

# Ex post evaluation – Palestinian Territories

**Sector:** Employment policy (CRS Code 16110)  
**Project:** School construction in Gaza Strip (Employment Programme VI; BMZ No. 2001 65 373\*) and School construction in the West Bank (Employment programme VII, BMZ No. 2002 65 389\*)  
**Implementing agency:** Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE)



## Ex post evaluation report: 2016

		Project EGP VI (planned)	Project EGP VI (actual)	Project EGP VII** (planned)	Project EGP VII** (actual)
Investment costs (total)	EUR million	5.57	5.66	5.00	5.45
Counterpart contribution***	EUR million	0.46	0.47	0.00	0.00
Funding	EUR million	5.11	5.19	5.00	5.45
of which budget funds (BMZ)	EUR million	5.11	5.16	5.00	5.45

\*) Project in the 2015 random sample

\*\*) No counterpart contribution was specified for EGP VII, but was de facto made by the schools

**Summary:** The projects designed as open programmes comprised the expansion, refurbishment, building and equipping of schools in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. They were labour intensive in order to create temporary employment and income opportunities. For EGP VI (Gaza) the activities comprised: refurbishment of 96 classrooms and 42 sanitary units as well as the construction of 212 school rooms, 91 sanitary units, green areas and 6 sports areas in 12 locations; for EGP VII (West Bank): the construction of 164 school rooms and 108 sanitary units in eight locations as well as the refurbishment of 16 school rooms in two locations.

**Objectives:** EGP VI: The development objective was to contribute towards social security and to the Palestinian reconstruction process amidst the ongoing conflict situation. The programmes' objectives were the temporary creation of jobs and the improvement of formal primary and secondary education opportunities with regard to access as well as teaching and learning conditions.


EGP VII: The development objective of the project was to contribute towards improved access to education for the growing population in the West Bank, likewise in a conflict zone, and to reduce poverty by temporarily raising the incomes of poor households. The programme objectives were to make appropriate use of the better quality and quantity of school infrastructure and create temporary employment opportunities for poorer groups in the population.

**Target group:** Foremost school children in the affected schools and the population influenced by the high unemployment.

## Overall rating: 2 (both projects)

**Rationale:** The projects alleviated the pressure on previously overloaded classrooms. As teaching in Gaza is organised in two shifts, the classrooms there are used by more pupils, while the building quality is more sustainable in the West Bank with the low-maintenance design. Both projects had significant impacts on access to schools and education quality, while the implementation was delayed by the conflict. Temporary employment was achieved through both projects, more so in Gaza than in the West Bank.

**Highlights:** The planning specific for the area and the pupil-oriented design for EGP VII set a trend, defined a framework within the MoEHE, and have since been adopted by other donors. The good state of the schools roughly seven to eight years after completion suggests the low-maintenance construction design is working. The construction of schools in general and particularly the two schools for pupils from refugee camps adds to stability. This improves access to education, reduces discrimination, and amidst an environment plagued with chronic conflict and violence, it at least offers the school children a positive outlook and supportive learning conditions.



## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 2 (both projects)

#### General conditions and classification of the projects

Phases VI and VII of the Employment Generation Programme (EGP) included the construction and rehabilitation of schools in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and were conceived as a continuation of the projects EGP IV (BMZ No. 1999 65 096) and EGP V (BMZ No. 1999 65 245). Further school measures are being undertaken within the framework of the projects EGP VIII (BMZ No. 2004 65 229) and EGP IX (BMZ No. 2005 65 341), which have not yet been completed.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, despite decades of Middle East diplomacy. The resulting difficult framework conditions are the main barriers to development in the Palestinian Territories (PT), which have been occupied by Israel since 1967. As a result of the Oslo treaties of 1995, the cities are under Palestinian administration and security, but Israel is responsible for the administration and security of 61% of the mostly rural areas of the West Bank. Control over water and air also lies with Israel. The second intifada (uprising) in 2000, the establishment of control posts and the construction of a wall made the movement of people and the exchange of goods in the West Bank difficult. The restrictions on the issue of work permits for Palestinians have led to high unemployment since the second intifada, especially among young people. The funding of employment-intensive measures therefore became an integral part of German development cooperation.

