

# Ex-post evaluation

## Peace agenda, Colombia

|                                           |                                                                 |                       |      |                                      |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------|--------------------------------------|
| <b>Title</b>                              | Sector reform programme Peace Agenda, Phases I and II           |                       |      |                                      |
| <b>Sector and CRS code</b>                | Post-conflict peacebuilding, 15230                              |                       |      |                                      |
| <b>BMZ number</b>                         | 2018 67 142 (Phase I), 2018 67 142 (Phase II)                   |                       |      |                                      |
| <b>Commissioned by</b>                    | Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) |                       |      |                                      |
| <b>Recipient and executing agency</b>     | National Planning Authority DNP                                 |                       |      |                                      |
| <b>FC financing volume and instrument</b> | EUR 200 million (loan)                                          |                       |      |                                      |
| <b>Project duration</b>                   | 2019-2020<br>2020-2021                                          | <b>Reporting year</b> | 2025 | <b>Year of random sample</b><br>2022 |

### Project objectives and implementation

The outcome-level objective was to implement the agreed reform measures of the 2016 Colombian peace agreement, particularly in the areas of victim protection and compensation, cadastral development and land titling, by means of a policy-based loan (PBL). In addition, monitoring of the implementation of the peace agreement was to be implemented at all levels of government. The ultimate impact-level objective was increased peace; peace is considered in this ex-post evaluation (EPE) as a reduction in violence against persons and armed conflict (negative peace). The target group was the entire population of Colombia.


### Key findings

The project was relevant but showed little effectiveness at the impact level:

- The project supported a highly relevant agenda and was embedded in the peace agreement and the 2018-2022 government programme. It supported the efforts and resources of Colombia and other donors. The scope and complexity of the reforms were too ambitious given the short implementation period.
- The reform steps decisive for the disbursement of the loans were fulfilled and created the initial conditions for structural reforms in a highly complex and protracted peace process. However, the project's outcome-level targets were only partially met, structural reforms in several areas were not implemented quickly enough, and the implementing authorities did not receive sufficient funding. As a result, there are few discernible trickle-down effects of the reforms at the local level and among the target group.
- Various dimensions of violence did not sustainably decrease during and after the legislative period of this project or remain at a high level. The presence of armed actors is increasing. The central objectives of the Colombian peace reform could therefore only be achieved to a limited extent.
- Numerous obstacles, including administrative ones, continue to delay the implementation of the reforms, and the presence of numerous new armed actors jeopardises the progress already achieved. The ongoing efforts to continue land reform are rated positively.

### Overall rating

moderately unsuccessful (4)



1: very successful – 6: completely unsuccessful

### Conclusions

- The sector-focused PBL was valuable for policy dialogue, but peacebuilding is highly complex and requires structural reforms that go beyond the short time horizon. It is essential to set realistic priorities in terms of time and content.
- A lack of government ownership, insufficient control of conflict areas and weaknesses in implementation by the administration are detrimental to the impact.
- Land reform and victim compensation require a variety of interrelated measures in conflict areas and predictable financial and personnel allocations in order to be effective at the local level.
- The monitoring of PBL results should not be completely outsourced to the partner government or third parties.

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## List of abbreviations

|             |                                                                              |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ANT         | Agencia Nacional de Tierras                                                  |
| ART         | Agencia de Renovación del Territorio                                         |
| BID         | Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo                                           |
| GDP         | Gross domestic product                                                       |
| BMZ         | Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development                    |
| CAR         | Corporación Autónoma Regional                                                |
| CEV         | Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad                                |
| CNMH/CMH    | Centro (Nacional) de Memoria Histórica                                       |
| CONPES      | Consejo de Política Económica y Social                                       |
| CGR         | Contraloría General de la República                                          |
| COP         | Colombian peso                                                               |
| DAC         | Development Assistance Committee                                             |
| DANE        | Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas                         |
| DNP         | Departamento Nacional de Planeación, supreme planning authority              |
| DOTD        | Dirección de Ordenamiento y Desarrollo Territorial (within the DNP)          |
| DSEPP       | Dirección de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas Públicas (within the DNP) |
| ELN         | Ejército de Liberación Nacional                                              |
| EPC         | Encuesta de Percepción Ciudadana del PND 2018-2022                           |
| EPE         | Ex-post evaluation                                                           |
| FARC-EP     | Fuerza Armada Revolucionaria del Común - Ejército Popular                    |
| FC          | Financial cooperation                                                        |
| FC E        | FC Evaluation                                                                |
| GEIH        | Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares                                           |
| IDI         | Índice de Desempeño Institucional                                            |
| IGAC        | Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi                                         |
| JEP         | Jurisdicción Especial de Paz (Sondergerichtsbarkeit für den Frieden)         |
| MDM         | Medición del Desempeño Municipal                                             |
| OCDE /OECD  | Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico                   |
| ODS         | Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible                                           |
| PBL         | Policy-based lending                                                         |
| PCR         | Project completion report                                                    |
| PDET        | Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial                              |
| PND         | Plan Nacional de Desarrollo                                                  |
| PNUD / UNDP | Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo                           |
| POT         | Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial                                             |
| RTDAF       | Registro de Tierras Despojadas y Abandonadas Forzosamente                    |
| SDG         | Sustainable Development Goal                                                 |
| SGP         | Sistema General de Participaciones                                           |
| SGR         | Sistema General de Regalías                                                  |
| SIIPO       | Sistema Integrado de Información para el Posconflicto                        |
| SINERGIA    | Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Gestión y Resultados                       |
| SIRCAP      | Sistema de Rendición de Cuentas de la Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz      |
| SNARIV      | Sistema Nacional de Atención y Reparación a las Víctimas                     |
| UARIV       | Unidad de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas                      |
| UBPD        | Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas                                 |
| UNDP        | United Nations Development Programme                                         |
| USD         | US dollar                                                                    |
| WB          | World Bank                                                                   |

# Overview

## General conditions and classification of the project<sup>1</sup>

Colombia has been marked by more than 60 years of conflict, with over 450,000 deaths and 8 million displaced persons. More than 90,000 people are officially considered missing, and approximately 7,000 children have been victims of forced recruitment. The various armed conflicts, particularly between conservatives and liberals, the state and drug gangs, and between the state, paramilitaries and various guerrilla movements, have gone through different phases, which differ in terms of their intensity and geography, the specific characteristics of the political framework, and economic and social processes.<sup>2</sup>

A major cause of the decades of violence in Colombia was the social, economic and regional inequality in the country. Colombian society was and is characterised by massive land and capital concentration, and Colombia is, alongside Brazil, the country with the traditionally highest inequality in wealth distribution in South America. The fair distribution and sustainability of land is currently one of the greatest challenges, alongside the impermeability of the education system.

While high living standards were achieved in the cities, the state was virtually absent in many rural areas, with corresponding consequences for supply and security. The state's lack of a monopoly on the use of force was countered by the historical presence of various guerrilla groups, corruption and, in some regions, a massive presence of organised crime. 6.6 million hectares of agricultural land were illegally expropriated in connection with the conflict, and further areas are unusable due to landmines.

On 24 November 2016, after lengthy negotiations between the oldest rebel group, FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo), and the government, the so-called "final peace agreement" (EFA) was signed in the capital Bogotá, resulting in the demobilisation and disarmament of this guerrilla group. The agreement had six areas of action. The PMI (Plan Marco de Implementación) framework plan "translates" the EFA agreements into 578 policy measures (see Table 1).

| Area of action (EFA)                                                                  | Number of subject areas | Number of individual topics | Number of commitments (PMI) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (1) Comprehensive rural reform                                                        | 3                       | 16                          | 104                         |
| (2) Political participation and democratic opening                                    | 3                       | 14                          | 94                          |
| (3) End of the armed conflict                                                         | 4                       | 14                          | 140                         |
| (4) Solving the problem of illegal drugs                                              | 3                       | 7                           | 66                          |
| (5) Recognition, compensation and reparation for victims of violent conflict          | 4                       | 10                          | 90                          |
| (6) Mechanisms for implementation, verification and legitimisation [of the agreement] | 1                       | 9                           | 84                          |
| Total                                                                                 | 18                      | 70                          | 578                         |

**Table 1:** Areas of action and associated obligations of the final peace agreement EFA.

**Source:** Instituto Kroc: Informe sobre el Estado Efectivo de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz en Colombia. Bogotá / Notre Dame, November 2017.

While the EFA is fundamentally of national significance and validity, specific commitments relate to 170 (out of a total of 1,000) districts particularly affected by the violent conflict, for which separate regional development programmes have been set up under the name PDET (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial).

<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise stated, see: <https://www.bmz.de/de/laender/kolumbien>, Hartmut Rank and Konstantin Schenk: Interim results of land reform in Colombia at [https://www.nomos.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Aufsatz\\_NJ\\_2024\\_01\\_Rank\\_Schenk.pdf](https://www.nomos.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Aufsatz_NJ_2024_01_Rank_Schenk.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> See <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/service/laender/kolumbien-node/politisches-portraet-212762>

The total cost of implementing the 578 individual commitments over a period of 15 years was last estimated by the Colombian Ministry of Finance in 2017 at a total of COP 130 trillion (equivalent to approximately USD 43 billion).<sup>3</sup> The project evaluated here, designed as policy-based lending (PBL), was part of a series of FC projects to support the implementation of the peace agenda and related to the legislative term of President Ivan Duque (2018–2022).

During and after the end of the PBL, the conditions for the successful implementation of the peace agreement have tended to deteriorate. This is reflected in the weak presence of the state in rural regions, which leads to vulnerability to corruption and clientelism, the strengthening of regional power groups, and the continued widespread cultivation of coca and illegal mining, lack of accessibility and lack of basic services close to the population. In remote rural areas, there is a regionally fragmented but, in some cases, growing presence of old and new rebel groups that were not involved in the peace agreement and reject it for various reasons. The most important of the currently active armed groups (ELN, FARC-EMC, Segunda Marquetalia, Clan de Golfo) finance themselves to varying degrees through informal mining, illegal drug trafficking and protection rackets<sup>4</sup>.

The government of Gustavo Petro, elected in 2022, is striving for "comprehensive peace" ("Paz Total")<sup>5</sup>. This peace process is to be promoted through decentralised dialogue processes with the various armed actors. The Petro government has achieved some partial successes with this approach (e.g. local temporary ceasefires). However, neither has the government been able to guarantee the safety of the negotiating parties, nor have the armed groups reliably refrained from attacks. The "Paz Total" policy is therefore highly controversial in Colombia, both in parliament and outside it.

At the beginning of 2025, the usually sporadic armed conflicts reached a new level of escalation. As a result of the fighting, the Petro government declared a regional state of emergency in the north-east and suspended negotiations with the ELN – the largest of the long-standing rebel groups.

## Brief description

The outcome target of the PBL was the implementation of selected EFA reform measures, particularly in the areas of victim protection and compensation, the establishment of a land registry and land titling, governance in conflict areas, and ensuring the monitoring of the implementation of all dimensions of the peace agreement, in line with the measures prioritised in the national development plan and the policy matrix. At the impact level, the PBL was intended to contribute to increased peace in line with PND Goal 2022, "Peace through legal certainty, self-initiative and social justice throughout Colombia". Within the framework of the EPE, peace is regarded as a reduction in violence and armed conflict (negative peace).

The project consisted of four components, for which 42 reform steps were prioritised and a total of 16 disbursement triggers were agreed in the joint policy matrix, eight each for phase I (2019/2020) and phase II (2020/2021). The phases built on each other in terms of content and were designed as sectoral budget financing, which was paid into the Colombian government's budget in the form of a low-interest development loan of EUR 200 million after the implementation of the agreed peace-related reform measures. The target group was the entire population of Colombia (just over 52 million people in 2023), in particular the population of the predominantly rural conflict areas.

A key mechanism for achieving the objectives of PBLs is political dialogue and sector dialogue in the narrower sense, which serves to maintain relations between countries in general and to prioritise or accelerate selected agendas. The project partner was the supreme planning authority, the Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). The agreements were reached in expert-supported sectoral dialogues and negotiations between KfW and the DNP. The DNP is responsible for all investment expenditure in the national budget and for fiscal transfer systems. The implementation of specific measures was the responsibility of various specialist authorities, including the Agostin Codazzi Geographical Institute (IGAC), the Victims Authority (UARIV) and its regional and local branches, and the Land Agency (ANT).

