

# Ex post evaluation – Niger

**Sector:** NIGETIP IV/FICOD I: multisector aid for basic social services, (CRS code 16050), FICOD II: 43030 urban development and management, FICOD III: 15110 public sector policy and administrative management  
**Project:** NIGETIP IV and FICOD I-III name, BMZ-No. 200265017\*, 200266924\*, 200866749\*\*, 200565952\*\*  
**Implementing agency:** NIGETIP and FICOD



## Ex post evaluation report: 2018

All figures in EUR million	NIGETIP IV (Planned)	NIGETIP IV (Actual)	FICOD I-III (Planned)	FICOD I-III (Actual)
Investment costs (total)	7.72	7.62	38.70	35.74
Counterpart contribution	0.05	0.05	3.70	0.69
Funding	7.67	7.57	35.00	35.05
of which BMZ budget funds	7.67	7.57	35.00	35.05

\*) Random sample 2015 / \*\*) Random sample 2018

**Summary:** The Agence Nigérienne de travaux d'Intérêt public pour l'Emploi (NIGETIP) implemented the NIGETIP IV project to finance the building and expansion of simple infrastructure facilities and soil protection measures to simultaneously support municipal administrations and user groups. The measures were primarily implemented in the regions of Tillabéri, Tahoua and Agadez. The FICOD I-III projects implemented by Fonds d'Investissement des Collectivités Décentralisées (FICOD) included small projects for economic and social infrastructure as well as various manual and mechanical soil protection measures and hydraulic engineering measures in Tahoua (retention walls, plantings, promotion of organic fertilisation, water-spreading weirs, wells for growing vegetables). All measures were identified using a participative approach and successively included in the emerging municipal development plans. Training components secured the investments with training for the municipalities, in particular, and promoted the sustainable operation of all infrastructure. The projects also financed the construction of the new building for the national school of administration.


**Objectives:** Impact: Alleviation of poverty/improvement of living conditions within the programme area, development of competence of elected representatives and administrations at the municipal level. Outcome: improving access to social and economic infrastructure as well as its use and sustainable operation; participating administrations' competent execution of their roles in the decentralisation process and participation of citizens in the planning process; maintenance and improvement of soil fertility and water retention capacity at select locations in the programme area.

**Target group:** Population in the supported locations within the focus regions, rural population, women.

## Overall rating: 4 (NIGETIP IV and all phases of FICOD)

**Rationale:** The individual measures were relevant and also used, leading to selective improvements to living conditions. The overall concept was overextended and difficult to manage. The quality of operation did not meet expectations. Stabilisation at the local level, important to ensure sustainability of the projects was beyond FC's sphere of influence and remained very weak in Niger.

**Highlights:** In addition to Niger's scant environmental resources, regional conflicts during the implementation period also affected the projects due to floods of refugees and the loss of remittance from labour migration from the project region into other areas. As a consequence of development cooperation safety requirements, visits to the project regions could only be conducted to a limited extent for many years. The projects also entailed the additional complexity of supporting the newly created decentralised institutions on the one hand and traditional structures and user groups on the other hand.



## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 4 (NIGETIP IV and all phases of FICOD)

#### Ratings:

	NIGETIP	FICOD
Relevance	3	3
Effectiveness	3	3
Efficiency	3	3
Impact	4	3
Sustainability	4	4

With regard to the key problem (poverty) and in the context of the country's reform, the projects were relevant. But with regard to promotional measures, they were overloaded with too many different project types with different technical requirements and were thus difficult to manage.

The defined indicators were largely achieved, and the infrastructure is still in continuous operation today. However, the quality of operational management remains lower than the requirements and does not consistently demonstrate improved revenue. The soil protection measures only continue to be pursued in part. The revenue from hydraulic engineering measures covers the running costs with little use of agricultural production resources but not the costs of maintaining the structures.

Some aspects of the promotional objectives (increased expertise among local authorities) are not recorded in the indicators, but still need to be taken into account from today's perspective. The municipalities are only slowly growing into their new role. High personnel turnover and insufficient budget allocations limit the capacity to provide services.