The electoral victory of the radical Islamic Hamas group in 2006 was followed by a boycott by Israel and the international community, which stopped already approved financial transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA). The unity government subsequently formed by Hamas and the Fatah Party in 2007 dissolved after only a few months, at which point Hamas took over control of the Gaza Strip forcefully. Since then, Israel has largely cut it off from the outside world, leading to a massive and ongoing deterioration of living conditions.

In early June 2014, a new technocratic Palestinian Unity Government was sworn in, supported by Fatah and Hamas. The Quartet Principles (recognition of the state of Israel, renunciation of violence, recognition of existing agreements) set out by the Quartet on the Middle East (EU, US, Russia and the United Nations) were accepted by the unity government, but not by Hamas. The Israeli government continues to strictly reject any political cooperation or negotiations with the unity government. Israel is not ready to negotiate with a government that is supported by the radical Hamas group. The "Gaza conflict" began on 8 July 2014, in response to multiple rocket attacks against Israel by Hamas and other militant groups from the Gaza Strip, and ended on 26 August 2014 with an indefinite ceasefire.

In response to the Palestinian efforts to join the UN International Criminal Court (ICC), Israel withheld Palestinian tax from the end of 2014 to April 2015, amounting temporarily to over EUR 100 million. The withheld taxes relate to VAT and customs duties on goods entering the Palestinian territories through Israeli territory. The salaries paid to public service workers in the Palestinian territories are taken from this tax revenue, meaning that teachers and other civil servants have been paid only a fraction of their salaries for months. This specific case has been resolved since April 2015. However, the PA's financial position remains strained.

#### Relevance

The objectives of the projects were in line with the priorities of the MoEHE. The projects supported the implementation of two of the main objectives of the Education Development Strategic Plan (EDSP I: 2000-2005, EDSP II: 2008-2013 and EDSP III: 2014-2019):

- Creating safe, equal access for boys and girls of all income groups in rural and urban areas to all levels of the education system (access to education);
- The development of a pupil-oriented pedagogy and a corresponding learning and teaching environment (educational quality).

EDSP III also pursues the overall objective of an improved, results-oriented and transparent sectoral management. In this way, EDSP III represents a consistent further development of the previous strategic plans and builds on the progress achieved.

In addition to the quantitative aspect of access to education, the design of EGP VII, in contrast to predecessor plans, emphasised the importance of adequate infrastructure and equipment within the meaning of the above-mentioned learning and teaching-oriented design of the schools in order to improve the quality of teaching.

Further objectives of the sectoral strategy – such as the improvement of learning and teaching methods as well as of education administration – are supported by bilateral programmes from other donors and organisations, as well as by the community basket funding established by Norway, Belgium, Finland and Ireland since 2010 under the leadership of German FC.

The programme was in line with the international objective “education for all” and with the developmental objectives of the Federal Government (BMZ Strategy Paper “Ten Objectives for More Education” 2010-2013).

From today’s point of view, the programme remains relevant, as it helps to cope with the still high growth in pupil numbers. The PT have a very youthful population structure (about 48% of the population is under 18 years of age) and high population growth of approximately 3% p.a. (2006-2012). According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the average growth rate in the Gaza Strip is about 3.4% p.a., which is significantly higher than the West Bank, at around 2.6% p.a.

Education is an essential determinant of the level of poverty. According to analyses by the World Bank, this relationship is somewhat weaker in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Despite the increased participation of women in working life, the official participation rate of women continues to be among the lowest in the world and, at around 14.6% (2013) is extremely low, even by regional comparison (average in the MENA region: 26% in 2009). Improved access to education for girls increases their chances of getting a skilled job and, therefore, can result in an improvement in the income situation of families as well as a strengthening of the role of women in society. Furthermore, the widely-documented influence of increased education and long-term schooling on the reduction of birth rates is worth mentioning.

