


# Ex post evaluation

## Food security for crisis victims




<b>Title</b>	Food security for crisis victims in DR Congo		
<b>Sector and CRS code</b>	Developmental food aid (52010)		
<b>Project number</b>	BMZ No. 2012 67 137		
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development		
<b>Recipient/Implementing</b>	World Food Programme of the United Nations (WFP)		
<b>Project volume/ Financing instrument</b>	EUR 20 million, grant		
<b>Project duration</b>	12.12.2012 – 30.09.2014		
<b>Year of report</b>	2020	<b>Year of random sample</b>	2019

### Objectives and project outline

On the *Impact level*, the objective was to save lives and maintain the livelihoods of people in need. At the *Outcome level* the project targeted a multi-sector objective: (1) reducing and/or stabilising acute malnutrition in children under 5 and vulnerable adults, (2) ensuring adequate food intake of displaced people and refugees, (3) restoring livelihoods, (4) stabilising school attendance rates, and (5) reinforcing governance capacities. To this end, the project financed food distributions to displaced people and their host communities, school meals, the therapeutic feeding of malnourished infants, women and HIV/TB patients, as well as “Food for Work” measures to a limited extent. Given the fragile context, the promotion was handled via the World Food Programme of the United Nations.

Overall rating:  
**moderately unsuccessful**



### Key findings

The project largely had humanitarian effects with limited sustainability. The project was rated as being “moderately successful” for the following reasons:

- **Relevance:** The measure responded to food shortages, mainly of internally displaced people. There was a lack of strategy to overcome the structural causes of food insecurity in the DRC in the long term. The targeting was in need of improvement.
- **Effectiveness:** The measure managed to achieve short-term improvements in the nutritional status and situation of the beneficiaries. The number of beneficiaries (coverage) fell short of the original expectations.
- **Efficiency:** Cost-efficient instruments, such as the local procurement of foods as well as the cash and voucher systems, were not used enough. It was not always possible to select beneficiaries based on vulnerability criteria.
- **Effectiveness:** The project made short-term improvements to the humanitarian situation of the displaced people. There is no evidence of contributions to the stability of livelihoods and the alleviation of conflicts. There was no expectations in terms of sustainability.
- This project was the beginning of the cooperation between German DC and IC with the World Food Programme, which has since been significantly broadened.

### Conclusions

- The project demonstrates the limitations of humanitarian approaches in situations where promoting peace and development are also required.
- The experiences of the project point towards the advantages of separating humanitarian and development measures at the institutional level.
- The strong local structures of the World Food Programme make it easier to implement measures in fragile contexts, but they are less flexible.
- When cooperating with the World Food Programme, attention should be paid to ensuring transparent reporting to KfW.

## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 4

#### Ratings:

Relevance	3
Effectiveness	4
Efficiency	3
Impact	4
Sustainability	3

#### Relevance

Focusing on improving the nutrition of displaced persons, women and children, the project was in line with the International Strategy for Security and Stabilisation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISSS, 2013-2017) and the Congolese government's Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for areas previously affected by conflicts (STAREC, 2013-2017). However, both programmes placed emphasis on the significance of a long-term revival of agriculture to achieve food security. The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was informed about the measure by the German partner, but they were not involved in the decision-making process. The measure was in accordance with the guidelines of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (2011) on transitional aid, as the aim was to promote the stabilisation of livelihoods. Within German development cooperation, the project's measures fell under the scope of peace-building and crisis prevention in the DRC. As part of this, the measure complemented a peace fund as well as a measure to reintegrate ex-combatants.

