

>>>> Ex post evaluation Conflict Management and Preventing Violence in Periurban Areas III, Colombia

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Title	Conflict Management and Prevention of Violence in Periurban Areas III, (Convivencia III)		
Sector and CRS code	Democratic participation and civil society (151)		
Project number	BMZ no. 2001 65 803 (investment) BMZ no. 2001 70 258 (CM)		
Commissioned by	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-		
Recipient/project-executing	Colombia/city of Bogotá		
Project volume/ Financing instrument	EUR 4.96 million budgetary grant		
Project duration	01/2010 - 06/2015		
Year of report	2021	Year of random sample	2019

Objectives and project outline


The objective at the outcome level was the sustainable use of the structures created for conflict management, the social programmes and the municipal infrastructure provided. At the impact level, the programme pursued the objective of contributing to constructively dealing with conflicts and preventing violence in the programme areas. The approach of the programme was to combine construction and social measures. Public spaces at critical security points were redesigned with public participation and accompanied by measures for conflict management, curbing intrafamily violence, youth work and improving their economic prospects.

Key findings

The project took place in a difficult and violent environment and had limited impact due to implementation problems and political changes. The project has been rated "moderately unsuccessful" for the following reasons:

- The relevance is assessed positively, as the conceptual realignment of the integral rehabilitation of periurban areas towards preventing violence and improving coexistence made sense in view of the problems in the neighbourhoods in the south of Bogota.
- Delays and interruptions in implementation, changes in executing agencies and necessary restructuring significantly impaired effectiveness and efficiency.
- The almost one-year standstill of the project in 2012 had a negative impact on the population's already low level of trust in the institutions of the city administration.
- During implementation, the municipal structures were initially strengthened, but the security situation and coexistence deteriorated in the long term due to an undiminished presence and lack of action against organised crime.
- After the handover of the mayor's office in 2016 and the subsequent political change, the social programmes in the areas of conflict management and youth work hardly received any support and were unable to have the targeted effect in the long term.
- The participatory approach has strengthened local management capacities in the context of clientelism, thus helping to empower the neighbourhoods.
- As a result of personal commitment, individual youth initiatives and mediation bodies continue to exist and have a positive impact on coexistence on a small scale.

Overall rating: moderately unsuccessful



Conclusions

- A political change and a lack of continuity endanger the sustainability of social processes. These must be additionally secured by strengthening the initiatives at district level.
- The many implementation organisations and small-scale measures would have required clearer structures and coordination as well as adequate capacities.
- Prevention programmes can only be successful in the long run if the police and justice system also vigorously fight organised crime at the same time. The prerequisite for this is that the security authorities work with integrity and enjoy the trust of the population.



Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 4

Ratings:

Relevance	2
Effectiveness	3
Coherence	2
Efficiency	4
Impact	4
Sustainability	4

General conditions and classification of the project

The project evaluated here, Conflict Management and Prevention of Violence in Periurban Areas of Bogotá - CONVIVENCIA III, was the third phase (2010-2015) of German FC cooperation with the city of Bogota in the area of integral rehabilitation of periurban areas. In contrast to the predecessor programmes (SUR Phase I and SUR (ATP) Phase II)¹, which mainly provided basic infrastructure as part of the participatory rehabilitation of periurban areas and only raised awareness of conflict prevention to a limited extent in Phase II, Phase III focused on improving local coexistence and preventing violence. Both predecessor programmes were rated satisfactory overall (now: moderately successful) in an ex post evaluation in 2010, with relevance and effectiveness scoring high marks, while efficiency, sustainability and impact were rated only satisfactory.

Relevance

The south of Bogota was, at the time of the appraisal, and still is, closely linked to the dynamics of violence surrounding the armed conflict in Colombia, and includes areas that have been penetrated by armed groups, organised crime and drug trafficking. At the same time, the areas have other security and violence problems such as violence in educational institutions, drug use and sales, domestic violence and neighbourhood conflicts.