The programme also remains relevant in that it has been conceptualised in the PT – with very limited freedom of movement thanks to the Israeli occupation (blockades, checkpoints, border controls, etc.) and regular military disputes – in order to simplify access to schools. Against the background of the tense political and economic situation – particularly in the Gaza Strip – the schools had the potential to contribute to stabilisation in the sense of securing access to basic public services in a persistently conflict-prone environment. The approach pursued at the programme appraisal (PA) thus fulfils the level of entitlement to security of supply appropriate for fragile countries, while at the same time remaining conflict-sensitive.

In addition, the concept was in line with the employment objectives of the PA in that it temporarily created jobs during the implementation as the result of labour-intensive construction works. This is highly relevant in the light of prevailing unemployment and poverty, especially as mobility in Gaza is severely restricted.

The impact logic, according to which the labour-intensive infrastructure (output) contributes to better access (outcome) and thus to better educational outcomes (impact), was methodologically plausible in the context of the proposed sector programme. The underlying problem analysis is consistent and understandable for both projects also from today’s perspective.

In Gaza, the programme was particularly relevant because of the high deficit of classrooms and high unemployment. The similarly high relevance in the West Bank is the result of the increased focus on education quality compared to earlier phases.

**Relevance rating: 2 (both projects)**

### Effectiveness

The programme objective of both projects was to improve the supply and quality of school infrastructure (primary and secondary education), to make appropriate use of said infrastructure and to create temporary employment opportunities with a wage ratio of at least 25% of construction costs.

The target set at the project appraisal (PA), comprising the new construction or refurbishment of around 200 classrooms in each case, has been modified over the course of implementation in favour of a more quality-focused approach. Within the scope of EGP VI (Gaza), 124 new classrooms were built and 96 were refurbished, including sanitary blocks, sports grounds, school libraries, computer rooms and laboratories as well as green areas. This corresponds to approximately 9,000 student places and exceeds the original objective (8,000). EGP VII (West Bank) included the construction of 108 classrooms – similar to EGP VI with associated functional spaces and facilities. Due to the high demand, some of the classrooms have now been divided and other rooms converted into classrooms, with the result that a total of around 5,400 school places were created in the West Bank. Although this means that the original target of 7,500 school places was not met, the learning environment did clearly improve in an exemplary way.

All schools were adequately utilised at the time of the EPE. In Gaza, 11 out of the 12 schools of the project are still operated in two shifts. The average number of students per class is approximately 40. Among the schools in the West Bank built under EGP VII, the average number of pupils per class was approximately 32, varying between 26 and 40 pupils depending on the age of the children and the location of the school. Using schools in two shifts has been almost completely abolished in the West Bank.

Eight out of twelve (EGP VI) and seven out of eight (EGP VII) of the supported schools are all-girls' or mixed schools, meaning that girls benefit disproportionately from the project.

Amongst those who benefited from the simpler school access established by the projects were also children from two refugee camps in the West Bank (EGP VII); one school is located in what is known as an "Area C", i.e. in an area under full Israeli civil and security control.

In terms of employment effects, the approximately 117,000 employee days for EGP VI and around 83,000 days for EGP VII exceeded the targets set at the PA (60,000 and 45,000 respectively). Reasons for this were, in particular, additional small-scale and labour-intensive rehabilitation measures financed through the savings from EGP VI as well as longer implementation periods and differences in the wage level between Gaza and the West Bank.