The modular objectives – (1) reducing malnutrition in children and vulnerable adults, (2) adequate food intake of displaced persons and refugees, (3) restoration of livelihoods, (4) stabilisation of the school attendance rate, and (5) reinforcing governance capacities – were aimed at the urgent problems of the target groups in the DRC (outcome level). During the project period (2013) the number of internally displaced people in the DRC was around 3 million, 43% of all children were chronically malnourished, and 6.35 million people suffered from food insecurity. The programme objectives were to be achieved by means of food distribution, supplying special food to malnourished people, school meals and “Food for Work”, provided to people over a period ranging from two weeks up to a maximum of three months. These instruments addressed the symptoms of food insecurity in the short term, but they were barely suitable for tackling the structural causes. The latter included low agricultural productivity, no market access, poverty and bad eating habits, as well as poor governance, the presence of armed groups, and in some regions, the systematic displacement of small farmers so that land could be seized for large landowners and mining. Some 15 years after the start of the armed conflicts in Eastern DRC, in 2013 the WFP still described the situation as a (transitional) crisis, responding to it in the short term with humanitarian aid, and not as a (“new”) normal, which requires more complex responses. This should include a reasonable combination of humanitarian aid, development cooperation, peace-building and the strengthening of good governance. The project contributed to this, but it did not live up to its own claim of achieving a more comprehensive stabilisation of livelihoods.

On top of all that, an insufficient understanding of the complex displacement events in the eastern part of the country exacerbated the problems. The project was focused here on supporting long-term displaced people in camps, who, however, accounted for a small part of all displaced people and did not always qualify as the most destitute<sup>1</sup>. Targeted food distributions that accounted for the largest bulk of the services instead concentrated more on the inhabitants of camps for displaced people rather than on newly displaced people, those returning, and other people in need outside the camps and the relatively well-

<sup>1</sup> Nguya, Gloria, 2019: ‘We are all IDPs’. Vulnerability and livelihoods in Mugunga 3 camp, Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo. London: Overseas Development Institute.

developed regions of North and South Kivu<sup>2</sup>. The coverage rate of the services was insufficient, which is hardly surprising given the size of the country and the magnitude of its problems. Instead of setting out to feed large parts of the population across the country with the WFP, a clearer targeting of intervention regions and target groups based on eligibility criteria, and a convincing strategy to deal with the complex and also structural causes of food insecurity would have made the project more transparent. Due to its broadly standardised and humanitarian approach, the WFP lacked the suitable tools to achieve this. Also, the expectations laid down in the KfW project proposal proved to be too ambitious because of the limited funds allocated to it and the humanitarian approach of the WFP.

### Relevance rating: 3

#### Effectiveness

The programme objectives linked to the FC contribution were probably achieved to some extent, though to what extent is unclear. The possibly incorrect assumptions in the project proposal about the WFP's approach makes it more difficult to estimate the target achievement. The planned targets for the number of beneficiaries, the share of development-oriented measures as well as the coverage rate and efficiency seem to be excessive, and they were clearly higher than the WFP's own planning. With a total budget of EUR 20 million and a planned number of 3.4 million beneficiaries, the project proposal set the project costs at EUR 5.80 per person, which is lower than the EUR 10–90 per-capita costs known from other WFP projects. The actual costs in this measure were around EUR 63 per beneficiary.

The WFP reporting does not enable certain outcomes to be clearly assigned to the FC contribution, it is patchy, and it includes contradictions regarding costs, performance and impacts during the project period. There seems to be a misunderstanding in terms of the impact indicators, too. The project proposal and KfW's reporting suggest that the measure can bring about a long-term improvement in the food security of entire population groups in certain provinces (e.g. "84% of the households in Katanga improved their Food Consumption Score"). On the other hand, in its impact matrix (LogFrame), the WFP stated that the food consumption of the recipients of food aid or special food improved over the support period (usually 2 to 12 weeks).<sup>3</sup> To measure these indicators, the WFP carried out random assessments of the before and after situations of individual interventions, where 84% of the beneficiary households had temporarily improved food situations, for example. Such improvements are to be expected and they cannot be generalised to apply to larger population groups. What is more, assessing the achievement of the project objectives is also made difficult by the inconsistent reporting of the WFP. A WFP special report for KfW<sup>4</sup> attributed 216,000 beneficiaries in the Food-for-Work measures to the FC contribution, whereas the Standard Project Report (SPR) in 2013<sup>5</sup> showed that the number of persons participating in similar measures totalled just 37,000. In 2013, an internal WFP Evaluation Report stated that the WFP, by its own account, supplied more internally displaced people in the North-Kivu Region than the number of people actually staying there according to the UN OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs).