To some extent, markets, slaughterhouses, trails and health stations demonstrate serious problems related to hygiene or access that adversely affect impact achievement as a whole and the ratio between the investments' costs and economic benefits (efficiency).

The training components were not designed for a long enough timeframe when the starting situation is taken into account. Although the measures thus contributed to the achievement of the promotional objectives, the extent of the contribution is unsatisfactory. The high amount of risk with regard to the municipalities' functional capacity was known in view of the complete lack of vertical financial compensation mechanisms during project appraisal.

Maintenance is insufficient for all of the promoted measures. The sustainability risks are high in this regard.

The roots of sustainability risks are beyond the projects' sphere of influence. However, they need to be included in the evaluation because of their impact on the projects. The existing risks, sluggish progress, presence of some setbacks (particularly during the fiscal decentralisation process compared to other countries) and the local evaluations must be rated as negative, despite individual positive trends in the country's decentralisation at present. The evaluation of the FICOD project's sustainability as weak thus ultimately leads to a downgrade in the overall rating to a score of 4.

The individual measures are substantively, organisationally and financially closely entwined, meaning that it is only possible to provide differentiated ratings to a limited extent. Independent of this, the evaluation results appear to be equally weak for both promotional approaches, particularly the sustainability rating, resulting in an identical overall rating for all four evaluated BMZ Nos.

### Breakdown of total costs

		NIGETIP IV (Planned)	NIGETIP IV (Actual)
Investment costs	EUR million	7.72	7.62
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	0.05	0.05
Funding	EUR million	7.67	7.57
of which BMZ budget funds	EUR million	7.67	7.57

		FICOD I (Planned)	FICOD I (Actual)	FICOD II (Planned)	FICOD II (Actual)	FICOD III (Planned)	FICOD III (Actual)
Investment costs	EUR million	11.20	10.30	22.00	21.15	5.50	4.29
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	1.20	0.30	2.00	0.35	0.50	0.04
Funding	EUR million	10.00	10.00	20.00	20.80	5.00	4.25
of which BMZ budget funds	EUR million	10.00	10.00	20.00	20.80	5.00	4.25

Training components FICOD II: EUR 2.58 million/FICOD III: EUR 0.65 million

### Relevance

From the current perspective, the relevance of the project is rated as satisfactory. The central problem identified during project appraisal of the first NIGETIP IV project in 2002 (60% impoverished population in a resource-poor landlocked country) still generally holds true from today's perspective: Niger still remains one of the poorest countries in the world; environmental risks have further increased. Decentralisation is also advisable from a security perspective, as strong local administrations can help to manage rural areas. Reliable local administrations that provide public services of acceptable quality can, in turn, more easily win the support of the population for other pursuits. The impacts of climate change require measures that counteract the progression of desertification and facilitate efficient use of the scarce water resources in the entire region – in Niger as well as in neighbouring countries.

However, the thematic scope of the NIGETIP IV and FICOD I projects was too ambitious and management-intensive in relation to the institutional capacity of the NIGETIP project-executing agency at the time, which was primarily a commercial developer. The scope of these projects arose from the integration of ongoing promotional measures for soil protection as part of German development cooperation's poverty alleviation priority area. This issue was mitigated in the subsequent FICOD II and III phases when the new project-executing agency created a specialised department, but it was not entirely resolved as the distinction between the responsibilities of municipalities and the Ministry of Agriculture was unclear, and the newly organised municipal administrations were overburdened. The promotional priorities were reformulated in 2011, towards the end of the programme period, and a clear separation between the programme promoting decentralisation and the promotional measures for agricultural and hydraulic engineering was created.

The impact logic of the projects was complex. The intent was to use specific agricultural measures to initiate economic cycles in rural areas with the objective of improving living conditions, particularly economic ones, for the rural population through employment, food security and sources of income. Use of municipal infrastructure measures was also intended to improve rural living conditions by generating positive effects on education, health and income through the use of these facilities. At the same time, the projects were intended to strengthen the municipalities in the context of decentralisation by cooperating with them. The objective was to contribute to good governance and also indirectly improve living conditions for citizens in the municipalities by strengthening the communities. With regard to the latter impact chain, it can be said that the impacts through the municipalities were limited by the limited promotion of decentralisation at the

national governmental level, which was due to the distribution of departments and the associated political power, for example.

