KfW Development Bank

Ex-post evaluation
Corona emergency aid in Morocco to cope with the corona epidemic and its consequences

Title	Emergency coronavirus aid in Morocco to deal with the coronavirus epidemic and its consequences		
Sector and CRS code	Multisector, CRS key: 43		
Project number	2020 68 484		
Commissioned by	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)		
Recipient/Programme executing agency	Kingdom of Morocco, represented by the Ministry of Economy and Finance		
Project volume/ Financing instrument	EUR 300 million (reduced interest loan)		
Project duration	10/2020 – 05/2023		
Year of report	2024	**Year of random sample**	2024

Objectives and project outline

To remedy the negative consequences of the coronavirus crisis, the Moroccan government launched the COVID-19 relief fund with over EUR 3 billion in 2020, in which the FC project participated with a subsidised loan of EUR 300 million. The objective at outcome level was the utilisation of coronavirus emergency aid transfer payments by employees in the formal and informal sectors. At impact level, the FC programme helped to mitigate the negative social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population and thus contributed to maintaining the state's ability to act.

Overall rating:
successful



Key findings

By co-financing the COVID-19 relief fund, the FC project adequately addressed key elements of the Moroccan crisis response programme and thus contributed to alleviating the loss of income of a large number of particularly poor households in the informal sector. A far more dramatic increase in poverty caused by the pandemic was thus prevented.

This FC project is rated as 'successful' for the following reasons:

- The objectives and activities of the project were very much in line with the priorities of the Moroccan government and the objectives of the BMZ's Corona Emergency Programme. This resulted in a high degree of relevance.
- By utilising transfer payments, potential income losses for a large number of particularly poor households were alleviated. This achievement was exceptional in the North African context, which is why we rate the effectiveness of this FC programme as successful.
- An increase in the poverty rate caused by COVID was effectively prevented and the state's ability to act was maintained.
- As a short-term emergency aid measure, the FC programme did not aim to strengthen the system in the long term, which is why its sustainability claim was limited from the outset. Nevertheless, by piloting customised social transfers, a contribution was made to stabilising this instrument, which is considered an important pillar of social security reform.

Conclusions

- Transfer payments proved to be adequate anti-cyclical measures during the crisis in order to prevent the poverty rate from worsening.
- It is recommended for future emergency aid programmes to include the preservation of the purchasing power of the poor population in the target and indicator system.
- In order to enable the replicability of this innovative approach for other countries with comparably large informal sectors, precise monitoring of transfer payments is recommended.

Ex-post evaluation - assessment according to OECD DAC criteria

Overview of the rating per criterion:

Relevance	2
Coherence	2
Effectiveness	2
Efficiency	2
Overarching developmental impact	2
Sustainability	2
Overall rating:	**2**

General conditions and classification of the project

The COVID-19 crisis, which was declared a pandemic by the *World Health Organisation* (WHO) on 11 March 2020, and the extreme drought in 2020, posed a number of challenges for the Kingdom of Morocco. As a result, the unemployment rate increased from 9.2 % at the end of 2019 to 16.9 % in the first half of 2020. Exports and imports plummeted in April 2020, mainly due to falling demand, lockdowns and disruptions of supply chains. Due to the drop in economic activity, tax revenues in Morocco fell by EUR 4.1 billion in 2020, while the crisis required additional expenditure totaling approximately EUR 1.8 billion. This resulted in a funding gap and jeopardized the state's ability to act. In order to meet these challenges, Morocco erected a COVID-19 Relief Fund of approx. EUR 3,1 billion (3,1 % of GDP), which ensured the financing of rapid response actions in three pillars:

a) Social transfers to employees and households in the formal and informal sector amounting to EUR 2 billion.

b) Transfers to the State guarantee institution 'Tamwilcom' for the implementation of loan guarantee schemes for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) amounting to EUR 487 million.

c) EUR 296 million in support for health infrastructure and testing capacity.

The total expenditure of the Rapid Reaction Programme was approx. EUR 2,78 billion. The FC-project "Emergency Corona assistance in Morocco to cope with the coronavirus epidemic and its consequences" co-financed pillar a) of the COVID-19 Assistance Fund. Overall, in 2020, a total FC commitment of EUR 1 billion was made for Morocco. In addition to this project, these funds included the reform partnership programmes (support for financial reforms in Morocco I-III, BMZ Nos.: 2019 687 18, 2019 68 767, 2019 70 334). These FC measures have been allocated to the development cooperation programme "Sustainable Economic Development". In addition, there were the FZ loan guarantee programmes for Small and Middle Enterprises (BMZ No: 2020 68 765, 2020 68 658, 2019 68 726, 2019 68 734, 2019 70 276). These guarantee programmes addressed the negative economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on MSMEs by ensuring access to finance. These FC projects, carried out in cooperation with Tamwilcom, have been integrated into pillar b) of the COVID-19 Relief Fund and are still being implemented.

Brief description of the project

The German government had participated in the COVID-19- Relief Fund with a subsidised FC loan of EUR 300 million; retroactive financing took place (reimbursement of money already paid by the government). The FC project addressed the entire population of Morocco, but was not explicitly assigned to any development cooperation programme. It indirectly secured the continuation of the various FC programmes and in particular the reform partnership by strengthening the Moroccan government's ability to act.

The Moroccan government had previously explicitly asked Germany to support its crisis response programme. It was feared that the successes already achieved in private sector development and poverty reduction could be eroded by COVID-19 and that significant parts of the Moroccan population could fall back into precarious situations. The aim of the coronavirus emergency aid was therefore to maintain the Moroccan government's ability to respond to the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The resources of the COVID-19 relief fund were managed in a special account (compte d'afféctation spéciale).

Breakdown of total costs

Table 1 Breakdown of the total costs of the COVID-19 relief fund

In EUR million	Investment costs (plan)	Investment costs (actual)
Total costs	3.000	2.760
Own contribution	-	1.860
External financing	-	900
of which budget funds (BMZ)	300	300

Map of the project country incl. project areas

Figure1 - Map of the project region



Rating according to OECD DAC criteria

Relevance

1. Alignment with policies and priorities

On the **Moroccan side**, the "High Royal Orientations and Instructions" (hautes orientations royales et hautes instructions royales) provided the framework for the crisis response program. The legal basis was Decree No. 2-20-269 (Official Gazette No. 6865 of March 17, 2020) for the establishment of the COVID-19 Relief Fund, which was confirmed by the supplementary budget for the year 2020.

On the **German side**, the strategic framework was the Corona Emergency Program of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), particularly its fields of action 6 ("Corona Emergency Aid for direct financing of national programs") and 4 ("Social Security").

The financial contributions to the crisis response program were directly paid into Morocco's overall budget. Morocco managed the funds according to national budgetary regulations. The module proposal from July 22, 2020, included a detailed assessment of public financial management and fiduciary risks, which were deemed acceptable with further need for reform. Morocco's political situation was stable, and the risks regarding environmental and social compatibility (USV) were considered low according to the module proposal. Therefore, the project met the criteria for budget support.

The FC contribution to pillar a) of the crisis response program was in line with the decisions of the economic monitoring committee (Comité de Veille Economique, CVE), the body responsible for steering the crisis response program, and the action plan it developed. The CVE, established under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Finance (Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, MEF), included the Ministry of the Interior and Health, the Moroccan Central Bank, and various business associations.

The overall program was designed to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 1 (No Poverty), 2 (Zero Hunger), 3 (Good Health and Well-being), 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), and 10 (Reduced Inequalities). As co-financing of the overall program, the FC project aligned with the principles of modern development cooperation, represented by the German government as a co-signatory of the Paris and Accra agreements (alignment with partner priorities, donor harmonization).

2. Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders

The project should ensure the utilization of transfer payments by employees in both the formal and informal sectors during the crisis situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the formal sector, employees who were registered with the National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale, CNSS) under the General Mandatory Health Insurance (Assurance Maladie Obligatoire, AMO) and had lost their jobs or experienced income reductions were part of the target group. The selection of beneficiaries was carried out by the CNSS based on the social insurance contributions reported by employers. The target number for employees whose income came from the formal sector was set at 950,000 (Indicator 1), which represented about one-third of the total 2.7 million employees registered with the CNSS.

From the informal sector, all heads of households (women or men) who were insured under the Basic Health Insurance for the Disadvantaged (RAMED - Régime d'Assistance Médicale pour les Démunis) and had at least one member in their household who had demonstrably lost their job or faced income reductions were included in the target group. However, since a significant portion of informal sector employees were not insured, this population segment was also given the opportunity to receive transfer payments through an online registration process called "Tadamoncovid," thus qualifying as part of the target group. There were no specific selection criteria otherwise.

Given the importance of the organization of basic medical coverage (couverture médicale de base, CMB) with its two pillars, AMO and RAMED, for this EPE, a brief introduction to this system is provided here:

AMO is the general health insurance, which is divided into three branches: AMO-TADAMON, which covers poor and vulnerable population groups; AMO-TNS for traders, self-employed individuals, and freelancers; and AMO-

ACHAMIL for individuals who are able to make contribution payments and are currently not engaged in paid employment.