Due to the close link between the two phases, they are evaluated together here. A previously funded five-phase PBL under the previous government of Juan Manuel Santos around peace reform was evaluated in 2018 (interim) and 2019 (ex-post evaluation) and rated as successful; it serves as a frame of reference for the present evaluation.

<sup>3</sup> See Günther Schulz-Heiss: Structured analysis of the progress of the final peace agreement in Colombia and its support through German-Colombian financial cooperation, internal analysis commissioned by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, April 2022, p. 8: "In the framework plan for the implementation of the peace agreement (PMI), which is based on the 2017 medium-term financial plan (MFMP), the Colombian Ministry of Finance has estimated the total cost of the 15-year implementation of the EFA for the national budget at just under 130 trillion Colombian pesos. This corresponds to a total of approximately 43 billion US dollars or an average annual expenditure of 0.6% of GDP. This cost projection was incorporated into the 2018 MFMP but has not been updated since then.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, <https://amerika21.de/2024/06/270251/dialog-regierung-und-segunda-marquetalia>

<sup>5</sup> See Law 2272 of November 2022.

## Breakdown of total costs


The total cost of the project amounted to EUR 200 million for phases I and II, which were disbursed on schedule and in full. These funds were granted as a development loan and will therefore be repaid by Colombia. The non-repayable funds include the significantly smaller amounts for interest subsidies and the financing of short-term expert assignments from the BMZ's SCF. The latter were financed as grants and amounted to a total of EUR 1.79 million over the course of the two project phases. The term of the loan was up to 10 years with a 3-year grace period.

|                                                   | Phase 1 (plan) | Phase 1 (actual) | Phase 2 (plan) | Phase 2 (actual) |
|---------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| <b>Investment costs (total)</b><br>in EUR million | 100            | 100              | 100            | 100              |
| <b>Own contribution</b><br>in EUR million         | n.a.           | n.a.             | n.a.           | n.a.             |
| <b>External funding</b><br>in EUR million         | 100            | 100              | 100            | 100              |
| <b>of which BMZ funds</b><br>in EUR million       | 100            | 100              | 100            | 100              |

**Table 2:** Breakdown of costs.

**Note:** Additional EUR 1.79 million in grants for SCF-funded short-term expert assignments; n.a. stands for not available.

## Map of the project region



**Figure 1:** Map of the project country.

**Source:** Own illustration.

**Note:** The map shows the frequent overlap between protected areas and conflict areas. This is also relevant for cadastral surveys and land reform.

## Project-specific strengths and weaknesses of the project

### The strengths include in particular:

- The greatest strength of the PBL was the provision of substantial financial resources within a relatively short period of time for the purposes of a medium-term reform agenda (peace agreement and government programme 2018–2022) that was widely considered to be highly relevant.
- The addition of substantial grant-financed technical support to the loan made it possible to conceptually refine the preparation of government reform initiatives on a wide range of issues and to increase understanding and acceptance on the part of partners, both the DNP and some implementing agencies.
- The existence of a conceptually strong partner authority (DNP) had the advantage of providing a potentially well-informed and reliable dialogue partner at the highest political level, who was also available for extended sector dialogue, especially with the prospect of further PBLs. From Colombia's point of view, the payment of loan funds into the national budget was a major advantage.
- The disbursement conditions included various special features. For example, ex-ante budget allocations protected certain issues and organisations at a time of changing political priorities (transitional justice institutions) and the necessary sectoral reform of social policy was initiated.
- The establishment of a peace information system at this very authority offered potentially good conditions for the timely availability of information relevant to governance.

### The weaknesses include in particular:

- The relatively short time between the negotiation of the reform steps relevant to disbursement, the conclusion of the financing agreement and the actual disbursement of funds made it difficult to specify realistically achievable reforms. The negotiating partners found themselves in an irresolvable trade-off: on the one hand, the PBL was intended to create incentives for the implementation of complex reforms. On the other hand, ambitious disbursement conditions could have jeopardised disbursement: if more complex reforms from the government programme are prioritised in order to strengthen their protagonists, the policy matrix quickly becomes too ambitious for a legislative period.
- Limiting the PBL indicators to those found in the government programme for the respective legislative period (and, in this case, also the implementation plan for the peace agreement) has the disadvantage that deficiencies or gaps in the wording of these documents could not be corrected. Adjustments to the indicators in German-language documents (module proposal), in turn, led to misunderstandings.
- The exclusive use of the partners' information sources for the appraisal of impacts did not prove successful, as these were incomplete, contradictory and not sufficiently up to date. The SIPO peace information system did not consistently provide relevant data. This is generally a high risk for monitoring PBLs on this topic and also had a negative impact on the availability and quality of data for the present ex-post evaluation (EPE).
- In accordance with its mandate, the partner DNP is a centrally acting authority with a pronounced top-down approach. As a result, practical implementation problems – especially at the decentralised level – and institutional problems due to the large number of authorities involved in the reform were underestimated during the negotiations on the PBL. During the course of the project, a great deal of energy was spent on developing new concepts, but their implementation was neglected over time. In this respect, dependence on the partners' systems proved to be a disadvantage. This applies to the implementation of cadastral and agricultural reforms, victim compensation and the governance of conflict communities.
- Despite the high-level involvement of the PBL, the approach did not offer any opportunity to empirically track the changing conflict fronts in order to respond to the deterioration of the security situation over time and, for example, to adjust the selection of conflict areas and corresponding support programmes of the predominantly decentralised peace agenda.
- The contribution to the achievement of important sectoral reforms (land reform and victim compensation) was not significant. The establishment of the new land registry was clearly too complex for the duration of the PBL; an experience that was also shared by the World Bank.

## General conclusions/lessons learned

- Thematically focused PBLs are fundamentally a useful instrument for policy dialogue, which can strengthen trust between the negotiating partners and create synergies with bilateral projects or with projects from other donors. To this end, the range of topics in a PBL must be kept clear and manageable, and experience from the relevant bilateral FC must be incorporated into



negotiations on new PBLs so that implementation challenges in the respective sector can be addressed at an early stage and indicators can be formulated in a realistic and specific manner.

- Once the loan has been negotiated and structured, for FC it is almost impossible to effectively address undesirable developments during the term of a PBL, as there is no direct link between the FC and the authorities responsible for implementation. It would be important to scale the structure of the reforms realistically and to define parts of the agreements as a 'living document' that can and must be further developed depending on the problem situation.
- PBLs that relate to the programme of a specific government term have significant intrinsic sustainability risks, as most substantial reforms are complex and controversial and cannot be completed within a single legislative period. Conceptually desirable thematic continuity between the PBLs of different legislative periods is limited by the specific creative will and changing political priorities of the partners. As a result, the classic strengths of FC in PBLs (continuity, long-term commitment to the sector) do not necessarily come into full play.
- Supplementary SCF-funded expert missions can help to create important conditions for systemic reforms and strengthen the personnel capacity of partner authorities in the short term. However, topics and duration must be selected very carefully and linked to prioritised outcomes in order to achieve sustainability. The capacities of weak implementing authorities cannot be sustainably compensated for by SCF missions.
- The FC should not fully rely on other donors – e.g. the World Bank with a loan for cadastre development or the EU with a trust fund for peace – to perform monitoring tasks for quality assurance of the German contribution.
- Since PBL does not involve strict earmarking of the funds provided, it should be ensured that the partner government provides a plausible amount of financial and human resources for the agreed reforms, including the relevant specialist authorities. This could involve, for example, disbursement-related triggers based on changes in the share of sector-relevant expenditure in the national budget or, in the case of a very broad peace agenda, on the funding of certain reform-relevant authorities.

### Sector-specific conclusions

- The quality of the policy dialogue is of great importance: it is important for the German side to have very good knowledge of the sector before using PBL (possibly a long-term portfolio). Being rooted in the sector makes it easier to assess the partner's real commitment to the sector, any existing conflicts of interest and the relevance of individual reforms. Only then can a PBL contribute to improving the necessary framework conditions for reforms.
- Peace and conflict prevention are, by definition, broad topics. Nevertheless, the number and scope of reform topics included in a PBL and the institutions involved should remain manageable in order to be able to go into depth in the policy dialogue and provide the capacities needed for governance. In particular, it is necessary to specifically examine and address the capacities of implementation-relevant authorities (e.g. IGAC, ANT, UARIV) when negotiating a PBL. It would be desirable to include administrative reform measures in implementation-relevant authorities at the outcome level in the policy matrix in order to reduce institutional risks.
- In line with the mandate of development cooperation, it would be advantageous to focus PBL on a few reform issues that aim to combat the causes of conflict in terms of development policy (e.g. access to land, curbing the drug economy, expanding decentralised control and governance). To the extent that it is politically necessary to address the consequences of conflict (e.g. victim compensation) – possibly even in the short term – clarifying expectations and objectives in advance would facilitate a balanced ex-post appraisal.
- Protracted conflicts of low or medium intensity are accompanied by an enormous number of civilian and military casualties from acts of violence and displacement. The politically legitimate desire to give all these people a "peace dividend" is extremely costly and – with or without PBL – quickly reaches the limits of what is fiscally feasible, increases the risk of windfall effects and is not easy to communicate to the next generation of taxpayers. The political dialogue on peace PBLs could address this dilemma and offer clearly defined strategies for socio-political compensation. Such a focus would be complex enough for a PBL, without adding to other broad topics.
- Effective land reform requires accessibility and state control of the areas concerned, especially rural areas. Deficits in state control can, for example, have a negative impact on the motivation of internally displaced persons or former militias to return to their places of origin. Decentralised governance in conflict areas is therefore a fundamental prerequisite for peace reforms of all kinds. If this is neglected, unplanned side effects may arise, such as additional burdens on municipalities with better security situations.
- The issue of land reform has direct and indirect implications for environmental reforms, e.g. the designation and management of protected areas. These interfaces should be actively managed during the preparation of a PBL and any conflicting objectives should be addressed.

# Assessment according to OECD DAC criteria

## Relevance

### 1. Alignment with policies and priorities

Colombia's development plans (PNDs), which are based on each legislative period, reflect the government programme of the respective presidency and also refer to the country's international commitments and the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals).

The priorities of the PBL were outlined on the basis of the respective PND in the government negotiations (RV) between Germany and Colombia and then gradually structured in negotiations with the DNP, and the policy matrix was formulated. The resulting priorities of the PBL were clearly linked to the peace agenda and the EFA, which spans legislative periods; the policy issues selected were and therefore remain highly relevant to the implementation of the peace agreement.

The degree of alignment with national policies and priorities was, by definition, exceptionally high, as only reform topics that were anchored in the EFA, the PMI and the national development plan DNP for the 2018–2022 legislative period were selected for the PBL. As the supreme planning authority, the DNP, was a partner in the project, the results of the policy dialogues between Germany and Colombia were guaranteed to be consistent with the country's overarching priorities.

In the course of the PBLs disbursed under the previous Santos government, the instrument of multi-level policy matrices was further developed in terms of form and content. This resulted in a strong sense of ownership on the part of the government.

With its thematic priorities, the PBL was in line with the relevant BMZ concepts and the BMZ country strategy. Other cross-cutting issues that are priorities for the BMZ (e.g. poverty reduction, gender) are either implicitly included in the project's focus or were explicitly addressed by other projects, such as a "gender PBL".

### 2. Alignment with the needs and capacities of stakeholders and beneficiaries

The measures were derived directly from the government's reform programme and were therefore fundamentally geared to its needs. In addition, parallel bilateral projects in rural areas were used as a source of information in order to take account of the needs in rural areas.

