

Ex-post evaluation

UNRWA Special Initiative on Displacement, Lebanon

Title	Supporting refugees and host communities in the countries bordering Syria, Phases I and II		
Sector and CRS code	72050 Emergency coordination		
Project number	2014 406 27 Phase I; 2015 40 830 Phase II		
Commissioned by	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)		
Recipient/Project-executing agency	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)		
Project volume/ Financing instrument	EUR 5.0 million Phase I; EUR 5.8 million Phase II / BMZ grant		
Project duration	December 2014 – December 2016		
Year of report	2023	Year of random sample	2021 Phase I / 2023 Phase II

Objectives and project outline


The objective at outcome level was to maintain or provide basic services of adequate quality in 12 UNRWA refugee camps and to improve the basic infrastructure used by Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) and by Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (PRL). At impact level, the aim was to contribute to mitigating the worst impacts of the Syrian conflict on PRS and PRL and to strengthening social cohesion between these groups. Temporary cash payments to PRS as well as measures and strategy concepts to improve basic services and infrastructure in the area of environmental hygiene (EH) and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) were used to achieve these goals.

Key findings

The project is overall rated as “moderately successful”, as the results are below expectations in terms of relevance and the overarching developmental impacts.

- Due to avoidable shortcomings in the design (e.g. small-scaled nature of the measures), the relevance of the project is rated as only moderately successful, even if it was strongly aligned with the policies, priorities and needs of the participants.
- The project and the corresponding support from UNRWA in Lebanon were predominantly tailored to other measures within and outside German DC to cope with the consequences of the Syrian crisis.
- The impacts achieved at outcome level in the area of EH/WASH remain despite the complex and volatile environment and are therefore rated as successful.
- The project’s production efficiency from the project-executing agency’s perspective and allocation efficiency from the target group’s perspective are also rated as successful, as services to meet the basic needs of PRS were provided in line with expectations.
- It was possible to contribute to alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian crisis for PRS and PRL. However, at the overarching development policy level, social cohesion has not been strengthened.
- With regard to the socio-economic and political context, the project assumed a limited sustainability claim. However, it is expected that UNRWA will be able to continue generating positive effects of the social services offered in the camps with the necessary funding.

Overall rating:
moderately successful



Conclusions

- The combination of several measures, such as money transfers on the one hand and measures and strategy concepts regarding EH/WASH on the other, makes it difficult to clearly allocate FC measures and impacts, and entails a high level of effort for the project-executing agency for follow-up and reporting.
- Overarching developmental impacts are offset by the serious effects of the Lebanese economic crisis, which means that the social situation of the target group is still precarious.
- In order to address the ongoing social tensions and the high escalation potential in the camps, in addition to infrastructure measures or money transfers, violence-preventing services and psychosocial care services for girls and women are also essential.

Ex-post evaluation – rating according to OECD-DAC criteria

General conditions and classification of the project

More than a decade of bloody civil war in Syria has led to massive refugee movements to neighbouring countries.¹ At the end of 2022, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) counted more than 814 thousand refugees from Syria.² Under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) mandate, there were 487 thousand Palestine refugees from Lebanon (PRL) registered at the same time.³ In addition, from 2012 onwards – also under UNRWA mandate – there were Syrian Palestinians who had fled to Lebanon due to the Syrian war (Palestine Refugees from Syria/PRS). In terms of the total population of 6.8 million, Lebanon was the country with the second highest proportion of refugees worldwide. The large refugee population exacerbates the pressure on resources and makes access to basic social services in the host communities more difficult, particularly for poor population groups. This also applies to UNRWA's camps for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which suffered from insufficient infrastructure in need of repair even before the Syrian crisis.

Lebanon is classified with the “Alert” warning level on the Fragile States Index – a category that includes countries like Uganda and Niger.⁴ Since the country's division into rival political camps in 2006, the state institutions have barely been able to fulfil their duties; corruption is perceived as endemic.⁵ Nationwide mass protests in 2019 and 2020 openly questioned the legitimacy of the exclusive exercise of political rule by three religious communities (Maronites, Sunni, Shia). The “national crisis as a normal condition”,⁶ in which Lebanon has been for years, makes it difficult to overcome the humanitarian and economic challenges that have also arisen as a result of the conflict in neighbouring Syria. The macroeconomic dynamic has been stagnating for years or is even negative.⁷ Inflation-adjusted gross national income (GNI) per capita fell by almost 30% in just a few years, from USD 7,964 in 2016 to USD 5,871 six years later.⁸ Basic social services can only be maintained with significant financial support from the international donor community; over the period 2016–2021, annual net ODA inflows to Lebanon averaged 26.8% of government spending or USD 225 per capita.⁹

Brief description of the project

In order to contribute to stabilising neighbouring countries in the Syrian crisis and to reduce the crisis' impact on refugees, the FC project “Supporting refugees and host communities in the countries bordering Syria” used funds from the special initiative “Tackling the root causes of displacement, reintegrating refugees” to finance UNRWA money transfers in Phase I and II to PRS as well as measures and strategic concepts for improving basic services and infrastructure in the area of environmental hygiene (EH)/WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) in UNRWA refugee camps in Lebanon. In addition to PRS, the target group also included PRL who lived in one of the twelve official refugee camps in Lebanon. Due to safety concerns, the planned component “Rehabilitation of

¹ By the end of 2022, 6.5 million people had fled Syria; UNHCR (2023): Global Trends 2022, p. 19.

² <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=IdUPk7> (accessed: 20 June 2023)

³ UNHCR (2023): Global Trends 2022, p. 3, note 7. UNRWA estimates, however, assume that no more than 250,000 Palestinian refugees are currently in Lebanon; <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon> (accessed: 20 June 2022).

⁴ Fund for Peace (2023): Fragile States Index Annual Report 2023, Washington DC, p. 7. The World Bank has long classified Lebanon as an FCV state, a state in which fragility, conflict and violence cause systemic national failures, with regional effects and potentially global consequences; World Bank (2021): Lebanon Economic Monitor: Lebanon Sinking (To the Top 3), Washington DC, p. xi.

⁵ In the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, Lebanon ranked one of the last places, alongside Tajikistan and Nigeria; Transparency International (2023): 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, Berlin, p. 3.

⁶ World Bank (2023): Lebanon Economic Monitor: The Normalization of Crisis Is No Road for Stabilization, Washington DC.

⁷ On average, overall creation of economic value in Lebanon fell by 6.4% annually between 2016 and 2020; data on the development of Lebanese gross domestic product is no longer published by the International Monetary Fund for years from 2021 onwards due to unusually high statistical uncertainty; International Monetary Fund (2023): World Economic Outlook, April, Washington DC, p. 118 and p. 248.


⁸ World development indicators: Lebanon GNI per capita (in constant 2015 USD). <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators> (accessed: 23 June 2023).

⁹ World development indicators: Lebanon Net ODA received % of central government expense; Net ODA current USD received per capita.

shared accommodations” in Phase I could not be implemented; the funds allocated for this were used for infrastructure measures and the WASH component.¹⁰

Map/satellite image of the project country including project areas

Project locations



Breakdown of total costs

		Phase I Inv. (planned)	Phase I Inv. (actual)	Phase II Inv. (planned)	Phase II Inv. (actual)
Investment costs* (total)	EUR million	5.0	5.0	5.8	5.8
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Debt financing	EUR million	5.0	5.0	5.8	5.8
<i>Of which BMZ funds</i>	<i>EUR million</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>5.8</i>	<i>5.8</i>

* Total grant to UNRWA

¹⁰ In Phase I of the FC project (BMZ no. 2014 406 27), UNICEF was – in addition to UNRWA – also the project-executing agency for the “Supporting Vulnerable School-Aged Children Affected by the Syria Crisis in Lebanon” module; however, these measures were not part of the ex post evaluation.

Rating according to OECD-DAC criteria

Relevance

Policy and priority focus

The objectives of Phase I and Phase II of the project, to reduce the impact of the Syrian crisis on PRS and PRL in the UNWRA refugee camps in Lebanon, as well as the corresponding support from UNRWA, were in line with the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's (BMZ) development policies and priorities. The objective was also aligned with the priorities and policies of the Lebanese government and its national and international partners, as formulated, among other things, in the corresponding Lebanon Crisis Response Plans (LCRP), which were part of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP).¹¹ Although the number of refugees moving from Syria to Lebanon has fallen since the start of the implementation of Phase I at the beginning of 2015, the plans have not lost urgency to this day, as Lebanon is still one of the countries with the highest numbers of refugees worldwide (see framework conditions and classification of the project).¹²

Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders

The strain on basic infrastructure in host countries identified as a core problem in the module proposal for Phase I from 2014 October coupled with the threat to social cohesion and growing potential for escalation was highly applicable for the UNWRA refugee camps in Lebanon. In addition to social tensions and violent protests, the UNWRA refugee camps were and are primarily characterised by, at times, insufficient infrastructure in need of repair and high material poverty among residents, especially among PRS. For example, a survey in 2015, the first year of implementation of Phase I, showed that 89% of PRS in Lebanon lived below the poverty line and had even less funds available than PRL, whose social situation is also considered precarious due to limited work permits and a poor macroeconomic situation, among other things.¹³

The improvement of infrastructure and basic services in the area of EH/WASH intended in Phases I and II, as well as the planned rehabilitation of community accommodations, were in line with the needs of PRL and PRS, who suffered from congested facilities in need of repair, as well as lack of services in the camps and the associated negative health consequences. Likewise, the financing of cash transfers for food, rental subsidies, winter aid and heating for PRS planned in Phases I and II was geared towards the needs of this population group. The fact that, in principle, all Palestinian refugees from Syria were entitled to cash transfers – regardless of whether they found refuge within or outside of a refugee camp in Lebanon – can be assessed as sensible from the point of view of the time and today, as the majority of PRS were destitute and lived below the poverty line. In addition, targeting certain groups among PRS would have been associated with unjustifiable administrative costs for the project-executing agency.