The services of AMO are provided through two authorities: the CNSS, where employees are insured, and the Caisse Nationale des Organismes de Prévoyance Sociale Nationale (CNOPS), which is the fund for social welfare organizations for public sector employees.

Until the end of 2020, RAMED was the basic health insurance for informally employed individuals, primarily disadvantaged households with very low incomes. As part of the social reform, RAMED was replaced by AMO-Tadamon, which is the branch of the general health insurance AMO that covers poor population groups. The establishment of the crisis response program in 2020 marked a milestone in health insurance, as a significant portion of the vulnerable population gained low-threshold access to medical care. Heads of households were the main insured parties, and other individuals in the household were also covered. The RAMED basic insurance, which was of significantly lower quality than the AMO offerings, had been subsidized by the state since 2019 through a social fund (Fonds d'Appui à la Cohésion Sociale) with 7 billion MAD (1.5 billion EUR) and was managed by the National Agency for Health Insurance (Agence Nationale d'Assurance de Maladie, ANAM) under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. According to ANAM, by the end of 2017, just over 5 million households were insured through RAMED. However, several studies pointed out gaps and errors in the RAMED databases, indicating that the actual number of eligible beneficiaries was somewhat below the 5 million households.[1] At the beginning of 2020, a signi-ficant number of individuals were recorded in the RAMED system who, due to their income situation, should not have been eligible for subsidized health insurance.[2] Despite these shortcomings, RAMED represented a significant improvement in basic health care and was utilized by a large portion of the informal sector. RAMED included, among other things, the population segment that fell below the absolute poverty line (for 2020: 4,939 MAD per year, 453 EUR). In Morocco, this accounted for approximately 10 % of the population. Since the contributions for RAMED insurance increased with rising income, it is one of the most progressive social programs in Morocco[3]: the annual RAMED contribution for the main insured heads of households from precarious circumstances was a symbolic 120 MAD (11.2 EUR), while the contribution ceiling for slightly better earners was 600 MAD (55 EUR) per year, regardless of the number of individuals in the household.[4]

The crisis response program—and thus the co-financing project—was generally aligned with the needs of the target group and aimed to make a relevant contribution to stabilizing existing income and maintaining purchasing power. It was not explicitly focused on gender equality and therefore did not consider gender impact potentials. It is doubtful whether an alternative design of the concept, such as the integration of a gender-specific accompanying measure for transfer payments through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), could have been organized and financed comprehensively within such a short period. Significant advantages from an alternative design of the concept with private or decentralized actors could not be identified in the context of this evaluation.

3. Appropriateness of the design

In principle, the Corona emergency aid is a financial cooperation (FC) instrument for crisis response, which requires particularly urgent intervention from the partner country. This instrument is designed to support the affected countries in the immediate management of potential health, social, and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The partner country is provided with short-term and counter-cyclical funds that maintain its capacity for action and response during the crisis and contribute to the macroeconomic stability of the country.

Typically, the partner government faces the challenge that the additional expenditures for financing emergency aid programs are often accompanied by more difficult access to the international capital market and a simultaneous decline in tax revenues. The FC funds are allocated to the national budget in a manner similar to policy-based or reform financing. According to the guidelines of the BMZ, emergency aid is to be classified as a variant of budget financing, designated as "sector budget financing," and conceptually separated from policy-based instruments.

Unlike policy-based financing (PBF) or reform financing, the implementation and enforcement of long-term, structurally effective reform programs are not required for Corona emergency aid. The ambition level for Corona emergency aid is therefore significantly shorter-term and easier to fulfill compared to PBF/reform financing. A

[1] International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Germany 2021: 'Morocco Country Information Sheet 2021: p. 3, DEPF 2020 p. 30
[2] DEPF p.34
[3] DEPF p.30: Hormis le RAMED qui bénéficie à hauteur de 39,4% à la population du premier quintile (contre une moyenne nationale de 28,5%)
[4] DEPF p.30: L'article 25 du décret n° 2-08-177 fixe la contribution partielle annuelle des bénéficiaires en situation de vulnérabilité à 120 DH par personne et par an dans la limite d'un plafond de 600 DH par ménage quel que soit l'effectif des personnes le composant

prerequisite is the existence of a national emergency aid program, which was provided for in the current crisis response program in Morocco. The agreement on specific prior conditions that trigger a disbursement is not always necessary. This is especially true given the urgency required in addressing the underlying crisis. However, it may be sensible to agree on prior conditions on a country-specific basis. In the case of Morocco, the disbursement of FC funds was linked to the following conditions:

a) Provision of the instruments and tools for crisis management and

b) Introduction of the supplementary budget into the democratic process

These conditions were met prior to the disbursement of the Corona emergency aid on December 29, 2020. The Moroccan government made significant efforts at the beginning of the pandemic both in setting up the instruments and in securing the necessary funding. There were consultations among individual donors; however, a joint donor matrix was not created, as the Corona emergency program was initially fully pre-financed at the national level, and the subsequently received donor funds which merely represented reimbursements.

In the context of this evaluation, adjustments to the objectives at the **outcome and impact levels** were made, since the traceability of the objective system in the module proposal was not given.

In the Module Proposal dated February 22, 2020, under section 4.01, the **outcome objective** was stated as: "To support the efforts of the Moroccan government in managing and mitigating the social and economic consequences of the current crisis." However, on the cover page, it stated: "Mitigation of the negative social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population and contribution to maintaining the state's capacity for action." For better traceability, we adjusted the outcome objective (utilization of the created capacities). In its current formulation, "Utilization of transfer payments from the Corona emergency aid by employees in the formal and informal sectors," the outcome objective of the FZ project can be traced more clearly and verified more easily through the originally chosen indicators.

The target value for **households in the informal sector**, with and without RAMED, that derived income from the informal sector (4.3 million for Indicator 2 and 3), was consistent with the estimated number of households in Morocco whose income depended on the informal sector (4.3 million out of a total of 8.8 million households in Morocco). The chosen indicators for 'RAMED beneficiaries' and 'non-RAMED beneficiaries' and their valuation were therefore appropriate in their entirety and aimed at making a relevant contribution to securing livelihoods.

The **development policy goal (impact objective)** was also not uniform in the module proposal. On the cover page, it stated: "The program goal of the Corona emergency program of the BMZ is to support developing and emerging countries in combating the COVID-19 pandemic by strengthening supply structures and social security as well as measures for pandemic control." However, under section 4.03, it stated: "Mitigation of the negative social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population and contribution to maintaining the state's capacity for action." By using the second version, which we adopted for this evaluation at the impact level, the contributions of the FC project can be better traced and verified through the additional indicators for the poverty rate and GDP included in the evaluation.

The causal chain is now consistently plausible: With a subsidized loan for co-financing the first pillar of the Moroccan government's crisis response program (input), the output "Transfer payments to formally and informally employed individuals" should be enabled. The implementation of these measures leads, under defined conditions (the pandemic remains temporally limited), to the desired outcome "Utilization of transfer payments from the Corona emergency aid by employees in the formal and informal sectors." By achieving the objective at the outcome level, a relevant contribution to the development policy goal at the impact level is also achieved, i.e., "Mitigation of the negative social and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population." Due to the increased purchasing power of the population as a result of the transfers, a "contribution to maintaining the state's capacity for action" can be made, especially in light of decreased (tax) revenues due to reduced economic activity. The causal chain is graphically represented in Figure 2.

Figure 2 : Graphical representation of the chain of effects



Source: Own presentation

The conceptual design of the project was fundamentally appropriate: Transfers as counter-cyclical measures in times of crisis are an adequate instrument for maintaining purchasing power, a key factor in economic growth. The core problem was correctly identified: Given the substantial decline in revenues due to reduced economic activity alongside pandemic-related additional expenditures, there was a need for a crisis response from the Moroccan government. The requirement to integrate the informal sector into crisis response measures was appropriate, as the official Moroccan social system only covered employees in the public and private sectors. This allowed for the preservation of purchasing power for a correspondingly larger number of people.

The issuance of Decree No. 2-20-269 (Official Journal No. 6865 of March 17, 2020) to establish the COVID-19 Relief Fund was the legal basis for providing transfer payments to the formal and informal sectors (output). The inclusion of the supplementary budget in the parliamentary process allowed for the suspension of the ceiling on foreign debt (Decree 2.20.320). The maximum limit for external debt set in the 2020 budget law of 31 billion MAD (2.83 billion EUR) was nearly doubled to 63 billion MAD (5.7 billion EUR). This led to a change in the weighting between domestic and foreign debt (previously one-quarter foreign debt and three-quarters domestic debt) and thus to a temporary uncertainty in the domestic bond market (*crowding out*).[5]

To ensure a balance between the emergency aid character, i.e., the speed of fund provision, and the legality and transparency of implementation, various adjustments regarding budget planning and reporting were agreed upon in advance with the Moroccan Ministry of Finance. A specific budget line "Tadamon" for transfer payments to the informal sector was established in the special account. In the official report of the Moroccan Ministry of Finance on the implementation of the crisis response program, the respective disbursement campaigns of the transfer payments were provided with concrete figures, i.e., costs in MAD and the number of beneficiaries. With this documentation, the Ministry of Finance responded to the donors' request for increased transparency in the use of funds. Additionally, in the FC contractual framework, alongside reports on the use of funds from the special accounts, the submission of reports from the Court of Auditors on the COVID-19 Relief Fund was also agreed upon.