The **core problem** to be addressed by the programme was the population's failure to deal adequately with conflicts, which affected peaceful coexistence in the neighbourhoods. This definition of the core problem was essentially related to the fact that residents had little tolerance for coexistence and condoned the use of violence in conflict situations, which was reflected in high crime rates that still persist today.² From today's perspective, organised crime should also have been taken into account as it significantly affects the security situation and coexistence in urban areas, although the municipal authorities did not/do not act resolutely when it comes to organised crime. The problem of organised crime and its links to drug trafficking and youth gangs was barely addressed in the 2003 appraisal; despite being included in the updated study, it had no further effect on the project. From today's perspective, the core problem was therefore only identified correctly in part.


With the concept of integral rehabilitation of periurban areas, the programme aimed to combine the construction of municipal infrastructure, such as walkways, stairs, parks and sports facilities, with social programmes. Social programmes for preventing and resolving conflicts (component 1), for reducing intrafamily violence (component 2) and for improving socio-economic conditions, especially for young people (component 3) were intended to have a direct impact on peaceful coexistence. At the same time, construction measures to improve the living environment (component 4) were to be planned using the

¹ SUR Phase I: BMZ no. 1999 65 435 and SUR (ATP) Phase II: BMZ no. 2002 65 231

² In 2019, the homicide rate (number of annual homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) was higher than the Bogotá city average of 12.6 in almost all the zonal planning units (Unidad de Planeamiento Zonal - UPZ) of the programme: UPZ Danubio 30.4 / UPZ Diana Turbay 21.8 / UPZ El Tesoro 44.2 / UPZ La Flora 82.5 / UPZ Libertadores 8.8 / UPZ Lucero 26.5.



multidisciplinary CPTED model (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) to make critical areas in the neighbourhoods safer. Measures for inter-institutional coordination (component 5) were designed to support the interaction of the public institutions and private organisations involved. The planned complementary measure was intended to ensure that the programme would have a lasting focus and impact on the prevention of violence in the social, organisational and institutional environment. The diagram below shows the structure of the programme.



Source: Informe Final Programa Sur de Convivencia. Unidad de Gestión del Programa / SUM Consult GmbH, November 2015

By combining investments in municipal infrastructure with participatory processes and social programmes to foster coexistence and prevent violence, CONVIVENCIA III aimed to give new direction to the concept of the integral rehabilitation of periurban areas initiated by multilateral organisations such as UN-HABITAT and further developed by the city of Bogota. In view of the difficult security situation and the problems of coexistence in the programme areas, as well as the increasing importance that the issue of conflict management has experienced in Colombia, the conceptual realignment (which was already indicated in Phase II) made sense.

The **impact logic** was appropriate for the prevention of violence, the promotion of peaceful coexistence and the resolution of individual and municipal conflicts, but for an effective improvement of the overall security situation and coexistence in the programme areas, there should have been stringent complementary initiatives on the part of the municipality to break up organised crime, linked for example with criminal investigation and prosecution, dismantling of criminal networks, control of small arms and an increased presence of the state to reclaim the areas under the control of organised crime. The programme was designed to disassociate itself from repressive activities, especially by the police. This is understandable; firstly, because closer proximity to security authorities would have meant an increased risk for programme participants, and secondly, because it could be assumed that the police themselves were involved in organised crime locally. Repressive police tactics have been and continue to be perceived as repression of residents, rather than as fighting crime with respect for human rights. However, given the lack of police integrity and the lack of trust between inhabitants and the police, comprehensive reforms are needed to break up organised crime, which CONVIVENCIA has not been able to influence.

The **selection of programme areas** was based on (a) social and (b) physical criteria according to the approach of social and situational prevention, such as increased conflict potential and acute security problems, but also how public space can be conducive to crime. The selection was based on analyses of the municipality and a participatory survey of local perspectives. Another selection criterion was the willingness of the neighbourhoods to actively take ownership in the planning and implementation of the programme. In retrospect, the selection of the programme areas is considered appropriate, with the exception of a few neighbourhoods (e.g. in the Unidad de Planeamiento Zonal UPZ Danubio), where the



presence of organised crime was and is so massive that the prevention-oriented programme was hardly expected to achieve significant success in improving the security situation and coexistence.