The number of people benefiting from the FC measures cannot be determined for certain. The targeted figure of 3.4 million beneficiaries in the project proposal was unrealistic. The 2013 SPR shows that a total of 1.26 million people were reached in the FC-funded areas in 2013. The FC contribution accounted for 17% of the donor contributions in 2013, which corresponds to around 215,204 beneficiaries in the FC areas of malnutrition, school meals and Food-for-Work. Additionally, according to the 2013 SPR, the WFP supplied general food aid during the reporting period to 1.35 million (mostly displaced) people, of whom around 230,825 beneficiaries (17%) can also be attributed to the FC measure.

<sup>2</sup> Spaak, Marie et al., 2014: Évaluation du portefeuille de pays. La République Démocratique du Congo: Une évaluation du portefeuille du PAM (2009–2013). Rapport d'Évaluation. Rome: WFP/DARA.

<sup>3</sup> World Food Programme, 2012: Budget Increases to Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations – Democratic Republic of the Congo 200167. Targeted Food Assistance to Victims of Armed Conflict and other Vulnerable Groups. WFP/EB.2/2012/9-D/3, Rome, 5 November 2012.

<sup>4</sup> World Food Programme, 2014: WFP in the Democratic Republic of Congo – Final report on the implementation of the BMZ/KfW contribution in 2013. Kinshasa.

<sup>5</sup> World Food Programme, Standard Project Report 2013. Democratic Republic of Congo. Targeted Food Assistance to Victims of Armed Conflicts and other Vulnerable Groups 200540. Rome.

Against this background, the following table showing the indicators at the module objective level (Outcome level) should be treated with caution:

Indicator	Status PA, target PA	Actual value at EPE
(1) Scale of acute malnutrition in children under the age of five	Status PA <sup>6</sup> : Orientale: 11.2%; Katanga: 8.8%; Maniema: 14.3% Target value: Reducing acute malnutrition in children under the age of five by 2 percentage points	No relevant data in 2013 SPR Final review <sup>7</sup> : achieved Orientale: 3.3% (-7.9%); Katanga: 6.6% (-2.2%); Maniema: 8.8% (-5.5%)
(2) Mortality rate (CMR <sup>8</sup> ) of children under 5 and vulnerable adults in the target group	Status PA: 0.12% Target value: Reducing/stabilising CMR to/at 0%	Final review: 0.07% Unclear achievement of indicators
(3) Food consumption of supported households (FCS <sup>9</sup> )	Status PA: Katanga: 68.8%; Orientale: 59.6%; South-Kivu: 53.9% Target value: 80% of the households exceed an FCS value of 28 <sup>10</sup>	SPR 2013: South-Kivu: 44.5%, Katanga: 54% Final review: unclear achievement of indicators Katanga: 84%; achieved Orientale: 92.9%; achieved South-Kivu: 61.3%; not achieved Equateur: 78.6%; not achieved
(4) Retention rate (number of children staying in school)	Status PA: 93% of girls, 94% of boys Target value: Retention rate	SPR 2013: Girls: 89.6%, Boys: 90.3% Final review: unclear achieve-

<sup>6</sup> According to the final review, this data reflects the status at the project appraisal. The project proposal contains no data on the status as of the appraisal.

