

# Ex post evaluation – Kenya



**Sector:** Primary education (11220)  
**Project:** Primary education for the children in Kenyan refugee camps (BMZ No. 2012 66 642)\*  
**Implementing agency:** Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR



## Ex post evaluation report: 2017

		Project (Planned)	Project (Actual)
Investment costs (total)	EUR million	11.44	10.20
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	0.00	0.00
Financing	EUR million	11.44	10.20
Co-financing	EUR million	10.44	9.20
of which BMZ budget funds	EUR million	1.00	1.00

\*) Random sample 2016

**Summary:** Schooling was supported in the Kenyan refugee camps at Dadaab and Kakuma within the scope of the Financial Cooperation (FC) project, as cofinancing for a UNHCR commitment. Its aim was to offer an opportunity for primary education and an ordered daily routine to the children who were suffering from the repercussions of their flight and the precarious living conditions in the camps. As a result, 68,685 workbooks (61,800 in Dadaab, 6,885 in Kakuma), 10,562 learning materials, 38,016 exercise books, 9,683 school uniforms (6,501 girls', 3,182 boys') and 300 lockers were procured and distributed. The FC contribution also helped to support the ongoing Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), which in particular has enabled older children to complete a primary school education within a short period of time. Due to the especially urgent nature of the measure, the German contribution of EUR 1 million was rolled out as cofinancing for ongoing UNHCR activities in the education sector.


**Development objectives:** The project objective (outcome) was to contribute to improving the teaching and learning conditions in the two refugee camps in Kenya mentioned above, offering the children an ordered daily routine and the opportunity of a primary education. This was intended to help to alleviate the emergency predicament of the children in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps (development objective).

**Target group:** Around 50,000 children aged 6 to 13 in need of primary education.

## Overall rating: 3

**Rationale:** The FC project addressed the lack of access to primary education and its inadequate quality in a difficult context. In spite of logistical challenges, a contribution was made to alleviating the children's emergency predicament in the refugee camps by making it possible for them to have an ordered daily routine through primary education. The implementation of the measures as an expedited process via UNHCR was appropriate, was efficient in this context, and took account of the project's emergency character. The measures and sustainability of the impacts depend heavily on ongoing external financing. In the absence of donor support for the camps, the primary education of future generations of pupils will be at risk.

**Highlights:** There was significant progress in education in Kakuma, meaning that the pass rate among refugee children in the primary schools at Kakuma camp was higher than that at national schools in 2017.



## Rating according to DAC criteria

**Overall rating: 3**

### General conditions

Since the start of the 1990s, Kenya has accepted refugees at the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, which are under the responsibility of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These refugees are escaping from famine and drought in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan/South Sudan, having to leave their home countries because of a lack of security structures, war, fragility and poverty. More than 140,000 new, predominantly Somali refugees made their way to the Dadaab refugee complex in September 2011 due to a serious famine, increasing the number of people in the camp to around 474,000 and hugely overstressing the capacity of the camp, which has infrastructure and services designed for 90,000 people. The Kakuma camp accepted around 91,800 refugees (again, predominantly Somali) in March 2012 and the influx of refugees has not stopped. Donations and external support primarily reached the large Dadaab refugee complex.

In December 2012, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) approved the “primary education for children in Kenyan refugee camps” Financial Cooperation (FC) project as an expedited process and for implementation as a direct UNHCR contribution. A detailed on-site audit was not conducted due to the emergency nature of the measure. UNHCR executed the project within four months (December 2012 to April 2013). FC had little chance to influence the design, implementation and follow-up, already made more difficult by the weak data situation.

UNHCR’s total budget for refugees in Kenya was around USD 251 million in 2013, of which around USD 9.3 million was budgeted for education. For the most part, UNHCR is funded by voluntary contributions from governments, intergovernmental actors, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), in addition to charitable trusts and private individuals.<sup>1</sup> In 2012, UNHCR and the Kenyan government’s (now disbanded) Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) coordinated the non-governmental organisations involved in the education sector, CARE International, Lutheran Worldwide Federation (LWF) and Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), which are still running the schools in the camps to this day.

The four components of the FC project envisaged at the programme appraisal reflecting UNHCR’s overall involvement in the camps were (a) procuring teaching and learning materials; (b) smaller-scale additional construction or repair measures to existing schools; (c) teacher training and continuing education and (d) financial incentives for teacher recruitment in the camps (refugees). Of these, component (a) in particular was ultimately financed from the FC contribution of EUR 1 million. This approach was appropriate, since the FC funds were to be used flexibly and this was a matter of the utmost urgency. However, UNHCR’s measures both before and after the FC measure’s four-month implementation also covered the other components, addressing the key problem at large. Consequently, in the course of the ex post evaluation, the impacts of the FC contribution are not isolated from UNHCR’s overall involvement in the education sector in the camps.