The target groups were the residents of the programme areas and, in particular, leading figures in the local community, single mothers, children and young people. When the project was updated in 2009, the focus was shifted more to young people in order to give them new opportunities and to reduce the stigma that society places on them as perpetrators of violence and insecurity. Women and children especially suffer from domestic violence, which is why they are of particular importance here. For the work on promoting conflict management mechanisms, it was essential to involve people with important leadership roles in the community. The **target groups selected** were appropriate.

From today's perspective, the programme had a high degree of relevance as the concept was realigned from integral rehabilitation of periurban areas in Bogotá to coexistence and security in the programme areas, despite the apparent risks from organised crime.

Relevance rating: 2

Coherence

CONVIVENCIA III fits well with international strategies for rehabilitation of periurban areas. The approach of combining the construction of municipal infrastructure with social programmes was and is promoted by UN-HABITAT. The CPTED model used is also internationally recognised. Prior to CONVIVENCIA III, preceding phases had already contributed to the further development of the approach of integral rehabilitation of periurban areas (Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios) pursued by the city of Bogotá.

Just like the municipality of Bogota, CONVIVENCIA III took the approach of focusing on particularly critical zones that had especially high homicide rates compared to the rest of the city, as well as concentrations of other violent crimes. CONVIVENCIA III thus fit into Bogota's urban development plans for 2008-2012 and 2012-2016 and complemented projects embedded in these plans that also aimed at prevention in other neighbourhoods.³ The CONVIVENCIA III 2009 update study made a significant contribution to the 2012-2016 development plan (especially the TVP programme). This shows how the analyses and strategies of the municipality and CONVIVENCIA III combined and complemented one another. Beyond this, however, there were no synergies with the city's prevention programmes.

The programme, carried out in alliance with 12 institutions of the municipality as well as civil society and private sector initiatives, consistently focused on integrating their strategies and goals. In this way, the programme did not create any new structures, but interlinked existing programmes from the areas of coexistence and security with the programme areas. This is how CONVIVENCIA III managed to involve initiatives with specific expertise, for example in the area of reconciliation. At local level, the programme worked with existing structures such as the Juntas de Acción Comunal (Municipal Civic Councils) and integrated alternative conflict resolution mechanisms developed by the city, resulting in, for example, 108 conciliators (Conciliación en Equidad) being trained and recognised by the Bogota Supreme Court.

The programme was aligned with the BMZ's 2013 sector strategy "Development for Peace and Security", particularly in terms of the goals "Overcoming root causes of conflict, fragility and violence" and "Improving capacities for non-violent conflict resolution". It is part of the development cooperation priority "Peace development and crisis prevention" agreed between Colombia and Germany in 2001. The purpose of the priority was to help build trust between the government and civil society, and the project was an integral part of this.

From today's perspective, the coherence of the programme is rated as good due to the intensive integration of existing strategies and mechanisms and their links to the programme areas.

Coherence rating: 2

³ Particularly the "Programa de Zonas de Atención Integral para la Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana" (ZAISC) and "Programa Territorios de Vida y Paz con Prevención del Delito" (TVP)



Effectiveness

At outcome level, the programme pursued the objective, adapted for the evaluation, of sustainable use of the structures created for conflict management, the social programmes and the municipal infrastructure provided.

Target achievement can be summarised as follows based on the indicators adapted for the evaluation:

Indicator	Ex post evaluation
(1) 75% of the municipal infrastructure provided by the programme is still in place and used regularly.	Achieved: 100%
(2) 75% of the municipal infrastructure provided by the programme is regularly maintained by formal or informal structures.	Achieved: 75%
(3) The social facilities created, such as the municipal conflict resolution centres (12), the reconciliation centres (4) and cultural centres (4), continue to exist and are used by the population.	Not achieved: only 6 out of 20 social facili- ties continue to exist.
(4) 50% of the people interviewed in the ex post evaluation in the pro- gramme area ⁴ (administration, civil society, target groups) have observed that the structures created are used for alternative conflict resolution mechanisms .	Only achieved for the few structures that are still planned.
(5) Registration of an increasing number of cases handled by mediators trained in the programme in the established municipal contact offices by means of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms.	Not achieved.