However, for vulnerable groups among PRL, such as chronically ill people or families with children, no cash transfer payments were planned in Phases I and II. Overall, no special measures for women or the inclusion of women were intended in Phases I and II, and gender impact potentials were therefore not addressed.

Appropriateness of design

From a conceptual perspective, the financing of infrastructure measures was fundamentally suitable for contributing to solving the core problem – the strain on basic infrastructure in the UNWRA refugee camps. Similarly, the infrastructure measures, the financing of cash transfers and the rehabilitation of community accommodation were expected to contribute to curbing the growing potential for escalation in the camps and strengthening social cohesion. This assumption is supported, for example, by an evaluation of the UNHCR's Regional Winterization Assistance Plan, which shows that the payment of cash transfers strengthened mutual support between beneficiaries and other community members and led to less tension in the beneficiaries' households and between refugees and the host community.¹⁴ Despite these positive findings, however, unequal access to cash transfers is also

¹¹ The respective LCRP and 3RP can be found at <https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/> (accessed: 5 August 2023).

¹² The number of PRS fell from 42,189 (2015) to 31,400 (2023); the number of Syrian refugees from 1.1 million (2015) to 814,000 (2022); United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2015): Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015, p. 5 and Government of Lebanon and the United Nations (2023): Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2023, p. 7ff.

¹³ Chaaban, Jad et al. (2016): "Survey on the Socioeconomic Status of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon 2015".

¹⁴ Lehmann, C./Masterson, D. (2014): Impact evaluation of a cash-transfer programme for Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

always associated with risks of conflicts and social tensions, which should have been taken into account more closely in the design of Phases I and II, as cash transfers were only intended for PRS and not for vulnerable groups among PRL.

In choosing UNRWA, a project-executing agency was selected that pursued a sustainable development approach despite annual financing deficits. UNRWA also had professional structures to implement the FC funds for the various measures efficiently and in a needs-based manner. However, the precise measures were only put into concrete terms during implementation of the respective phases and followed the needs expressed by UNRWA more than the conceptual considerations on the part of FC. This limited the scope for incorporating KfW's sector-specific expertise into the design, which included both the areas of EH/WASH and cash transfers. The result was that conceptual added value that could have resulted from KfW's participation in this type of financing and implementation of the project was not exhausted.

In terms of focusing on impact, the combination of cash transfers, measures and strategy concepts to improve basic services and infrastructure in the area of EH/WASH generally made the clear allocation of FC measures and impacts difficult, also because the FC funds were only intended for some of the recipients of cash transfers. In any case, FC did not base the phases on a results chain or set indicators and corresponding target values. The target system was also not adapted to the different sectors in which measures were implemented or differentiated according to outcome and impact level.

Due to the latter point, the target system for Phases I and II was established ex post and was as follows: The objective at outcome level was to improve the basic infrastructure in the UNRWA refugee camps and to maintain or provide basic services of appropriate quality that are used by PRS and PRL. The aim at impact level was to contribute to mitigating the worst effects of the Syrian conflict on PRS and PRL and to strengthening social cohesion between these refugee groups. This takes into account the distinction between different impact levels and the dual objective (FS 1 classification), as well as qualitative aspects and the use of generated outputs.

Response to changes / adaptability

In both phases, the planned durations were extended at no extra cost. The reason for the time delay in Phase I was primarily due to volatile security situations in individual regions, which is why the rehabilitation of shared accommodations in these regions was not performed. The freed-up funds were diverted for measures in the WASH sector. In Phase II, implementation was extended, in particular due to delayed approval procedures and delivery difficulties. At the same time, measures such as the waste management strategy were completed earlier than expected in Phase II, which is why funds were allocated to concluding the pilot implementation of this strategy. The respective term extensions and reallocation of funds took place in coordination with KfW and are to be assessed as inevitable in the light of external, changing framework conditions.

Rating summary:

Overall, the projects are characterised by a successful response to change/adaptability and a strong alignment with policies and priorities. However, an assessment of the relevance reveals avoidable faults in the appropriateness of the design and in the alignment with the needs of vulnerable groups, which is why both phases are assessed as only moderately successful overall.

Relevance: 3

Coherence

Internal coherence

Phase I and Phase II were part of the FC regional project "Supporting refugees and host communities in the countries bordering Syria" and were the first two phases of a total of four UNRWA financing phases in Lebanon. In addition to financing UNRWA, financing was committed to UNICEF in Lebanon in Phase I.¹⁵ In Phase II, on the other hand, there was only a financing commitment to UNRWA in Lebanon, as well as in Phases III and IV, which continued support for PRS and PRL in the UNRWA refugee camps in Lebanon. The respective phases were supplemented by the FC regional programme "Regional Programme for the Improvement of the Living Conditions of

¹⁵ Cf. footnote 10.

Palestine Refugees in and close to the Camps (REPAC)", by FC projects to promote employment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and by FC projects to support refugees and rebuild infrastructure in and around Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. In addition to the provision of humanitarian funds by the Foreign Office for Lebanon, several projects were also implemented there by TC during the implementation period of Phases I and II, such as those to strengthen the social participation of Palestinian refugees or to support the development of the UNRWA Solid Waste Management strategy.¹⁶

Due to the urgency of the projects, the different budget funds and the specification of measures during implementation, consistent synergy effects and a clear division of work within German DC cannot be fully confirmed as part of the EPE, e.g., in the area of waste management. Therefore, despite the joint reporting by TC and FC, overlaps cannot be completely ruled out, as measures had to be repeatedly adjusted in terms of time and content due to the volatile security situation in the camps. At the end of the implementation period, there was also the destabilisation of UNRWA due to an intensifying financial crisis as a result of the suspension of payments by the USA and accusations of mismanagement, which is why reform requirements at UNRWA were also increasingly supported by German DC. This was intended to ensure that UNRWA behaves consistently with international norms and standards to which German DC is committed, such as transparency, participation and accountability.¹⁷

External coherence

The LCRP ensured external coherence by embedding UNRWA's involvement in Lebanon and thus also for Phases I and II of the FC project evaluated in this report. These plans were jointly adopted by the Lebanese Government and its international and national partners and were part of the 3R plans which, due to existing national structures and systems in the neighbouring countries of Syria, assigned UNRWA a clear role in supplying PRS (cf. Relevance | Policy and priority focus). Overall, in addition to strengthening the ownership of the host countries, the 3R plans aimed to improve coordination and cooperation between different actors and to use a common system for monitoring, evaluation and accountability. An evaluation of the 3RPs from 2015 to 2021 showed that the plans largely fulfilled their regional strategy and coordination function, although at national level there was still room for improvement in terms of design and learning. The plans were also effective in terms of procurement of funds.¹⁸ In 2015 – the first year of implementation of Phase I – the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Kuwait and the European Union were among the largest donors alongside Germany, some of which also provided indirectly support UNRWA.

Rating summary:

Despite some deficits, we still rate the internal and external coherence of Phases I and II as successful, as the measures of Phases I and II and the corresponding support from UNRWA in Lebanon were predominantly tailored to other measures within and outside of German DC to deal with the consequences of the Syrian crisis.

Coherence: 2

Effectiveness

Achievement of (intended) targets

The outcome-level objective adjusted as part of the EPE to maintain or provide qualitatively appropriate basic services in the UNRWA refugee camps and to improve basic infrastructure used by PRS and PRL was largely achieved in Phases I and II.¹⁹

¹⁶ Information on the project can be found at <https://www.giz.de/projektdaten/region/2/countries/LB> (accessed: 12 August 2023).

¹⁷ For example, the TC project "Supporting UNRWA in Lebanon in practising their accountability", implemented in January 2019 promotes the improvement of UNRWA's transparency and accountability towards Palestinian refugees by developing and institutionalising mechanisms and structures that ensure greater transparency and participation of the refugee community.

¹⁸ The report can be found at https://www.3rpsriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/3RP_evaluation_June2022.pdf (accessed: 14 August 2023).

¹⁹ The question of the extent to which the basic services can be assessed as qualitatively appropriate is answered in the subsection "Contribution to achieving the targets".

Phase I

The basic services provided by UNRWA, which were financed with FC funds, included cash transfers to PRS for food and housing (Component 1 (C1)). In Phase I, according to the UNRWA Final Report from December 2016, a total of 34,554 individuals benefited from cash transfers for food (C1a) for the months of February, March, April and October 2015²⁰ and 11,732 families benefited from cash transfers for housing (C1b) in March 2015 as well as 3,756 families in April 2015. The target value of 41,000 beneficiaries stated in the project completion report corresponded to the estimated number of PRS in Lebanon at the start of the implementation of Phase I. Although not all estimated beneficiaries were reached monthly, the FC funds from Phase I made a contribution to the availability of basic services in the corresponding periods, which is why the target is regarded as partially achieved in the implementation period.²¹

The multiple measures in the area of EH/WASH also contributed to the improvement of basic infrastructure and the maintenance of basic services, such as waste disposal or access to drinking water in the 12 UNRWA camps in Lebanon. For example, FC funds financed annual salaries for waste disposal companies as well as waste collection vehicles/equipment and equipment to improve the drinking water supply and quality. In addition, FC funds were used to finance rehabilitation and construction measures in the areas of supplying fresh water and wastewater disposal.²² Since the measures were implemented across different camps, it is plausible to assume that more than the 22,000 PRL and PRS set as a target value in the project completion report benefited from the services and infrastructure, even beyond the implementation period of Phase I.²³ For example, a random on-site inspection of measures in the area of WASH in November 2020, which covered more than 50% of the investment volume, showed that the installed infrastructure was in satisfactory condition. Due to wear and tear, not all financed machinery and vehicles were in operation at the time of the EPE. However, according to those responsible at UNRWA, the remaining waste collection vehicles and equipment were in an acceptable condition and were used. According to UNRWA employees, the WASH infrastructure was also in good condition due to continuous maintenance work.