During the conceptual phase, the positive, significant impacts of the FZ project on the disposable incomes of disadvantaged households were not included in the objective and indicator system, nor was monitoring in cooperation with Moroccan authorities planned. In hindsight, this could have better illustrated the economic relationships between the transfer payments and the objectives of the FC project.

The instruments chosen for implementation, especially those for the informal sector, were appropriate. Nearly the entire Moroccan population has internet access (88 per 100 inhabitants in 2021). The online registration process "Tadamoncovid," established by ANAM, was the best way to capture as many eligible individuals from the informal sector as possible in a short time. Eligibility criteria included proof of income loss within the household and identity verification of the household head. Informally employed individuals received a code via SMS that authorized them to withdraw the allocated funds at designated ATMs. Almost all residents of Morocco also have a mobile phone (137.5 per 100 inhabitants in 2021), making the payout method via mobile phones and SMS code an

[5] Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2022a: p.19 and p.26

appropriate, innovative, and well-tailored component of the design to the needs and capacities of the target group.[6]

In particular, the choice of the already existing RAMED database (as the basis for payments to the informal sector) was a crucial conceptual element that helped address the particularly poor population. Due to the availability of the RAMED database and a well-developed digital infrastructure, Morocco, unlike other North African countries, had the prerequisites for the success of the transfer payments.

4. Adaptability – response to change

The FC measure was not adjusted in the course of its implementation due to changes in the general conditions

A change that had a not insignificant impact on this FC project occurred in mid-2021 due to tensions in diplomatic relations between Morocco and Germany, which were attributable to differences in dealing with the territorial affiliation of Western Sahara. As a consequence of this diplomatic disagreement, the Moroccan government broke off contact with representatives of German organisations from March 2021 to March 2022.

Rating summary

The objectives and activities of the crisis response programme and the co-financing FC project were very much in line with the priorities of the Moroccan government and the objectives of the BMZ's Corona Emergency Programme. However, political dialogue was limited. Essentially, the Moroccan side cooperated bilaterally with the respective donors and there was no joint coordination (e.g. for a joint donor matrix with harmonised indicators). This is mainly due to the fact that the coronavirus emergency programme was initially fully pre-financed at national level and the donor funds received subsequently were merely reimbursements.

The design of the rapid response programme was tailored to the needs and capacities of those affected and followed a clear logic. It was appropriately designed to contribute to the achievement of SDG 1 (No Poverty), 2 (No Hunger), 3 (Good Health and Well-being), 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and 10 (Reduced Inequalities). Overall, this results in a high degree of relevance.

Relevance: 2

Coherence

5. Internal coherence

The approach of the BMZ to strengthen social supply structures through the provision of liquidity proved to be coherent with the goals of the Moroccan government, which aimed to reform existing social assistance programs and better align them with the needs of disadvantaged populations. Additionally, the focus on disadvantaged population groups in all social measures was mandated by royal directives ("hautes instructions royales/hautes orientations royales").

Since the FC project was not a reform initiative but merely aimed at alleviating liquidity shortages in a crisis situation, there were no explicit content-related connections to other FC or TC projects. However, the assessment of fiduciary risks created for reform financing was adopted for this FC project. Due to its significant volume and rapid availability of funds, this FC project also contributed to maintaining the framework conditions for the implementation of ongoing and future German development cooperation projects with Morocco. It particularly complemented the previous German engagement under pillar b) of the Corona emergency aid (support for SMEs with BMZ numbers: 2020 68 765, 2020 68 658, 2019 68 726, 2019 68 734, 2019 70 276) and other FC projects in the focus area of "Sustainable Economic Development" (BMZ numbers: 2014 20 215, 2019 22 954, 2019 22 962, 2019 22 970, 2018 22 063).

In the module proposal, there were indications of "regular coordination meetings between TC and FC" (module proposal dated February 22, 2020, p. 6). However, we are not aware of any specific TC programs for which technical coordination between FC and TC would have been necessary.

[6] Federal Statistical Office 2024: p.12

6. External coherence

The crisis response programme was conceived and implemented by the Moroccan government in March 2020, four months before the FC programme appraisal and more than eight months before the disbursement of FC funds and the financing contributions from other donors. It therefore involved reimbursements for expenses already incurred by the Moroccan government, i.e., disbursements in the reimbursement procedure. Due to this circumstance, the influence of the donors on the project design of the crisis response measures was limited, and existing systems and structures of the partner were fully utilised.

Due to the high, sometimes confusing number of donors and the required speed, communication with the Moroccan government was rather fragmented. There was no common matrix with coordinated indicators. This reduced the possibilities for policy dialogue, but was essentially due to the crisis situation. The focus was more on rapid assistance. Donors whose financing contributions also contributed to pillar a) of the crisis response programme coordinated among themselves to make the coordination processes with the Moroccan government as efficient as possible.

The ‘Programme d'Appui à la Reponse à la crise du COVID-19 (PARC)’, financed by the Banque Africaine de Développement (BAD) and Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) with around EUR 400 million, coordinated the objectives and indicators of both projects. A joint agreement was reached on a total of 4.3 million informally employed people who were to receive transfer benefits. A joint virtual evaluation mission by BAD, JICA and KfW took place in February 2021. As part of this mission, the Moroccan government officially announced the achievement of the objectives and held high-level talks with the main stakeholders involved in the crisis response programme (such as the Moroccan statistical office and the CNSS).

There was bilateral coordination with the World Bank's ‘COVID-19 Social Protection Emergency Response Project’, which was implemented largely at the same time under pillar a). Under the first component of this project ("Emergency Cash Transfers"), social transfers totalling USD 165 million were financed exclusively for the informal sector. The World Bank programme provided for relatively extensive evaluations, with a focus on process and impact analyses and an audit. However, these have not yet been published. The communitication of these evaluations could have been ensured through coordination. Regrettably, FC failed to do this.

Opportunities for continuous dialogue with the Moroccan government were significantly reduced by the one-year communication ban between the German FC and the Moroccan partners. This situation affected not only the information situation but also coordination processes with other donors, as participation in general coordination meetings for German actors from March 2021 to March 2022 was only possible if no representatives of the Moroccan government were present.

Collaboration with Moroccan authorities (such as the Statistics Office and the Department of Studies of the Ministry of Finance) was facilitated by the World Bank and UN Women through the joint publication of accompanying monitoring studies. These studies served, among other things, to better understand the relationship between the economic impacts of transfer payments on the target group and to document gender differences in access to government assistance.

Rating summary:

There were no indications of friction losses with other FC or TC projects that would question internal coherence. Despite the communication ban and the associated impairments, the coordination of donors for the first pillar of the crisis response programme and thus the external coherence can be considered successful.

Coherence: 2

Effectiveness

7. Achievement of (intended) objectives

The achievement of the objective at outcome level, the utilisation of transfer payments from the Corona emergency aid by employees in the formal and informal sectors, can be summarised in the following Table 2. However, it should be noted that the number of beneficiaries initially referred to the entire pillar a) of the COVID-19 relief fund with a volume of EUR 2 billion, which was co-financed by this FC project with EUR 300 million.

Table 2 Target achievement Outcome

Indicator	Status at PA	Target value according to PA/EPE	Actual value at PCR (optional)	Actual value at EPE
(1) Number of formal sector employees benefiting from a cash transfer in response to the COVID-19 pandemic by the end of 2020.	0	950.000	1.022.140	1.022.140 **Target value fulfilled**
(2) Number of households of informal workers with basic health insurance (RAMED) benefiting from cash transfers in response to the COVID-19 pandemic by the end of 2020.	0	2.3 million	5.65 million	2.3 million **Target value fulfilled**
(3) Number of households of informal workers without basic health insurance (RAMED) benefiting from cash transfers in response to the COVID-19 pandemic by the end of 2020.	0	2.0 million	5.23 million	3.2 million **Target value fulfilled**

At the outcome level, the targeted objectives were achieved. The value determined for Indicator (1) in the Project Completion Report (PCR) dated 31 May 2023, 1,022,140 employees in the formal sector from 119,250 companies, could be confirmed within this ex-post evaluation (EPE). For Indicator (2), households in the informal sector with RAMED, 2.3 million beneficiaries were identified in the EPE instead of the 5.65 million stated in the PCR. For Indicator (3), households in the informal sector without RAMED, 3.2 million beneficiaries were identified in the EPE instead of the 5.23 million stated in the PCR. The figures determined in the EPE are based on the results of the Joint Mission from February 2021 ("5.5 million households", p. 5), the report of the COVID-19 Social Protection Emergency Response Project by the World Bank ("5.45 million households", p. 5), the report on special accounts in the 2021 budget draft ("5.5 million households", p. 41), the Moroccan Economic Report by the World Bank Group ("approximately 4.5 million beneficiaries", p. 22), the Staff Report, Article VI Consultations 2021 by the International Monetary Fund ("about 5 million people", p. 7), as well as the Economic and Financial Report as part of the 2021 budget draft ("5.5 households", p. 8). The figures were also confirmed by ANAM during the mission. The values determined in the PCR, on the other hand, were based on the official report of the Ministry of Finance to the KfW from 2021. Here, the estimated number of beneficiaries was given for Indicators (2) and (3), not the number of households.