In the project concept, it remains unclear as to whether and to what extent the parallel promotion of municipalities, parallel structures at the implementing agency level, participation of the local population and local user groups fit together. Traditional decision-making patterns can definitely stand in conflict with the newly created decentralised administrations. More participation could weaken the new decentralised administrations where local conflicts exist. It would have been more appropriate to narrow the focus here.

Overall, we evaluate the relevance of both promotional approaches as satisfactory because the approaches were generally relevant in terms of development policy even though the complexity of the measures and the implicit requirements for performance capacity at the local level limited the impacts. Although the ratings were the same, the detailed reasons for the lower relevance ratings are very different because the demands placed on the local authorities tended to increase even though the mix of decentralisation approaches with agricultural measures decreased over time.

**Relevance rating: 3 (NIGETIP IV and all phases of FICOD)**

### Effectiveness

The objectives at the outcome level were 1. improving access to social and economic infrastructure as well as its use and sustainable operation; 2. participating administrations' competent execution of their roles in the decentralisation process and participation of citizens in the planning process; 3. maintenance and improvement of soil fertility and water retention capacity at select locations in the programme area.

Achieving the project objectives can be summarized as follows: the numerous slightly varying indicators between the promotional phases were achieved and the infrastructure is also in continuous operation today. The newer projects are established and valued within the municipalities. However, the operation management quality often remains below the requirements – despite efforts of local user groups and the advanced training performed within the framework of the training components – and the results are not always clearly documented.

While the operation of simple water supply systems delegated to private service providers works, there are sometimes serious hygienic and/or access problems at markets, slaughterhouses, trails and health stations despite the involvement of user committees.

The training components were implemented according to plan and educational and advanced training modules were established in relevant topic areas. But the financing timeframe was strictly limited for the first round of training and was insufficient to achieve higher decentralisation objectives (hiring a relevant number of qualified municipal officials, application of subject matter, improvement of the municipalities' own revenue). There is a lack of political will to ensure long-term financing.

The promoted soil protection measures were only continued in part as they are labour-intensive and compete with other work requirements. There is no information available as to which groups within the local population have access to the irrigable areas and which have less or no access. It is not entirely clear which body is responsible for the hydraulic engineering measures.

The achievement of the objectives at the outcome level can be summarised as follows:

Indicator	Status PA, target PA	Ex post evaluation
<b>NIGETIP IV</b>		
(1) The promoted final projects continue to be operated correctly by the user groups two years after start-up of operation – this includes appropriate maintenance.	Target value 75%	Operation: achieved Maintenance: not achieved

(2) Local people employed by the FC programme (employment-months) within 30 months, estimated on the basis of the local wages earned.	Target value 32,000	Not documented but plausible <sup>1</sup> .
(3) On average, wages account for a high share of all FC-financed individual projects.	Target value 25%	Achieved. 26% (according to the final follow-up 2013, sources from 2011)
(4) Application of HIMO techniques (labour-intensive procedure), where possible	Target value for the local wage share > 25% of construction costs or > 10,000 months of local work p.a.	Achieved. 46% according to the final follow-up 2013, overall employment not documented but plausible.
<b>FICOD I-III</b>		
(1) Increasing integration of individual projects in local development planning processes	Status 2005: 30%, target value + 15% p.a., Status 2007: 92% (FICOD I project appraisal), target value + 5% p.a.	Achieved. EPE 2018: 100% of visited infrastructure listed in PDC; soil protection: 0% as it is not clearly within the municipalities' delegated funds
(2) Increased participation of the target group, including more vulnerable subgroups, in planning, monitoring, execution and operational control of individual projects (FICOD III)	100% of the applications with a positive vote from the Commissioner for Gender and Civil Society 2009	Achieved (2013 reporting, through establishment of an additional position in FICOD)
(3) Economic and social improvements through individual projects/soil protection measures	Target value annually > 7,000ha manually /10,000ha mechanically,  FICOD II: target value continuous processing of at least 17,000ha p.a. (2013 reporting)	Achieved FICOD I: 94,749ha FICOD I (final follow-up 2013, based on sources from 2011)  Largely achieved: FICOD II 47,157ha/92%, final follow-up 2012 (Other figures: 16,367ha (2010) + 6854ha (2011))  Additional information: FICOD III: 3,000ha, (final follow-up 2013),