Indicator	Target value PCR	Actual value during the implementation period	Actual value at EPE
(1) Recipients of cash transfers	41,000 PRS per month	35,554 people (C1a: 4 months) 11,732/3,756 families (C1b: 2 months) → partially achieved	Is outside the scope of the evaluation due to the selective financing
(2) Beneficiaries of measures in the area of EH/WASH	22,000 PRS and PRL	> 22,000 → achieved	Since the EH/WASH infrastructure is in an acceptable to good condition, the target is still considered achieved.

Source: Project completion report and UNRWA final report

Phase II

In Phase II, according to the UNRWA Final Report from August 2019, 10,481 families benefited from unconditional cash transfers in May 2016, 10,347 families in June 2016, and 6,216 families in July 2016. It is uncertain whether the target value of 41,000 eligible persons per month was achieved, according to the project completion report, as the information refer to families. Overall, however, the objective of maintenance or availability of basic services in the corresponding periods is also seen as at least partially achieved.

²⁰ The efficiency assessment assumes 8,638 beneficiaries per month, which corresponds to the average number of persons for the four-month cash transfer for food.

²¹ Seven years after implementation, it was no longer possible to reconstruct whether eligible persons did not receive cash payments in the periods under review. It is also possible that the number of eligible persons during the implementation period was already below the value of 41,000, as the number of PRS has been continuously declining since the start of implementation.

²² The measures in the area of EH/WASH were monitored during the implementation period and beyond, among other things with the help of a TE, and potential for improvement was identified.

²³ During the EPE, it was also no longer possible to reconstruct the assumptions on which this target value of 22,000 PRL and PRS in the project completion report was based. However, the target value could have been set higher, as it was already known at the time of the project completion report that the measures covered several camps and can therefore be used by more than 22,000 PRL and PRS.

In the area of EH/WASH during Phase II, FC funds were used to finance costs for the removal and disposal of solid waste for a one- or two-year period in various camps. Waste ramps were also rehabilitated and – as in Phase I – various vehicles and equipment were procured to improve environmental hygiene and the quality of the drinking water supply. Phase II also involved the development and implementation of plans for an integrated waste management system and several rehabilitation measures in the area of fresh water supply and wastewater disposal, in particular of wells and water supply networks. Just like in Phase I, the diverse measures were implemented in various camps, which is why it can be assumed that more than 22,000 PRL and PRS used the services and infrastructure. In addition, a random on-site inspection of measures in the WASH sector in November 2020 was also assessed as satisfactory, and a survey of UNRWA employees at the time of the EPE confirmed that the Phase II EH/WASH infrastructure is in an acceptable to good condition and in use, although not all created services were in operation here either.²⁴

Indicator	Target value PCR	Actual value during the implementation period	Actual value at EPE
(1) Recipients of cash transfers	41,000 PRS per month	10,481 / 10,347 / 6,216 families (C1: 3 months) → partially achieved	Is outside the scope of the evaluation due to the selective financing
(2) Beneficiaries of measures in the area of EH/WASH	22,000 PRS and PRL	> 22,000 → achieved	Since the EH/WASH infrastructure is in an acceptable to good condition, the target is still considered achieved.

Source: Project completion report and UNRWA final report

Contribution to achieving targets

It is plausible that the FC funds in Phase I and II contributed to the goals of UNRWA's overall commitment in Lebanon, even though the FC funds were only part of a much larger overall budget that UNRWA used in the 12 refugee camps in Lebanon to achieve the agency's strategic objectives at outcome level, such as protecting health or meeting basic needs.²⁵

From a target group perspective, an evaluation from March 2023 with regard to Component 1 shows that beneficiaries saw cash transfers as the most effective measure as part of the Emergency Appeal²⁶ to cover basic needs and use the transfer payment to cover the costs of food, rent, transport and electricity.²⁷ Adjusting the design of conditional food and housing aid in Phase I to unconditional payments in Phase II was not only assessed as a more qualitatively appropriate service for the beneficiaries as part of the evaluation, but also involved a lower administrative expense for UNRWA and a lower expense for beneficiaries in proving eligibility.

With regard to Component 2, on-site visits to the camps in November 2020 and interviews with UNRWA employees during the EPE also show that the FC-financed measures in the area of EH/WASH continued to contribute to ensuring that solid waste could be disposed of regularly and that the quality and quantity of drinking the water supply improved. The FC measures made a substantial contribution to meeting the technical requirements for a continuous and qualitatively adequate drinking water supply and regular waste disposal.

For both components, neither women nor other specific groups were explicitly involved in the development and implementation of the measures, even though UNRWA generally ensures that the camp residents in all refugee camps are involved in the maintenance and repair of the infrastructure in order to prevent vandalism and

²⁴ The fact that UNRWA Lebanon has its own engineering department had a positive effect on the condition of the infrastructure.

²⁵ The strategic objectives can be found in the Medium Term Strategy 2016–2021 at https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/mts_2016_2021.pdf (accessed: 16 August 2023).

²⁶ The Emergency Appeal finances emergency aid measures for Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian territories, for PRS in Lebanon and Jordan, and for Palestinian refugees who remain in Syria.

²⁷ The report "Evaluation of the UNRWA Emergency Appeals for the OPT and Syria Regional Crisis 2016–21" can be found at https://www.UNRWA.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/final_report_unrwa_emergency_appeal_evaluation2_1.pdf (accessed: 16 August 2023).

structural violence. The fact that no specific groups were included in Component 1 was also due to the emergency aid character of the measure and the great need of all PRS (cf. Relevance | Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders). However, the decision to disburse cash transfers to women, for example, could have created the added benefit of empowering women.

In addition, there were differences in access to services in Component 1. For example, during initial implementation of Phase I, the cash transfers were reserved for PRS, PRL were not supported, which led to tensions. However, towards the end of the implementation of Phase II, UNRWA also paid cash transfers to PRL classified as the most vulnerable, which was not financed with the FC funds from Phase I or II. The most vulnerable population groups among PRL included families with children up to five years of age, older people and chronically ill people.

Quality of implementation

Overall, UNRWA was characterised by satisfactory quality in the management and implementation of the measures in Phases I and II, but failed in some cases to build up sufficient institutional capacities or to exchange information with other actors in order to adequately take into account current findings and developments.²⁸ In addition, UNRWA is also characterised in Lebanon in particular by a highly volatile political and economic environment, which had a negative impact on the quality of implementation and the planned implementation period, e.g. due to delayed approval procedures and delivery difficulties (cf. Relevance | Response to changes / adaptability). There were also violent protests in UNRWA refugee camps during the implementation period. Overall, UNRWA's work is still characterised by a violent environment, which also affects children and women in particular. The various risks and incidents are monitored regularly by UNRWA, e.g. as part of the UNRWA Protection Monitoring Report. UNRWA also tries to address certain risks through targeted programmes, such as violence against women, etc.

Unintended impacts (positive or negative)

One of the unintended effects of UNRWA's involvement for PRS included tensions within the group of Palestinian refugees, as cash transfers were reserved for PRS (cf. Impact | Contribution to impact (unintended)).²⁹ However, cash transfers also had positive effects. For example, beneficiaries indicated that the cash transfers prevented further deterioration of their economic situation and a need to fall back on negative coping mechanisms, such as the need to go into debt or cut down on meals.³⁰ It can also be assumed that, in addition to cash transfers, the salaries financing of waste management companies in Phase I had positive impact by improving the purchasing power of employee. Salary financing also included social security contributions and company social benefits, such as transport and health insurance.

Rating summary:

Despite the complex and volatile environment in which the measures of Phase I and Phase II were implemented, the objectives at outcome level were largely achieved and still exist today in the area of EH/WASH. Therefore, we rate the effectiveness of both phases as in line with expectations, without significant shortcomings.

Effectiveness: 2

Efficiency

Production efficiency

UNRWA, as the project-executing agency, was not obliged to submit detailed cost and performance accounts to KfW for the measures implemented. This was in line with the standard procedure (Single-Audit Principle) for Financial Cooperation with UN organisations. UNRWA and/or the Lebanese government did not make any counterpart contributions to financing the project measures. Both phases of the project demonstrated financial

²⁸ This is also the conclusion of the report "Evaluation of UNRWA's transition to the e-card modality in the Jordan, Lebanon and West Bank Fields". The report can be found at <https://dios.unrwa.org/evaluation-unrwas-transition-e-card-modality-jordan-lebanon-and-west-bank-fields> (accessed: 16 August 2023).


²⁹ Evaluation of the UNRWA Emergency Appeals for the OPT and Syria Regional Crisis 2016–21, p. 31.

³⁰ Final Evaluation of Phase Three Support through the EU Madad Fund; available at <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/dios-and-evaluation/final-evaluation-madad-iii-support-lebanon-and-jordan> (accessed 16 August 2023).

additionality of the use of public FC funds, as private capital markets had not financed the cash transfers for PRS or the development and expansion of the water supply and sanitation in the UNRWA camps.


Phase I

The financial report prepared by UNRWA at the end of December 2016 shows the following cost structure for Phase I of the project: Of the used FC funds amounting to EUR 5.0 million (USD 6,180,607), USD 5.477 million (85.93%) could be attributed to the cost of the project; UNRWA also charged USD 160,000 (2.6%) overhead costs and USD 404 thousand as a flat-rate management fee (6.5% of the total cost of the project).