Unfortunately, a clear distinction between the terms "households" and "people" was not always made. Misunderstandings arose frequently in this context, as "people" could mean all individuals in a household, i.e., all persons benefiting from the support, or only the individual household heads. Transfer payments were exclusively disbursed to eligible household heads after strict control. For example, the IMF Staff Report refers to "about 5 million people" for the informal sector, but it actually means the individual household heads. Differences in counting methods led to non-comparable values and complicated the determination of the actual beneficiaries.

8. Contribution to achieving the objectives

The monthly disbursement for **employees in the formal sector** was 2,000 MAD (192 EUR) from March to June 2020, which corresponded to approximately 80 % of the median of the salaries declared monthly by employers to CNSS, amounting to 2,772 MAD (256 EUR). This amount was approximately 70 % of the legally stipulated minimum wage for trade and industry of 268 EUR (Salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti, SMIG 2021). In addition to the disbursement, there was also the family allowance and the coverage of health insurance.

Overall, an average of 776,750 beneficiaries from 119,250 companies benefited monthly from financial support during the period from March to June 2020. In the period from July to November 2020, an additional amount of 567.3 million MAD (approximately 50.9 million EUR) was paid to CNSS to support the tourism sector for about 245,390 beneficiaries. By December 2020, a total of 1,022,140 employees were benefited (employees in the formal sector in general and additionally in tourism). Overall, the 5 disbursement campaigns amounted to 6.9 billion MAD (634.7 million EUR).

According to the official report of the Ministry of Finance, five disbursement campaigns took place for the formal sector in 2020:

Table 3 Payment campaigns in 2020 for formal employees

Period	Employer	Funds disbursed
March	132.000	1 billion MAD
April	125.000	2 billion MAD
May	125.000	2 billion MAD
June	95.000	1.3 billion MAD
July-November	Employer in the tourism sector	0.6 billion MAD

Source: Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2021: p. 24-25

Employees in the **informal sector** were reached on the one hand through RAMED and on the other hand through the online platform "Tadamon" (see chapter Relevance). Through "Tadamon," households with two or fewer persons were supported monthly with 800 MAD (approximately 72 EUR), households with three to four persons with 1,000 MAD (approximately 90 EUR), and households with more than four persons with 1,200 MAD (approximately 108 EUR) from March to June 2020. The amount of disbursement for employees in the informal sector thus varied depending on the number of persons in the household between 800-1,200 MAD monthly (72-108 EUR) and corresponded on average to approximately 50 % of the legally stipulated minimum wage for the agricultural sector (189 EUR).

According to the official report of the Ministry of Finance, three disbursement campaigns took place for the informal sector in 2020. These funds were recorded in the special account under the budget line "Tadamon."

Table1 Payment campaigns in 2020 for informal employees

Period	Payout campaign	Beneficiaries	Households	Funds disbursed
April-May	1 and 2	10.885.168 (including 5,654,129 Ramedists and 5,231,040 non-Ramedists)		10.85 billion MAD
May-June	3	5.000.000		5.3 billion MAD
Total		**15.885.168**	**5.5 million***	**MAD 16.15 billion** (EUR 1.46 billion)**

Source: Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2021: p. 26

*According to the special account report (Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2021a: p.41). The official report of the Ministry of Finance does not provide any information at the household level.

**The report of the special account (Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2021a: p. 41) deviates slightly here and states MAD 15.26 billion as the total expenditure of the "Tadamon" budget line.

Approximately 30 % of the working-age population applied for government assistance. By the end of 2020, 73 % of applicants had received the aid, which accounted for 22.4 % of the total population, approximately 6.2 million people (around 1.2 million in the formal sector and about 5 million in the informal sector). The utilisation of benefits varied by sector: employees in construction and trade benefited more from the transfer payments than those in agriculture and services.[7]

Among all available aid offerings during the crisis (NGOs, foreign aid, private institutions, neighbourhood help/solidarity), transfer payments via RAMED were the most frequently used. With an average compensation of 35 % of income losses, these transfer payments made a significant contribution to securing livelihoods.

The Moroccan Statistics Office, *Haute Commissariat au Plan* (HCP), conducted two surveys with 2,350 households each on the economic impacts of the transfer payments, one in April 2020 and another at the end of June 2020. Additionally, in cooperation with various donors, the Statistics Office produced studies on specific topics, such as gender analyses of COVID-19 impacts, which also considered the gender impacts of the transfer payments. Although not all topics were covered in the surveys (e.g., the specific use of transfer payments by the target groups), the surveys by the Statistics Office were valuable and contributed to the quality of implementation.

Despite the general appropriateness of the transfer amounts, the Statistics Office survey documented that three out of four surveyed households (formal and informal) rated the compensation amounts as insufficient to offset their income losses (75.9 % in urban areas and 55.7 % in rural areas). An evaluation of the World Bank-funded "Social Protection Emergency Response Project" concluded that 45 % of beneficiaries in the informal sector were able to alleviate COVID-19 impacts with the cash transfers and were satisfied, meaning that the majority of beneficiaries (55 %) also desired higher transfers.[8]

The proportion of individual income compensated varied significantly by sector: employees in construction and trade benefited more from the transfer payments than those in agriculture or services. The tourism sector was most affected by the pandemic due to early border closures. The tourism sector's revenues, which contributed 11% to GDP in 2019, fell by more than half in 2020. Combined, the hotel and gastronomy sector led Moroccan business closures in 2020 with 89 % pandemic-related closures. Employees in the tourism sector received transfer payments of EUR 50.9 million from July to November 2020 and EUR 14.7 million in January 2021.

Technical difficulties arose at the initial stage of the transfer payments, i.e., in April 2020, at the time of the first survey: 60% of respondents reported having problems accessing the transfer payments. Among them, 59 % confirmed that they were registered with RAMED or CNSS but had not yet received assistance. Other reasons for initial access difficulties included the invalidity of the RAMED card (5.6 %), rejection of the application (4.2 %), and the perceived complexity of the registration process (2.9 %). In individual cases, these difficulties led to delayed disbursements, i.e., consideration in later disbursement campaigns, online complaints, and - in the case of complaint rejection - also to non-receipt of government aid.[9] Details can be found in Figure 1 in Annex 5.

A study by the Statistics Office and *UN Femmes* from 2021 confirms that women generally benefited less from the transfer payments than men. The proportion of women was 10 %, compared to 35 % for men. The proportion of compensated income was also higher for men at 39 % than for women at 20 %. 57 % of surveyed urban households led by women (and 77 % of rural women-led households) reported that no member of their household had access to aid. In contrast, only 52 % of urban households led by men (and 76% of rural men-led households) reported that no member of their household had access to aid. Therefore, the crisis response programme and the co-financing FC project cannot be credited with significantly positive gender impacts. The study cites two reasons for these gender differences: firstly, more men than women are employed, and women are less often in stable, high-quality employment than men, thus having a higher risk of being laid off in times of crisis. Secondly, women rely more on social solidarity or welfare. Thus, 28 % of women-led households had access to transfer aid from other households, compared to only 13 % of men-led households. Women also tended to turn to their employers rather than register with CNSS or RAMED.[10]

Regarding the specific use of transfer payments, very little information is available. It can be assumed that these payments were used to secure basic needs. The Statistics Office states in its April 2020 survey that the situation at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic was existentially threatening for a large part of the surveyed households (see Figure 3). On average, 21.1 % of surveyed households reported resorting to savings, 13.8% reported going into debt, while 8 % relied on solidarity or neighborhood help, and another 8% utilised state aid. Consequently, households had alternative sources of supply, albeit to a lesser extent, such as aid from NGOs, solidarity/neighborhood help, or resorting to savings. Regarding the assessment of the quality of management and

[7] World Bank Group 2021: p.22
[8] https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-details/p172809
[9] HCP, 2020: p. 16
[10] HCP et ONU femmes 2021: p. 47

implementation of the project, no data was available from the target group. Factors limiting the effects of COVID-19 transfer payments on household income could not be identified for either 2020 or 2021.

Figure 3 Financial situation of households (in %); as at April 2020 (before transfer payments).[11]

Situation financière actuelle du ménage (en %)

	Urbain	Rural	National
Parvient à épargner	11,2	5,2	9,4
Revenus couvrent les dépenses	38,8	35,4	37,7
Puise dans l'épargne	20,4	25,8	21,1
Endettement	12,2	17,3	13,8
Solidarité sociale	7,3	10,4	8,3
Aides de l'Etat	9,4	4,9	8,0
Aides des ONG	0,3	0,9	0,5
Autres	0,3	0,3	0,3
Total	100	100	100

9. Quality of implementation

The Moroccan Ministry of Finance was a suitable recipient and simultaneously the programme host for this FC project. Due to its central position within the political structure of the Kingdom of Morocco, it was able to assume an overarching coordination function for the implementation of the crisis response programme. The Ministry of the Interior, in its role as a member of the CVE, played a crucial role as the second "power pole" within the government for the smooth execution of the crisis response programme.