The poverty differences between the individual regions of the PT are relatively high, which is reinforced by the limited mobility of the population. Measured against the national definition of poverty (2005: USD 2.10/day), the share of poor population groups increased by 65% in the period from mid-2005 to mid-2006 – around the time the construction began – from 650,000 to close to 1.1 million people. Over the same period, the proportion of poor households across the country increased from 40% to more than 55%, while in the Gaza Strip it rose to almost 80%. Social and economic poverty is greatest in the Gaza Strip, in the rural areas of West Bank and in the refugee camps. In the case of the schools built in rural areas in the West Bank, as well as the schools in Gaza, it can generally be assumed that the temporary workers were recruited from the immediate area and were among the poorer sections of the population since, according to the architects and builders, it would have made little sense to hire workers from areas further away due to the Israeli mobility restrictions.

Overall, we consider the programme objectives to be achieved. Due to the change of the programme concept to a qualitative approach, it seems sensible to retroactively replace the above-mentioned indicator "Creation of new or refurbished student places" with more outcome-oriented indicators (see below). On this basis, the target achievement can be summarised as follows:

Indicator	Status PA	Ex post evaluation (EPE)
1 (i) Pupil/classroom ratio (ii) Pupil/teacher ratio (iii) Classroom / school equipment	(i) EGP VI: 42 pupils per class or double shift EGP VII: 28 pupils (ii) EGP VII: 28 pupils/teacher (iii) Functional and adequately equipped schools.	(i) EGP VI: Ø 40 pupils EGP VII: Ø 32 pupils/class. (ii) EGP VI: Ø 24 pupils EGP VII: Ø 19 pupils/teacher. (iii) All schools were functional and adequately equipped, and were used appropriately.

(2) Creation of employee days	Result: Creation of approximately 60,000 (EGP VI) or 45,000 employee days (EGP VII); wage ratio of approximately 25% of construction costs.	EGP VI: 116,914 (wage ratio 31% of construction costs) EGP VII: 83,191 (wage ratio 45% of construction costs)
(3) Number of poor in workforce	EGP VII: The target level should be determined prior to the tendering of construction measures.	EGP VII: Although no target level was defined, it is plausible that the project mostly benefited poorer population groups.

In comparison, the evaluation for EGP VII is somewhat more favourable when aspects such as appropriate infrastructure and equipment in the sense of learning and teaching-oriented, improved teaching quality are foregrounded. On the other hand, if more emphasis is placed on establishing access to schooling and creating temporary employment, EGP VI scores better. The effectiveness of both programmes is therefore assessed as good.

**Effectiveness rating: 2 (both projects)**

### Efficiency

The implementation period for EGP VI was extended by around 19 months compared to the plan set out at the PA, while the period for EGP VII was extended by around 28 months: 22 months during the preparatory phase and six months during the construction phase. The reasons for this were above all the unstable political situation during the preparatory period 2002-2004, which led to the late entry into force of the FC contracts and resulted in bureaucratic obstacles to the consultancy tendering procedure. In addition, design revisions were necessary due to unfavorable subsoil conditions. Delays during the construction phase resulted above all from obstacles put in place by the Israeli military, which severely restricted the transportation of goods and the freedom of movement of persons and temporarily blocked construction sites. As a result, the consulting costs were significantly higher than planned at the PA. The consulting costs increased by approximately 20% for EGP VII (the costs for the “Programme Management Unit” within the MoEHE, however, were 75% lower than at the PA). Consulting costs rose by approximately 40% for EGP VI, resulting to some extent from the additional small-scale refurbishment measures implemented towards the end of the programme. Given that the total costs remained within the programme budget and that the delays were mainly caused by external factors, this increase is generally acceptable.

At USD 31,389 per classroom and USD 747 per pupil respectively, the unit costs are within the scope of the costs of similar programmes. A comparison of the unit costs of EGP VII, those of the predecessor programme EGP IV and those of a similar project carried out by the French Ad revealed higher unit costs for EGP VII. Taking into consideration the use of higher-quality materials, the longer lifespan of the buildings and the provision of a better learning environment, the costs for EGP VII are justifiable.

The allocation efficiency of the projects is rated as good because the project financed schools in poverty-stricken areas, schools for pupils from refugee camps in rural areas which are difficult to reach in some cases, and schools for girls to a significant degree.