Own data. Data source: UNRWA Financial Report December 2016.


An exact breakdown of the financial inputs to the outputs in the project's components cannot be reconstructed from UNRWA's accounting documents, nor does the project completion report contain any detailed information on this. It is only possible to break down the total costs by cost type. Cash transfers accounted for the largest share of the financial input, accounting for 40% of the costs; a further 39% was paid for services that third parties abandoned on behalf of UNRWA (construction measures and equipment, consultants). UNRWA project management (including personnel, procurement of goods, overhead costs) accounted for close to 14% of the total costs. The flat-rate management fee amounting to 7% of the direct cost of the project (or 6.54% of the total costs) is assessed as appropriate in view of the difficult framework conditions, especially as it was slightly lower than for comparable FC projects with UNRWA as the executing agency.³¹ In any case, UNRWA, as the project-executing agency, was de facto given a monopoly position, meaning that there was no room for negotiation with regard to the flat-rate administrative expenses to be reimbursed.



Own data. Data source: UNRWA Financial Report December 2016.

³¹ For the FC project "Education and Health Program UNRWA – Gaza and West Bank", the flat-rate administrative fee charged by UNRWA was 9.9% of the total costs; cf. EPE BMZ no. 2019 69 245 (Phase II) and 2020 68 625 (Phase III).

The planned outputs were largely achieved in the components of money transfers for food (C1a) and housing (C1b) as well as improvement of infrastructure and basic services (C2a), in some cases even exceeded (cf. Effectiveness). In the case of money transfers, C1a accounted for 15% of the total costs, C1b³² for 25% and C2a for a further 53%. The focus of the financial inputs on these outputs corresponded to the living conditions of the PRS characterised by multidimensional poverty, chronic diseases and social exclusion.³³ For safety reasons, the planned rehabilitation component for shared accommodations (C2b) had to be omitted.




Own data. Data source: Final report on the UNRWA Special Initiative on Displacement, Lebanon (Phase I), 2021, p. 5.

For Phase I of the project, a term of 12 months ending on 31 December 2015 was planned after the conclusion of the financing contract in December 2014. However, due to the tense safety situation in the camps, UNRWA applied for two cost-neutral extensions, initially until 30 June 2016 and then until the end of December 2016. Thus, the actual implementation phase was 24 months, and the project completion report could not be submitted until July 2021 due to capacity bottlenecks.

Phase II

The project's cost structure can be derived from the financial report submitted by UNRWA at the end of July 2019. Of the used FC funds amounting to EUR 5.8 million (USD 6,374,174), USD 5.477 million (85.93%) were used to finance the cost of the project; UNRWA also charged USD 480,000 (7.5%) for overhead costs and USD 417,000 as a flat-rate management fee (6.5% of the total cost of the project). Compared to Phase I, significantly higher overhead costs were incurred in Phase II, mainly due to the development of strategic concepts and operational implementation plans for waste disposal in the 12 refugee camps.




Own data. Data source: UNRWA Financial Report July 2019.

³² The monthly payments by transferring funds to electronic money cards developed by UNRWA instead of cash payment improved the compliance check; whether this payment method also led to a significant cost reduction could not be verified as part of the EPE.


³³ Cf. Chaaban, Jad et al. (2016).

As in Phase I, an exact breakdown of the financial inputs to the outputs in the project components cannot be reconstructed from the UNRWA accounting documents for Phase II; detailed information is also missing in the project completion report. It is only possible to break down the total costs by cost type; this shows that, at 42% of the costs, cash transfers accounted for the largest share of financial inputs. A further 29% was paid for services provided by third parties on behalf of UNRWA (construction measures and equipment, consultants). UNRWA project management (including personnel, procurement of goods, overhead costs) accounted for 22% of the total costs. The flat-rate management fee charged by UNRWA for Phase II was identical to the flat-rate fee in Phase I at 7% of the direct cost of the project (or 6.54% of the total costs).



Own data. Data source: UNRWA Financial Report July 2019.

The planned outputs in the cash transfer component (C1) and improvement of infrastructure and basic services component (C2a) were fully achieved, in some cases even exceeded. C1 accounted for 42% of the total costs³⁴ and C2a for 40%. In Phase II, too, the focused financial inputs met the most pressing needs of the target group.³⁵ For the “Strategic concept for waste disposal” output (C2b) – as preliminary services for follow-up phases – 11% of the financial inputs were used (cf. Effectiveness).



Own data. Data source: Final report on the UNRWA Special Initiative on Displacement, Lebanon (Phase II), 2021, p. 6.

The duration of Phase II of the project was originally expected to be 24 months, but it was actually 43 months before the project was officially completed at the end of July 2019 and another 24 months before the project

³⁴ The monthly payments by transferring funds to electronic money cards developed by UNRWA instead of cash payment improved the compliance check, and the changed payment method also reduced transaction costs; see section on Allocation efficiency.

³⁵ Cf. UNRWA (2020): Socio-economic survey on Palestine refugees from Syria living in Lebanon, Beirut, Section IV and Section VI.

completion report was submitted in July 2021. Following the conclusion of the financing contract at the beginning of December 2019, three cost-neutral extensions of the term had to be agreed with UNRWA, as external approval procedures for construction measures were delayed, delivery difficulties occurred in the EH/WASH component, and remaining project funds were to be paid out.

When assessing time efficiency, it should be taken into account for both phases that the collapse of public life in Lebanon was part of everyday life at times during the implementation period. Implementation of the measures was massively hampered by the volatile political environment, enhanced by nationwide mass protests in 2019, and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic at the beginning of 2020. In view of this situation, the time efficiency of the project is rated as moderately successful.

Taking into account the extremely difficult framework conditions, the production efficiency of the project in both phases can be assessed as successful overall, as the results are without significant deficiencies and in line with expectations.

Allocation efficiency

Statements on the allocation efficiency of Phase II of the FC project can only be derived indirectly from the available data by interpreting the number of beneficiaries³⁶ as an indicator of output utilisation from the perspective of the target group.

Phase I

UNRWA money transfers for food financed with FC funds in February, March, April and October 2015 for 8,638 people, 37 each month, with monthly costs of USD 27.25 per beneficiary (USD 29.03 including the pro rata UNRWA management fee). Money transfers for housing were made in March and April 2015 for an average of 27,104 people each, at a monthly cost of USD 28.35 per person (USD 30.21 including the pro rata UNRWA management fee).

According to our calculations, 21,121 people benefited from the infrastructure measures for EH/WASH improvement in the 12 camps, the direct costs of amounted to USD 156.14 per person or USD 166.67 including a pro rata UNRWA management fee.

Phase II

A monthly average of 33,846 people³⁸ received cash transfers in May, June and July 2016 with direct costs of USD 26.39 per beneficiary (USD 28.12 including UNRWA pro rata management fee). Unlike in Phase I, money transfers were not divided into specific purposes for housing and food, but instead only one transfer was made in each case. This resulted in efficiency gains in the form of lower per capita costs: in Phase I, the arithmetic mean of costs per person weighted by the number of beneficiaries was USD 29.92, compared to USD 28.12 in Phase II.

According to our calculations, 21,121 people benefited from the infrastructure measures to improve EH/WASH in the 12 camps³⁹, the direct costs of which amounted to USD 121.20 per person or USD 129.13 including a pro rata UNRWA management fee. Compared to Phase I, this meant a cost reduction of around 22 percentage points. Overall, however, the costs of the WASH measures per beneficiary were significantly more cost-intensive in both phases than the comparable WASH measures of a 2016 FC project with UNICEF as the project-executing agency in Jordan (USD 41.44 per beneficiary).⁴⁰ However, it must be noted in this comparison that the price level and inflation rates in Lebanon were significantly higher than in Jordan, and delayed approval procedures and

³⁶ For both phases, the project completion report and UNRWA final reports contain, in some cases, strongly differing information on the number of beneficiaries in the individual components. In addition, the numbers of beneficiaries mentioned include instances of multiple counting, as identical persons could be eligible in each of the months in which money was transferred; the allocation efficiency evaluation is therefore based on the number of beneficiaries per month on average over the payment periods, which lasted several months.


³⁷ Beneficiaries per month on average for the four-month cash transfer for food in 2015.

³⁸ The figure in the project completion report (Section 4.04) and in the UNRWA Final Report (p. 6) of 101,539 beneficiaries of cash transfers in the three-month period contains instances of multiple counting, as identical persons could be eligible in each of the three months; the assessment of the allocation efficiency is therefore based on the number of beneficiaries per month on average of the three-month cash transfers May to July 2016.

³⁹ In the project completion report (Section 4.10), a total population of 220,000 in the 12 UNRWA refugee camps in Lebanon is named as beneficiaries, while the UNRWA Final Report (p. 2) names 29,000 persons as beneficiaries. For our assessment of the allocation efficiency, we assume 21,121 beneficiaries, which corresponds to 51% of the PRS registered by the UNRWA Lebanon Field Office at the end of 2015 in the 12 camps; cf. UNRWA (2019): Maintaining the resilience of Palestine refugees from Syria in Jordan and Lebanon, p. 13.

⁴⁰ Cf. EPE "UNICEF Jordan, WASH Berm and Education/NLG" (BMZ no. 2016 18 594).

delivery difficulties led to higher costs; in addition, the WASH measures for the project in Jordan were concentrated on only three camps, while the EH/WASH activities in the Lebanon project we evaluated were carried out in 12 camps, increasing costs.



Own data. Datenquelle: Eigene Berechnung.