The Committee for Economic Monitoring (CVE), which included a multitude of ministries, banks, professional associations, chambers of commerce, and business associations, proved to be a helpful entity for prioritising the expenditures of the COVID-19 relief fund. Due to the multitude and diversity of the committee's actors and the ongoing dialogue with civil society organisations, the allocation decisions of the crisis response programme represented a societal consensus and offered little room for disputes.[12]

The implementation of the crisis response programme was stringent and consistent, from the swift creation of the legal foundations for the transfer payments to the establishment of the committee and the selection of implementing organisations such as CNSS (for the formal sector) and ANAM (for the informal sector), to a transparent handling of approximately 2 million complaints, mainly due to technical errors in the RAMED databases.

In addition to the effective coordination by the Ministry of Finance, two other key elements were responsible for the success of the transfer programmes: The digitized RAMED databases with the registered beneficiaries were provided by ANAM on the "Tadamoncovid" platform within a few weeks and forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior. One reason for the functioning of disbursements in the informal sector was the existing partnerships between ANAM and various banks and mobile operators. These partnerships enabled the implementation of digital disbursement campaigns in a very short period.

The information campaigns on registration and disbursement procedures were tailored to the needs of the target group (some of whom could not read or write). The individual steps to be carried out by the beneficiaries were explained in a well-prepared, multilingual didactic manner on the websites of various ministries and in other media. There was no indication during the mission that a large number of eligible beneficiaries had no access to the transfer payments due to a lack of information.

Overall, and with few restrictions, which mostly referred to the short duration of the transfer payments (in 2020, including the tourism sector, only four months), the reports of the World Bank and the IMF praised the crisis response of the Moroccan government as "remarkable," "exceptional," and "unprecedented," especially in

[11] HCP 2020: "Enquête sur l'impact du coronavirus de la situation économique et sociale et psychologique des ménages", p. 14
[12] This was already emphasised positively in the module proposal when considering the UPS risks p. 85

comparison with other countries in the region where the informal sector rarely benefited from COVID-19 aid programmes.[13]

The communication regarding the implementation of the crisis response programme by the Moroccan authorities was partially criticised by donors. Information on implementation details (such as relevant databases, criteria for selecting eligible beneficiaries, and indications of delays in disbursements) was available in the studies of the Statistics Office but reached most donors only at the time of the publication of the official report of the Ministry of Finance. Due to the one-year communication ban between the Moroccan and German sides, the lack of information for the German development cooperation was exacerbated. Various adjustments by the Moroccan Ministry of Finance aimed to create more transparency regarding the disbursement campaigns and payment proofs. Nevertheless, the financial reporting remained rather unsatisfactory overall. Contractually, the transmission of the Ministry of Finance's report on special accounts ("Rapport sur le comptes spéciaux du trésor 2022") as an annex to the budget plan was agreed upon, as well as reports from the Court of Auditors on the COVID-19 fund. The report on special accounts contained only ten lines on the COVID-19 fund and was therefore not suitable for assessing the use of funds. A special report by the Court of Auditors specifically on the use of funds from the COVID-19 fund has not yet arrived. However, the Court of Auditors certified in its regular report for the fiscal years 2019/2020 the effectiveness of the COVID-19 measures in terms of maintaining purchasing power and increasing economic performance.[14] Contractually agreed were also three activity reports from the Ministry of Finance on the implementation of the crisis response programme over the period from October 2020 to June 2021. These were summarised in a single main report from January 2021. Activities that took place after January 2021 were formulated as plans or declarations of intent, e.g., transfer payments for the tourism sector until the end of April 2021.

The total of 2 million complaints from eligible households in the informal sector, which were received via the "Tadamoncovid" platform, related to the non-receipt of transfer payments and were processed by the Ministry of the Interior. According to the official report of the Ministry of Finance, 2/3 of these complaints, which were mainly due to errors in the RAMED databases or inaccurate registration data, were accepted and the transfers were subsequently paid in the corresponding cases.[15] The errors in the RAMED system were documented in several texts and confirmed by the director of ANAM during the mission.[16]

From the formal sector, only 204 complaints were received. 109 complaints came from companies registered with CNSS, ten complaints came from companies whose status was unclear and initially had to be clarified, and 85 complaints came from employees registered with CNSS. The complaints from the formal sector were processed by CNSS.

10. Unintended effects (positive or negative)

There were no unintended effects.

Rating summary

The targeted utilisation of transfer payments at the outcome level was achieved, despite significant errors in the RAMED database that led to non-registration or incorrect registration of informally employed individuals. The Ministry of Finance and the Committee for Economic Monitoring (CVE) succeeded in a stringent and consistent implementation of the crisis response programme. Through the utilisation of transfer payments, income losses for a large number of poor households were alleviated. This achievement was unusual in the North African context, which is why we rate the effectiveness of this co-financed FC project as successful.

Effectiveness: 2

Efficiency

[13] Groupe de la Banque Mondiale -Région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord- 2021: p. 23
[14] Cour des Comptes 2020a: p. 5
[15] Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2021c: p. 27-29
[16] DEPF 2021: p. 30

11. Production efficiency

The use of cash transfers in development cooperation is generally considered one of the most cost-effective measures to strengthen purchasing power and support the poor population in times of crisis. Within the BMZ's Corona emergency programme, cash transfers were one of the most used instruments at the target group level. The evaluation of the Corona emergency programme by the German Institute for Evaluation (DEval) rated the programme as "suitable for an economically efficient crisis response."[17] The DEval evaluation also included the distribution channels used within the programme in its assessment of economic efficiency: Compared to multilateral organisations, bilateral state organisations (GIZ and KfW) had lower organisational costs concerning the resources used, thus enabling a comparatively cost-efficient crisis response. The use of the sector budget support instrument in combination with BMZ procedural simplifications for the expedited procedure (V1077 "Procedural Simplifications COVID-19 Pandemic, Tz 47 of LL/Expedited Procedure) enabled further efficiency gains in the form of time savings.

The BMZ's decision to set up the Corona emergency programme in countries where German development cooperation was already active fundamentally increased efficiency. In the case of Morocco, German development cooperation was already active within the framework of the reform partnership and the promotion of SMEs. This allowed for the use of existing networks, procedures, and coordination processes, thus promoting the timeliness and precision of the measures.

A business or economic profitability calculation of the implementation of the first pillar of the crisis response programme cannot be carried out within this ex-post evaluation, as there is insufficient data regarding the total costs. Likewise, the exact contributions of the other donors to the first pillar (AfDB, World Bank, and JICA, etc.) are not known. However, it can be assumed that the crisis response programme of the Moroccan government was efficiently managed through the only temporary coordination structures (such as the Committee for Economic Monitoring CVE and sectoral implementation committees with short-term appointed staff). After the end of the crisis response programme, these committees were dissolved again, so that the management costs remained comparatively low overall. The online registration system "Tadamoncovid" and the disbursement procedures via mobile phones also contributed significantly to efficient target achievement.

An alternative design of the project might have included the complementary use of regional NGOs. These could have reached households in remote rural areas early due to their local knowledge, thus increasing the timeliness of transfers. However, it is doubtful that the positive effects could have been achieved more cost-effectively through the complementary use of NGOs. Likewise, there were no indications that Morocco's decentralised administration already had sufficient competencies and experience to implement social benefits more efficiently. As mentioned in the chapter on effectiveness, the success of the first pillar of the crisis response programme was mainly based on the stringent implementation by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior. The timeliness of the measures contributed to the high cost-benefit ratio: Only five days elapsed between the establishment of the CVE on 11 March 2020 and the establishment of the COVID-19 relief fund on 16 March 2020. The first disbursement campaign began in the same month and ended in July 2020.

The focus on the tourism sector had impacts on other sectors such as the hotel industry, gastronomy, and the transport sector.

With the opening of borders in mid-2021 and the revival of tourism, the sector slowly recovered, but its contribution to GDP remained weak in 2021 (3.3%). It was not until August 2022 that the tourism sector slowly recovered, even surpassing the pre-COVID level, thus becoming one of the stabilisers in an otherwise economically challenging year.[18]

[17] DEval-study 2024: p. 64
[18] IWF 2024: p. 24.

12. Allocation efficiency

The assessment of the economic allocation efficiency of the FC project, i.e., the cash transfers, can be carried out, among other things, through a cost-benefit comparison with the instruments previously used in Morocco for social security and cushioning external shocks and emergencies.

Morocco's significant investments in social security before the COVID-19 pandemic (up to 3 % of GDP) largely "fizzled out" due to the high proportion (50%) of subsidies for flour, sugar, and gas. Only 7 % of the gas subsidies reached households in the lower consumer quintiles.[19] Morocco's approximately 40 social programmes were fragmented and incomplete, leaving a significant number of disadvantaged individuals unconsidered. A study by the Ministry of Finance in 2021 confirmed this: Three different instruments for cushioning external shocks were examined regarding the efficiency of their redistribution effects: cash transfers, subsidies on basic products (oil, gasoline, sugar), and social programmes in the health sector. The instrument of cash transfers showed clear advantages in terms of reducing social inequality (measured by the GINI coefficient), primarily due to the precise targeting of the disadvantaged. While subsidies disproportionately benefit wealthy population segments, social transfers can be designed progressively downward, so that predominantly poor population segments benefit from them.[20] The study by the Ministry of Finance calculated that cash transfers, which specifically support the poorest population segments, have a better impact on the GINI coefficient. The success of the targeted cash transfers of the crisis response programme influenced the later design of social assistance in Morocco regarding its focus on the specific needs of the particularly disadvantaged population.