**Efficiency rating: 3 (both projects)**

### Impact

According to the project appraisal report, the development objective of EGP VI (Gaza) was to contribute, against the background of ongoing conflict conditions, to social security and to the process of developing the Gaza Strip; no indicator was defined for this objective and, in the absence of sufficiently robust or meaningful data, a retrospective assessment must be based primarily on survey results. It can be assumed that the development objective has been achieved: with regard to **educational impacts**, the results of surveys among pupils, teachers and municipalities emphasise the positive impact of schools for imparting knowledge, and thus also values, morality and culture, as well as contributing to improved future



prospects for adolescents and young adults. With regard to the at least temporary, employment-related **contribution to poverty reduction**, the information available allows us to conclude that the corresponding effects have temporarily materialized, as expected.

In a similarly chronically conflict-prone environment, the development objectives for EGP VII (West Bank) were to improve access to education for the adolescent population of the West Bank, as well as to reduce poverty by temporarily increasing the income of poor households in the catchment areas of construction sites. Due to the already very good initial values at the beginning of the project, the **educational indicators** (see below) are only of limited use. This indicator survey is to be supplemented by a primarily qualitative evaluation of the improved teaching quality, both in terms of the increased consideration of adequate equipment as well as due to improved teaching conditions from the point of view of both premises and personnel (see section on “Effectiveness”). All available information and assessments allow us to conclude that the desired effects have been achieved at least to the extent expected. The **poverty effects** cannot be quantified, as suitable data is not available. Thus the – overall positive – assessment of this aspect is based primarily on the results of interviews and plausibility considerations.

The data available on access to education exclusively for the West Bank (see above) is as follows:

Indicator	Status PA (2000/01)*	Ex post evaluation
Gross enrolment rate:	97.9%**	95.3% (WB 2013)
Net enrolment rate:	91.7%**	91.2% (WB 2013)
Completion rate (2003/2004 ⇔ 2013/2014):	Tubas: 97.79% Hebron: 96.26% Bait Ommar: 94.68% Al Jalazoon: 97.40% Umm Al Toot: 99.10% Deir Sharaf: 99.28% Al Yamoon: 98.00% Al Aroob: 99.59%	Tubas: 98.2% Hebron: 97.5% Bait Ommar: 97.6% Al Jalazoon: 98% Umm Al Toot: 98.6% Deir Sharaf: 97.7% Al Yamoon: 96.4% Al Aroob: 98.3%
Dropout rate (same period):	Tubas: 1.51% Hebron: 2.69% Bait Ommar: 4.26% Al Jalazoon: 0.00% Umm Al Toot: 0.90% Deir Sharaf: 0.29% Al Yamoon: 1.80% Al Aroob: 0.41%	Tubas: 1.1% Hebron: 1.7% Bait Ommar: 0.7% Al Jalazoon: 0.6% Umm Al Toot: 0.3% Deir Sharaf: 0.6% Al Yamoon: 0.8% Al Aroob: 0.6%
Repetition rate (same period):	Tubas: 0.71% Hebron: 1.05% Bait Ommar: 1.06% Al Jalazoon: 2.59% Umm Al Toot: 0.00% Deir Sharaf: 0.43% Al Yamoon: 0.24% Al Aroob: 0.00%	Tubas: 0.8% Hebron: 0.8% Bait Ommar: 1.7% Al Jalazoon: 1.4% Umm Al Toot: 1.0% Deir Sharaf: 1.7% Al Yamoon: 2.8% Al Aroob: 1.1%

\*) According to the PA report for EGP VII, the target level of the ultimate objective indicators should be determined prior to the start of construction by means of a baseline survey for the relevant catchment area differentiated by gender, and subsequently reviewed following completion of the construction phase.

\*\*) Values as at the PA – no values were collected for the individual schools in the baseline survey.