<sup>7</sup> The final review is based partly on the figures published by the WFP in the Special Project Report 2013. WFP data is collected randomly from the beneficiaries of its measures, at the beginning and at the end of the given measure. They indicate to what extent the beneficiaries actually benefited from the services of the WFP (e.g. distribution of special nutrition). The data cannot be generalised for the population of entire provinces because only a low percentage are affected by the services of the WFP. Unfortunately, the wording of the final review gives the impression that changes are measured at provincial level. If the figures in the final review are based on information from the WFP, this relates to random samples among the beneficiaries in the different provinces.

<sup>8</sup> CMR: Crude Mortality Rate. However, the indicator probably refers to the “supplementary feeding death rate (%)” measured by the WFP. This measures the ratio of malnourished children and adults who died whilst being treated with special nutrition. The ratio should be reduced to zero in line with the wording of the project proposal. According to the 2013 SPR, the ratio was a low 0.12% (“Status PA”) in June 2013, and fell to 0.07% in December 2013. The final review cites this data when measuring the mortality rate. In the 2013 SPR, the WFP refers to reports of its implementation partners. The significance of these figures, collected 6 months apart and using unknown methods, is unclear

<sup>9</sup> FCS: Food Consumption Score. The Food Consumption Score measures the diversity and quality of food in terms of the sufficient intake of different nutrients. In this context it is often examined the extent to which households have consumed food from different food groups over a reference period of seven days. The WFP has a wide range of methods and guidance at its fingertips for measuring Food Consumption Scores. The reporting under this measure does not clearly show what methodology was used to measure Food Consumption Score.

<sup>10</sup> In the project proposal this indicator was taken from the Logframe for the WFP’s application for additional funds for PRRO 200167 in November 2012. The selected figures are not justified in either the application for additional funds or in the project proposal.

	achieved for 80% and 70% of sampled schools	ment of indicators <sup>11</sup> Girls: 88%, Boys: 89%
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In acute emergency situations such as violent conflicts and displacement, food distributions by the WFP were definitely a welcome addition to the survival strategies of those affected. Beneficial effects can also be expected from providing special nutrition and food supplement products to malnourished young children, pregnant and breastfeeding women as well as HIV/TB (tuberculosis) patients, and from school meals. However, based on the observations of an internal WFP evaluation (Spaak et al. 2014), such effects were limited by the following factors: the WFP halving the per person rations and limiting school meals due to financing constraints, late and unreliable deliveries (6 to 20 weeks after the start of the emergency situation), focusing on a few easily accessible camps of displaced people, discrimination of newly displaced people against those already in the camps, no significant assistance for host communities and the return of displaced people, reallocation of project resources from long-term targeted measures (e.g. Food-for-Work, prevention of malnourishment) to emergency aid measures for internally displaced people<sup>12</sup>, insufficient coverage of the target group and the arbitrary nature of access to support services as a result, and the lack of integration of the Food-for-Work measures into long-term development concepts. The insufficient cooperation with government agencies (e.g. education and healthcare system) and development-oriented UN organisations such as the FAO also contributed to this

Various scientific studies (e.g. ODI 2019) point out the problematic aspects of food aid in the DRC. They suggest that as a result of the insufficient participation of the local population in the decision-making processes on the nature and distribution of the aid, the aid often did not meet the needs of the people, did not arrive in time, and was insufficient in quantity, which led to conflicts over the distribution. The studies also found a lack of transparency with the distribution. Many of those affected wanted long-term development projects to improve their living conditions in the long run, instead of repeated short-term humanitarian aid. As also confirmed by the WFP's internal evaluation, local leaders and implementation organisations made sure that aid was delivered to certain regions and to the benefit of certain groups, favouring their own supporters, which can exacerbate local conflicts. It was also not uncommon in the DRC that implementation organisations, also of the WFP, distributed only part of the aid supplies, and sold the rest for their own benefit at local markets ("opération retour")<sup>13</sup>. No such information was found relating to the FC-financed measures. Prior to the monitoring missions of international project staff, sometimes local people were said to be intimidated through the involvement of local security forces into keeping quiet about such observations. In addition, target groups are frequently sexually exploited in the DRC by the staff of aid organisations or those of the implementation partners ("food for sex"). There is no evidence to suggest that such practices could be associated with measures financed with FC contributions. However, they describe the context in which the measure was implemented. According to the internal evaluation (Spaak et al. 2014), no specific preventive measures were taken by the WFP that went beyond general explanations.