A special feature of Colombia is the very strong position of the central planning authority DNP compared to the Ministry of Finance and the pronounced policy-making authority of this central authority vis-à-vis local and regional administrations. Although subordinate authorities were also involved in the sector dialogue within the framework of the prioritised reform topics, the extent of their participation cannot be determined retrospectively. Overall, it cannot be ruled out that the needs and capacities of the partner DNP differ from those of the specialist authorities responsible for implementation (in this case, the land reform authority ANT, the cadastral authority IGAC and the victims' authority UARIV). This was an inherent risk of the PBL instrument, as the funds were paid into the national budget without any further earmarking once the disbursement conditions had been met. Accordingly, the instrument could not necessarily ensure that the needs of all levels of implementation involved were met and that capacities, skills and procedures were sufficiently strengthened.

A closer analysis of the reform areas included in this project reveals that the concept appears too ambitious and insufficiently focused in relation to the time available.

The project was designed to be rather distant from the target group, but directly affected the population in the areas of land reform and victim compensation (thematic areas 1 and 3) and indirectly in the area of governance in conflict communities (thematic area 2). Due to the long years of civil war and the discrimination against indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, measures in rural areas of Colombia required a high degree of sensitivity towards these population groups and other actors (e.g. NGOs, grassroots organisations, and, where applicable, armed groups). This was considered through consultation mechanisms in the reform of the land registry and victim compensation policy, as well as through the consideration of collective and historical rights, the reversal of the burden of proof and the principle of voluntariness. However, the procedures for enforcing rights – especially land rights – were and remain so complicated that they are almost impossible for the target groups to navigate without legal assistance. Despite the fundamentally decentralised structure of the state, many decisions are still made centrally, and not all specialist authorities relevant to peace are represented at the local level. The PBL was also unable to directly address the protection of the population and local interest groups from attacks, threats and intimidation.

Since all items of expenditure in the state budget compete, the general population was also indirectly affected by the priorities of the PMI and the PBL based on it, as well as the reforms derived from them. The PBL did not consider in detail how the needs

of different groups (e.g. conflict victims and other disadvantaged groups) for a fair balance of interests could be met, which posed a risk to the subsequent acceptance of the measures. However, this was and is an unavoidable risk in processes of reconciliation and reparation and in any reform in democracies with freedom of expression.

### 3. Appropriateness of design

The Theory of Change (ToC) of the project was and is fundamentally plausible. Figure 2 shows the reconstructed ToC. The three inputs of the PBL are i.) the loans, ii.) personnel support in the form of short-term expert assignments, and iii.) continuous policy and sector dialogue.

Prior to the disbursement of the loan, the political dialogue was intended to foster relations between Colombia and Germany in general, strengthen the position of the authorities responsible for implementation, and prioritise or accelerate selected reforms of the peace agenda by negotiating a policy matrix and a series of disbursement triggers. After the respective loans have been disbursed, the dialogue should be used to monitor the implementation of the reforms and track the achievement of the objectives. In addition, SCF-funded expert missions should strengthen the DNP and the implementing authorities and prepare for the subsequent implementation of reforms, e.g. by drafting policy papers or procedural proposals (all outputs).

This was intended to create the conditions for the adoption of reforms and improve the (personnel, strategic, financial) framework conditions for their implementation (induced output).

The reforms and improved framework conditions were in turn intended to yield usable results at the outcome level, such as data availability as a result of a newly developed peace information system or the granting of land titles on the basis of an improved cadastral system and other procedures. Among other things, this was intended to contribute to the implementation of certain thematic areas of the peace agreement, including improved access to land, victim compensation and reintegration. By addressing the structural causes of conflict, the aim was to achieve a reduction in violence at the impact level.

This ToC was based on several assumptions about the development of external factors, without which the effects could not be achieved. These included, for example, a high level of willingness and ability on the part of the government to implement reforms, and the continuation of certain reforms beyond the term of a legislative period.

The reform topics selected for the EPE are clearly related to the peace agreement and the PMI agreements, and the measures were fundamentally verifiable. The question of whether other reform topics could have made a greater contribution to peace lies outside the scope of the PBL system, as this funding instrument was fundamentally based on an existing reform programme (in this case, the development plan for the Duque legislative period).

It should be noted, however, that the security situation, which had been deteriorating since 2017, was not sufficiently addressed in the concept, even though this would foreseeably affect several reform topics and the peace agenda as a whole. The politically intended strengthening of governance in the conflict communities would have been an important starting point here, but was not operationalised accordingly.

Another critical point is that the Land Agency, in particular, as one of the most important implementing authorities, was not adequately equipped (in terms of personnel and finances); there was also a lack of branches and contact persons at the local level to implement the intended (land) reforms quickly and efficiently. The risk of insufficient transfer of funds to the local level was foreseeable ex ante, but earmarking of FC funds was generally not provided for in policy-based financing. The background to this is that the fungibility of funds, the use of which is competitively debated in parliament, generally benefits efficient allocation.

One possible instrument for ensuring the allocation of funds to reform-relevant authorities is the inclusion of a disbursement-relevant trigger based on changes in the share of sector-relevant expenditure in the national budget. This option was used in the evaluated PBL to secure transitional justice institutions, which is appraised as positive. However, it was not used for authorities technically involved in land reforms, which would have been crucial for the achievement of outcomes. The strengthening of outcome-relevant institutions through SCF interventions was also used too sparingly or not focused enough, and the scope for improving efficiency was not sufficiently exploited conceptually.




Figure 2: Reconstructed theory of change.

Source: Own illustration.

It should also be noted that, although the selected measures were necessary, they were often insufficient for the successful implementation of the peace agenda. For example, although the need to maintain transitional justice was emphasised, the resources allocated to the land reform authority were neglected, as was the mainstreaming of all social policy measures, which is important for the acceptance of victim compensation. These are inherent limitations of a PBL, whose scope can only be expanded through political dialogue.

When formulating the outcome indicators, adjustments were needed for the purposes of the EPE (see Effectiveness and Impact). At the outcome level, individual indicators in particular were expanded and specified in order to establish a clearer link between reforms and effects. Only limited data was collected for the impact level, as the formulation of objectives and indicators tended to be at too low a level; accordingly, the impact chapter primarily draws on publicly available data and EPE interviews.

#### 4. Adaptability – response to change

The project was adapted to the financial and fiscal conditions changed by the Covid-19 pandemic. In view of a foreseeable decline in the tax ratio and an increase in the public debt ratio and budget deficit, a third phase originally planned for the 2018-22 legislative period was postponed and is currently being implemented together with two further development loans under the subsequent government of Gustavo Petro to support the government programme for the 2022-26 legislative period (not part of this EPE). This adjustment is understandable, but it made it difficult to maintain thematic continuity across different PBLs. This also made it more difficult to achieve the objectives at the outcome and impact levels. However, given the short implementation period of the PBLs, this is not considered to be a decisive factor. A third phase under the Duque legislature (i.e. within the same timeframe) would not have led to significantly different results, as the lack of financial resources was not the main bottleneck for advancing structural peace reforms. During the pandemic, according to the Ministry of Finance, about one-third of the national budget was reallocated to new priorities, but peace-related reforms were not significantly affected.

#### Rating summary of relevance: **successful (2)**

Relevance is appraised as successful. Yet, it should be noted critically that, in favour of a legalistic approach, too little emphasis was placed on concrete procedural reforms for the authorities responsible for implementation and their resources. Furthermore, too little detail was provided on how governance was to be improved, particularly in the conflict areas. The high complexity and breadth of the reforms, as well as the ambitious goals and indicators of the project, appear too ambitious and insufficiently clear and focused relative to the short implementation period (areas of land reform and victim compensation). Despite successful political dialogue prior to disbursement, the pace of reform was often not accelerated and too few precautions were taken to ensure the impact and sustainability of the engagement. The failure to address the security situation in rural areas remains a point of criticism in terms of adaptability.

However, the intended reforms were in line with the peace agreement, supported a highly relevant area of reform (promotion of the peace agenda) with strong momentum at the time, and were prioritised, at least in general terms, in government programmes (EFA, PMI, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo). The design and impact logic are fundamentally plausible, both ex ante and from today's perspective.

## Coherence

#### 5. Internal coherence

During the peace process, German development cooperation with Colombia has shifted its focus from supporting civil society and subnational structures to supporting central government reforms. The volume of German development cooperation with Colombia has multiplied in this context.

The central instrument of this shift in focus was the peace sector programmes, which included the PBL evaluated here. The FC project was thus at the heart of the existing development cooperation engagement in the peace sector, with a particular emphasis on important institutional and political framework conditions. The implementation of the EFA was translated into a gradually more complex policy matrix, which referred to a series of PBLs for each legislative period (in this case 5+2 phases), which were further developed under two different governments.

The EZ programme running at the start of the PBL included further FC and TC projects that complemented each other thematically and conceptually. Within the FC, there were synergies in rural road construction ("Pilot Investment Programme for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement at Local Level" BMZ No.: 2018.6803.3), as this was directly active in three rural communities in conflict areas. On the other hand, there were synergies with the German contribution to the EU Trust Fund for the Colombian

Peace Process (EUTF, 2018 652 60), which also financed local projects in conflict areas and was intended to strengthen two peace-related specialist authorities by means of budget subsidies. However, in view of the EUTF's funding spectrum, a closer exchange of information on the performance of the land agency Agencia des Tierras and implementation experiences at the decentralised level in conflict communities would have been desirable.

Synergies with German technical cooperation arose through the Propaz project, which, among other things, supported the establishment of a land registry system at regional level. The two organisations coordinated their activities in terms of content.

The PBL was fully compatible with the relevant BMZ strategies in the peace promotion and conflict prevention sector.

## 6. External coherence

Ongoing coordination between the national planning authority DNP and KfW on individual policy actions and accompanying SCF assignments ensured that synergies could be exploited and duplication between the various donor initiatives avoided.

The development measures of numerous other bilateral and multilateral donors were continued during the implementation period of the PBL, in particular the aforementioned EUTF and a project co-financed by the World Bank and IDB to establish a modern cadastral system<sup>6</sup>. Over the years, further projects/programmes were added, which also aimed to support the implementation of the peace agenda and put an end to the spiral of violence. The objectives of all these projects were and are similar and support the government's own efforts.

Sector coordination has been and continues to be pursued very actively by the KfW office in Bogota, and information has been shared between donors both within the framework of the EUTF and through bilateral contacts.

### Rating summary of coherence: **successful (2)**

Coherence is appraised as successful. Together with other donors, Germany financed reforms by the Colombian government to support the peace agenda, which were based on the government programme (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2018–2022) and the EFA and its implementation plan, the PMI. Communication between donors and between FC and DNP was good. A clearer distinction between the PBL's priorities in the area of land reform and the EUTF's budget support for the land reform authority (ANT) would have been desirable.

## Effectiveness

### 7. Achievement of objectives

The outcome-level objective adjusted<sup>7</sup> within the framework of the EPE was as follows: The agreed reform measures (outcomes) of the EFA peace agreement are implemented, particularly in the areas of victim protection and compensation, development of the cadastral system and land titling, and monitoring of the implementation of the agreement.

The implementation plan for the peace agreement provided for 578 individual commitments in six areas of action (see Table 1). The PBL focused on the topics of "Comprehensive Rural Reform" (1), "Recognition, Compensation and Reparation for Victims of the Violent Conflict" (5), and "Mechanisms for the Implementation, Verification and Legitimation of the Agreement" (6), as well as the establishment of a new peace information system.

The original indicators for the project were partially specified or replaced and evaluated as part of the EPE.

In addition, the reporting of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame is used for the appraisal of effectiveness<sup>8</sup>. In 2016, the Kroc Institute was entrusted by the Colombian government and the FARC-EP with monitoring the progress of the implementation of the EFA. This joint mandate gave the Kroc indicators a high degree of legitimacy in the first years after the peace agreement. However, the importance of the monitoring reports seems to have declined significantly under the current government ("one input among many"). The monitoring focuses on progress in implementing the 578 commitments contained in the EFA (see Table 1). The monitoring is cross-legislative and comes from a single, independent source. The Kroc Institute generates indices from the EFA commitments according to field of action and uses a 4-point scale for the appraisal of progress: not started, minimal progress, moderate progress, fully completed. Within the framework of the

<sup>6</sup> See <https://www.bancomundial.org/es/news/press-release/2019/03/14/colombias-multipurpose-registry-will-become-a-reality-with-world-bank-support>

<sup>7</sup> The original objective was: "The objective was to support the institutional and structural reforms necessary to implement the peace agenda following the conclusion of the peace agreement with the FARC (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común) and to provide the Colombian government with financial resources for its implementation on favourable terms." This objective does not meet the criteria for an outcome objective.