Figure 4 : Proportion of households (in %) that as part of the have benefited from state aid crisis response programme in the informal sector.



Sources: Haut-Commissariat au Plan 2020: "Enquête sur l'impact du coronavirus de la situation économique et sociale et psychologique des ménages", p.14.

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[19] World Bank 2020: p. 5
[20] DEPF 2021: p. 27/34

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Figure 4 shows that despite the inaccuracies in the RAMED databases, mainly poor households benefited from the transfer payments, most of whom lived in precarious accommodations in urban areas.

A World Bank study, which used survey data from the Statistics Office from April and June 2020, also demonstrated the above-average impact of transfer payments in the lower income segments. The proportion of informal sector workers who benefited from transfer payments decreased with increased income levels: 27 % of workers were reached in the lower quintile of the income range, compared to only 13 % in the highest quintile of the income range. A direct link between the transfer payments and the development of the Moroccan labour market could not be proven.. The essential structural challenges of the labour market had existed for a long time and were not directly related to the pandemic and the crisis response programme. At the end of June 2020, more than half of the employed (53 %) in Morocco were still unemployed, 36 % had resumed work, and 11 % were seeking employment. The rate of employees who resumed work after the pandemic varied significantly with their social status: while only 30 % of employees in the lower income quintile returned to work, 44 % did so in the upper quintile.

Rating summary

The efficiency of the project was high, as the cost-benefit ratio for the beneficiaries and the overall economic stability of Morocco was positive: With relatively low use of budgetary funds, high individual and overall economic benefits were achieved. Socially disadvantaged individuals benefited from the transfer payments despite significant errors in the RAMED database. Overall, we rate the efficiency of the first pillar of the crisis response programme and thus also that of the co-financing FC project as successful.

Efficiency: 2

Overarching developmental impact

13. Overarching (intended) developmental changes

The adjusted goal at the overarching development policy level within this evaluation is: "Mitigation of the negative social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population and contribution to maintaining the state's ability to act." The achievement of the goal at the impact level is summarized as follows:

Table 5: Target achievement Impact

Indicator	Status at PP	Target value according to EPE	Actual value for AK	Actual value for EPE
(1) NEW: International poverty indicator[21] decreases in in Morocco 2021 compared to the previous year.	International poverty indicator 2020: 0.7 %	International poverty indicator in 2021≤ 0.7 %	n.a.	International poverty indicator 2021: 0.6 % **Value fulfilled**
(2) NEW: GDP in Morocco increases by at least 5% in 2021 compared to the previous year	GDP in 2020 -7.2 % compared to the previous year	GDP in the year 2021: At least 5 % increase compared to the previous year	n.a.	GDP in the year 2021: 8 % compared to the previous year **Value fulfilled**

GDP Source: IMF 2021

[21] The International Poverty Indicator is measured at $2.1 per day per person (2017 PPP). Source: MFMOD Database, World Bank WDI and GEM databases, IMF

14. Contribution to overarching (intended) developmental changes

In 2019, the international poverty rate (USD 2.1/day) in Morocco was 0.6 %, rose to 0.7 % in 2020, and fell back to 0.6 % in 2021. The forecast for 2024 is 0.5 %.

According to a study by the Statistics Office in 2020[22], based on calculations of a national monetary poverty rate (pauvreté monétaire absolue), the increase in this poverty rate could be reduced by an average of 9 % through transfer payments (from 1.7 % to 1.4 % in urban areas, from 19.8 % to 4.5 % in rural areas). The GINI index could be reduced to 38.4 % through transfer payments, according to the Statistics Office, after it had risen to 44.4 % during the crisis.[23] We thus see a clear contribution to overarching development policy changes.

The intended overarching development policy impacts of the project were also achieved with the second indicator. After GDP fell by -7.2 % from 2019 to 2020, it rose by 8 % in the following year 2021 compared to the previous year. In addition to the transfer payments, the successful harvest year 2021 and further fiscal measures by the Moroccan government were responsible for the rapid economic recovery. According to estimates by the IMF and the Ministry of Finance, the redistribution effects of the entire crisis response programme were significant and contributed approximately 1.5 % to GDP growth. The redistribution effects solely of the transfer payments were estimated at 0.9 % of GDP.[24] The FC project is therefore likely to have had a positive impact on household purchasing power. According to the Statistics Office, private consumption fell by 9.4 % in 2020 due to the pandemic but rose significantly again by 7 % in 2021, with total domestic demand increasing by 8.8 %.

The 2021 microsimulation by the World Bank regarding the impacts of transfer payments on purchasing power in the fisheries sector and maritime tourism ("Economie bleue") confirmed this. Both sectors contributed significantly to GDP before the COVID-19 pandemic, maritime tourism by 10 %, and fisheries and fish processing by 3 %, each with a high proportion of informal employment. Both sectors were severely affected by the pandemic. Approximately 13 % of fishermen lost their jobs during the COVID-19 pandemic, and 76 % of employees in "blue" tourism. The World Bank simulation concludes that without the transfer payments of 2020, the impacts of COVID-19 would have resulted in a 39 % reduction in per capita purchasing power for fishermen and a 49 % reduction in purchasing power for employees in maritime tourism. Without the transfer payments, 26 % of fishermen and 34 % of employees in maritime tourism would have fallen below a threshold of USD 5.5 per day.[25] Thanks to the transfer payments, these values could be limited to 14 % for fishermen and 19 % for workers in blue tourism.

Factors that also positively impacted increased private consumption were the high transfers from Moroccans living abroad and the moderate rise in inflation (0.2 % in 2019, 0.7 % in 2020, 1.4 % in 2021).[26] External factors that limited the effects of transfer payments on household income in 2020 and 2021 could not be identified, except for the already mentioned drought in 2020 and its consequences for the agricultural sector. Uncertain conditions, which, like the COVID-19 crisis, influenced purchasing power, persisted even after 2021: In 2022, foreign imports fell due to the war in Ukraine, coupled with volatility in commodity prices, which also affected purchasing power and private consumption. A sharp rise in inflation (6.6 %) contributed to a decline in total domestic demand in 2022. Escalations in the global political situation continue to be capable of stalling external demand and thus initiating another terms-of-trade shock. Domestically, further drought periods and reduced agricultural production pose high risks.

Overall, the establishment of a COVID-19 relief fund was helpful in maintaining the state's ability to act. Deposits into the fund and subsequent counter-financing by donors provided Morocco with additional financial leeway. The negative impacts of the pandemic-induced economic downturn could be mitigated, so that Morocco emerged from the crisis in 2021 with a strengthened foreign exchange position. The ability to act thus created was mainly used for further financing of COVID-19 relief measures and financing reforms in the area of social security.

15. Contribution to overarching (unintended) developmental changes

With the exception of the short-term increase in debt as a result of the COVID-19 crisis, which the Moroccan

[22] The International Poverty Indicator is measured at $2.1 per day per person (2017 PPP). Source: MFMOD Database, World Bank WDI and GEM databases, IMF
[23] HCP, ENSR de 2019 & 2ème panel de l'enquête COVID-19 de 2020 (World Bank-financed with technical support from the Italian National Institute of Statistics, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, ISTAT)
[24] HCP 2020a, p. 6
[25] The " Upper Middle Income Class Poverty Line of USD 5.5/day was used here. Groupe de la Banque Mondiale -Région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord- 2021: p. 23
[26] DEPF 2021, p. 5

government quickly got under control, we are not aware of any unintended effects.

Rating summary

Morocco succeeded in creating sufficient fiscal leeway during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 through the rapid mobilisation of funds to finance measures for economic recovery. Thus, the intended beneficiaries (the Moroccan population) indirectly benefited at the impact level from the COVID relief fund, which was co-financed by the FC programme: A pandemic-induced increase in the poverty rate could be effectively prevented, and the state's ability to act was maintained. Therefore, the overarching development policy impacts of this FC project can be considered successful overall.

Overarching developmental impact: 2

Sustainability

16. Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders

A sustainable improvement in the capacities of the involved and affected parties was not targeted by the emergency aid project. However, the first pillar of the crisis response programme unexpectedly created momentum for reforms in the area of social security, which benefited the target group. In general, the recognition was significant that the informal sector is too important for the economy to remain unprotected in times of crisis. This protection also prevents social unrest.

17. Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

Since the FC project was designed as part of an emergency aid programme to mitigate the short-term impacts of the pandemic, the demand for sustainability was initially low and not the main focus. The structural impacts that nevertheless occurred are therefore considered additional.

In particular, the host, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, acquired extensive technical and organisational competencies for the planning and implementation of emergency aid programmes during the crisis response programme. After the earthquake in September 2023, the Ministry of Finance applied similar methods as in the COVID-19 crisis response: establishment of a special account, setting up a fund, appointment of a monitoring committee, and use of mobile banks for implementing social transfers. The establishment of a crisis response fund also proved effective in combating the earthquake: 20 billion MAD (1.8 billion EUR), almost 1.5% of the GDP of 2023, could be mobilised through private donations. The financing method via a fund with a high proportion of private donations has since been considered in Morocco as a mutualisation of risks ("mutualisation des risques").