Altogether, the achievement of the measure's objectives is significantly below the expectations clearly laid out in the project proposal, particularly with regard to the size of the target group and the reach of the in-

<sup>11</sup> This indicator was taken from the logical framework for the application for additional funding for PRRO 200167. It is based on the assumption that school meals reduce the likelihood of dropping out of school. The WFP indicator relates to outcome 7 ("Enrolment of girls and boys, including IDPs and refugees, in assisted schools stabilized at pre-crisis levels"), and reads "Retention rate met by 80% of sampled schools". This means that school meals should maintain the attendance rate at pre-crisis levels in 80% of the assisted schools. The date and the absolute amount of the pre-crisis figure is not indicated. In its reports the WFP uses December 2011 as the baseline, when the retention rate was 93% for girls and 94% for boys. This fell to 89.6% for girls and 90.3% for boys in December 2013. Reports by the implementation partners from four regional WFP offices (sub-offices) provide the data. This means the data is not generally valid.

<sup>12</sup> These reallocations took place on a large scale and were justified by the WFP with its humanitarian mission and the priority of life-saving measures. It is unclear to what extent the reallocated funds were actually life-saving, particularly given that the internal evaluation of the WFP Portfolio 2009–2013 (Spaak et al. 2014) found that mostly long-term displaced people in a few refugee camps benefited from the measures.

<sup>13</sup> Barbelet, Véronique et al, 2019: Local humanitarian action in the Democratic Republic of Congo Capacity and complementarity. London: Overseas Development Institute.

tended changes. The aim of the project proposal was certainly too ambitious and unrealistic from the outset.

### Effectiveness rating: 4

#### Efficiency

The challenging context and conditions in the DRC, including the size of the country, bad transport conditions in many parts of the country, weak government structures, bureaucratic obstacles, and the continuing violence in the project regions, must be taken into account when assessing efficiency. Also, in 2013 the WFP had to respond to a continuously worsening security situation in the eastern part of the country and a number of displacement processes in remote areas. The WFP was one of the few international organisations that had sufficient structures to provide humanitarian aid in this situation. This included numerous regional offices, its own logistics capacity for land and air transport as well as an extensive system of national and international partner organisations that implemented the measures on the ground. In 2013 the WFP worked together with nearly 100 implementation partners in the DRC, which were always tasked with implementing certain measures (e.g. food distributions, Food-for-Work) under Field Level Agreements. Due to the large number of implementation partners and small contracts, the WFP management was faced with considerable challenges, which resulted in a limited ability to steer and monitor the measures. Only 10% of all Field Level Agreements were monitored by the WFP, which is insufficient given the high risk of corruption in the DRC. Still, KfW believes that an alternative implementation structure would have come at a higher cost or it would not have had the same coverage rate. Direct implementation through one or more international NGOs who were also implementation partners of the WFP would have been a possible alternative. A long-term approach would also incorporate the cooperation with the available government structures (e.g. Ministry of Public Health and Agriculture). There is also room for improvement in the WFP's cooperation with the UN's development agencies, such as the UNDP and FAO. This could have gone hand in hand with measures such as purchasing food locally in a development-oriented manner (Spaak et al. 2014).