<sup>8</sup> The project/programme itself uses these criteria for the appraisal of its impact.



project, progress classified as "minimal" by the Kroc Institute was considered progress, even if this does not yet imply that the 2030 target will be achieved and is insufficient from the perspective of the evaluation nine years after the peace agreement.

The EPE uses the latest systematic inventory of the KROC dated 2024, which refers to the results achieved by the end of 2023<sup>9</sup> as well as the quarterly reports<sup>10</sup>. When considering the Kroc indicators, it should be noted that the individual indicators behind the respective indices are at both the outcome and output levels and therefore only meet the requirements for an outcome indicator to a limited extent. It should also be borne in mind that the progress made (especially the early, "low-hanging fruits") has already been positively reflected, at least in part, in the ex-post evaluation of Phase I.

The achievement of the outcome-level target can be summarised as follows:

| Indicator                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Status at time of audit                                                  | Target value at EPE (audit)                                                                                                    | Actual value at PCR                                                                                  | Actual value at EPE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Land rights and governance</b><br>(1a) % of municipalities in which the cadastre has been fully established                                                                                                              | 0                                                                        | For 2022: 60% of all municipalities and 100% of conflict municipalities                                                        | 2022: 112 out of 1,000 municipalities (SIIPO)                                                        | Little progress in establishing the land registry: Start of land registry establishment in approximately 10–12% of municipalities (2024)<br><br>☒Target not achieved                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| (1b) Increase in land titles granted by the Land Agency: Number of titles granted and area granted to existing and returning private users, with special consideration given to conflict areas, gender and indigenous areas | 0 hectares/title                                                         | For 2026: Political target (PMI): 3 million hectares of formalised land ownership<br><br>For 2022: PBL target: 24,350 hectares | 2022: 14,860 hectares                                                                                | 2024: 40,000 land titles for around 100,000 hectares of land<br><br>☒Target not achieved<br>☒Insufficient data                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| (1c) Improved performance of the 170 district administrations in conflict areas compared to the national average, using the example of the land recorded by the land registry offices in %                                  | 2019: Municipalities with modern cadastral systems: 0 according to SIIPO | For 2018: 40% above national average                                                                                           | n.a.                                                                                                 | Target achievement implausible<br><br>☒Target value not achieved<br>☒Insufficient data                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| (1d) Kroc indicator: Progress in the action area "Comprehensive rural reform"                                                                                                                                               | 2018<br>At least minimal: 63%                                            | For 2022:<br>At least minimum: 90%                                                                                             | Dec. 2022:<br>Minimum: 87%<br><br>Complete: 4%<br>Partially: 17%<br>Minimum: 66%<br>Not started: 13% | November 2024:<br>At least minimal: 95%<br><br>Complete: 9%<br>Partially: 18%<br>Minimal: 68%<br>Not started: 5%<br><br>☒Target value achieved with delay                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| <b>Victim compensation</b><br>(2a) Total number of victims who were able to return to their home community or be integrated into a new community                                                                            | 2018: 1,602,670                                                          | For 2022: 3,115,670                                                                                                            | 2020: 2,531,779                                                                                      | 2022: 3.6 million compensation measures implemented (return and reintegration not reported separately)<br><br>2024: 7.7 million claims approved (return and reintegration not reported separately)<br><br>However, all benefits, including significantly minor ones, are counted here.<br><br>☒Target value partially achieved<br>☒Insufficient data |
| (2b) Kroc Indicator: Progress in the action area "Victims of violent conflict"                                                                                                                                              | 2018<br>At least minimal: 58%                                            | For 2022:<br>At least minimum: 90%                                                                                             | Dec. 2022<br>Minimum: 88%                                                                            | November 2024:<br>At least minimal: 89%                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |

<sup>9</sup> See Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame: 2025, Navigating the Waters of Peace: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities in the Eighth Year of Implementation December 2023–November 2024

<sup>10</sup> See <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/barometer/colombia-reports/quarterly-reports>

|                                                                                                                                                                                             |                          |                               |                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                             |                          |                               | Complete: 31%<br>Partially: 22%<br>Minimum: 34%<br>Not started: 12%                                | Complete: 40%<br>Partially: 21%<br>Minimal: 28%<br>Not started: 11%                                                                                                                                    |
|                                                                                                                                                                                             |                          |                               |                                                                                                    | ☑Target value almost achieved with delay                                                                                                                                                               |
| <b>Information on the implementation of the peace agreement</b><br>(3a) Percentage of progress indicators for the implementation of the framework plan (PMI) recorded and published by SIPO | 2018: 5%                 | For 2022: 80%                 | 2020: 75                                                                                           | Formally fulfilled with gaps: high standards, but data availability not reliably ensured and not very user-friendly<br><br>☑Target value partially achieved<br>☑Insufficient data                      |
| (3b) Kroc indicator: Progress in the field of action "Implementation/verification/legitimation of the EFA"                                                                                  | 2018: 87<br>Minimum: 87% | For 2022: 90%<br>Minimum: 90% | Dec. 2022:<br>Minimum: 92%<br><br>Complete: 58%<br>Partial: 14%<br>Minimum: 19%<br>Not started: 8% | November 2024:<br>At least minimal: 95%<br><br>Complete: 61%<br>Partially: 15%<br>Minimal: 19%<br>Not started: 5%<br><br>☑Target achieved, but largely through legislative and administrative measures |

**Table 3:** Outcome target achievement.

**Note:** n.a. stands for not available. The categories "fully, partially, minimally, not started" are the categories used by the Kroc Institute to describe the implementation status of agreements. "At least minimally" adds up the "fully", "partially" and "minimally" implemented agreements.

## 8. Contribution to the achievement of objectives

With the PBL instrument, the achievement of indicators and objectives can never be completely or clearly attributed to a specific project, as the funds flow into the general budget. The financial contribution made by PBL to the implementation of the peace agenda and the target indicators can also only be quantified very roughly: government estimates suggest that PBL accounted for less than 5% (see efficiency).

### Reform area: land rights and governance (1)

The background to this reform area is that legally sound protection of land ownership in Colombia is a basic prerequisite for resolving land conflicts, some of which have been going on for decades. Reforms in this area relate to two different processes<sup>11</sup>: i) the establishment of a modern cadastre covering all uses in the municipalities (Catastro Múltipropósito) and ii) the allocation of land titles to the rural population via the land agency ANT. The processes behind these are completely separate from each other in administrative terms.

#### Indicator 1a: Establishment of a comprehensive land registry

The EFA aimed to achieve cadastral coverage of 70% of the 1,000 municipalities by 2023, i.e. within seven years of the conclusion of the peace agreement. In line with this, the Duque government wanted to establish a land registry covering all uses of land (residential, commercial, agricultural, nature conservation, etc.) in 60% of all municipalities and 100% of conflict communities by 2022.<sup>12</sup> During the term of the PBL, the methodological foundations for establishing this cadastral system were laid and administrative processes were prepared and, in some cases, accelerated, which is considered positive<sup>13</sup>. However, due to the extensive preparations, almost no results at the outcome level could be achieved and documented during Duque's term in office. The target was clearly missed. In addition, the information provided by various government agencies is contradictory.

#### Indicator 1b: Granting of land titles via the ANT

Separate from the establishment of the new cadastre, land titles are being granted directly to needy population groups through completely different legal processes. Title ownership is a prerequisite for further important development and support measures, e.g. agricultural loans in particular. Two procedures must be distinguished here: (i) the formalisation of land ownership for individuals or – mostly indigenous – communities who already own and cultivate land but do not have the necessary documents to prove

<sup>11</sup> Other procedures relate to the provision of land for former combatants. These are not referred to here because they were not part of this PBL.

<sup>12</sup> See Presidential Council for Stabilisation and Consolidation: Colombia 2035, two years of peace with legality, Comprehensive Rural Development Report August 2018 – September 2020.

<sup>13</sup> See <https://siipo.dnp.gov.co/detalleindicador/CArAbcYqcas8JAAbcYqftrgh>



their land rights, and (ii) the initial allocation of land to those in need. In the latter category, the needs of displaced persons, former combatants and poor landless populations who have neither been displaced nor demobilised overlap. The EFA and the implementation plan stipulated that the government should purchase 3 million hectares through a land fund and formalise a further 7 million hectares.

The institutional framework for the allocation of land titles is complex: the land agency ANT has attracted negative attention due to a variety of budgetary and procedural problems. The peace information system SIPO does not currently publish data on the total area allocated through the land fund or on formalised areas.<sup>14</sup> The allocation of land titles was not given much importance during the term of the PBL. Only around 14,000 hectares were titled during Duque's entire term in office<sup>15</sup>, which means that this government's targets (14,860 ha for 2018-2022) were nevertheless met, but the PBL's targets (24,350 ha by 2022) were not. In any case, the target achievement is below the political target of 3 million hectares, which in turn would only compensate for about 50% of the land expropriated during the conflict. The number of beneficiaries to which the PBL indicator refers is not apparent.

The indicator is therefore not fully quantifiable in formal terms but has not been met for the duration of the PBL.

#### Indicator 1c: Improved performance of the 170 district administrations in conflict areas, using the example of cadastral development

A total of 170 of around 1,000 Colombian municipalities are classified as conflict communities whose development is to be promoted through a variety of rural integrated programmes (PDET). Around 24% of the rural population lives in these areas. Given the generally difficult experiences with cadastre development described for indicator 1a, it is implausible that this ambitious approach can be successfully implemented in conflict communities of all places. The available information on the fulfilment of the indicator is insufficient and inconsistent.

The Peace and Human Rights Department of the DNP, which was responsible for the PBL, categorically denied the existence of the indicator. A comparison of various data sources suggests that the indicator has not been met. In summary, it should be noted that the indicator cannot be reliably verified, partly because the DNP is currently not interested in doing so.


#### Indicator 1d: Kroc indicator: Progress in the action area "Comprehensive rural reform"

In November 2024, only 27% of the agreements on land reform had been fully or partially implemented. In addition, 68% had been minimally implemented, meaning that only 5% had not yet been started. However, the Kroc Institute criticises the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture and the Land Agency have so far failed to provide consistent figures on the actual amount of land that has been legalised (2024: 145), which has also been criticised by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría de la Nación).

The target value of the project of 90% (minimum) implementation was therefore achieved with some delay. However, the question arises as to whether the level of ambition is appropriate after six years of the peace agreement: Figure 3 shows, firstly, that a large proportion (70%) of the 97% achieved was only "minimally" implemented. Secondly, some of the agreements are at the output level, which is generally much easier to achieve than targets at the outcome level. Thirdly, although Figure 3 shows a sharp increase in the fulfilment of agreements from 2016 to 2018, this flattens out during the Duque and Petro terms of office and continues to rise only slowly. A comparison with indicators 1a-1c shows that, overall, the successes measured by the Kroc Index have little impact on the actual land registries created and land titles granted.

<sup>14</sup> See <https://siipo.dnp.gov.co/detalleindicador/ShzueKwebFzTuKB2>.

<sup>15</sup> See <https://siipo.dnp.gov.co/detalleclasificaindicador/UwiueKwSZw3e67ch>



**Figure 3:** Implementation of the EFA agreements in the action area "Comprehensive rural reform", gender and ethnic issues from 2016 to 2024.

**Source:** Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame: 2025, Navigating the Waters of Peace: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities in the Eighth Year of Implementation December 2023–November 2024.