Methodologically comparable statements on the allocation efficiency of the waste disposal strategy development component (C2b) for the 12 camps in Lebanon derived from the perspective of the target group cannot be formulated, as there were no direct beneficiaries during the duration of the project. The possible implementation of the strategy recommendations was only possible in follow-up phases.

With the limitation that statements on the allocation efficiency of the FC project can only be derived indirectly for both phases due to limited data availability, the allocation efficiency is assessed as successful.

Rating summary:

The efficiency assessment takes into account that alternative design options were not available for the project's design, but the project also contributed to closing the UNRWA budget gap, so that services to meet the basic needs of PRS could be provided. With regard to the difficult framework conditions under which UNRWA operates in Lebanon and the results that meet expectations, the project's production efficiency is assessed as successful from the project-executing agency's perspective. We also rate the allocation efficiency of the project as successful from the perspective of the target group. Time efficiency is rated as moderately successful. Taking into account all evaluation dimensions, we rate the efficiency of the project as successful overall.

Efficiency: 2

Overarching developmental Impacts

Contribution to impact (intended)

The impact-level objective adjusted as part of the EPE was to contribute to mitigating the worst effects of the Syrian conflict on PRS and PRL and to strengthening social cohesion between these refugee groups.

One of the worst effects of the Syrian conflict on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was the intensification of the overcrowding of UNRWA camps and the pressure on the technical and social infrastructure there as well as on basic services, the lack of which has a detrimental effect on fundamental individual and societal conditions for development policy changes.

Since it has been possible in recent years to maintain basic services in the UNRWA refugee camps and to improve basic infrastructure, it is plausible that the target was achieved – the goal of alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian conflict on PRS and PRL, in which the situation of hunger, cold, lack of water and poor hygiene conditions could be cushioned.

Target achievement with regard to the strengthening of social cohesion between PRL and PRS is less clear. In the past, UNRWA has observed – in some cases increasingly – tensions or conflicts between PRL and PRS,

which were primarily related to the perception of different access to UNRWA aid. There were also sometimes violent to fatal conflicts between rival Palestinian groups in the UNRWA camps.⁴¹

Contribution to overarching developmental changes (intended)

Despite plausible reasons that the FC project contributed to alleviating the worst effects for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon with regard to its support of basic services and infrastructure creation, the social situation of PRL and PRS has changed little to date. For example, the proportion of PRLs who have to live below the poverty line has seen a massive increase from 65% (2016) to 80% (2023). The poverty rate is also high and unchanged among PRS (89% (2015); 87% (2020)).⁴² In addition, there is a tense food situation for many PRS and PRL.⁴³ These developments can be attributed primarily to the economic and political crisis in Lebanon in recent years, which is so profound that it is able to counteract any improvements at the overarching development policy level that were brought about by the FC project or the overall involvement of UNRWA. Due to the economic crisis, for example, waste disposal in the camps is a challenge because municipal landfill sites have been closed and are now only operated privately – for a fee. Continuous water supply is also not possible in the camps due to the economic crisis, as the national electricity supply repeatedly collapses, and electricity-powered wells cannot continue operation. However, despite these immense challenges, it can be assumed that, without the financing of Phase I and Phase II as well as the contributions of other donors, the living situation of Palestinian refugees and, in particular, the PRS would have been even more precarious, as, for example, the cash transfers from UNRWA were able to cushion the need of the PRS at least in the short term or the measures in the area of EH contributed to a lower risk of infection, which had a positive effect on the health of people in the UNRWA camps. In addition, new solutions have now been found to continue operating the infrastructure, for example by using PV plants to operate the wells.

Contribution to impact (unintended)

The unintended effects of the project included access to UNRWA services perceived by PRL as unequal, in particular with regard to cash transfers (cf. Effectiveness | Unintended consequences (positive or negative)). While all PRS were eligible, only those who suffered from extreme poverty, for example, were eligible among PRL. There were and still are differences in terms of the amount and the payment frequency of cash transfers.

According to UNRWA reports, although tensions over perceived inequalities in access to cash transfers had eased by time of the EPE but the economic crisis had led to an increased need for transfer payments under the PRL, meaning that potential conflicts between PRL and PRS could reemerge. At this point, do-no-harm principles have not been fully taken into account and implementation risks have not been sufficiently addressed. In addition, cash transfers only achieve positive long-term effects if they are combined with a number of other measures.⁴⁴

Rating summary:

Overall, the overarching developmental impacts are still rated as moderately successful, as the Phase I and Phase II measures contributed to mitigating the worst effects of the Syrian crisis on PRS and PRL, although social cohesion between these groups could not be demonstrably strengthened.

Overarching developmental impact: 3

Sustainability

Capacities of participants and stakeholders

The positive impacts achieved with the project can only be maintained in subsequent phases with external financial support. Because Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon will not be given legal status in the foreseeable future that would allow them to work independently to secure their livelihoods, nor will they be able to return to

⁴¹ The socio-economic situation of PRL and PRS as well as conflicts between PRL and PRS were used as indicators of the target system to assess target achievement at impact level. However, because data is not sufficiently available, the indicators and their target and actual values are not presented in table form in the EPE.

⁴² Chaaban, Jad et al. (2016); UNRWA (2020); UNRWA (2023); Lebanon Quarterly Protection Update Q1.

⁴³ https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Lebanon_Acute_Food_Insecurity_May2023_Oct2023_Report.pdf.

⁴⁴ <https://www.idos-research.de/en/briefing-paper/article/the-impact-of-cash-transfers-on-food-security-in-sub-saharan-africa-evidence-design-and-implementation/> (accessed: 18 September 2023).

Syria for the most part. There is no political solution to the Palestinian refugee question, on which the future task of UNRWA also depends, in sight in the foreseeable future. The financial situation of UNRWA remains unsecured, and thus also the sustainability of the social services offered in the UNRWA camps in Lebanon. UNRWA expected USD 1.6 billion from the international donor community in 2022 to close the chronic budget deficit.⁴⁵ Against this background, the formulation of an exit strategy was unrealistic.

Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

The FC project enabled UNRWA to temporarily finance cash transfers and improvements to basic EH/WASH infrastructures. Without this external support, neither the project-executing agency nor the target group would have been able to implement the measures. With the development of a strategy for waste disposal and implementation plans for all camps, the development of sustainable capacities was promoted in Phase II, which supported the project's connectedness. This was also fulfilled in subsequent phases with conceptual modifications.⁴⁶ In this respect, the project's contribution to supporting sustainable capacities was successful.

Durability of impacts over time

The 2014 module proposal for Phase I stressed that this is a crisis-related emergency aid programme with fast-acting individual activities. In both phases, the project, as a module of the UNRWA Special Initiative on Displacement, Lebanon, did not directly target long-term overarching developmental impacts. This was not expected from money transfers for just a few months in any case. On the other hand, EH/WASH measures helped to improve the basic infrastructure in the camps not only in the short term, and thus also improved the precarious situation of the refugees from Syria living there. Female refugees in particular suffer from completely inadequate sanitary conditions in the camps.⁴⁷

The socio-economic context remains characterised by a steep decline in the Lebanese economy, far from sustained stabilisation. Fragmented and also totally inadequate state crisis management measures erode available capital (including human and social capital); the result of this state failure is profound social inequality, with a few winners and a large majority of losers.⁴⁸

If the political risk is excluded in the assessment of sustainability and only the assurance of the use of qualitatively appropriate UNRWA basic services is taken into account for the assessment, sustainability level 3 (moderately successful) applies to the FC project from today's perspective, taking into account the limited sustainability claim. Although the results are below expectations, it is somewhat probable that UNRWA will receive the necessary financing commitments so that the positive impacts achieved with the UNRWA service offerings are maintained.

Rating summary:

The modular measures of the project, which were financed as part of the UNRWA Special Initiative on Displacement, Lebanon, were not designed for long-term overarching developmental impacts. Overall, we assess the sustainability criterion as only moderately successful because, on the one hand – also due to the negative socio-economic and political context – a limited sustainability claim was assumed; on the other hand, it can be expected that UNRWA will receive the necessary financing to continue the positive effects of the social services offered in the camps.

Sustainability: 3

⁴⁵<https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/un-agency-palestine-refugees-announces-2022-budget>

(Accessed: 10 July 2023). On the chronic UNRWA financial crisis, see Berg, Kjersti G./Jensehaugen, Jørgen/Tiltne, Åge A. (2022): UNRWA, funding crisis and the way forward, Oslo.

⁴⁶ Final report on the UNRWA Special Initiative on Displacement, Lebanon Phase III (BMZ no. 2016 408 12) and Phase IV (BMZ no. 2017 499 51).

⁴⁷ Cf. IPSOS group (2018): Unpacking gendered realities in displacement: the status of Syrian refugee women in Lebanon, UN Women Regional Office for Arab States, Cairo.

⁴⁸ World Bank (2023): Lebanon Economic Monitor: The Normalization of Crisis Is No Road for Stabilization, Washington DC.

Overall rating: Moderately successful

The overall rating of Phases I and II of the project is “moderately successful”, as the project had only limited developmental effectiveness in addition to conceptual weaknesses in Phases I and II; sustainability is also at risk.

Contributions to the 2030 Agenda

Universal validity: The project contributed to achieving Sustainable Development Goals, in particular SDG 3, SDG 5, SDG 6, SDG 16 and SDG 17.

Shared responsibility and accountability: The project was complemented by measures from FC financing via UNICEF, WFP and UNDP in the area of EH/WASH in Lebanon. Recommendations for integrated water resource management in the camps were discussed with stakeholders in technical workshops that were included in the UNRWA Lebanon Environmental Health and Response Plan (2018–2021). UNRWA’s accountability was based on the United Nations’ single audit principle.