Re (1): The 24 **municipal infrastructures** created, including walkways (9), stairs (2), parks (7), skate parks (3), artificial football pitches (1) and rehabilitated gorges (2) are functional and **used** regularly by residents. However, the CPTED model was only successfully applied for some of the infrastructure, as shown by an impact analysis from 2015 (of 16 construction measures analysed, 3 performed well, 11 moderately well and 2 poorly with regard to the application of CPTED variables). The study concludes that knowledge of the CPTED method is lacking at the institutions despite relevant further training.

Re (2): More than 90% of the 5-10 year old buildings are in good condition. While only 75% of **municipal infrastructure** is regularly **maintained**, the robustness and relatively young age of even unmaintained structures means that they are still in good condition. From a total of 24 construction measures, 2 walkways, 2 parks and 2 sports facilities are currently not maintained, 2 rehabilitated gorges, 4 walkways, 1 set of stairs, 1 park and 2 sports facilities are formally maintained by the institutions responsible, and in the case of 3 walkways, 1 set of stairs and 4 parks, this task is carried out informally, i.e. by individuals, without a plan and regulated support. The sustainability committees set up under the programme to maintain them locally no longer exist. The general conditions for the continued existence and use of the maintained infrastructures are good, while infrastructure without regular maintenance is expected to show increasing signs of wear and tear.

Re (3): Only a small number of the **social facilities** created continue to exist. These include: 4 municipal conflict resolution centres (out of 12 created), 1 reconciliation centre (out of 4) and 1 cultural centre (out of 4).⁵ The continued existence of these facilities depends heavily on the commitment of individuals or youth groups.

⁴ Interviews were conducted with a total of 27 people in the programme areas (individual interviews and focus groups).

⁵ Intended support: reconciliation centres - established by NGOs and short-term support by district mayor's offices, municipal conflict resolution contact offices - municipal support, cultural centres - supported by the city of Bogotá.



Re (4): The few remaining **structures for alternative conflict resolution mechanisms**, which are maintained through individual or community involvement, such as a reconciliation centre, four municipal contact offices and the services of some mediators in these contact offices or elsewhere, are used by residents.

Re (5): The **cases** processed via **mediation** are not systematically registered, but the feedback from 27 mediators in an online survey among the 108 trained mediators showed that the number of cases initially remained constant from 2015 to 2018, and then decreased significantly. At the time of the survey (October 2020), 2/3 of the 27 participants indicated that they no longer perform mediation. The percentage is probably even higher, as it can be assumed that only people who are particularly interested in the subject took part in the survey. People interviewed locally mentioned declines in mediation and confirm the fall in the number of cases.

CONVIVENCIA III was implemented in cooperation with 12 institutions of the Bogota municipality and about 15 civil society and private sector organisations. The programme included 99 neighbourhoods (barrios) in 5 programme areas.⁶ As a result of restructuring, changes in executing agencies and frequent staff changes in the implementation unit, CONVIVENCIA III encountered enormous **difficulties in implementation**. The change in executing agency from the municipal Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning to the municipal Ministry of the Interior in 2012 was accompanied by restructuring and a reduction in the number of implementing institutions, programme areas and the target group. The latter was originally estimated at 600,000, but was then reduced to just under 185,000 and is now reported at around 160,000. In addition, the issues of conflict management, security and work for young people were given greater emphasis from this point on.

The **complementary measure** was primarily used for social programmes to prevent and resolve conflict and to promote youth initiatives. The corresponding measures were embedded in the overall implementation concept and in practice were not clearly differentiated from the investment project.

The **participation of the population** was a high priority in the course of conducting district analyses, planning the construction measures and implementing the programme in general. In the context of violence and insecurity, the participatory processes were essential for (re)building trust between target groups and implementing organisations. The fact that it was possible to implement the programme in this difficult context despite the implementation problems must be seen as positive, in spite of all the limitations, and can be attributed to the participatory approach. In terms of youth participation, it has proven positive to both openly invite and actively seek out specific young people who were already on the path towards criminality, and encourage them to participate.