<sup>1</sup> Estimate of the employment effects based on data from the final follow-ups for the construction costs (25% of investments in infrastructure/presumed monthly wage of EUR 50) results in approximately 34,000 months for NIGETIP IV and close to 40,000 months for FICOD I. If the wage level was lower, the employment effects were correspondingly higher (only direct effects without multiplier effect).

	<p>FICOD II: Water-spreading weir annual target value &gt; 600ha/50 water-spreading weirs; 1,800ha, target value 75% profitable</p> <p>FICOD III: target value 29 water-spreading weirs</p>	<p>Achieved: FICOD II+III: 3,500ha/89+ 2,200ha/45 water-spreading weirs + 45 wells (final follow-up 2013, 2016 reporting)</p> <p>Limitations: farmland increased and became profitable due to repeated cropping, some of the costs are covered through repeated cropping and food security, no maintenance (no year indicated for the study, circa 2008)</p>
(4) Qualified building implementation (concepts proposed by MOD for individual projects are fine, construction periods are on schedule; individual projects do not have major shortcomings during provisional acceptance)	<p>Target values: concepts: 95%/construction periods: 75%/individual projects without major shortcomings: 95%</p>	<p>Partially achieved: Concepts 97% Construction periods 97% Quality 80.49% (final follow-up 2013)</p>
Sustainable operation/upkeep within the framework of self-administration	<p>Target values 75% of the individual projects were properly operated/maintained two or three years after start-up of operation (FICOD II/III)</p>	<p>Partially achieved. Operation: FICOD II: 95% according to 2013 reporting EPE: 80% of the infrastructure was in operation but not properly (deficits: sections of routes were lost, drainage, solar systems, cooling systems, utilisation below capacity, infrequent cleaning, chaotic filing department) Manual soil protection: rarely applied Plantings: present, but not productive Hydraulic engineering measures: 100% Maintenance: user committees present Manual soil protection: only replicated rarely Plantings: present but untended Hydraulic engineering measures: different in individual cases</p>
Percentage of economic infrastructure that is profitable (=self-supporting) (FICOD III)	<p>90%, profitable two years after start-up of operation</p>	<p>No viable data during EPE</p>

**Supplemental indicators with regard to the training components**

<p>Advanced training concepts, methods + materials developed for relevant subjects</p> <p>Local participants trained in relevant subjects</p>	<p>2016 reporting proposal</p> <p>Subjects: local finances and responsibility for construction</p>	<p>Achieved</p> <p>Concepts + 14 modules are available and tested:</p> <p>1612 + 1473 participant (6 + 7 modules) (for both training components)</p>
<p>Trained people are employed by the municipalities</p> <p>Number of successful graduates during initial training</p> <p>Advanced training plan</p> <p>CFGCT planning</p> <p>Results of advanced training</p>	<p>2016 reporting</p> <p>30 people from the first year</p> <p>2 x 30 people</p> <p>Plan with objectives and measures</p> <p>CFGCT five-year plan</p> <p>Number of successful advanced training graduates</p>	<p>Partially achieved</p> <p>19 (according to final follow-up)</p> <p>Partially achieved:</p> <p>One year: 19</p> <p>Partially achieved: 2014 national strategy, no plan</p> <p>Achieved:</p> <p>Plan created, but budget funds not set</p> <p>978 + 770 participants (for both training components)</p>
<p>Sustainable application of the administrative procedures by the municipalities as learned at advanced training</p>	<p>Target values: trained individuals are still in office, they can remember the subject matter, subject matter is applied.</p> <p>Awareness of responsibilities</p> <p>Perception of the administration's public accessibility</p>	<p>Partially achieved.</p> <p>Remember general subjects, but do not remember much subject matter. Income and expenditures are noted but not analysed and often not available</p> <p>Global knowledge of the planning processes</p> <p>Project guidance + soil protection mainly the responsibility of the line ministry (génie rural)</p> <p>To some extent, market taxes are collected by the municipality but not analysed</p> <p>Monitoring of demand is participative but not delegated to NGOs</p> <p>School authorities improved but no analysis of educational results</p>