Interaction of economic, environmental and social development: Positive interactions between social, environmental and economic impacts were promoted through the maintenance of basic services, the construction and rehabilitation of water and sanitation systems for PRL and PRS, and the involvement of private construction companies.

Inclusiveness / leave no one behind: For PRS as a particularly vulnerable group, the project’s measures achieved positive impacts. However, vulnerable groups among PRL were not addressed with the project.

Project-specific strengths and weaknesses as well as cross-project conclusions and lessons learned

The project had the following strengths and weaknesses in particular:

- On the basis of needs analyses, the FC contribution also financed strategic measures for the long-term planning and implementation of WASH and waste disposal in the refugee camps through UNRWA in order to be able to continue these measures on a sustainable basis.
- The project's design made it possible to provide quick responses appropriate to the local context with regard to precarious situations in the camps and to the needs of the residents, but at the expense of standards for impact measurement.
- Combining temporary cash transfers to PRS with measures in the area of EH/WASH directly contributed to improving the supply situation of PRS and PRL; however, the parallel occurrence of these measures made it difficult to clearly allocate the effects of the FC project.
- Due to the urgency of the project and the fact that the measures were only specified during the implementation period, FC was able to contribute little sector-specific expertise, which is available in both in the areas of EH/WASH and cash transfers.
- The fact that not all groups of Palestinian refugees had the same access to UNRWA services led to social tensions between these groups.

Conclusions and lessons learned:

- Financing the project via the multilateral Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) title instead of the selected financing from Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) budget funds would have had the advantage of avoiding unjustifiable expenditure by the project-executing agency for follow-up and reporting on many small-scale measures.
- The fact that the social situation of PRL and PRS has sometimes deteriorated and that social tensions and violent escalations persist is due to the economic and political crisis in Lebanon. This is why, in addition to measures such as cash transfers or measures in the area of EH/WASH, violence prevention and psychosocial care services are needed for girls and women suffering from the fragile security situation and sexual violence.
- For FC projects in refugee camps, measures to strengthen the target group's ownership are of great importance in order to counteract vandalism and structural violence; this requires the integration of participatory measures into longer-term project planning. At least when planning and implementing investment measures, the project-executing agency took a participatory approach and developed "camp improvement plans" with the support of German TC and the involvement of residents.

Evaluation approach and methods

Methodology of the ex-post evaluation

The ex-post evaluation follows the methodology of a rapid appraisal, which is a data-supported qualitative contribution analysis and constitutes an expert judgement. This approach ascribes impacts to the project through plausibility considerations which are based on a careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. This also includes – when possible – the use of digital data sources and the use of modern technologies (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). The reasons for any contradicting information are investigated and attempts are made to clarify such issues and base the evaluation on statements that can be confirmed by several sources of information wherever possible (triangulation).

Documents: KfW project documents, UNRWA reports, secondary specialist literature, World Bank and IMF analyses, ex post evaluations of comparable projects with UNRWA and UNICEF as project-executing agencies.

Data sources and analysis tools: UNHCR Refugee Data Finder; Bertelsmann Transformation Index; satellite images; Health Nutrition and Population Statistics; World Development Indicators

Interview partners: KfW employees in the operational department, UNRWA employees.

The analysis of impacts is based on assumed causal relationships, documented in the results matrix developed during the project appraisal and, if necessary, updated during the ex-post evaluation. The evaluation report sets out arguments as to why the influencing factors in question were identified for the experienced effects and why the project under investigation was likely to make the contribution that it did (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure and its influence on results is taken into account. The conclusions are reported in relation to the availability and quality of the data. An evaluation concept is the frame of reference for the evaluation.

On average, the methods offer a balanced cost-benefit ratio for project evaluations that maintains a balance between the knowledge gained and the evaluation costs and allows an assessment of the effectiveness of FC projects across all project evaluations. The individual ex post evaluation therefore does not meet the requirements of a scientific assessment in line with a clear causal analysis.

The following aspects limit the evaluation:

- Some of the project documents could not be obtained at all or only with a great deal of effort.
- Evidence of costs in project documents was partially contradictory or incomplete, but no indication of misuse of funds.
- Deviating information in project documents on the number of FC project beneficiaries made it difficult to assess the efficiency criterion.
- Security-related access restrictions to the camps limited the informative value of the reporting during the intervention period.
- Prompt ex-post evaluations of several FC projects meant a significant capacity burden for UNRWA as the project-executing agency.
- Difficult and delayed communication with responsible UNRWA employees in Lebanon.

Methods used to evaluate project success

To evaluate the project according to OECD-DAC criteria, a six-step scale is used for all criteria except for the sustainability criterion. The scale is as follows:

- Level 1** very successful: result that clearly exceeds expectations
- Level 2** successful: fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
- Level 3** moderately successful: project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
- Level 4** moderately unsuccessful: significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
- Level 5** unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
- Level 6** highly unsuccessful: the project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all six individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a “successful” project while rating levels 4-6 denote an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“impact”) and the sustainability are rated at least “moderately successful” (level 3).

Publication details

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List of annexes:

Target system and indicators annex

Risk analysis annex

Project measures and results annex

Recommendations for operation annex

Evaluation questions in line with OECD DAC criteria/ex post evaluation matrix annex

Target system and indicators annex

Project objective at outcome level		Rating of appropriateness (former and current view)			
During project appraisal: A contribution should be made to reducing the worst effects of the precarious situation of Syrian Palestinian refugees through cash transfers, winter aid and food. There were also emergency investments in shared accommodations.		The measures were only specified during implementation, which is why the project objective was formulated vaguely in the PP. Usage and qualitative aspects were not taken into account. In addition, the project objective is more likely at impact level.			
During EPE (if target modified): The objective at outcome level was to maintain or provide basic services of adequate quality in the UNRWA refugee camps, which are used by Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (PRL).					
Indicator	Rating of appropriateness (for example, regarding impact level, accuracy of fit, target level, smart criteria)	PCR target level Optional: EPE target level	PA status (year)	Status at final inspection (2021)	Optional: EPE status (year)
Indicator 1 (PCR): recipients of cash transfers (total/PCR)	Reflects usage and is appropriate at outcome level. However, qualitative aspects are not taken into account.	Phase I: 41,000 Phase II: 41,000	N/A	Phase I: 92,705 Phase II: 101,539	N/A
Indicator 2 (PCR): Beneficiaries of improved WASH infrastructure	Reflects usage and is appropriate at outcome level. However, qualitative aspects are not taken into account.	Phase I: 22,000 Phase II: 22,000	N/A	Phase I: 220,000 Phase II: 220,000	N/A
NEW: Indicator 3: Water and sanitation infrastructure is in operation and in good condition	Indicator is taken from the UNRWA final report. Indicator is appropriate and is addressed in the main report, but not included in the table, as no quantitative statements can be made.				A query has been made
NEW: Indicator 4: Plans for an integrated waste management system	Indicator is taken from the UNRWA final report. Indicator is appropriate and is addressed in the main report, but not included in the table, as no quantitative statements can be made.				A query has been made

have been developed and implemented					
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Project objective at impact level		Rating of appropriateness (former and current view)			
During project appraisal: The intent was to contribute to stabilising neighbour- ing countries in the Syrian crisis and reducing the impact on refugees.		The contribution to stabilising and reducing the impact on refugees is assessed as appropriate from both the point of view at the time and today. However, what is meant by “contribution to stabilisation“ remains vague, as does “im- pact”.			
For the EPE (if the objective was modified): the impact-level objective was to contribute to mitigating the worst impacts of the Syrian conflict on Palestinian refu- gees from Syria (PRS) and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (PRL) and to strengthening social cohesion between these refugee groups.					
Indicator	Rating of appropriateness (for example, regarding impact level, accuracy of fit, target level, smart criteria)	Target level PA / EPE (new)	PA status (year)	Status at final inspection (year)	EPE status (year)
NEW: Indicator 1: Rele- vant indicators with re- gard to the living situa- tion have not deteriorated, such as poverty rate, food inse- curity, etc.	Indicators can serve as proxy indicators to assess the liv- ing situation. However, an allocation gap remains due to improvements or deterioration.	Source: https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/re- sources/sur- vey_on_the_econo mic_status_of_pa- lestine_re- fugees_in_leba- non_2015.pdf			Source: UNRWA Protection Moni- toring Report – Quarter 1 (Q1) 2022 and https://action- pal.org.uk/en/post/ 12732/news-and- reports/87-of-pal- estinians-of-syria- in-lebanon-living- below-poverty-line
NEW: Indicator 2: There are no violent conflicts between PRS and PRL	Indicator can serve as a proxy indicator to assess the contribution to social cohesion between PRS and PRL.				Source: UNRWA Protection Moni- toring Report – Quarter 1 (Q1) 2022

Risk analysis annex

All risks should be included in the following table as described above:

Risk	Relevant OECD-DAC criterion
Planning and implementation risks as a result of the politically highly sensitive refugee issue in Lebanon - Identified ex post in the 2021 PCR	Effectiveness Efficiency
Implementation risks (access restrictions by the Lebanese army; volatility of the political environment; violent conflicts in the refugee camps) - Identified in reporting during implementation phases - Identified ex post in the 2021 PCR - Identified ex post in the UNRWA Phase I Final Report	Effectiveness Efficiency Overarching developmental impact
Risk of a deteriorating security situation - Identified ex ante in the 2014 module proposal - Identified in reporting during implementation phases - Identified ex post in the 2021 PCR - Identified ex post in the 2016 and 2019 UNRWA Final Reports	Overarching developmental impact
Risk of ongoing financing bottlenecks at UNRWA - Identified ex ante in the 2014 module proposal - Identified in reporting during implementation phases - Identified ex post in the 2021 PCR	Sustainability