The extensive opportunities for participation through dialogue and joint decision-making have created **barely any distribution conflicts** among residents. The attempt to create synergies between mediation as an official process with legally binding decisions and reconciliation as a community-based empowerment approach, for example by involving mediators in reconciliation work, has not been very successful. Some mediators were more resentful of the attention paid to reconciliation work through the programme.

The decisive factor for the even more limited target achievement at the time of the 2020 ex post evaluation compared to the final review was the change of mayor in 2016, which ended 12 years of city politics marked by left-wing alliances and ushered in a **change of policy** with the new centre-right officeholder. Experience shows that mayoral changes in Bogotá bring discontinuities in programmes and processes, which were particularly strong in 2016. In the neighbourhoods that were the subject of intervention, there was a noticeable break in the institutional support for social facilities, as a result of which social facilities that had been created could not be maintained in most cases. The continuity of most of the facilities created would have been important for the development of medium and long-term effects (see Impact).

In retrospect, the effectiveness is still considered to be moderately successful. That the municipal infrastructure provided, in which 45% of the total costs of the programme were spent, is still being used is a

⁶ The programme areas are zones that span several city districts. The 99 districts of the programme (out of a total of roughly 1922 districts in Bogotá) are located in 6 zonal planning units, called UPZs (out of a total of 117 UPZs in Bogotá). The programme areas were not stringently geared to the UPZs, as their boundaries have little relevance for the local population and problematic areas exist across these zonal planning units.



positive development. However, the continuation and use of the structures created for alternative conflict resolution mechanisms and social facilities fell far short of expectations.

Effectiveness rating: 3

Efficiency

The start of the programme planned for 2003 was delayed by several years due to a lack of government agreements, an administrative reform and a change in the originally envisaged executing agency. The implementation ultimately took place from 2010-2015, although **implementation problems** due to changes in executing agencies and restructuring extended the planned 48-month duration of the programme by 16 months, which had a negative impact on the efficiency of the programme. Due to persistent weaknesses in implementation, the decision was made in the final phase to close the programme, even though not all of the available funds had been used.

As a consequence of the change in executing agency in 2012, the programme's **priorities** were **shifted**, which led to an increase in spending on municipal infrastructure (+13.6%) and conflict management (+6.4%) By contrast, the budget of the components for improving the socio-economic conditions of young people in particular and for curbing and preventing intra-family violence was reduced, meaning that these two issues were only marginally addressed and were difficult to capture in the ex post evaluation.

Four of the six zonal planning units (UPZs) served by CONVIVENCIA III were already part of Phases I and II (UPZs Libertadores, La Flora, Danubio, Diana Turbay), and the programme was extended there to other neighbourhoods to make use of the social capital already created for participatory planning. The UPZs Lucero and Tesoro were added.

CONVIVENCIA III was characterised by a large number of small-scale measures in 99 neighbourhoods⁷. With the participation of several institutions and organisations, 379 implementation agreements were concluded. The wide range of implementing organisations, initially seen as an advantage, turned out to be an obstacle to programme implementation. The advantage of this structure of targeting groups through different institutions and combining different approaches and strategies worked only in part, while the disadvantages of highly **fragmented measures** clearly outweighed the advantages.

Another problem was the **resistance expressed by some of the implementing institutions**. According to information from stakeholders during the evaluation, the measures and necessary funds were included by the municipal financial administration in the planning and budgets of the municipal implementing institutions (spent budget funds were reimbursed to the municipal financial administration from FC funds). The resulting earmarking limited the flexibility in the use of funds for the institutions, which led to resistance - especially after personnel switches during the change of government in 2012. The consequent lack of interest on the part of individual institutions in implementation impaired the efficiency of the programme. The acceptance of the programme by the target groups, on the other hand, was very high due to their often successful participation.