Data availability for EGP VI and for Gaza is not as good. The net enrolment rate for primary school (classes 1-10) is estimated by UNICEF at 92% and for secondary school (classes 11 and 12) at 67%. According to UN figures, the drop-out rates in Gaza are lower than in the West Bank, which could be due either to the strong commitment of NGOs to education or to the poorer employment opportunities in Gaza. 85%

of the schools in Gaza teach in multiple shifts and the teaching and learning conditions in Gaza are generally less favourable than in the West Bank.

EGP VII set new standards in school building design with regard to improving teaching quality. The design was trend-setting for contemporary school building in the Palestinian territories and has since been adopted by the MoEHE as “state of the art” and used in numerous other projects.

Access to education is still of high value in Palestinian society and is now largely non-biased in terms of gender. This is evidenced by the gross enrolment rates for both sexes, which are high for both primary and secondary education, even by regional comparison. Education is seen as safeguarding for the future – for men even more so than for women – and also offers the prospect of finding well-paid work abroad. In the case of women too, however, the decline in the Palestinian economy during the second intifada and the accompanying rapid rise in unemployment have led to an increasing number of women seeking a higher education qualification or university degree in order to feed their families. Today, more women than men study at universities and even continue their education after marriage.

While the two projects together total approximately 14,500 student places and – taking into consideration the double-shift system in operation at the majority of schools in the Gaza Strip – ensure improved school access for around 20,000 pupils, the results for school performance are not clearly demonstrable. A study carried out by the MoEHE in collaboration with the University of Lausanne investigated the influence of school design on the performance of pupils and – however this involved just a single survey – found no clear positive effect. On the other hand, a World Bank report from June 2014 attested that the design and condition of schools as well as the equipment provided are very likely to influence student performance. Schools with very good learning results were compared with schools with poor learning results in the same regions and under the same socio-economic conditions. While socio-economic factors did not play a major role, the quality of the school infrastructure had a significant impact on motivation and performance. In addition to quantitative factors such as a sufficient number of classrooms and adequate teaching materials, the importance of computer rooms, multi-purpose rooms, sports facilities and libraries was highlighted. On average, the EGP VII-financed schools in the West Bank scored better than those financed in Gaza under EGP VI, which can be attributed both to the poorer political situation in Gaza and to the better learning conditions in the schools in the West Bank.

Looking at the impact of the school-building programme from today’s point of view, and taking into account the additional benefits of subsequent phases still ongoing, the educational offering at an appropriate standard has been broadened to a considerable extent. The funding currently benefits approximately 1.1 million pupils and around 44,000 teachers (2014) in public schools. In the long term, this is an important contribution to economic and social development in the Palestinian territories.

As construction contracts were awarded only on a local basis, small and medium-sized Palestinian companies have benefited. Local consultants have also benefited from the cooperation with international architecture firms.

In terms of the context of fragility, it is plausible to conclude for both projects that better access to education and a temporary reduction in poverty at least tend to have a stabilising effect.

**Impact rating: 2 (both projects)**

### **Sustainability**

EGP VI: Since their completion (2007-2008), the schools in Gaza have been in operation for around eight years and the approximately 9,000 student places that were newly created or refurbished under EGP VI are currently used intensively – with one exception – in two shifts by more than 15,000 pupils. The condition of the schools is mostly good, with only two schools showing severe difficulties with maintenance. A number of the special-purpose rooms were converted into classrooms or teachers’ rooms for lack of space. One school (Zaid Ben El Haresa) was severely damaged during the fighting in 2008. Other schools have complained about the destruction of computer rooms and laboratories, as well as of broken windows due to acts of war. According to the head teachers, most of the damage was quickly repaired. In about half of the schools the computer rooms are in poor condition, which is understandable given the age of the equipment and their high level of utilisation. Vandalism is an issue in some schools; this is a greater problem in Gaza City than in rural areas and in Rafah City, and is more common in boys’ schools than in girls’

schools. The use of sports and playgrounds by the municipalities also leads to loss of use and damage, with a minimal percentage of extreme vandalism (1%). Support from the municipalities in terms of maintenance work (generally in the form of donations in kind or labour services) also varies strongly and is estimated at 15% on average. The schools in Gaza have to transfer their total income from canteen sales and school fees to the MoEHE and receive a reimbursement of between the equivalent of EUR 500 and EUR 700 for smaller maintenance works and other activities.