Due to poor data availability, considerable caution should be used in the overall view when estimating the level of achievement for the indicators. Attention should also to be paid to the fact that many of the indicators have the characteristics of output indicators. Due to data availability, however, no new outcome indicators were able to be set. But overall, a coherent picture is revealed, mainly of partially achieved indica-



tors. Target achievement was better for infrastructure use than for objectives aiming to promote decentralisation. Both promotional approaches were given a satisfactory rating for this reason.

### Effectiveness rating: 3 (NIGETIP IV and all phases of FICOD)

#### Efficiency

On the positive side, the administrative costs for the NIGETIP and FICOD executing agency and the consulting costs in relation to granularity and intensity of management for measures in the first phases were appropriate. Outsourcing the builder role was the best alternative when the programmes in Niger began as the municipalities in their current form were not yet operational. The gradual introduction of the municipalities to the builder role and the associated processes (e.g. awarding contracts, construction supervision) was complex but unavoidable in the context of the programme objective.

If the difficult geographic location is taken into account, there is no indication of abnormally high specific investment costs. The design of the infrastructure is fundamentally robust, suitable and relatively low-maintenance. The value of several structures was increased through retroactive electrification with solar power. One exception here is the trails. Their design is not low-maintenance, making it difficult to amortise the initial investment due to fast degradation of relevant sections (and it disrupts transport options). However, this plays a minor role in the overall portfolio. The target regions were supplied with individual measures, as planned. The precise selection was done during the implementation period in these projects, which were developed as open programmes.

However, the administrative cost rose significantly during programme implementation and were 18% for FICOD II and 44% for FICOD III (costs for FICOD and the international consultant). This increase was due to the government's refusal to contribute to FICOD's functional costs and a simultaneous decline in implementation volume, which was caused by various delays. These costs are clearly too high in relation to the low promotional business volume of the FICOD III phase and were subsequently reduced again by restructuring the fund. The costs and salary structure are nevertheless not completely transparent.

On the other hand, the large number of different implementation modalities and project types, and the suboptimal institutional safeguarding of training components had a negative effect on efficiency. To some extent, these effects are a result of the political intention to create a programme in which measures and sub-programmes were grouped together which, under other circumstances, would not have belonged together. We must highlight the following phenomena: (i) some soil protection measures were promoted for common plots and some for private plots; in this context, both modalities require different approaches, and the individual obligations associated with the promotion were not fully observed; (ii) hydraulic engineering measures are not a conventional responsibility of either rural local authorities or commercial developers. Even though the investments were appropriate as such, the fact that the FICOD executing agency needed to establish a separate department for this was associated with additional costs; the allocation of further professional support between municipalities and agricultural ministries is not ideal (and was also separated in later programme phases); (iii) there are clear indications of declining profitability of the hydraulic engineering measures (water-spreading weirs) as a result of flawed maintenance and insufficient support; (iv) the costs for developing the advanced training module for municipal employees does not result in adequate economic benefits because the initial training has only taken place once so far and there is no intention to offer more for this target group in the future; (v) from the sectoral perspective, requirement planning and coordination in the Ministry of Education are not ideal. In several areas, an increasing number of schools with different sponsors are opening in close proximity, which negatively affects the capacity utilisation of the individual schools.