There were possibilities to enhance the efficiency of the measures, but they were not used sufficiently. The majority of the distributed food was purchased outside Africa and had to be transported at high cost from coastal ports in Kenya, Tanzania or Angola on the overland route to the project areas, which normally requires 90 days. Around 10% of the food was regionally sourced, which had the potential to promote local agricultural production. Under the pilot project Purchase for Progress (P4P), innovative approaches were developed to support local food production, which included purchasing small quantities of food from local producers in regions that had food surpluses. Such a development approach to local food production could have been strengthened and extended through cooperation with specialised organisations like the FAO, which advises small farmers in the DRC. Only around 7% of all beneficiaries received vouchers or cash, although these instruments have proved less expensive than services in kind (Spaak et al. 2014). These inefficiencies can probably be explained by the fact that the WFP depended on food delivered from the USA at the time, which accounted for roughly 85% of the distributed food in 2013. The impression is that the funds received from the other international partners were used mostly for the transport and distribution of the food supplied by the USA. The United States was the only international partner of the WFP that made its contributions exclusively in kind. Some flexibility in this arrangement would be desirable. In addition, the fact that the WFP was also highly dependent on the contributions the USA, which it failed to make in some of the years (e.g. in 2012), also had a negative impact on providing the target groups with supplies. Efficiency gains could have been achieved by a more targeted geographical focus of the measures and a criteria-based selection of the target groups. The internal evaluation (Spaak et al. 2014) found that the WFP looked into the potential of purchasing food locally in several regions. These examinations confirmed the feasibility and the higher efficiency of this approach. Ultimately, internal organisational obstacles were blamed for the limited use of this instrument.

The WFP's data regarding the purchase prices of the distributed food is contradictory, and they seem to have been way over the world market prices at the time. During the reporting period of 2013, Germany is reported to have acquired 234 tonnes of corn flour, 108 tonnes of peas and 36 tonnes of cooking oil at unknown prices. Due to the unclear data, a cost-efficient procurement process cannot be proven.

There is room for improvement in terms of the implementation structures, monitoring, cost transparency and a better use of locally produced food. Given that the project measures were implemented in a difficult institutional, economic and security context, and that they benefited from the considerable logistical capacity of the WFP, the efficiency is still rated as satisfactory, despite the limitations.

**Efficiency rating: 3**

**Impact**

By supporting food deliveries for displaced people, malnourished children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, as well as HIV and TB patients, the FC measure probably contributed to the survival of sections of the target groups during the intervention period. Thus, the humanitarian part of the project objective was achieved (“saving lives”). The contribution of the measure to the social and socio-economic stabilisation of the project region is, however, questionable. The overwhelming majority of the measures were short-term food deliveries, the impact of which was limited in time. By focusing the services on existing populations of displaced people in camps near cities, the displacement situation was possibly prolonged involuntarily in some of the cases, whilst those returning and the host communities barely received any support. A methodologically rigorous study carried out in parallel regarding the peace funds supported by KfW in the DRC showed that Food-for-Work measures had no long-term impact on income and employment in the beneficiary communities. Positive influences on social cohesion and the perception of the government were also not noticeable, and existing conflicts in the communities flared up instead. Retention rates in the schools that benefited from school meals dropped slightly during the project period, probably due to the general increase in the number of violent conflicts and the discontinued school meals for financial reasons. Hence, the potential of school meals to stabilise school attendance rates and to improve education was limited.

Food insecurity during the project period was a consequence and not a cause of the violent conflicts in the southern and eastern parts of the DRC. Violence and displacement were caused by political conflicts and conflicts about the control of land and natural resources. Food supplies were therefore unable to tackle any of the causes of conflict, but this was not an explicit objective of the project approach to begin with. Given that the supplies to displaced people have been provided by the WFP and other humanitarian organizations for more than 20 years, the question remains whether this supply has now become part of the rationale of the armed players. The possibility that food supplies only aggravated the conflicts can therefore not be ruled out.