Project measures and their results annex

Cf. Main section

Recommendations for operation annex

The project completion report for both phases of the project does not contain any recommendations for operation, just the general recommendation for continued support for UNRWA in supplying PRS

Evaluation questions in line with OECD-DAC criteria/ex post evaluation matrix annex

Relevance

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / o / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Policy and priority focus			2	o	
Are the objectives of the programme aligned with the (global, regional and country-specific) policies and priorities, in particular those of the (development policy) partners involved and affected and the BMZ?	To what extent do the measures and their objectives in Phases I and II correspond to the objectives of the Regional Response Plan or the 3RP?	Regional Response Plan (2014), Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) (2015/2016 ff.)			
Do the objectives of the programme take into account the relevant political and institutional framework conditions (e.g. legislation, administrative capacity, actual power structures (including those related to ethnicity, gender, etc.))?	What are the framework conditions for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon? Are the framework conditions for PRS and PRL the same? Were there any changes in the framework conditions between Phases I and II?	Including (German only) https://www.bpb.de/themen/migration-integration/laenderprofile/228365/fluechtlinge-zweiter-klasse-palaestinenser-im-li-banon/#node-content-title-3			
Other evaluation question 1	How has the inflow of PRS developed since the start of implementation / between Phases I and II? What is the relationship between PRS and PRL? What is the relationship between the Lebanese population and refugees?	Including https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees-syria-lebanon			
Evaluation dimension: Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders			3	o	PRL not taken into account

Are the programme objectives focused on the developmental needs and capacities of the target group? Was the core problem identified correctly?	See other evaluation question 1 What is the social situation in the UNRWA refugee camps in Lebanon? Were there concepts to proactively address violent conflicts within the camps between rival Palestinian groups?	including https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/survey_on_the_economic_status_of_palestine_refugees_in_lebanon_2015.pdf Question to the project-executing agency			
Were the needs and capacities of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group taken into account (possible differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)? How was the target group selected?	How does the social situation differ for PRS and PRL?	PP			
Would the programme (from an ex post perspective) have had other significant gender impact potentials if the concept had been designed differently? (FC-E-specific question)	Were there approaches/measures specifically for women in Phase I or Phase II?	PP, interview with project-executing agency			
Evaluation dimension: Appropriateness of design			3	+	Shortcomings would have been preventable
Was the design of the programme appropriate and realistic (technically, organisationally and financially) and in principle suitable for contributing to solving the core problem?	What was the financing situation of UNRWA over the duration of the project? Were the phases designed for an appropriate time frame?	Interview with project-executing agency			
Is the programme design sufficiently precise and plausible (transparency and verifiability of the target system and the underlying impact assumptions)?	What impact assumptions underlie cash transfers? What impact assumptions underlie the construction of infrastructure and other project-specific measures?	Secondary literature			

Please describe the results chain, incl. complementary measures, if necessary in the form of a graphical representation. Is this plausible? As well as specifying the original and, if necessary, adjusted target system, taking into account the impact levels (outcome and impact). The (adjusted) target system can also be displayed graphically. (FC-E-specific question)	Results chain not available in PP, as measures were only specified in concrete terms during the implementation period			
To what extent is the design of the programme based on a holistic approach to sustainable development (interplay of the social, environmental and economic dimensions of sustainability)?	Why was the focus not placed on just one sector, e.g. water and sanitary facilities?	Interview with operational department		
For projects within the scope of DC programmes: is the programme, based on its design, suitable for achieving the objectives of the DC programme? To what extent is the impact level of the FC module meaningfully linked to the DC programme (e.g. outcome impact or output outcome)? (FC-E-specific question)	What other modules were implemented in Lebanon at the same time ? What are the differences between the module projects?	PP		
Evaluation dimension: Response to changes/adaptability			2	0
Has the programme been adapted in the course of its implementation due to changed framework conditions (risks and potential)?	Why did the measure in Phase I or II have to be adapted? How did the coordination with KfW go?	Interview with project-executing agency and operational department		

	Would there have been alternatives to the adjusted measures?	
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Coherence

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Internal coherence (division of tasks and synergies within German development cooperation):			3	–	Overlaps appear possible, but are not certain
To what extent is the programme designed in a complementary and collaborative manner within the German development cooperation (e.g. integration into DC programme, country/sector strategy)?	Which countries and UN organisations are still being supported as part of the regional project?				
Do the instruments of the German development cooperation dovetail in a conceptually meaningful way, and are synergies put to use?	Were there TC projects with UNRWA in Lebanon during Phases I and II? Did the German Federal Foreign Office have any projects with UNRWA in Lebanon during Phases I and II?	GIZ project database, German Federal Foreign Office website If applicable: also from discussions with the operational department, KfW Office Management Lebanon and UNRWA key account			
Is the programme consistent with international norms and standards to which German development cooperation is committed (e.g. human rights, Paris Climate Agreement, etc.)?	What does German DC's commitment to UNRWA look like? Where does German DC see the need for reform at UNRWA?	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)			
Evaluation dimension: External coherence (complementarity and			2	0	

coordination with actors external to German DC):						
To what extent does the programme complement and support the partner's own efforts (subsidiarity principle)?	Was there any involvement/participation of local or national authorities in Lebanon?	Interview with project-executing agency				
Is the design of the programme and its implementation coordinated with the activities of other donors?	Which other donors supported UNRWA during Phases I and II?	Interview with project-executing agency Discussion with operational department				
Was the programme designed to use the existing systems and structures (of partners/other donors/international organisations) for the implementation of its activities and to what extent are these used?	To what extent were the measures designed for the existing UNRWA structures and systems? Would there have been alternatives that would have been more aligned with the use of existing systems and structures?	Project documentation Question for the operational area				
Are common systems (of partners/other donors/international organisations) used for monitoring/evaluation, learning and accountability?	Did UNRWA and other UN organisations have a common system for M&E?	Interview with project-executing agency				

Effectiveness

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Achievement of (intended) targets			2	0	

Were the (if necessary, adjusted) objectives of the programme (incl. capacity development measures) achieved? Table of indicators: Comparison of actual/target	Why were the values of the indicator targets significantly exceeded, especially in Component 2? Should the target values have been set higher in Phases I and II?	Including project documents, interviews with operational department			
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to achieving objectives:			2	0	
To what extent were the outputs of the programme delivered as planned (or adapted to new developments)? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Why were funds reallocated? For what purpose?				
Are the outputs provided and the capacities created used?	Is the infrastructure constructed in Phases I and II still in operation and well maintained?	Interview with project-executing agency			
To what extent is equal access to the outputs provided and the capacities created guaranteed (e.g. non-discriminatory, physically accessible, financially affordable, qualitatively, socially and culturally acceptable)?	Do PRS and PRL have equal access?	Project documents, interview with executing agency If possible/feasible. Underpin with discussion with target group representative or with results of discussions with target groups			
To what extent did the programme contribute to achieving the objectives?	What proportion of the total UNRWA budget was made up by the FC contribution in Phases I and II?	Interview with project-executing agency			
To what extent did the programme contribute to achieving the objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?	Did PRS and PRL use the basic services to the same degree? Were there groups that benefited more?	Interview with project-executing agency and, if possible, target group representative?			

Did the programme contribute to the achievement of objectives at the level of the particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups involved and affected (potential differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)?	See above			
Were there measures that specifically addressed gender impact potential (e.g. through the involvement of women in project committees, water committees, use of social workers for women, etc.)? (FC-E-specific question)	Did women participate in the measures? Were there differences in the participation of women between Phase I and II?	Project documentation		
Which project-internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Has the reallocation of funds had a positive/negative effect on the achievement of the targets?	Project documentation		
Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended objectives of the programme (also taking into account the risks anticipated beforehand)? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	What was UNRWA's financial situation during the implementation period of Phases I and II? What is the current financial situation?	Interview with project-executing agency		
Evaluation dimension: Quality of implementation			2	0
How is the management and implementation quality of the programme (e.g. project-executing agency, consultant, taking into account ethnicity	Was UNRWA suitable as the project-executing agency?	Project documentation Other sources? Other donors?		

and gender in decision-making committees) evaluated with regard to the achievement of objectives?				
How is the quality of the management, implementation and participation in the programme by the partners/sponsors evaluated?	Were other involved stakeholders suitable, e.g. consultants?	Project documents, interview with operational department		
Were gender results and relevant risks in/through the project (gender-based violence, e.g. in the context of infrastructure or empowerment projects) regularly monitored or otherwise taken into account during implementation? Have corresponding measures (e.g. as part of a CM) been implemented in a timely manner? (FC-E-specific question)	What risks are women exposed to in the refugee camps? Have these risks been addressed?	Including UNRWA Protection Monitoring Report – Quarter 1 (Q1) 2022		
Evaluation dimension: Unintended impacts(positive or negative)			3	0
Can unintended positive/negative direct impacts (social, economic, ecological and, where applicable, those affecting vulnerable groups) be seen (or are they foreseeable)?	What are the unintended effects of cash transfers, for example, and were there any indications of these in the refugee camps?	Secondary literature, including https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/unrwa-cash-assistance-vital-assistance-palestine-refugees-syria		
What potential/risks arise from the positive/negative unintended effects and how should they be evaluated?	Cannot be ascertained yet, as effects have not yet been identified			
How did the programme respond to the potential/risks of the positive/negative unintended effects?	See above			