EGP VII: Around eight years after completion and handover, all schools in the West Bank were generally in good condition, which confirms the high construction quality and low-maintenance design. In two of the schools, however, problems were visible due to damp which could not be completely remedied by the MoEHE. Acoustic problems noticed following the handover have been resolved at least to some extent. One school near a refugee camp is subject to high levels of vandalism (broken windowpanes, damaged water taps, etc.). In principle, none of the issues detected affect the proper use of the schools. All schools were fully utilised at the time of the EPE; in some cases, changes to school regulations, growing pupil numbers, etc. have already necessitated expansion measures or plans for expansion. Computer room and laboratory use is extremely positive and the equipment in these areas is still heavily utilised, which attests to its careful handling. The school kitchens / cafeterias are the only source of income aside from the low school fees and contribute to the financing of teaching materials and minor repair works. Each school must pay 20% of its total income to the respective directorate and 10% to the MoEHE. The introduction of an income-linked “education tax” has so far been unsuccessful due to the lack of registration and appraisal of property. Overall, the educational budget largely depends on donor grants.

In contrast to at the PA, parent and municipality participation was found to be satisfactory to very good in all schools. The differences can mainly be attributed to the different financial capacities of the municipalities and of the parents. Overall, there is a perceptibly high level of appreciation for the newly constructed schools. Contributions to this included ensuring the security of the construction site with guards, the financing and organisation of school transport, teaching contributions (so-called informal teaching), and the financing of security technology, software and user fees for the internet, etc. Amongst head teachers and teachers too there is a high level of commitment and high appreciation for the constructed schools; and their positive learning environments created by the pupil and child-friendly construction. The adoption of the new design standards by the MoEHE and their use in other donor models are testament to the sustainability of the approach.

The school partnership programme established under the framework of EGP VII has been pursued in just one school to date. The reasons for its termination included a lack of interest on the part of the German partner schools; in addition, from time to time no funds were available for internet service charges.

The current maintenance concept of the MoEHE essentially works in three stages: minor repair and maintenance measures are commissioned (and paid) directly by school management – said measures are generally carried out by local craftsmen or are performed, as far as is possible, on a voluntary basis by craftsmen employed in the municipality or by parents (“parents’ councils”). Medium-sized repairs are commissioned and paid by the responsible school directorate following an appraisal. Larger construction and repair measures must be reported to the responsible construction department in the MoEHE. The MoEHE prepares a list of priorities and makes decisions on the implementation schedule and budget allocation depending on the available funds. According to the MoEHE construction department, each school is checked at least once a year by a civil engineer, who then compiles a corresponding list of issues. In principle, the maintenance concept of the MoEHE can be regarded as satisfactory under the given circumstances. The MoEHE currently does not have an independent budget for major maintenance measures in Gaza, but is supported by the aforementioned basket funding. Approximately 80% of major works are financed by donors or NGOs. The schools in Gaza have to transfer their total income from canteen sales and school fees to the MoEHE (Treasury) and receive an amount of between NIS 2,000 and NIS 3,000 for smaller maintenance works and other activities.

The general security situation in West Jordan and Gaza represents a continued chronic risk to sustainability. Especially in Gaza, future school utilisation and the sustained improvement of access to quality education depend heavily on the regional security situation.

**Sustainability rating: 3 (both projects)**



### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's development effectiveness. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall (this is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive development effectiveness.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a “successful” project while rating levels 4-6 denote an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“impact”) **and** the sustainability are rated at least “satisfactory” (level 3).