Overall, the separation of prioritisation and budgeting is leading to inefficiency. Double promotion is certainly avoided by including the project in local development plans. A series of really integral measures were successively completed in the same location over several promotional phases; this resulted in increased planning costs and the original lack of planning could not always be rectified, in any case. The cause was partially due to imprecise cost estimates in the project proposals and design planning processes.

Furthermore, financing for the periodic maintenance costs (including rectification of the shortcomings during planning) was not secured, which negatively affected the efficiency (also see sustainability).



We rate the allocation efficiency to be good in some instances. The generally reasonable sectoral selection of individual measures and their utilisation by the rural population stand in opposition to the very restrictive statements about administration and permanence of the impacts.

**Efficiency rating: 3 (NIGETIP IV and all phases of FICOD)**

## Impact

The overarching development policy objectives of the project were: 1. Contribute to alleviating poverty/improving the living conditions within the programme area; 2. Contribute to development of competence of elected representatives and administrations at the municipal level. The target logic of the four projects evaluated here started with the general objective of alleviating poverty and then became successively oriented more towards the requirements of progressive decentralisation. Accordingly, they became more streamlined and were adjusted to fit target setting for the four phases from today's perspective.

Neither the random sample visited for the EPE nor the analyses previously performed reliably demonstrate that the sub-projects financed are operated in a way that is able to facilitate the overarching impacts (e.g. increase in numbers graduating from school, pupil competency, decreasing maternal and child mortality, increasing income for municipalities from markets, surplus money available in the majority of rural households in one zone). Increased user rates, educational success in schools and reduced mortality in maternity wards are generally assumed but are not documented with figures. In light of the underutilisation of a segment of rural schools determined during the EPE, the problem of transport between health facilities and the limited nighttime operation, we assume that there are positive impacts, but they are weak and unquantifiable. Gender-related impacts are not ascertainable.

Because the promoted infrastructure is still present, accessible and also in use, the prerequisites for a real improvement in the living conditions exist, particularly if the general conditions for decentralisation were to improve.

On a positive note, the municipal administrations are aware of the financed projects and have also created budget items for their maintenance. The promoted facilities were clearly perceived as being part of municipal assets. However, organisation of work and filing in the municipal administration buildings seems to be improvised. Due to the very delayed establishment of the Agence Nationale de Financement des Collectivités Territoriales (ANFICT), the new transfer mechanism for national financing of municipalities, budget funds are not very effectively allocated. Municipalities are only able to generate their own income at a low level using economic infrastructure, but not always in ways that are results-oriented: the municipal administrations collect market taxes and the user committees collect further contributions for paying water and, where applicable, electricity bills. This is an example of how promoting municipal administrations and user groups at the same time can lead to unclear impacts. But there are no comparative figures collected over several years with regard to the income, and the income is not being analysed with regard to possibly available potential. One study about market operation demonstrated that the level of income continues to be volatile.

An increase in income from economic infrastructure is also hampered because the improvements only benefit a fraction of the users: roofed market stands and closed shops are in the minority; the majority of shops continue to operate under improvised conditions. During the final follow-up and the EPE, it was observed that water supply and sanitation were not always ensured. We thus assume that, although hygiene was improved in part, the potential is far from being maxed out.

Positive socio-economic impacts were achieved and income in rural areas was generated by creating temporary employment during construction measures and due to the partial expansion of farming options. Measures helped facilitate school attendance, safer births and created the prerequisites for effective local governance. In places where markets and slaughterhouses were expanded, working conditions and, to a certain extent hygiene, were improved, whereas the visual impression of the slaughterhouses left unresolved questions with regard to hygiene.

The impacts of soil protection measures vary: mechanical methods are case-related and depend on the degree of maintenance. We assume the positive impacts have been low, because a section of the protective walls is falling into disrepair or the materials were used for other purposes. The impacts of the manual protection measures are protective to some extent as long as plantings remain intact. A small-scale im-

provement in soil fertility is possible as long as measures are replicated in future years. As the majority of measures were performed using cash for work and similar modalities, monetary flows were into the local economy during the construction phase, which also had an impact on demand there. This effect is temporary, however. One portion of the measures no longer exists, and some of the materials (stone) were used for other purposes. One portion of the measures still exists and contributes to stabilisation of the thorn bush savannah; however this portion does not impact productivity. A third part is used productively, even if the use is suboptimal.