The competencies acquired through the implementation of social transfers were further utilised for the reform of mandatory insurance (Transfers Monétaires d'Urgence, TMU). The Ministry of Finance was the host of the World Bank-funded Social Protection Emergency Response Project, within which the TMU were revised.

18. Durability of impacts over time

At the beginning of 2021, a new development strategy (Nouveau Modèle de Développement) was introduced for the Kingdom of Morocco, which included comprehensive structural reform plans in all essential areas of public life. A significant part of the development strategy aimed at reforming social and health insurance and included the following areas of action:

The expansion of general health insurance was implemented at the end of 2022 with the establishment of the "**AMO-Tadamon**"[27] branch. This new health insurance offers higher quality medical services for those previously insured under RAMED. The generalisation of AMO health insurance tripled the total number of registered individuals, from 7.8 million people in 2020 to more than 23.2 million people by the end of June 2023.

Social assistance (aide sociale directe/allocation familiale) came into effect in December 2023, targeting primarily disadvantaged individuals below a certain income threshold. Social assistance is considered an extension of the previous family allowance.

[27] Tadamon means 'solidarity' in Arabic

These two reform measures represented a milestone in the expansion of social security, particularly regarding the coverage of insured individuals and the precision of the offerings. The precision of the offerings was achieved at the end of 2023 through needs assessments using the so-called "Registre Social Unique" (RSU), which helped tailor state expenditures more closely to the needs of the population. The needs assessment identified the specific economic situation of individual households and their needs for general mandatory health insurance. All Moroccan households can now register with the social register and receive a score based on self-reported and verified socio-economic indicators (e.g., electricity bill). Those below a certain score receive free health insurance or, depending on the RSU rating, a fixed lump sum as social assistance. 60 % of the poorest households in Morocco have already been recorded. Inaccuracies and errors of the old RAMED system could be corrected with the RSU.

The success of cash transfers within the crisis response programme also highlighted the need for targeted social assistance (politique de ciblage des bénéficiaires du soutien public).

Although no sustainable impacts were expected from the crisis response programme (and the co-financing FC project) due to its emergency nature, it can be assumed that these were unexpectedly generated.

Serious risks to sustainable transformation in the area of social security currently seem low. The strategic-conceptual guidelines of the government (new development strategy, royal instructions) are mandatory as a framework for orientation, and the reforms currently being carried out in the area of social security are likely irreversible. The banking and telecommunications sectors, which were also used for transfers from the subsequent earthquake fund, are well developed and, like digitalisation, are being further expanded as key elements of the reforms. The financing of comprehensive social reform programmes, whose implementation is planned until 2026, does not seem to be at risk despite medium-term budget cuts. For the new family allowance programme alone, over 24 billion MAD (approximately 2.3 billion EUR) annually, i.e., nearly 2 % of the annual GDP, are firmly planned.[28]

The medium-term financial planning from 2023-2026 envisages a redistribution in all expenditure categories in favour of social spending. Additionally, the costs for social transfers have been financed since April 2024 through the reduction of wheat, gas, and sugar subsidies and the gradual termination of previous social programmes. The successive reduction of subsidies thus contributes to a more targeted (progressive) design of social assistance through the social register. The IMF estimates that the projected economic growth of 3.5 % for the coming years is also supported by reforms in the social sector and the resulting increased purchasing power of the population.

The sustainability claim regarding the second part of the impact goal ("maintaining the ability to act") was limited, as it was a short-term measure to finance emergency aid. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that Morocco has shown remarkable resilience to further external shocks since the pandemic, such as the earthquake in September 2023 and the ongoing drought with extreme water scarcity and record inflation triggered by the war in Ukraine (10.1 % in February 2023).[29] In 2023, the debt ratio was still very high at 69.7%, but for the IMF, the commitment to gradual budget consolidation set in the medium-term financial planning was crucial for the state's long-term ability to act. A debt ratio of 70.4 % is forecast for 2024, with a budget deficit of 4.3 %, with a slightly declining trend in the coming years to 3.2 % of GDP in 2026 and a debt ratio of 68.5 %. Indicators for improved debt management, according to the IMF, are the low proportion of foreign debt (20-30 %), the solid base of domestic investors (70-80%), as well as the positive effects of the tax reform, which provided increased revenues in 2022.[30] Morocco seems to have found the right balance between measures for economic recovery, financing further social reforms, and gradually reducing public debt.

Rating summary

Although system strengthening was not conceptually planned, the project contributed to the consolidation of this instrument through the piloting of social transfers. For the Ministry of Finance, as the newly designated supervisory authority for the financing of the family allowance, the capacities built during the crisis response programme were helpful. The medium-term financial planning leaves no doubt about the new development strategy as a

[28] This information is based on estimates from the Ministry of Finance and the statistical office from May 2024. Currently (as of May 2024), the medium-term financial plan (or the 3-year budget plan, Programmation budgetaire triennal 2023- 2025) does not yet provide any details regarding the costs in MAD and the GDP share of the new social reform. (IMF 2024: p. 11)

[29] World Bank Group (Middle East and North Africa Region) 2021: "Morocco Economic Report: Creating Momentum for Reform. With a special focus on COVID-19, inequality and employment in Morocco, p. 15

[30] IWF 2004: p. 6-7

framework for concrete policy, ensuring that the successive reform of the social security system and thus the sustainability of the positive impacts of the FC project seem to be secured.

Sustainability: 2

Overall rating

In Morocco, one of the fundamental goals of the BMZ's Corona emergency programme was effectively implemented, contributing to the establishment and expansion of stable social security systems through Corona aid measures. Among the North African countries, Morocco distinguished itself as a country that used the COVID-19 crisis as an opportunity to create momentum for ambitious reform programmes in the social sector.

The long-term sustainability of the impacts of the crisis response programme and the co-financing FC project will depend on whether Morocco can continue to find the right balance between measures for economic recovery, financing further social reforms, and reducing public debt.

Overall rating: 2

Contributions to the 2030 Agenda

The project contributed to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 1 (No Poverty), 2 (Zero Hunger), 3 (Good Health and Well-being), 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), and 10 (Reduced Inequalities), through its short-term focus on income-generating measures.

Universal Claim, Shared Responsibility, and Accountability

Due to the fact that the crisis response programme was implemented by the Moroccan government more than eight months before the disbursement of FC funds, the influence of donors on the design and implementation of the crisis response measures was rather limited. Existing systems and structures of the partner were fully utilised. As it was an emergency aid measure, which allowed only limited coordination with other donors due to time constraints, donor communication with the Moroccan government was rather fragmented. However, donors contributing to the financing of the first pillar a) of the crisis response programme, like this FC project, joined forces for efficiency reasons, resulting in both the coordination of indicators and a joint evaluation mission in February 2021.

Interplay of economic, ecological and social development

Since it was an emergency aid project aimed solely at cushioning liquidity shortages in a crisis situation, the sustainability claim was limited from the outset. However, a contribution to sustainability was achieved through reforms in the social security sector, which from 2023 more precisely addressed the needs of the poor and disadvantaged, thereby contributing to their resilience strengthening.

Inclusivity/leaving no one behind

The fact that women generally benefited less from the transfer payments than men was partly due to fewer women being insured in a mandatory health insurance than men and also being less often in stable employment. By choosing the RAMED database, the measure was fully consistent with norms for promoting the particularly disadvantaged. The introduction of the new mandatory health insurance AMO brought together formally insured individuals and those previously informally insured under RAMED. For those previously covered by low-threshold RAMED basic insurance and those without insurance coverage, there is now the opportunity to claim benefits from the regular health insurance. For employees below a certain income level, these benefits are free. The reform of health insurance represents a significant improvement in healthcare for the disadvantaged.

Project specific strengths/weaknesses and general conclusions/lessons learned

The strengths of the project include in particular:

1. The FC project, through the co-financing of the COVID-19 relief fund, adequately addressed key elements of the Moroccan crisis response programme, thereby contributing to the alleviation of income losses for a large number of particularly poor households in the informal sector. A much more dramatic pandemic-induced increase in poverty was thus prevented.

2. The measures of the first pillar of the crisis response programme contributed to the consolidation of social transfers through their piloting. This makes an important contribution in the area of social security.

The weaknesses lie in the following areas:

1. A weakness is the lack of a policy matrix as a basis for policy dialogue between the Moroccan government and donors. However, considering that the COVID-19 pandemic was a global exceptional situation, which the Moroccan government initially addressed with the crisis response programme set up entirely from its own resources, this is, in our opinion, excusable.
2. Unfortunately, during the conception phase, coordination with the World Bank on monitoring and evaluation aspects was not expanded. It was decided not to provide monitoring in cooperation with Moroccan authorities and to include the positive impacts of transfers on the disposable income of disadvantaged households in the target and indicator system. This would have provided the COVID-19 relief fund—and thus also the co-financing FC project—with further insights (also for the design of future FC projects).
3. The social measures of the crisis response programme were implemented solely by the Moroccan government nine months before the counter-financing (reimbursement) by donors. To obtain reliable statements on the impacts of the FC project in a timely manner, it would have been necessary to provide impact monitoring of the results. The validity of the assumptions made can be ensured through surveys of a representative sample of the target group with a comparison group immediately after the activities have ended. In the case of the COVID-19 relief fund, it would have been advantageous to plan this in collaboration with Moroccan authorities (i.e., the Statistics Office or the Directorate for Studies of the Ministry of Finance). Especially the Statistics Office, which operates independently and uses modern survey methods, has essential databases and results from representative surveys before and after the pandemic (i.e., at least 16,000 households).