Efficiency

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Production efficiency			2	0	
How are the inputs (financial and material resources) of the programme distributed (e.g. by instruments, sectors, sub-measures, also taking into account the cost contributions of the partners/executing agency/other participants and affected parties, etc.)? (Learning and help question)	What share of the total costs did Component 1 (cash transfers) have compared to the measures in Component 2 (infrastructure and basic services to improve environmental hygiene)? Did this allocation correspond to the core problem addressed? What was the percentage distribution of money transfers for housing and food in Phase I for Component 1? Did this distribution make sense from an efficiency perspective?	PCR 2021 Questions for the operational department UNRWA Final Report July 2016			
To what extent were the inputs of the programme used sparingly in relation to the outputs produced (products, capital goods and services) (if possible in a comparison with data from other evaluations of a region, sector, etc.)? For example, comparison of specific costs.	What were the costs per beneficiary in the individual components? Did the costs correspond to the costs in comparable WASH projects with UN organisations as executing agencies?	Phase I: UNRWA Final Report July 2016 PCR 2021 Phase II: UNRWA Final Report July 2019 PCR 2021			
If necessary, as a complementary perspective: To what extent could the outputs of the programme have been increased by an alternative use of inputs (if possible in a comparison with data from other evaluations of a region, sector, etc.)?	Were there realistic alternatives to the existing input structures of UNRWA in Phases I and II to achieve the planned outputs of the individual components?	Questions for operational area			

Were the outputs produced on time and within the planned period?	Why was the implementation period of the project extended in both phases?	UNRWA Final Report December 2016 UNRWA Final Report July 2019 PCR 2021			
Were the coordination and management costs reasonable (e.g. implementation consultant's cost component)? (FC-E-specific question)	What administrative fee was defined in the financing agreements with UNRWA? Was UNRWA's flat rate for administrative costs appropriate compared to other UN organisations as project-executing agencies in fragile contexts?	Interview with operational department Project documents for similar FC projects			
Other evaluation question 1	Did the fees paid by UNRWA to commissioned companies correspond to the customary level in the country for activities of comparable content and qualifications?	Question for the project-executing agency Question for the operational area			
Evaluation dimension: Allocation efficiency			2	0	
In what other ways and at what costs could the effects achieved (outcome/impact) have been attained? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Did UNRWA have a de facto monopoly position as project-executing agency? Were alternative project-executing agencies (e.g. state-owned Lebanese institutions or NGOs) considered for the project? To what extent could a stronger integration of Components 1 and 2 have made a more targeted contribution to alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian crisis and to social cohesion in the intervention area?	Questions for operational area			
To what extent could the effects achieved have been attained in a more cost-effective manner, compared with an alternatively designed programme?	Were alternatives to cash transfers examined in terms of costs?	Questions for operational area			

If necessary, as a complementary perspective: To what extent could the positive effects have been increased with the resources available, compared to an alternatively designed programme?	Not a relevant question, as this was a module project in a crisis situation	
In what respect was the use of public funds financially complementary?	No specification necessary, as private capital markets would not have financed the cash transfers for PRS or the development and expansion of the water and sanitation supply in the UNRWA camps	

Impact

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / o / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Overarching developmental changes (intended)			3	o	
Is it possible to identify overarching developmental changes to which the programme should contribute? (Or if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time.)	How have relevant indicators developed since the start of implementation of Phase I (poverty, health, etc.)?	Question for the project-executing agency			
Is it possible to identify overarching developmental changes (social, economic, environmental and their interactions) at the level of the intended beneficiaries? (Or if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)	What are the differences in the social situation of PRS and PRL?	Question for the project-executing agency			

To what extent can overarching developmental changes be identified at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group to which the programme should contribute? (Or, if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)	See above				
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to overarching developmental changes (intended)			3	0	
To what extent did the programme actually contribute to the identified or foreseeable overarching developmental changes (also taking into account the political stability) to which the programme should contribute?	How have conflicts in the refugee camps developed since the start of the implementation of Phase I?	Question for project-executing agency, for operational department Alternative sources (e.g. Lehmann, M. Christian/Masterson, Daniel T.R. (2020): Does Aid Reduce Anti-Refugee Violence? Evidence from Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, American Political Science Review, 114 (4) p.1335–42?			
To what extent did the programme achieve its intended (possibly adjusted) developmental objectives? In other words, are the project impacts sufficiently tangible not only at outcome level, but at impact level? (e.g. drinking water supply/health effects)	See above: How have relevant indicators developed?				
Did the programme contribute to achieving its (possibly adjusted) developmental objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?	What would have happened if the multi-phase project had not been financed?				
Has the programme contributed to overarching developmental changes or changes in life	How would the situation of PRS have developed if the project had not been financed?				

situations at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group (potential differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.) to which the programme was intended to contribute?		
Which project-internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended developmental objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	See above: UNRWA financing situation	Berg, Kjersti G./Jensehaugen, Jørgen/Tiltne, Åge A. (2022): UNRWA, funding crisis and the way forward, Oslo.
Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended developmental objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	What influence do the economic framework conditions have, such as high inflation, poor economic situation, etc. on target achievement?	Secondary literature
Does the project have a broad-based impact? - To what extent has the programme led to structural or institutional changes (e.g. in organisations, systems and regulations)? (Structure formation) - Was the programme exemplary and/or broadly effective and is it reproducible? (Model character)	What structure-forming effects are evident, for example, in water supply or waste management?	
How would the development have gone without the programme? (Learning and help question)	See above	

Evaluation dimension: Contribution to (unintended) overarching developmental changes			3	0	
To what extent can unintended overarching developmental changes (also taking into account political stability) be identified (or, if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)?	Was it sensible to finance several components or could financing only one component have resulted in more development policy changes?				
Did the programme noticeably or foreseeably contribute to unintended (positive and/or negative) overarching developmental impacts?	Were there unintended overarching developmental impacts?				
Did the programme noticeably (or foreseeably) contribute to unintended (positive or negative) overarching developmental changes at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups (within or outside the target group) (do no harm, e.g. no strengthening of inequality (gender/ethnicity))?	To what extent have do-no-harm principles been implemented?	Discussion with operational department, with project-executing agency, if possible with target group representative			

Sustainability

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / o / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Capacities of participants and stakeholders			4	–	Taking into account the political, socio-economic and socio-cultural context, the

				project was not expected to strengthen target group resilience
Are the target group, executing agencies and partners institutionally, personally and financially able and willing (ownership) to maintain the positive effects of the programme over time (after the end of the promotion)?	Was UNRWA able to continue the measures after the end of FC promotion of this project? Was the project's design suitable for connecting other projects? Have the UNRWA approaches in the areas of water and sanitation been adopted by competent Lebanese government departments and/or NGOs?	Questions for the project-executing agency Questions for the operational department. Analysis of alternative sources		
To what extent do the target group, executing agencies and partners demonstrate resilience to future risks that could jeopardise the impact of the programme?	Was the project able to contribute to alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon? Were Palestinian refugees motivated to change their situation through their own initiative?	Questions for the project-executing agency		
Other evaluation question 1	Were there measures to raise awareness among the refugees in the camps about the need for consistent waste disposal?	Questions for the project-executing agency		
Other evaluation question 2	Did the project's measures contribute to reducing (latent) tensions within the refugee population and with the local population?	Internet research		
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities:			2	0
Did the programme contribute to the target group, executing	Were there any initiatives to involve the users of the created water and	Questions for the project-executing agency		

agencies and partners being institutionally, personally and financially able and willing (ownership) to maintain the positive effects of the programme over time and, where necessary, to curb negative effects?	sanitation infrastructure in its maintenance after the promotion ended? Has a concept been created to sustainably finance the water infrastructure through user fees? Has an exit strategy been formulated?				
Did the programme contribute to strengthening the resilience of the target group, executing agencies and partners to risks that could jeopardise the effects of the programme?	What risks jeopardise the resilience of the project-executing agency to continue the measures? Which people in the target group are particularly affected by this?	Questions for the project-executing agency			
Did the programme contribute to strengthening the resilience of particularly disadvantaged groups to risks that could jeopardise the effects of the programme?	Which risks (e.g. sociocultural and/or economic hurdles) jeopardise the continued positive effects achieved in the individual components? Which groups of people are particularly affected by this?	Questions for the project-executing agency			
Other evaluation question 1	Were the measures of the project able to strengthen the target group's awareness of the importance of hygiene measures?	Questions for the project-executing agency			
Evaluation dimension: Durability of impacts over time			3	0	
How stable is the context of the programme (e.g. social justice, economic performance, political stability, environmental balance)? (Learning/help question)	How has the economic, political and social situation developed in Lebanon and the intervention areas?	Internet research and secondary literature			

To what extent is the durability of the positive effects of the programme influenced by the context? <i>(Learning/help question)</i>	Does a further influx of refugees from Syria and/or a lack of return opportunities for the refugees living in the camps jeopardise the positive effects achieved?	Internet research and secondary literature
To what extent are the positive and, where applicable, the negative effects of the programme likely to be long-lasting?	What are the risks that the positive impacts achieved by the FC project will no longer be sustainable in the foreseeable future due to the fragile situation in Lebanon and the UNRWA 's unsecured financial situation ? Are competent Lebanese government institutions able to maintain the WASH structures in the medium term?	Questions for the operational department and the executing agency
To what extent are the gender results of the measure to be considered permanent (ownership, capacities, etc.)? (FC-E-specific question)	Does UNRWA intend to prioritise/increase the use of the implemented WASH services for girls/women?	Questions for the project-executing agency
Other evaluation question 1	Did the experiences in Phase I lead to a conceptual realignment for the subsequent Phase II and for further phases?	Questions for operational area
Other evaluation question 2	If the fragile context in Lebanon persists, can any impacts achieved by the FC project be permanent?	The project was designed as an emergency measure, not for sustainable effectiveness.