The **inter-institutional coordination** planned as an additional component was inadequate. Despite efforts by the programme's own dedicated implementation unit (funded by the programme) and the implementation consultant, there was no coordinated approach between the 12 institutions. Inter-institutional meetings remained at the level of discussions on programme progress without generating synergies. The attempt to coordinate contributions from different institutions and organisations for measures in specific areas is nevertheless perceived by stakeholders as an important experience. It became clear that it makes sense not only to pursue sectoral goals at the level of individual institutions, but to formulate goals transversally and in relation to specific territories. The costs of component 5 for programme coordination were within reasonable limits at 5.1% of the total budget (originally planned at 6.9%).

The involvement of the implementation consultant was crucial for the coordination of the participating municipal institutions and monitoring of the programme. The costs of the implementation consultant amounted to 6.4% of the total budget and were significantly higher than planned (3.3%) due to the extensions of the programme duration.

⁷ Bogotá (Distrito Capital) \rightarrow Localidades (city districts) \rightarrow UPZs (zonal planning units) \rightarrow Barrios (city districts).



Since the impacts of the programme fell significantly short of expectations, the programme is rated as not very efficient in terms of **fund allocation**. However, the use of funds for preventive approaches at neighbourhood level in a context like the south of Bogotá makes perfect sense and can achieve a high level of allocation efficiency, as long as it complements an effective fight against organised crime by the municipal security and justice authorities. Alternatively, investing in the security and justice sectors would not be successful without complementary prevention programmes. The combination of both is crucial for efficient and sustainable violence prevention and conflict management.

Due to the delays and difficulties in implementation, the highly fragmented programme as a result of the many small-scale measures and the changes in the area of security and coexistence that ultimately fell short of expectations, the efficiency of the programme is rated moderately unsuccessful.

Efficiency rating: 4

Impact

At impact level, CONVIVENCIA III pursued the objective, adapted for the evaluation, of contributing to constructively dealing with conflicts and preventing violence in the programme areas.

The achievement of the objective is operationalised through the indicators listed here for the ex post evaluation:

Indicator	Ex post evaluation
(1) The number of homicides in the vi- cinity of the municipal infrastructure built has shown a decreasing trend in the years during and after the pro- gramme implementation. ⁸	Not achieved. The number of homicides (homicidio) in the vicinity of mu- nicipal infrastructure (at the level of police quadrants) has not decreased, but has remained at the same level. On the other hand, the number of murders at the level of the 4 supported zonal planning units (UPZs: Diana Turbay, Libertadores, Tesoro, Lucero) and the 2 control UPZs (San Blas and Gran Yomasa) decreased slightly. A slight in- crease is only evident in the La Flora UPZ and it remains at the same level in the Danubio UPZ. The number of mur- ders in the entire city of Bogotá decreased slightly during the same period. The city managed to steadily reduce the high homicide rates in the early 1990s (1993: 80 annual homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) (2019: 13).
(2) The development in other crimes in the vicinity of the municipal infrastruc- ture built has shown a decreasing trend in the years during and after pro- gramme implementation.	Not achieved. The number of crimes of theft, assault and domestic vio- lence has increased in the vicinity of the municipal infra- structure built. An increasing trend can also be seen at the level of the city of Bogotá and at the level of the 4 sup- ported zonal planning units as well as the 2 control areas
(3) 75% of the people interviewed in the ex post evaluation in the pro- gramme area (administration, civil so- ciety, target groups) saw an improve- ment in the constructive management	Not achieved. None of the 27 people interviewed in the programme areas noticed a decrease in violence; on the contrary, they think that the situation worsened. Seven of the respondents

⁸ Comment: The statistical information for the assessment of impact indicators 1 and 2 was collected at the small-scale quadrant level of the Colombian National Police. 13 quadrants were included in which the 24 municipal infrastructure facilities built are located. For purposes of comparison, statistics at the level of Bogotá and the zonal planning units (UPZ) were also used. For the analysis, only absolute figures for the number of crimes in the years 2013 to 2019 were available. It was not possible to use statistics on the number of crimes in relation to the population. The statistical data used was provided by the national police (SIEDCO information system).



of conflicts and a related decrease in the level of violence.

added that the situation had improved during the programme period, but then deteriorated.