### Reform area: victim compensation

#### Indicator 2a: Total number of victims who have been able to return to their home communities or be integrated into new communities

The peace agreement recognises that, in principle, all victims of the conflict have a right to recognition and compensation, that this right has no expiry date and that the burden of proof lies with the state, not the victims. According to estimates, between 4.7 and 5.7 million people had been displaced by the start of the peace negotiations in 2012. The outcome indicator selected for the PBL reflects the desire to enable *all* victims to either return to their places of origin or benefit from other integration measures. The target value of 3.1 million victims provided for in 2022 was roughly double the baseline value of 1.6 million victims provided for in 2018. Accordingly, by the end of the legislative period relevant to this PBL, over 50% of registered victims would have received fair compensation offers.

In fact, the number of registered victims has continued to rise even after the peace agreement, reaching over 9.8 million in 2024, or around 20% of Colombia's population and almost twice as many as before the peace agreement.<sup>16</sup> Achievements have therefore been neutralised by the expansion of the problem.

Secondly, the specific services provided are not reported separately, so it is not possible to verify how many victims are returning to their home communities or being integrated into new communities. For example, over a million people have received psychological and psychotherapeutic counselling. In addition, double counting, i.e. counting people who have received multiple services, is not reported.

Thirdly, competition and free-riding effects are occurring, increasingly reducing the acceptance of the approach among the population. The ratio of the total number of victims to the number of returnees specified for 2023 illustrates that the goal of return is neither quick nor easy to achieve; the local offices of the Victims Authority report massive difficulties in implementing the return: Discussions held at the EPE reveal that cooperation between various state organisations in the field of social policy and labour market promotion for all socially disadvantaged sections of the population in Colombia is relatively new and heavily dependent on individuals.


In summary, the indicator is quantitatively fulfilled in relation to all forms of victim compensation if the total number of beneficiaries during the Duque legislature is taken as a benchmark. Regarding the right to return and reintegration formulated for the PBL, verification is not possible. In any case, the relative contribution of the PBL to addressing the victim issue as a whole is less than intended, because the number of victims has risen sharply again since the peace agreement, meaning that the total number of open cases has not decreased, and the issue has not become any less complex. The approach is increasingly encountering acceptance problems among the population. Administrative and institutional reforms have been neglected in this area.

<sup>16</sup> See <https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/Cifras/#/1/infografia>

### Indicator 2b: Kroc indicator: Progress in the action area "Victims of violent conflict"

An examination of the Kroc indicators shows greater progress in the recognition, compensation and reparation of victims (thematic area 5): in 2024, 89% of the agreements had been fulfilled, 40% of them in full. The project's target of 90% (minimum) implementation was therefore only narrowly missed.

It should be noted, however, that the settlement of claims is likely to keep the state busy for several decades to come due to the enormous and still rising total number of victims, the sometimes complicated procedures and the need to weigh up each individual case. The Kroc report also explicitly refers to significant gaps in the peace agreement that make the successful reintegration of ex-combatants difficult: unlike peace agreements in some other countries, Colombia neglected to regulate land access for this group.



**Figure 4:** Implementation of the EFA agreements in the action area "Victims of violent conflict" Gender and ethnic issues from 2016 to 2024.

**Source:** Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame: 2025, *Navigating the Waters of Peace: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities in the Eighth Year of Implementation* December 2023–November 2024.

### Reform area Information on the implementation of the peace agreement

#### Indicator 3a: Percentage of progress indicators from the framework plan for its implementation recorded and published by SIPO

The DNP is responsible for monitoring public policies. The SINERGIA system records hundreds of indicators from the respective government programme, whose development is continuously updated. However, this only applies to the respective government programme for a specific legislative period.

The monitoring of the PMI framework plan, which is relevant for the implementation of the peace agreement, spans multiple legislative periods. For this purpose, the SIPO was developed, which is also operated by the DNP and comprises over 500 target indicators. It is linked to the existing SINERGIA system. The outcome indicator selected for the PBL was intended to ensure that all relevant PMI indicators are actually included in SIPO.


Within the framework of the EPE, reliable information was not available for several indicators in either of the two systems, or the information in the two databases was not comparable. The figures on the websites of the specialist authorities responsible for implementing the reform areas do not always correspond to the figures in SIPO.

SIPO measures the implementation of more complex reforms by forming weighted averages that consider different stages or even different measures of a reform package and calculating a mean value from them. This makes sense in principle, but the formation of mean values can easily create a distorted picture that obscures serious weaknesses. In particular, the terms "progress" or "degree of target achievement" give the impression that this movement should also be perceptible at the level of the population. Here, the effort to achieve methodological correctness becomes counterproductive.

Overall, and based on the random samples taken, the indicator is partially fulfilled. It is fundamentally positive that peace-related data is being collated in one place. However, there is considerable room for improvement in the pragmatic definition of measurable indicators and in the timely provision of strategically relevant information.

### Indicator 3b: Kroc indicator: Progress in the action area "Implementation/verification/legitimisation of the EFA"

The establishment of mechanisms for the implementation, verification and legitimisation of the agreement (thematic area 6) is well advanced, as it largely requires purely legislative and administrative measures (72 per cent of measures fulfilled or well advanced).



**Figure 5:** Implementation of the EFA agreements in the action area "Implementation/Verification/Legitimisation of the EFA" Gender and ethnic issues from 2016 to 2024.

**Source:** Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame: 2025, *Navigating the Waters of Peace: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities in the Eighth Year of Implementation* December 2023–November 2024.

### Gender-related agreements

Compared to the implementation of the agreements as a whole, the implementation of gender-related agreements lags even further behind: according to Kroc, 70% have not yet been started or show only minimal progress, 17% and 18% respectively show a medium degree of implementation, and only 12% of the measures have been completed.

## 9. Quality of implementation

From KfW's perspective, implementation of a PBL can primarily be managed by negotiating the disbursement conditions and providing accompanying SCF-financed expert assessments. The loan increases the government's overall fiscal leeway, thereby facilitating the implementation of reforms. Once the loan has been disbursed, the implementation and management of the budget is the responsibility of the government. In the best-case scenario, the political dialogue continues even after disbursement, often through the preparation of a further PBL.

In the present PBL, the scope for negotiation and the SCF instrument were used extensively. However, the political dialogue was not effective enough to ensure the implementation of the jointly formulated requirements and the provision of the necessary resources across the legislative period: Although the peace-related budget items were protected overall in the distribution of budget funds, the ministries and authorities relevant to implementation (in this case, primarily the Agencia Nacional de Tierras and IGAC) were not adequately taken into account, and procedures were not streamlined and standardised to such an extent that reforms could be implemented quickly. However, some of the reforms were complex. The budget tracking tool<sup>17</sup> was potentially helpful as a theoretical frame of reference for addressing peace-related expenditure, but in practice it was no longer used after the tool was presented.

The role of the DNP is appraised ambivalently. On the one hand, the authority has many well-trained specialists with high professional standards who are not afraid to break new ground. A great deal of information converges at this strategic point and is

<sup>17</sup> A tool developed with the support of UNDP for tracking environmentally relevant government expenditure (Trazador de Paz) classifies peace-related government expenditure, thereby making it visible in budget planning. However, there is no consistent reporting on its implementation.

used from there for steering purposes. On the other hand, this staff changes frequently (at the latest after every change of government) and often consists of specialists who are academically trained but have no experience in implementing public policy at the local government level, let alone under war conditions. As a result, management and implementation often fall significantly short of the self-imposed standards, or targets prove impossible to achieve.

## 10. Unintended effects (positive or negative)

KfW stakeholders note positively that funding allocations for various non-governmental organisations with peace-related expenditures (the institutions of so-called transitional justice) were maintained during the term of the PBL. This was not to be expected given the orientation of the Duque government and is considered a positive outcome of the political dialogue.

The relatively generously defined compensation claims of the victims of the conflict and the extended opportunity to register and file claims have most likely led to free-riding effects among some organised groups. Furthermore, they have contributed to competition between victims and other low-income groups for limited state resources, which is contributing to the rejection of the peace agreement by parts of the population.

### Rating summary of effectiveness: **moderately successful (3)**

The effectiveness of the project is still appraised as moderately successful.

The reform steps (triggers) relevant for the disbursement of the loans were fulfilled, the reforms were initiated or pursued in the agreed areas, and the foundations for peace-related reforms were laid. The Kroc indicators agreed in the project were formally achieved in the three areas of action, albeit with some delay. Regarding the Kroc indicators, however, it must be noted that, firstly, this target achievement already considers "minimum implementation" to be progress. Secondly, that also output indicators (not outcome) are included in the Kroc indices<sup>18</sup>. Successes around effectiveness should, however, reflect short- to medium-term changes in the target group that improve their quality of life.

The results of the in-depth research conducted as part of the EPE and the additional indicators used clearly show that, particularly in the areas of cadastre and land rights, as well as the peace information system and local governance, these results have not yet led to sufficient outcomes that can be considered usable results for solving the structural causes of violence (rising number of victims, lack of land titles and cadastral records, substantial gaps in the formally established peace information system). The Kroc Institute, which is responsible for monitoring, also criticises the slow pace of reform since the peace agreement, which has not increased substantially under the Petro government, and considers the successful and complete implementation of the EFA within its 15-year term to be unrealistic. Under the Duque administration (2018-22), this was due to cumbersome and opaque procedures and, in some cases, a lack of political prioritisation. This has improved in some areas under the subsequent government; however, the security situation is slowing down the implementation of many reforms in rural areas, including the return of victims to their communities of origin.

Despite these substantial limitations, the EPE still makes the appraisal that effectiveness is moderately successful, particularly due the fact that peace processes are cross-sectoral, complex and lengthy. The Kroc Institute also contextualises that delays in peace agreements are not unusual (see, for example, Guatemala, El Salvador) given the high complexity of the peace process.

## Efficiency

Due to the design of PBL as a contribution to the national budget, classic statements on production and allocation efficiency are only possible to a limited extent. In addition, poor data availability and cleansing (see effectiveness) limit the assessment of efficiency in this PBL.

The total volume of the project for both phases amounted to EUR 200 million. As these funds were granted in the form of a development loan, the majority will be repaid by Colombia. Germany provided the funds for an interest rate reduction and the non-repayable grants.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, indicator 1.1.2: Applicable regulations have been adapted and enacted for the establishment, expansion, rehabilitation, restructuring, clarification, demarcation, protection measures and collective titling.

## 11. Production efficiency

The transaction costs of PBL financing are generally advantageous and, in terms of cash outflow, more efficient than often small-scale bilateral project: this is achieved through the high degree of alignment resulting from the restriction to reform topics and indicators of the national system. With a substantial but time-limited effort to negotiate the policy matrix, a fairly large financing volume can be implemented. In addition, monitoring is generally in the hands of the government, which is why additional project-/programme-specific surveys are usually not required. The sector dialogue before and after disbursement can be staggered quite flexibly, as can the scope of accompanying expert assessments.

It is generally considered positive that the reforms were financed from the budget, thus maintaining its steering function.<sup>19</sup>

Considering the limited outcomes achieved (see Effectiveness) in relation to the total funding volume of EUR 200 million and the subsidies spent on short-term expert assignments, the appraisal is significantly weaker. In view of the results presented above (effectiveness), the impression is that the time allowed for the achievement of the ambitious objectives at the outcome level was too short (in this case, one legislative period), or that the objectives should have been formulated differently and/or a differently designed instrument would have been better suited to the intended objectives. In relation to the modest outcomes, the use of funds appears to be too high.

According to discussions at EPE, the reallocations in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic have had less of an impact on peace-related spending than on other areas. According to an assessment commissioned by KfW, the Colombian government provided a consistently high level of budgetary resources for the implementation of the agreement during the first five years. This also applies to the duration of the project evaluated here. Even in the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic, 2022, the total EFA budget increased by 4% compared to the previous year.

Nevertheless, the costly agricultural reform and victim compensation are foreseeably reaching the limits of their financial viability. Too little attention has been paid to streamlining and consolidating administrative procedures and authorities.

Under the Duque administration, which is relevant to the project, a budget marker (marcador presupuestal) was introduced to identify all EFA-related items in the budget and track them over time. This so-called "Trazador de Paz" (Peace Tracker) first analyses the budget estimates for peace-related expenditure in various government budgets using a method developed by the UNDP. The current tracking of expenditure is not available.