Little is known about the impact of the hydraulic engineering measures. Older analyses suggest that the food security for a limited number of families was definitely improved and that surplus cash funds are also being generated through secondary crops. However, the impacts remain lower than the production-related capabilities in light of the degradation of many structures and the foreseeable maintenance costs. As long as water is generally being retained, positive impacts on the water table can be assumed. However, these impacts will also decrease as the degradation of the structures and/or operation errors increase.

In the overall view, the overarching developmental impacts of NIGETIP IV are rated as unsatisfactory. As of today, the impacts here are below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results. Conversely, FICOD predominantly leaves positive impressions, even though they are weak, so the impacts of these phases can be still be given a satisfactory rating.

**Impact rating: 4 (NIGETIP IV), 3 (all phases of FICOD)**

## Sustainability

The maintenance is defective for all promoted infrastructure. The sustainability risks are high.

The prerequisite for sustainable operation of municipal infrastructure is the sustainable increase in the performance capacity of the municipalities through personnel and financing. Advanced training modules were developed during the course of the training components that were suitable for improving the skills of municipal personnel in the key areas of “local finances” and “fulfilment of construction responsibilities”. But the municipalities do not have sufficient funds available after the FC-promoted pilot run to enable participation for their professional staff. According to statements from local participants, personnel at the municipal level is usually switched out after elections, which constitutes a further sustainability risk.

Although the training measures are located in the ENAM administrative school and are thus institutionalised, there are no specialised and permanently employed trainers. Due to the financing issues, advanced training for municipal officials is also no longer offered in a targeted manner. Instead, training is generally offered for state officials, which tends to increase the risk of “brain drain”.

Furthermore, a general mechanism for municipal financial compensation has since entered into force. But the actual transfer amounts are so small that no periodic maintenance or improvement to the service levels can be financed. The responsibility for most of the work is basically initially delegated to the user group organisations, whereby the municipalities make small contributions, depending on their performance capacity (e.g. construction material). For expensive measures, like road construction, rehabilitation of sanitation facilities for slaughterhouses, or securing transport between health facilities, the user groups (who are rural and poor themselves) are overburdened. The extent to which income from the operation of markets and slaughterhouses covers the costs and whether some of this income could be used for maintenance could not be determined due to a lack of meaningful documentation.

Because some of the soil protection measures no longer exist or practices are no longer used, these are also not sustainable. Still existing plantings are sustainable in the sense that they serve a protective function. Hydraulic engineering measures are subject to sustainability risk due to unclear responsibilities, which limits the productive sustainability to some extent. Furthermore, measures in common areas are less sustainable than measures in private areas. Due to the large number of project types and implementation modalities, there is a differentiated risk here.

Neither executing agency plays a role in ensuring sustainability because NIGETIP is purely a commercial developer that only remains active to a small extent, and FICOD also cannot take on this role as an FC-financed transition organisation. So the sustainability risk determined during the final follow-up continues to exist.

On the basis of the data available, we rate this sustainability as unsatisfactory overall, although the maintenance of operation at a low level is already recognised as an accomplishment under the existing preconditions in the difficult context of Niger. The deciding factor is that the municipalities in the projects evaluated here still have insufficient government contributions for the equipment and maintenance/rehabilitation of infrastructure and still do not have a mechanism in place to stabilise municipal staff. The roots of these sustainability risks are beyond the projects' sphere of influence. However, they need to be included in the evaluation because they impact the projects.

It is possible but improbable in the short term that both of these variables will develop positively in the future. Despite some positive trends in Niger's decentralisation process during the past months and the involvement of the Sahel Alliance, the sustainability risks are so high from today's perspective and in comparison with other countries and evaluations there that the sustainability must be rated as unsatisfactory.

**Sustainability rating: 4 (NIGETIP IV and all phases of FICOD)**

### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).