To analyse the effects of the programme on the security situation, an indicator based on statistical information and an indicator based on the perception of the people interviewed were used. In summary, both the statistical data and the perception of the interview partners suggest an increase in violent crime and a deterioration of the security situation in the programme areas.

The ways in which the programme could influence the security situation were limited and there is a large correlation gap, as the development of the security situation depends on many factors. In this context, it is worth noting that some people interviewed at local level stated they had perceived an improvement in the security situation during the programme implementation, which they attributed to a temporary strengthening of the social fabric. Accordingly, the programme had the potential to influence the security situation, but did not have a positive impact in the medium and long term. This is mainly due to weaknesses in programme implementation (see Effectiveness) and a lack of complementarity of the programme's preventive measures with repressive law enforcement measures by a police force and judiciary with integrity, especially to fight organised crime as well (see Relevance).

Coexistence in the supported neighbourhoods has not noticeably improved as a result of the programme. During the implementation phase, the reconciliation and mediation measures showed positive effects. It was possible to deal with social and family conflicts through dialogue. As a result of the political change in 2016 and the associated decline in institutional support, these conflict management mechanisms were not continued and did not have a long-term impact on improving coexistence. In particular, after 2016, the municipality did not sufficiently support mediation as an alternative mechanism for resolving conflicts. The city's mediation and conciliation units (Unidades de Mediación y Conciliación - UMC), which were supposed to support the mediators trained by CONVIVENCIA III, were also repurposed under the new government. The number of cases processed and the number of people active in mediation is decreasing.

Young people were successfully involved in the programme during the implementation phase, especially some young people who were difficult to reach due to their involvement in illegal activities. As a result, what are known as invisible borders, which are mainly established by youth gangs, have been broken down and there is more freedom of movement. Sports, cultural and artistic activities, as well as some of the facilities and municipal infrastructure provided (cultural centres, parks and sports facilities) played a key role in the process. After the programme ended, however, the processes that had been initiated were not continued and young people barely received any further support. Some of the youth initiatives established with the support of the programme have managed to continue due to the commitment of individuals, and have had a positive impact on coexistence on a small scale. In the neighbourhoods, however, the impression prevails that invisible borders are playing a stronger role again. The programme component for socio-economic support remained largely neglected, especially for young people, although this could have made social processes on the ground more sustainable and thus offered young people long-term opportunities. In short, the impact of working with young people to improve coexistence in the neighbourhoods has therefore remained far below its potential.

The almost one-year standstill of the programme in 2012 (restructuring, change of executing agency) created a deep mistrust of the local people towards the municipality. This was especially true for young people, whose integration into the programme was challenging anyway. Restoring the trust of local residents was achieved mainly through the consistent use of the participatory approach.

The effect on improving the management capacities of the population and their social organisations is acknowledged as positive. In a context strongly characterised by clientelism, the participatory approach of CONVIVENCIA III (as well as the previous phases) has provided local residents with important experiences in terms of agreements within and between neighbourhoods and institutions. These experiences and the local management capacities that have emerged have significantly empowered the neighbourhoods.

The municipal infrastructure has largely been retained, continues to be used, and it has contributed to improving the quality of life in the neighbourhoods in question. However, due to the discontinuity of the social programmes, the infrastructure cannot assert its potential impact on the security situation and



coexistence in conjunction with the neighbourhoods. The neighbourhoods were too badly affected by the lack of support from the municipality to have any wider impact.

In the short term, conceptual approaches from CONVIVENCIA III were incorporated into other city programmes, but in the long term, the programme was not able to have a structural impact or function as a model approach, as the techniques were barely adopted or continued by the municipality. The discontinuity in city politics associated with the change of mayor in 2016 contributed significantly to this development. The CPTED model was not consistently used in the programme's construction measures and is not used to plan municipal infrastructure today. Concepts for reconciliation were not pursued and mediation as an alternative conflict resolution mechanism did not receive the necessary support as a result of the political change. On the other hand, it has been recognised that investments in municipal infrastructure last longer if they are accompanied by participatory processes. As a result, some institutions plan their construction measures with local participation. Selected programme activities are also being continued in some institutions. For example, a mobile school centre acquired under the programme continues to be used for youth work. The city's Ministry of Housing still implements a programme of integral rehabilitation of periurban areas, but the importance attached to the concept by the city has significantly decreased and the focus on safety and coexistence contributed by CONVIVENCIA III has not been embraced.