The achievement of the objective at impact level can be summarised as follows:

Indicator	Status PA, Target PA	Ex post evaluation
(1) Violent conflicts	Stabilised or reduced	In 2013, armed conflicts in the eastern and the southern parts of the DRC spread, even though a UN intervention force cooperating with government forces was able to overcome the rebel organisation M-23. Over 1 million people were displaced by violent conflicts. There is no direct and causal link between the development of the conflict and the project (cannot be attributed to it).
(2) Food insecurity, as measured by proportion of the population that is food insecure (Food Insecurity, %)	Stabilised or reduced	Increase of persons suffering from acute food insecurity from 6.4 million to 6.9 million during the reporting period (December 2012 to December 2013) in the entire DRC (source: IPC), particularly in regions plagued by violent conflicts.

<p>(3) Prevalence of malnutrition specific to target group, based on: Moderately acute malnutrition (Global acute malnutrition, GAM) in children under five; Chronic malnourishment (stunting) in children under five; Malnutrition in pregnant and breast-feeding women; Malnutrition in HIV/AIDS &amp; TB patients</p>	<p>Stabilised or reduced (These indicators are not included in the WFP's PRRO 200167 budget revision and are not measured by the WFP.)</p>	<p>Chronic malnutrition in children: 43% Moderately acute malnutrition in children: 23% Malnutrition in pregnant and breast-feeding women: 14% (Source: DHS 2013–2014)<sup>14</sup></p> <p>Strong regional differences in the nutrition indicators, but with contradicting study results. Possibly less acute malnutrition in children in North- and South-Kivu owing to the presence of food programmes run by international organisations (Linard et al. 2014).</p>
<p>(4) Resilience against future crises, measured as: - household asset score - community asset score</p>	<p>Household asset score is not a WFP indicator Community asset score: 80% of the beneficiary communities have functioning infrastructures (assets) (WFP, Budget Revision PRRO 200167, 2012)</p>	<p>No data available for the project period. Given the small scope of the Food-for-Work measures and that they only affected certain areas, it cannot be assumed that there are any broad impacts.</p>
<p>(5) Response strategies Coping Strategy Index (CSI)</p>	<p>Negative response strategies fall in 80% of the target groups. (WFP, Budget revision PRRO 200167, 2012) Baseline: South-Kivu 17; North-Kivu 14; Maniema 12; Katanaga 11; Haut Uélé and Bas Uélé 10</p>	<p>No data available for the project period. With average values of 25, data for the period 2016–2019 suggests a general deterioration of the Coping Strategy Index in the DRC (source: <a href="https://vam.wfp.org/mvam_monitoring/Data-Bank_Csi.aspx?iso3=cod">https://vam.wfp.org/mvam_monitoring/Data-Bank_Csi.aspx?iso3=cod</a>). It is unclear to what extent such data can be compared with the baseline data of the measure.</p>

Although the FC measure probably achieved its objective of short-term food security, its contribution to stabilising the living conditions of the population remained limited. Given the firm humanitarian focus of the project partner WFP, with these measures designed as transitional aid, the WFP was able to achieve structural impacts only in a very limited manner.

**Impact rating: 4**

<sup>14</sup> The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) were carried out in the DRC in 2007, 2013/2014 and 2017. Changes to the DHS indicators between 2007 and 2013 cannot be ascribed to the project for methodological reasons.



**Sustainability**

As set out in the project proposal, the project as an emergency measure did not follow a sustainable approach in terms of the durability of the impacts. In hindsight, this proved to be right. The impacts of the food distribution and Food-for-Work measures were indirect. The potential for building sustainable structures related to the project measures was not sufficiently used, including the instrument of locally purchased food, which could have strengthened local agriculture. Opportunities to develop capacities in schools and in health care were not fully used. A separate strategy to support resilience in the DRC was also absent, which could have enabled a more strategic selection and a better integration of the Food-for-Work measures. The cooperation with national NGOs focused equally little on the capacity-building of these organisations, the cooperation was limited to short-term service contracts instead. The question of how the transition from humanitarian aid to a long-term approach could be managed in spite of the tough overall conditions was raised in the eastern parts of the DRC as early as 2013. Even in 2020, humanitarian aid still accounts for a significant part of international commitment in the DRC.

**Sustainability rating: 3**

### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).