In addition, there is considerable discretion in classifying individual budget items as EFA-relevant: many of the government institutions involved perform a variety of tasks, only some of which are peace-related. For example, the overall budget of the Ministry of Agriculture developed positively; however, under the Duque administration, the budget of the subordinate authority ANT, which is responsible for granting land titles, was cut, which was reflected in correspondingly low performance (see effectiveness). Even with this limitation, there are no publicly available sources that document the development of actual expenditure declared as peace-related.

Furthermore, there are naturally discrepancies between the original allocation of funds and the effective use of budgetary resources. For example, the parliamentary group in Congress that monitors the implementation of the EFA points out that, of the considerable funds that the government has made available for the implementation of regional development plans in the districts particularly affected by the violent conflict, only 5% has been spent so far by 2021.<sup>20</sup> No report on the actual implementation of peace-related expenditure has been found. This is significant because the capacity to implement public funds effectively at the local level is often weak. This is particularly true in conflict areas.

Duplication cannot be ruled out: by signing the EFA, DAC countries increased their average annual ODA commitments to Colombia for 2017–2022 by more than 50% compared to the previous period 2011–2016. In 2020, DAC countries' commitments to Colombia amounted to more than USD 2 billion, accounting for over a third of total commitments to all South American countries. According to the Colombian development agency APC, 42% of all new commitments for non-repayable funds in 2018 were related to peace.

Overly complex procedures and the distribution of responsibilities for a problem among several institutions are part of Colombia's administrative legacy, which fundamentally slows down reforms through years of coordination games, thereby increasing project duration and costs and reducing Production efficiency.

<sup>19</sup> In today's PBLs, a comprehensive assessment of fiduciary risks is carried out using various methods, the results of which are then used to assume that the funds are in good hands. These analyses are elaborate at the macro level, but do not take into account the power imbalance between different departments.

<sup>20</sup> See Congreso de Colombia: ¿En qué va La Paz 5 Años después de la Firma del Acuerdo Final?, November 2021).



## 12. Allocation efficiency

It is not possible to determine the exact impact of the PBL and thus its allocation efficiency. However, the general usefulness of investments in the implementation of the peace agenda and their prioritisation in national policy is beyond question (see relevance). In the sense of a "black box", positive repercussions of the high investments on the country's overall development are generally expected.

The overarching development policy goals of the PBL have not really been achieved (see Impact). Although individual reforms were initiated, the momentum for reform regarding the peace agenda was very limited under the Duque administration. Under the subsequent Petro government, political will has increased significantly, but so has political resistance in this deeply divided country. On the other hand, however, substantial funds totalling over EUR 200 million are available.

In 2017, the Colombian Ministry of Finance estimated the total cost of implementing the EFA over 15 years at COP 130 trillion (equivalent to approximately USD 43 billion). This estimate was adopted by the subsequent government and has not been updated since. Eighty-five per cent of the total cost of implementing the EFA was to be financed from current revenues of the various levels of government in Colombia. The private sector was also expected to contribute to the financing. Colombia expected international cooperation to contribute around USD 6.5 billion (see Schulz-Heiss 2022).

The government's actual contribution to the implementation of the peace agreement beyond the PBL cannot be precisely quantified. It is clear that only around 1% (i.e. COP 10.431 billion or approximately EUR 3 billion<sup>21</sup>) of the total expenditure for the government programme of the relevant legislative period (2018-2022 budget) was allocated to topic area 11 (peace, legality, stabilisation, coexistence, victims). This makes it one of the least well-funded areas, lagging far behind areas such as health and education, security, and energy and mining. However, other areas of the budget also include peace-related expenditure, although this is not explicitly identified as such. Furthermore, there is no meaningful comparison of planned and actual peace-related expenditure. In addition, own contributions cannot be allocated to individual components or phases of the PBL, which makes it difficult to calculate an own contribution.

### Rating summary of efficiency: **moderately unsuccessful (4)**

Efficiency is appraised as moderately unsuccessful. The funds were paid into the national budget and were therefore subject to parliamentary control. A tool for illustrating peace-related budget estimates was introduced and relevant budget items were protected by political dialogue during the project period. Yet, procedures and responsibilities between the many state organisations were insufficiently defined and relevant authorities, in particular the strategically important land agency, were inadequately equipped during the project period, thereby impairing the production and allocation efficiency of the funds provided by FC. Above all, however, the total financial expenditure was considerable in view of the limited achievement of the outcome and impact targets (see Impact), even considering the large amount of additional donor and budget funds. However, the availability of funds was not used to initiate necessary reforms in the overall social policy framework that could have improved acceptance of the peace policy. Given the diverse support Colombia receives from various donors for peace reforms, substitution effects and duplication are likely.

## Impact

### 13. Overarching developmental changes

The overarching goal of the PND, with its 2022 policy objective of "establishing peace through legal certainty, initiative and social justice throughout Colombia", addresses the complex phenomenon of the peace process, but the indicators selected by the PND<sup>22</sup> do not adequately reflect this and in some cases do not meet the requirements for indicators at the impact level. The wording of the objective also emphasises that "peace" is the ultimate goal to be achieved "through" other outcomes/impacts.

The original goal of the project was "The 'Final Agreement for the Cessation of the Conflict and Establishment of a Stable and Lasting Peace' (EFA) signed on 24 November 2016 has been implemented to a significant extent". It is not at the impact level in the sense of the requirements for an EPE.

The impacts of a peace process can only be measured and appraised approximately, as peace is a complex phenomenon in terms of sectors and dimensions. Among other things, it encompasses the reduction of violence and armed conflict, the promotion of

<sup>21</sup> Average exchange rate 0.00029 EUR per COP in 2018

<sup>22</sup> 0.1. Annual cases of violent crime against persons per 100,000 inhabitants, 0.2. Annual cases of violent crime against children and young people per 100,000 inhabitants aged up to 17, 0.3. Number of local self-help groups that have been empowered to implement publicly funded development projects, 0.4. Number of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in public business support programmes, 0.5 Income inequality in Colombia (measured using the Gini coefficient), 0.6. Difference in the multidimensional poverty index (IPM) between the 170 municipalities particularly affected by violent conflict and the national average.



political stability, the improvement of socio-economic conditions and the strengthening of human rights and the rule of law. In addition, there is a considerable attribution gap between the PBL implemented and these peace attributes, which makes it difficult to directly attribute impacts to the PBL.

In view of the above limitations, the EPE refrains from selecting a narrow range of indicators; instead, it discusses trends in the incidence of violence (negative peace). When considering the incidence of violence over time, the EPE refers firstly to the government's reporting on SDG 16.1: "Significantly reduce all forms of violence and violence-related mortality everywhere". This reporting is government-led and values are set in relation to the size of the population.


Secondly, the EPE refers to a recent evaluation by the PARES organisation, which meticulously evaluates a wide range of primary sources for 15 indicators over time on behalf of the Canadian government. The data comes from sources including the police, the Ministry of Defence, Ocha Monitor Humanitario, UARIV and the military.<sup>23</sup> One limitation of this data is that values are presented as absolute figures and not in relation to demographic developments and migration movements (refugee flows).<sup>24</sup> The strengths of this analysis are that it uses more diverse data and covers more diverse forms of violence against persons, which it evaluates independently.

#### a. Government reporting on the achievement of SDGs


Figures 6 and 7 show the figures reported by the government (DNP) for the fulfilment of SDG 16.1.1 and SDG 16.1.4 with reference to DANE and military data.

Fig. 8 shows that there have been substantial reductions in violence against persons since 2016. The targets set in the PND were exceeded for both 2020 (116 instead of 240) and 2022 (130 instead of 233). The achievement of targets relating to violent crimes against children and young people cannot be determined due to a lack of data. However, it must be emphasised that violence against persons has been rising steadily since the low point of 116 in 2020 and stood at 171 again in 2023. Furthermore, these figures include all acts of psychological, physical and sexual violence and are therefore only of limited indicative value for peace development.

The rate of intentional killings is a much more indicative figure. At the height of Pablo Escobar's reign in the early 1990s, this figure stood at 86. Figure 9 shows that it has fallen dramatically. Since the beginning of 2015 – and thus also during the PBL period – it has stagnated at a very high level (Fig. 9): in 2019, the rate was 25. The global murder rate in 2020 averaged 5.5<sup>25</sup>, while in Germany it was below 4. In Latin America, Colombia ranks 8th out of 31.



**Figure 6:** Annual cases of violence against persons in Colombia per 100,000 inhabitants (SDG 16.1.4), from 2000 to 2023  
**Source:** SDG reporting by the DNP, see <https://ods.dnp.gov.co/en/>



**Figure 7:** Annual cases of intentional homicide in Colombia per 100,000 inhabitants (SDG 16.1.1), from 2000 to 2019  
**Source:** SDG reporting by the DNP, see <https://ods.dnp.gov.co/en/>

<sup>23</sup> See: PARES: Plomo es lo que viene 2024. The sources are listed from p. 29 onwards. The report contains extensive methodological explanations and points out the limited comparability of data across years.

<sup>24</sup> The total population has grown by about 5-6 million people since 2015.

<sup>25</sup> See UNDP, UNODC, and OHCHR (2024). Global Progress Report on Sustainable Development Goal 16 Indicators. At the Crossroads: Breakdown or Breakthrough for Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.


## b. PARES evaluation

Figure 8 shows the various PARES indicators over time, while Figures 9A and 9B show excerpts from this in "zoom" view. Overall, the evaluation concludes that although the peace process has had a proclamatory effect so far, it has not effectively protected the population from violence.<sup>26</sup> Most types of crime show a volatile trend. Although the level of violence is not comparable to the number of murders, kidnappings and recruitment of minors in previous decades (not visible in the figure), but in relation to the relevant period after the 2016 peace agreement, and in particular in the 2018-2022 legislative period, there has been no substantial absolute improvement in the categories of murder, displacement and threats (or in other violence/conflict indicators). In terms of the various types of violent crime, the trend was as follows:

**Murders (Fig. 7A, purple, green, yellow):** The number of murders stagnated between 2016 and 2020, rose substantially during the pandemic (from around 12,000 to 14,000 cases per annum) and has remained at a high level since then. There is a marked concentration in certain regions (not visible in Fig. 7A), including the Cauca Valley in the south, parts of Antioquia and the Pacific coast, parts of the Magdalena Valley and areas on the eastern slopes of the Andes.

In addition to murders of former FARC combatants, the murders of representatives of human rights organisations, which exceeded 300 in 2020, are causing particular concern. Even under the government that has been in office since 2022, the number of serious acts of violence against individuals has not declined. In 2023, there were 94 well-documented massacres, and 188 leaders and 44 individuals involved in the peace agreement were murdered. This trend has continued in the first months of 2024; the protection of human life is not guaranteed.

**Threats (Fig. 7, light blue):** The number of people affected by threats shows a cyclical pattern. It rose sharply after the conclusion of the peace agreement, fell again at the beginning of the PBL, rose again during the Covid pandemic and fell to a level similar to that of 2016 in 2023. Threats and intimidation undermine the sense of security in many areas, especially rural areas. The discussions held during the EPE indicate a high number of unreported cases.




**Figure 8:** Development of violence/conflict indicators, 2016–2023.

**Source:** Own illustration based on PARES: *Plomo es lo que viene 2024*, p. 50.

**Note:** For the sake of completeness, all variables reported by PARES are presented; only those that are not available for the relevant period are excluded. The year 2024 is also excluded, as the data only reflect the period up to May 2024. Pol stands for police, Min Def for Ministry of Defence, INML for Instituto Medicina Legal, Registro Único de Víctimas (Unified Victims Registry).

<sup>26</sup> Alternative analyses by human rights organisations come to similar conclusions. See, for example, INDEPAZ: the NGO regularly monitors and documents the positive and negative aspects of the peace process and its impact on violence against individuals throughout the country (<https://indepaz.org.co/la-paz-total-en-colombia-una-utopia/>).



Figures 9A and 9B: Development of violence/conflict indicators: enlarged excerpts from Figure 8, from 2016 to 2023.