Conclusions and lessons learned:

Transfer payments proved to be adequate counter-cyclical measures in a crisis period to prevent a deterioration in the poverty rate.

A precise documentation of the implementation of transfer payments would have been useful to enable the replicability of this innovative approach for other countries with comparably large informal sectors.

For future emergency aid programmes, it is advisable to include the maintenance of purchasing power of the poor population in the target and indicator system and to define goals for the impact level in advance.

The manner in which the partner provides information regarding the use of funds should be contractually defined as clearly as possible, so that even with sector budget support, reliable financial reporting is available, which can be used in an ex-post evaluation. It is at the discretion of the independent Court of Auditors to decide whether a special audit for the COVID-19 fund is conducted or not. This should be considered in contractual agreements with the Ministry of Finance in a timely manner.

List of abbreviations:

AFD	Agence Française de Developpement (French Development Agency)
AMO	Assurance Maladie Obligatoire
ANAM	Agence Nationale d'Assurance de Maladie (National Health Insurance Agency)
AK	Final inspection
BAD	Banque Africaine de Développement (African Development Bank)
GDP	Gross domestic product
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CMB	Couverture Médicale de Base (basic health insurance)
CNOPS	Caisse Nationale des Organismes de Prévoyance sociale Nationale
CNSS	Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (National Social Security Fund)
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CVE	Comité de Veille Economique
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEPF	Direction des Etudes et des Prévisions Financiaires (Studies and Financial Projections Department)
DEval	German Institute for Evaluation
EU	European Union
HCP	Haute Commissariat au Plan (National Statistics Office)
HDI	Human Development Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency (Japan International Cooperation Agency)
MEF	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation / Organisation-Non Governmental
PBA3	Programme-based approaches
PBF	Programme-based financing
PP	Project review
PPB	Project appraisal report
PARC	Programme d'appui Résponse à la Crise COVID-19 (COVID crisis response programme)
RAMED	Régime d'Assistance Médicale pour les Démunis (health insurance for the disadvantaged)
RSU	Registre Social Unique (Social Register)
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals (goals for sustainable development)
SMIG	Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel garanti
SMS	Short Message Service
TMU	Transfers Monétaires d'Urgence
TNS	Travailleurs Non Salariés
UPS	Environmental and social compatibility
WHO	World Health Organisation

Evaluation approach and methods

Methodology of the ex-post evaluation

The ex-post evaluation follows the methodology of a rapid appraisal, i.e. a data-supported, qualitative contribution analysis and represents an expert judgement. This involves attributing impacts to the project through plausibility considerations based on the careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. Where possible, this also includes the use of digital data sources and modern techniques (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). Causes of any contradictory information are investigated, attempts are made to eliminate them and the assessment is based on statements that are - if possible - confirmed by several sources of information (triangulation).

Data sources and analysis tools:

Data collection on site, monitoring data from the partner, surveys

Documents:
Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale 2021: "Rapport annuel 2020".
Cour de Comptes 2020: "Rapport sur l'exécution de la loi des finances titre d'année 2020".
Cour de Comptes 2020a : "Rapport annuel de la Cour de Comptes 2019-2020. Synthèse".
Cour de Comptes 2022: " Rapport de la Cour de Comptes au titre des années 2019 et 2020".
Direction des Etudes et des Prévisions Financières (DEPF), MEF (2020): "Les effets de la politique budgétaire sur la pauvreté et les inégalités au Maroc".
Direction des Etudes et des Prévisions Financières (DEPF), MEF and Observatoire National de Développement Humain 2021: "La crise Covid-19: Quel impact sur la pauvreté au Maroc"
Groupe de la Banque Mondiale (Région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord) 2021 : "Rapport économique du Maroc: Créer un élan pour la réforme. Avec un focus spécial sur le COVID-19, inégalité et emploi au Maroc".
Haut Commissariat au Plan 2020: "Enquête sur l'impact du coronavirus de la situation économique et sociale et psychologique des ménages".
Haut Commissariat au Plan, ONU Femmes 2021: "Analyse genre de l'impact du coronavirus sur la situation économique, sociale et psychologique des ménages".
Haut Commissariat au Plan 2020a: "Evaluation au niveau de vie des ménages de la pandémie sur les inégalités sociales".
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Germany 2021: "Morocco Country Information Sheet 2021".
International Monetary Fund 2020: "IMF Country Report Morocco, No 20/14
International Monetary Fund 2021: "IMF Country Report Morocco", No 21/02
International Monetary Fund 2022: "IMF Country Report Morocco", No 22/36
International Monetary Fund 2023: "IMF Country Report Morocco", No 23/42
International Monetary Fund 2024: "IMF Country Report Morocco", No 24/99
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2020: "Budget Citoyens Loi de Finances 2020".
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2021: "Budget Citoyens Loi de Finances 2021"
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2022: "Budget Citoyens Loi de Finances 2022"
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2023: "Budget Citoyens Loi de Finances 2023"
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2022a: "Projet de Loi de Finances pour l'année budgétaire 2022. Rapport sur les comptes sociaux du trésor "
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2022b : "Projet de loi de Finances pour l'année budgétaire 2022. Rapport sur la dette publique".
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2023a: "Projet de réponse d'urgence de la protection sociale face à la COVID-19".
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2021b: "Situation des Charges et Ressources du Trésor à fin Février 2021".
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances et de la Réforme de l'Administration 2021c : "Pandémie COVID-19 : Principales mesures prises par le Gouvernement du Maroc".
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, DEPF 2021: "Synthèse du Rapport Economique et Financier accompagnant le Projet de Loi de Finances 2021".
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, DEPF 2024: "Synthèse du Rapport Economique et Financier accompagnant le Projet de Loi de Finances 2024".
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, DEPF 2021a: "Note de conjuncture 2021 Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances 2021c: "Pandémie COVID-19. Principales mesures prises par le Gouvernement du Maroc".

Ministry of Economic Affairs, Labour and Tourism, Baden Württemberg 2021: "Morocco as a gateway to the francophone markets".
Federal Statistical Office (destatis) 2024: "Morocco statistical country profile".
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (WKO) 2023: "Country profile Morocco".
World Bank 2020: "Morocco COVID-19 Social Protection Emergency Response Project, Project Information Document".
World Bank / WDI 2021: "Macro Poverty Outlook 2021"
World Bank / WDI 2024: "Macro Poverty Outlook 2024".

Online documents:
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-details/p172809
HCP, ENSR de 2019 & 2ème panel de l'enquête COVID-19 de 2020.

Interview partner:
Programme executing agencies: Ministry of Economy and Finance, KfW office Rabat, representatives of bilateral and multilateral organisations (GIZ, EU, World Bank, JICA) and the national health insurance agency.

The analysis of impacts is based on assumed causal relationships, documented in the impact matrix developed during project appraisal and possibly updated during the ex-post evaluation. The evaluation report presents arguments explaining which influencing factors were identified for the observed impacts and why the examined project likely contributed in certain ways (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure is considered regarding its influence on the results. Conclusions are related to the availability and quality of the data basis. The evaluation concept attached in the annex serves as the reference framework for the evaluation.

The method offers an average balanced cost-benefit ratio for project evaluations, where knowledge gain and evaluation effort are balanced, allowing a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of FC projects across all evaluations. Therefore, individual ex-post evaluations cannot meet the requirements of a scientific review in terms of a clear causal analysis.

The following aspects limited the evaluation:
The provision of a list of beneficiaries of the transfer payments (with phone numbers) was rejected by the Ministry of Finance. This list would have been the basis for impact monitoring of approximately 50 beneficiaries through a Kobo Toolbox survey.

The Court of Auditors report on the use of the COVID-19 fund, contractually agreed with the Ministry of Finance, was not provided to the KfW. However, no contract was concluded with the Court of Auditors itself, so this contractual agreement with the Ministry of Finance is only of limited help. It is also unknown whether the Court of Auditors has already conducted this special audit.

Methodology of the performance evaluation

A six-point scale is used to assess the programme according to the OECD DAC criteria. The scale values are assigned as follows:

Level 1 Very successful: result significantly above expectations

Level 2 Successful: result fully in line with expectations, without significant deficiencies

Level 3 Moderately successful: below expectations, but positive results dominate

Level 4 Moderately unsuccessful: is significantly below expectations and negative results dominate despite recognisable positive results

Level 5 Unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate

Level 6 Highly unsuccessful: the project is useless or the situation has worsened

The overall rating on the six-point scale is based on a project-specific weighting of the six individual criteria. Levels 1-3 of the overall rating indicate a "successful" project, while levels 4-6 indicate an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally "successful" if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness") and the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") as well as the sustainability are rated as at least "Moderately successful" (rating 3).

The annex to this report is available upon request (German only).

Imprint

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