The impact of the programme is rated moderately unsuccessful, as the security situation and coexistence have not improved, promising social processes have not been continued, and approaches of the programme have not been pursued by the municipality.

Impact rating: 4

Sustainability

Municipal infrastructure continues to exist and is regularly maintained in 3/4 of the cases. Various institutions (for gorges, walkways, stairs, parks and sports facilities) and partly the district mayor's offices (neighbourhood parks) are responsible for the maintenance of the construction measures. In practice, however, the maintenance of some walkways and some parks and sports facilities depends on residents from the neighbourhood, which jeopardises the maintenance of 8 construction measures.

The conflict resolution mechanisms introduced are hardly used anymore and their continuation is dependent on the commitment of individuals, so a further decline is to be expected due to lack of support. In particular, the volunteers who conduct mediation in the municipal contact centres lack support from municipal institutions (see Impact). Currently, there are no training opportunities, there is little support for the approach and the mediated cases are not officially registered, which makes the work in mediation invisible. If there is no change of direction in politics and administration, it can be assumed that the number of active mediators will continue to decline and this alternative method of conflict resolution will continue to become less important. Perceptions of the sustainability of the reconciliation centres vary widely and the programme had no clear exit strategy. While the CONVIVENCIA III programme assumed that the reconciliation centres would last beyond the end of the programme, the strategy of the Stiftung für Versöhnung (Foundation for Reconciliation) as the implementing agency was to maintain the centres only for 2-3 years during the implementation and to transfer the reconciliation practices to the family or community domain when the centres closed. The abrupt closure of the centres at the end of the programme led to irritation and frustration locally. The short-term support for reconciliation work has not created any sustainable structures for constructive conflict management, and the remaining centre provides no decisive input for this either.

The cultural house (1 of 4 cultural centres originally established), which continues to operate with the commitment of the local community and a group of young people, has become an important point of reference for youth work. It shows that coexistence can be improved through culture, art and youth work if the spaces can be made available in the long term. In addition, several youth initiatives that emerged in the programme areas under the programme continue to be active in the arts and in culture. They have survived on their own and without municipal support. In the long term, however, their sustainability is uncertain without appropriate support, as they depend heavily on the commitment of individuals. The original approach of transferring the cultural centres to the city after 8 months failed, as the municipal programme to which the centres were handed over was discontinued at the end of 2015.



There are risks that could affect the sustainability of the few impacts achieved by the programme. The effects of the current COVID-19 pandemic cannot yet be fully foreseen, but it is conceivable that the economic, social and political consequences will have a negative impact on neighbourhood coexistence. Another risk is related to the influx of internally displaced persons due to the armed conflict and the increased arrival of migrants from Venezuela as a result of the crisis there. How well the new immigrants are integrated will determine how the neighbourhoods coexist in the future. The professionalisation of organised crime and the increase in drug trafficking are other challenges to the development of peaceful coexistence and the security situation in the programme areas. For the situation to improve in the long term, it is necessary to combine crime-fighting strategies with those of prevention. The police have a central role to play here and potential success will depend on whether they can evolve into a security agency with integrity that enjoys an appropriate level of trust among the local population. The current discussions about reforming the police give cause for hope.

The sustainability of the development effectiveness, which is already limited, must be rated as unsatisfactory. The programme has not sufficiently improved peaceful coexistence and the security situation in the programme areas in the long term, and due to a lack of support it is highly likely that its effectiveness will not increase.

Sustainability rating: 4



Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

Level 1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
Level 2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
Level 3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
Level 4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
Level 5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
Level 6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).