**Displacement** (Fig. 6, dark green dotted line): Similar to the reported cases of threats, the number of people affected by displacement also shows a cyclical pattern. However, with several hundred thousand people affected, the figures are still at a high level. After the conclusion of the peace agreement and the demobilisation of the FARC, displacement initially increased over several years due to control deficits, fell slightly at the beginning of the PBL term, but rose again during the Covid pandemic and was at a significantly higher level in 2023 than in 2016. According to the latest reports from the state ombudsman's office (Defensoria del Pueblo) from 2023, forced displacements are on the rise again. In the department of Nariño, for example, there were 58 such incidents, affecting 24,000 people. 18,000 families in 215 locations had their freedom of movement restricted by armed actors, an increase of 63% compared to 2022.

Furthermore, the **presence of armed groups** is an extremely important indicator in the context of peace in Colombia. The attempts established under the current government since 2022 to hold parallel talks with nine different armed groups at round tables are a completely new and pluralistic approach for Colombia.<sup>27</sup> Parallel to the talks, however, both the number of armed fighters and the military presence of rebels are increasing again: According to the early warning system of the state ombudsman's office, the FARC-EMC and Segunda Marquetalia militias have increased their presence from 230 to 299 rural communities in 2023<sup>28</sup>. This is a significant deterioration compared to the classification of 170 rural communities as conflict areas, which was the basis for state planning after the peace agreement. The new FARC are mainly active in the departments of Antioquia, Guaviare, Meta, Caquetá, Cauca and Nariño, where they have taken over some of the functions of local government, such as inaugurating new roads and distributing learning materials to schoolchildren, while state institutions are largely absent.<sup>29</sup>

At the beginning of 2025, the usually sporadic armed conflicts between the government and armed groups have reached a new level of escalation. As a result of the fighting, the Petro government has declared a regional state of emergency in the northeast and suspended negotiations with the ELN, the largest of the long-standing rebel groups.

## Conclusions

According to reports on the SDGs, there has been a massive improvement compared to the civil war era. However, during the period relevant here – during and after the PBL – intentional murders stagnated at a high level. Cases of violence against persons (relative to population size) fell at the end of the PBL, but have been rising again since then. The PARES report considers significantly more forms of violence and shows that in the 2018-22 legislative period and beyond, there are no signs of improvements with sustainability (in absolute terms) in the categories of murder, displacement and threats, which are indicative here. Another cause for concern is the increasing presence of new armed groups in various parts of the country, some of which are fighting each other.

According to regular opinion polls conducted on behalf of the government, more than a third of the population considers security or insecurity to be the biggest current problem. Similarly, more than two-thirds of the population perceives an increase in protection racketeering by illegal groups, even though, according to government figures, progress has been made in law enforcement<sup>30</sup>. While 41% of the population still felt safe in areas with a rebel presence in 2022, this figure had fallen to just 37% by 2023. Local successes, e.g. in clearing mines, are quantifiable, but are not perceived as relevant to everyday life across the breadth of the

<sup>27</sup> In addition to the actors mentioned in the section on context, negotiations are also being held with other smaller and only locally based groups.

<sup>28</sup> According to the military, the ELN has increased its number of fighters from 4,000 to 5,000. The paramilitary AGC (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia) has grown from 10,000 members to 13,000 in recent years.

<sup>29</sup> In the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Valle del Cauca, Tolima and Nariño, armed groups have even issued codes of conduct for the population and introduced mechanisms of social control to increase their influence.

<sup>30</sup> See: DNP / DSSEP: Balance de resultados 2023. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2022 - 2026, May 2024

territory<sup>31</sup> According to the early warning system of the state ombudsman's office, the FARC-EMC and Segunda Marquetalia militias were able to increase their presence from 230 to 299 rural communities in 2023. This is a significant deterioration compared to the classification of 170 rural communities as conflict areas, which was the basis for state planning after the peace agreement.

The Federal Foreign Office also concludes<sup>32</sup> that the security situation in Colombia has deteriorated again overall in recent years. It points to the suspension of talks with FARC and ELN dissidents, fighting between organised groups in the border area with Venezuela, fighting and illegal activities by armed groups (drug trafficking, illegal mining, smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, attacks, violent crime and homicide), as well as increasing displacement among the civilian population and the declaration of a state of emergency in January 2025.

All in all, violence against individuals has not decreased with sustainability during the relevant legislative period and beyond. There are cyclical fluctuations and shifts from one location to another, but no general reduction (in absolute terms) in murders, expulsions and other serious acts of violence.

#### 14. Contribution to overarching intended developmental changes

With the PBL instrument, the achievement of indicators and targets can never be fully or clearly attributed to a specific project, as the funds flow into the national budget without earmarking. Furthermore, the achievement of targets can only be attributed to a limited extent to the legislatures and the implementation of the peace process.

#### 15. Contribution to overarching unintended developmental changes

The PBL had positive overarching effects at the policy level, which occurred independently of the fulfilment of the actual impact indicator and were highlighted by both sides (DNP and KfW) in the EPE. Although these effects are clearly intended in a PBL, they are not measured by indicators. Specifically, there is unanimous agreement that the intensified policy dialogue during the preparation and accompanying support of the PBL strengthened trust between the partners, improved general foreign and development policy relations between the two countries and provided important thematic impetus.

#### Rating summary of impact: **moderately unsuccessful (4)**

Peace processes are highly demanding and lengthy and depend on various factors that are independent of the peace agenda.

Overall, the impact sought by the EFA in terms of a substantial reduction in various forms of violence (negative peace) has not been achieved as of 2025. Although violence against individuals in the form of kidnappings, disappearances and torture is at its worst since the civil war, since the 2016 peace agreement there has been a volatile trend in key areas, but no substantial improvement. Particularly worrying is the number of murders of politically active people and the increasing number of expulsions and criminal groups. Threats and protection rackets, which are often not officially reported, also place a strain on those affected, which is why an increasing proportion of the population perceives their environment as unsafe. This also prevents conflict victims and demobilised persons from returning to their areas of origin.

## Sustainability

#### 16. Capacities of beneficiaries and stakeholders

The capacities of the authorities involved in implementing the peace agreement vary according to the range of issues involved. The numerous short-term assignments that accompanied the loan temporarily strengthened the capacities of the partners at the central level. However, these effects are only partially sustainable, as there is always a high turnover of personnel in all authorities after elections.

The capacities of the Land Agency, which is essential for the allocation of land titles, were not developed due to political decisions during the PBL. At the time of the evaluation, it was not yet possible to determine whether there was citizen engagement with sustainability; recent developments remain to be seen. The capacities of the IGAC and the Victims Authority have developed positively, according to selective insights from the EPE: At the decentralised level, IGAC staff and the municipal victim contact point appeared to be highly motivated in some cases and are continuing to hold official conferences and citizen consultation

<sup>31</sup> 29 areas in 27 counties have been officially declared mine-free, covering approximately 1 million square metres.

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/service/laender/kolumbien-node/kolumbiensicherheit-201516>, accessed on 3 October 2025

hours (with the much-appreciated support of GIZ). However, their performance is hampered by the limited resources available to local authorities, competing needs of citizens and victims, and the deteriorating security situation in PDET and elsewhere.

The central control authority's ability to consider situations at the subnational level is insufficient.

## 17. Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

The numerous short-term assignments financed by grant funds that accompanied the loan have strengthened the capacities of partners at the central level in several areas of reform in the short term and created or simplified the conditions for initiating reforms. This instrument is highly valued by partner organisations but is only partially sustainable.<sup>33</sup>

According to the interviewees, the support provided to several transitional justice organisations (e.g. JEP, CEV, JBPD), which are important for strengthening the rights and visibility of conflict victims and indigenous populations, was sustainable. These organisations were under severe pressure during President Duque's term of office and were supported and given visibility through the project. The new government recognises the importance of these organisations.

The land reform agency ANT and the agency responsible for conflict communities, ART, were also supported through short-term assignments in procedural reforms. In the case of the ANT in particular, this support was not comprehensive enough to be sustainable. The prospects for sustainability have only improved with the strengthening of the land agency under the new government, which, however, has not yet been able to complete any substantial administrative reforms in its first few years.

## 18. Durability of impacts over time

Like the implementing authorities, the DNP is fundamentally obliged to continue the reforms prioritised under the PBL after changes of government, as these relate to the implementation plan of the PMI peace agreement, which runs for 15 years.

However, only those reforms that were priorities for the relevant 2018-2022 legislative period were selected for the policy matrix of this PBL. These priorities may shift after a change of government, with more or fewer resources being made available to certain implementing authorities and fields of action. After the 2022 presidential elections, many positions in both the DNP and the specialist authorities changed, and not all the priorities of this PBL are being pursued with the same intensity in the follow-up PBL, which has now been negotiated and paid out. The sustainability of the effects therefore varies over time between fields of action and activities. Specifically, of the four outcome indicators of the PBL relevant here, two are appraised as limitedly sustainable and two as unsustainable:

**Field of action 1, indicator 1:** Although the implementation of field of action 1 (comprehensive rural reform) continues to be prioritised, the indicator no longer refers to the establishment of the land registry, but to the land allocated to those in need under the land fund. Nevertheless, the development of a comprehensive land registry is being pursued by the relevant authorities and specialised subcontractors, and the term of the World Bank loan earmarked for this purpose has been extended<sup>34</sup>. This reform is fundamentally sustainable in terms of procedure. The principles and modalities of the cadastral reform have been retained, but the very slow pace of reform has not been accelerated. Implementation faces substantial problems, including lack of access to the area (see effectiveness). The reform is therefore only sustainable to a limited extent.

**Field of action 1, indicator 2:** Diverse support for governance in PDET conflict communities is continuing, but efforts to establish cadastral systems have taken a back seat to other measures, and the focus of the follow-up PBL has also changed. The focus is no longer specifically on governance around cadastre development, but on the proportion of the population living in poverty. This adjustment makes sense because it considers the diversity of efforts to improve access to and development of conflict communities. At the same time, it acknowledges that cadastral reforms cannot be specifically promoted in these areas. This area of reform is therefore not sustainable at the time of the EPE. Sustainability is also impaired by the fact that an increasing number of new armed actors are active in old and, in some cases, new conflict communities and are harassing the population.

**Field of action 5, indicator 3:** Compensation for **victims of conflict** is continuing, but its sustainability is limited by the continuing increase in numbers and the ongoing coordination with other social measures. Victim compensation is fundamentally institutionally secured and is also being continued at various levels. However, coordination between the many institutions involved, procedures for accelerating individual and collective solutions, and the prioritisation of victims' claims over those of the general population have not been conclusively clarified. As the number of recognised victims continues to grow, new armed conflicts produce new victims, free-riding effects are observed and acceptance among the general population declines, fair and sustainability compensation for the damages suffered by all victims is not foreseeable. In the follow-up PBL, victim compensation is

<sup>33</sup> A list of SCF-funded capacity-building operations can be found in Annex 3 to the PBL's final report.

<sup>34</sup> The approach of using private service providers to set up the cadastre was viewed critically by some of the people we spoke to; however, these companies are subject to state supervision, see <https://www.supremotariado.gov.co/inspeccion-vigilancia-y-control-a-la-gestion-catastral/>

no longer prioritised. There is a high risk that the measures will no longer be financially viable. Acceptance problems and (pre-  
sumed or real) free-rider effects also impair the compensatory effect of the reforms. The reform is therefore only sustainable to  
a limited extent.

**Field of action 6, indicator 4:** The SIPO peace information system is fundamentally established in the DNP and is also being  
further developed methodologically. However, the scope and significance of the information actually provided in SIPO shows  
major gaps and time delays, which do not allow for a change of course based on the data generated. Existing gaps have not been  
closed over time, and system maintenance is unsatisfactory in terms of the content generated. The system is no longer priori-  
tised in the new PBL. The new PBL explicitly deviates from the SIPO indicator when measuring violence against persons and  
prioritises the measurement of the murder rate and the killings of leaders of civil society organisations. This makes sense but  
implies that the methodological efforts of SIPO are not generally sustainable.

