable or durable. The project-executing agency was not aware of the houses or housing units being sublet or sold by the families after completion, and this was also assessed as very unlikely. According to UNRWA, local construction companies and tradesmen were also commissioned for the repair measures, so local structures were able to benefit from the measures, and these contributed to local capacity building in the short term. However, as Gaza's economy and production were already severely restricted before the 2014 outbreaks and came to a standstill during the conflict, the use of local building materials was almost impossible, and imports had to be used.

⁴⁰ Kissick et al. (2006): Housing for all: essential to economic, social and civic development. In: The World Urban Forum III. Washington, DC: Planning and Development Collaborative International.

⁴¹ Barakat, S. (2003): Housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster. Humanitarian Policy Group, Network Papers, 43, 1–40.

Sustainable or structure-forming effects of rental subsidies were never sought and are therefore not considered in the assessment of sustainability. Nevertheless, rent subsidies are only a short-term measures and cannot guarantee that housing will be secured in the long term.

The REPAC V and VI projects were able to establish procedures and structures that can also be used through follow-up phases, such as the TA-financed follow-up project “Reconstruction of housing in Gaza” (BMZ No. 2016 18 586) carried out with UNRWA and UNOPS.

Despite unavoidable high risks for the continued existence of housing units due to the continued volatile security situation, it can be assumed that the beneficiary families have developed a high level of ownership as part of the self-help component and will continue their endeavours to maintain the rebuilt or rehabilitated housing units in the future. For this reason, sustainability is assessed as satisfactory overall.

Sustainability rating: 3

General conclusions

In the event of acute emergencies and the urgent need for action, for example after conflicts or natural disasters, a top-down approach can guarantee the necessary speed of planning and implementation. In general, participatory approaches bring more advantages in terms of satisfaction and self-responsibility of the beneficiaries, effectiveness and sustainability, but are significantly more time-consuming and cannot be implemented appropriately in a short time. However, by using a self-help approach, deficits in these areas can be bridged and emergencies can be quickly alleviated. In addition, a participatory approach in the context of private housing reconstruction does not seem to be a suitable instrument without further joint use of the construction measures.

In intervention contexts heavily influenced by external import regulations for the movement of goods, project implementation periods dependent on imported goods should be realistically estimated.

In conflict-ridden contexts, infrastructural progress, such as housing construction in this case, can quickly be destroyed by resurgent conflicts. Accordingly, the formulation of realistic target levels for the target achievement for the time-of-use of the created infrastructure is essential to secure the success of the project even beyond the implementation period.

Rental subsidies do not have a structural or sustainable effect but should only be used to bridge emergency situations as a fast-acting instrument in combination with more medium-term measures, such as reconstruction or repair.

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance**, **coherence**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency** and **impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at an **overall rating** of a project's development effectiveness. The scale is as follows:

Level 1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
Level 2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
Level 3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
Level 4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
Level 5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
Level 6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all six individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1–3 of the overall rating denote a “successful” project while rating levels 4–6 denote an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the development objective (“impact”) **and** the sustainability are rated at least “satisfactory” (level 3).