The large number of ad hoc SCF interventions on topics that cannot be clearly assigned to outcomes but relate to politically  
highly rated triggers is not generally sustainable<sup>35</sup>.

In summary, only a small proportion of the prioritised reforms are sustainable in part. Decentralisation, institutional clarifications  
and citizen communication remain major gaps that undermine the effectiveness of peace reforms and other measures beyond  
the cities. The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated these weaknesses, as many coordination pro-  
cesses and measures were not possible on the ground for many months (especially in conflict areas), even though the implemen-  
tation of the peace agenda was given priority in budget allocations even during the pandemic. It is unlikely that the outcome  
would have been different if the originally planned third phase of the PBL had not been postponed, as the peace agenda was  
supported by many donors and did not suffer from a general lack of funding.

**Risks to sustainability:** The risks to the implementation of policy measures and the continuation of reforms after the project's  
completion, which were initially assessed as 'medium' during the project appraisal, have therefore materialised in part.

- The measures are being continued at the institutional level, but it is not possible to predict whether the objectives will be  
effectively achieved or whether the pace of implementation will accelerate.
- The government's currently limited control over parts of rural areas reduces the likelihood of effects that are sustainable in  
land reforms and rural community governance, as well as the return of victims and demobilised persons to their areas of  
origin.
- All the areas of reform under consideration require greater political and financial support from local authorities, which is  
currently not guaranteed.

Both the security situation and the discontinuous contract terms in Colombia's public service are external factors that impair the  
performance and resilience of those involved and affected, as well as the impact of the project, but could not be directly ad-  
dressed by PBL.

#### **Rating summary of sustainability: moderately successful (3)**

Sustainability is still assessed as only moderately successful, as all four reform topics are being continued under the new govern-  
ment and some of the systems have been established in a sustainable manner. However, all the reform areas under consideration  
require greater political and financial support from local authorities. The presence of armed actors and uncertain financing pose  
a serious threat to the achievements in the areas of land reform and victim compensation. The likelihood of effects that are sus-  
tainable in land reforms and in the governance of rural communities is declining due to the increasing presence of armed groups  
over recent years and the current conflicts described above.

## **Overall assessment: moderately unsuccessful (4)**

The PBL supported a highly relevant reform, consistent with the implementation plan for the peace agreement and embedded in a  
wide range of other peace and poverty-related measures implemented by the Colombian government and donors. In some areas,  
political dialogue helped to keep reforms and institutions alive that did not receive the highest priority from the government during  
the relevant legislative period.

The project laid the foundations for shaping the dialogue on the implementation of the peace agenda across legislative periods and  
achieved the agreed project *triggers*. The project's own objectives were partially achieved, but short- to medium-term changes in the

<sup>35</sup> Example: The Ministry of the Interior's support for the establishment of security guarantees in conflict areas was not sustainable because the military situation in many areas has deterio-  
rated, an aspect over which the PBL had no influence.



target group that improve their quality of life and security are limited. Due to the high complexity and protracted nature of peace processes, the project's successes (effectiveness) are still assessed as limited (3). However, the project has not had an impact in terms of increased peace, expressed as a reduction in violence and armed conflict (negative peace) (4). The overall project is appraised as "moderately unsuccessful".

The project fell short of expectations for the following reasons in particular:

- The complexity and breadth of the reforms, as well as the number of actors involved in their implementation, were predictably too great to ensure, sustain and demonstrate focused progress.
- There were overarching deficits around security, in the coordination and communication with citizens of the numerous authorities involved in the reforms, and in the still pronounced centralisation of decision-making despite widely varying decentralised problems.
- Even though some of the sectoral reforms have accelerated under the subsequent government, new problems are emerging in other areas, or successes already achieved are being neutralised due to new priorities.
- Institutional weaknesses and coordination problems between the many specialist authorities – despite fundamentally sound anchoring and many accompanying expert missions by the FC – paralysed the implementation of the agreement.
- The establishment of a new land registry and access to land for those in need are long-term projects that require significant procedural reforms, pragmatism and citizen-centred approaches to become effective more quickly. These conditions are currently not sufficiently met in Colombia.
- Progress has been made around compensation and reparation for victims of the conflict, but it is being slowed down by the continuing increase in the number of recognised victims and the manifold problems, some of which are linked to the deteriorating security situation. Efforts to improve governance in conflict communities are also being affected by the increase in new armed conflicts.
- Access to information on the implementation of the peace agreement is generally available through the SIPO system, but the DNP, the governing authority, is focusing on ever new methodological refinements, while for many topics even basic data or time series are not available and the comparability of data over time is difficult.
- Impact in terms of implementing the peace agreement and reducing violence against people has not yet been achieved. Although this has received a great deal of attention during the reporting period, the pace of reform is slowing, and violence is not being reduced in a sustainable manner.
- The government's currently limited control over parts of rural areas, the increasingly tense security situation and the emergence of new armed groups are limiting the likelihood of sustainability effects in land reform and rural community governance, as well as the return of victims and demobilised persons to their areas of origin. All the areas of reform under consideration require greater political and financial support from local authorities.

## Contribution to Agenda 2030

The project was very well aligned with the United Nations Sustainability Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 16, "Peace, justice and strong institutions". The reforms/measures financed are logically related to this goal.



# Methodology

## Evaluation methodology

The ex-post evaluation follows the methodology of a rapid appraisal, i.e. a data-based, qualitative contribution analysis, and represents an expert opinion. The project is attributed effects based on plausibility considerations, which are based on a careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. Where possible, this also includes the use of digital data sources and modern techniques (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). The causes of any contradictory information are investigated, attempts are made to resolve them, and the assessment is based on statements that are confirmed by several sources of information (triangulation), where possible.

The analysis of the effects is based on assumed causal relationships, documented in the impact matrix developed during the project appraisal and updated during the ex-post evaluation, if necessary. The evaluation report sets out arguments as to why certain influencing factors were identified for the effects observed and why the project under review probably made a certain contribution (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure is taken into account in terms of its influence on the results. The conclusions are put into relation to the availability and quality of the data basis. An evaluation concept serves as the reference framework for the evaluation.

The method offers a balanced cost-benefit ratio for project evaluations, on average, with a balance between knowledge gain and evaluation effort, and allows for a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of DFG projects across all project evaluations. Individual ex-post evaluations cannot therefore meet the requirements of a scientific assessment in the sense of a clear causal analysis.

The main objective of the evaluations (knowledge interest) is to measure impacts, provide accountability, promote transparency and enable institutional learning.

### Type of evaluation:

*Trip to the project area.*

### Key questions of the evaluation according to the evaluation concept:

- Have PBL funds also been channelled to local authorities via the fiscal equalisation system ('Sistema de Participaciones') or other transfer mechanisms, and have they been made available there for additional peace-building measures?
- Have private sector actors and civil society (in particular former militiamen/guerrillas from all armed groups, drug mafias, displaced persons and victims of violence) been successfully integrated into the reforms? What was the price of this? Benefits in the broader sense: for the victims, so that they receive justice, and for the perpetrators of violence, so that they prefer peace.
- Has it been possible to strengthen the capacities and performance of district and local administrations, even in poorer and conflict-affected areas, in such a way as to ensure sustainability, thereby pushing back perpetrators of violence and opponents of structural reforms (spoilers)?
- To what extent were the outcomes and impact of the peace reforms influenced by external factors, in particular COVID, old and new perpetrators of violence, changed political priorities and incomplete control of the territory?
- Will the PBL's priorities for the 2018-22 legislative period also guide the actions of the next government, and how might a change in priorities affect the sustainability of the project?

The analysis of the impacts is based on assumed causal relationships, documented in the impact matrix developed during the project appraisal and updated during the ex-post evaluation, where applicable. The evaluation report sets out arguments as to why certain influencing factors were identified for the impacts observed and why the project under review probably made a certain contribution (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure is taken into account in terms of its influence on the results. The conclusions are put into relation to the availability and quality of the data basis. An evaluation concept serves as the reference framework for the evaluation.

On average, the method offers a balanced cost-benefit ratio for project evaluations, with the knowledge gained and the evaluation effort being in equilibrium, and allows for a systematic appraisal of the effectiveness of FC projects across all project evaluations. Individual ex-post evaluations cannot therefore meet the requirements of a scientific assessment in the sense of a clear causal analysis.

## Non-public (internal) documents

*Internal project documents, secondary specialist literature, strategy papers, context, country and sector analyses, media reports.*

## Data sources and analysis tools

- *The Final Peace Agreement (EFA) and the associated implementation plan Plan Marco de Implementación (PMI)*
- *Planes Nacionales de Desarrollo (for the 2019-22 legislative period and the subsequent period 2023-26)*
- *Relevant CONPES (policy papers) and political strategies, in particular victim policy*
- *Internal KfW documents, including Schulz-Heiss (2022).*
- *Monitoring data from government systems (in particular Sinergia and SIPO)*
- *Reports from relevant NGOs (in particular PARES)*
- *Information from GIZ in the field of peace (ProPaz project) at regional level.*

## Project sites visited

- *Visits to regional and local authorities in the department of Meta (administrative headquarters in Villavicencio and municipality of Puerto López) and meetings with a grassroots organisation of Afro-Colombian women*
- *Visit to a GIZ cooperation partner in the field of peace (ProPaz project) at regional level (Puerto López citizens' office, responsible for supporting victims of the conflict)*
- *Visit to a conflict site in a protected area (municipality of La Macarena in the department of Meta); the department of Meta is one of 32 departments severely affected by armed conflict.*

## Interview partners and modality (in person, virtual/by telephone, in writing)

*KfW, project executing agency DNP (Subdirectorato of Credit, Subdirectorato of Land Use Planning, Subdirectorato of Budget, Directorate for Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Policies, Subdirectorato of Territorial Resource Distribution), Ministry of Equality, GIZ Pro-Rural and Propaz Villavicencio, PNN, Ministry of Finance MHCP, World Bank, PNNC, IGAC Villavicencio, representatives of the municipality of Puerto Lopez, grassroots organisation Asociación de Afrocolombianos, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (UARIV), land authority ANT.*

## The following aspects limited the evaluation

- *During the evaluation, the management of the implementing agency DNP was heavily occupied with preparations for the next PBL and further FC missions. Discussions on all selected reform topics with experts, consultants or representatives of reform-relevant authorities took place, but were sometimes subject to considerable time pressure and could not be conducted for all authorities at all relevant levels of government (national, regional, local).*
- *The government monitoring systems were not equally up to date and meaningful for all topics. This applies in particular to the availability of quantitative data for large populations, such as the total number of victims of the conflict. The relevant specialist authorities also do not always publish detailed reports on the topics prioritised in the PBL. This was compensated for by obtaining as wide a range of qualitative information as possible.*
- *The selection of locations visited and authorities relevant to reform had to be adapted to the time available, logistical considerations and the security situation. Municipalities in conflict areas (known as PDETs) could not be visited.*
- *The programme nature of PBLs (which are planned and structured in series) differs from the logic of random samples for EPEs. Since the originally planned third phase of the PBL was not implemented during Duque's term of office but was postponed to the following term of office together with two other PBLs, it is not possible to isolate with certainty which effects would have occurred if this third phase had been paid out earlier.*

## Assessment methodology

A six-point scale is used to assess the project according to OECD DAC criteria, with the exception of the sustainability criterion. The scale values are as follows:

**Level 1** Very successful: results significantly above expectations

**Level 2** Successful: results fully in line with expectations, without significant shortcomings

**Level 3** Moderately successful: results below expectations, but positive results predominate

**Level 4** Moderately unsuccessful: significantly below expectations and negative results dominate despite recognisable positive results

**Level 5** Unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate

**Level 6** Highly unsuccessful: the project is useless or the situation has deteriorated

The overall rating on the six-point scale is based on a project-specific weighting of the six individual criteria. Levels 1–3 of the overall rating indicate a ‘successful’ project, while levels 4–6 indicate an ‘unsuccessful’ project. It should be noted that a project can generally only be classified as "successful" in terms of development policy if both the achievement of objectives at the outcome level (effectiveness) and impact level, as well as sustainability, are rated at least as "moderately successful" (level 3).

### Imprint

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