### Relevance

The education system at the Dadaab und Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya was characterized in 2012 by a lack of school infrastructure in some places, overcrowded schools in others, and insufficient or poorly skilled and qualified teaching staff (key problem). Only 32% of around 213,000 children of compulsory school age were enrolled in school at Dadaab, while the school enrolment rate among registered children at Kakuma was 36% for ages 6-11 (2011). Entry into the formal school system was also made more difficult for many children by the fact that they had received little to no nursery or primary education in their home countries. The absolute numbers of pupils rose in 2011 as more refugees arrived, increasing the

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<sup>1</sup> 86% governments and the European Union, 6% intergovernmental actors (African Union, International Organisation for Migration, etc.) and funds, 6% private sector, 2% from the regular UN administrative budget. <http://www.unhcr.org/dach/de/ueber-uns/struktur-und-finanzierung>, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/donor-profiles>

pressure on the limited infrastructure and causing the classroom–pupil ratio at Kakuma to worsen from 1:64 (2010) to 1:99 (2012). At Dadaab, the ratio stood at 1:106 in 2012. Studies show that it becomes barely possible to learn when there are more than 62 children per class.<sup>2</sup> Alongside the shortage of schools, the quality of instruction was also poor in the absence of school equipment and teaching staff with skills and qualifications. Only 22% of the primary and secondary school teachers had teacher training; only 13% of teaching staff were women, and the difficult security situation in the region made it difficult to bring national teaching personnel to the refugee camp. The teacher–pupil ratio worsened in Kakuma’s primary schools from 1:46 (2010) to 1:59 (2012). The ratio was 1:68 at Dadaab in 2012. This means that the teacher–pupil ratio far exceeded the international guidelines (FTI Benchmark) of 1:40, illustrating the limitation at hand both in access to education and in quality.

UNHCR’s involvement, of which a small part was financed to the tune of EUR 1 million by the FC measure under evaluation, addressed these key problems. The improvement in access to education was intended to help improve the teaching and learning conditions in the refugee camps. The aim was for regular school attendance to provide the children a primary education and an ordered daily routine, alleviating their emergency predicament in the short and long term. This results chain also appears sound from today’s perspective.

This gave the project the potential to contribute towards achieving Millennium Development Goal 2 regarding primary education and the latest Sustainable Development Goal 4 regarding education. The strategy was also in line with UNHCR’s strategic goal of “guaranteeing access to education worldwide”. The education sector continues to be a focus area for German-Kenyan development cooperation.

Measures to improve teaching and learning conditions are especially relevant on account of the serious deficiencies in the education sector in the refugee camps and the great importance of primary education for development and poverty alleviation, in addition to the contribution education makes towards people’s ability to help themselves.<sup>3</sup>

**Relevance rating: 2**

**Effectiveness**

The project objective (outcome) was to improve the teaching and learning conditions in the refugee camps. The target achievement was predominantly measured in the UNHCR results matrix with output-oriented indicators. These indicators often serve as decent proxy indicators and were used for this ex post evaluation:

Indicator	Status PA (2012), target value (in brackets)	Project completion: late 2013
(1) Textbook–pupil ratio	Dadaab: – , ( – ) Kakuma: 1:5, (1:3) Overall: 1:6, ( – )	Dadaab: 1:2 Kakuma: 1:5 – not achieved Overall: 1:5 – improved
(2) Classroom–pupil ratio <sup>4</sup>	Dadaab: 1:106, ( – ) Kakuma: 1:99, (1:80) Overall: 1:83, (1:45)	Dadaab: 1:118 – worsened Kakuma: 1:86 – not achieved Overall: 1:106 – worsened

<sup>2</sup> Benbow, J. et al. (2007): Large Class Sizes in the Developing World: What Do We Know and What Can We Do? American Institutes for Research under the EQUIP1 LWA. USAID. Washington, DC. USA.

<sup>3</sup>Systematic Review “Interventions in developing nations for improving primary and secondary school enrolments”, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), 2013, 2016, Summary.

<sup>4</sup>The number of classrooms varies in the camps. A benchmark of 24 classrooms per school is used for the EPE.

(3) Teacher–pupil ratio	Dadaab: 1:68, ( – )	Dadaab: 1:60, – improved
	Kakuma: 1:59, (1:55)	Kakuma: 1:88 – worsened
	Overall: 1:64, (1:45)	Overall: 1:66 – worsened

Source: UNHCR reports 2012, 2013, 2017; CARE 2017; LWF 2017.

After the refugee number increase in 2011, the number of camp residents as well as children required to attend school decreased from 2012 onwards (474,000 (2012); 408,000 (2013)). Nonetheless, the classroom–pupil ratio continued to deteriorate from 1:106 (2012) to 1:118 (2013), as more children were actually going to school (cf. indicator for net school enrolment rates in the “Impact” criterion section).

Responding to the fluctuating numbers of refugees in the camp with adequate infrastructure continues to be a challenge. When the objectives of higher school enrolment rates are achieved (even for a short time, as is often the case), the classroom–pupil ratios suffer. The same is true for the quality-related aspects of the education sector. While it was possible to improve the average textbook–pupil ratio from 1:6 to 1:5 with the procurement of 61,800 new textbooks at Dadaab, as well as 10,600 learning materials and 38,000 exercise books<sup>5</sup> at Kakuma, the teacher–pupil ratios followed a different trend. There was an improvement at Dadaab, whereas the ratio worsened at Kakuma, even though many parents already sent their children to religious and/or private schools, relieving strain on the public school system. The textbooks and school facilities procured from FC funds were used, according to UNHCR.

Many children, young people and adults who made their way to the camp in 2011 received little to no nursery or primary education in their home countries and, in turn, had difficulties integrating into the formal school system. Consequently, the FC also supported the already established Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) via the provision of teaching and learning materials. Altogether, 3,373 pupils, young people and adults received a certain level of primary education by this means, assisting them in entering the primary or secondary school system.

Given that the FC contribution was disbursed within four months, the bulk was only used for one component (procurement of teaching and learning materials), and the indicators set out above only take a very short period into consideration (late 2012/mid-2013), it is hardly possible to deduce long-term results and trends here. In light of the fluctuations in the camps’ refugee numbers, the indicators also fluctuate accordingly, and it is difficult to deduce target achievements without consideration over a longer time-frame. The lack of a reliable reporting and monitoring system compounds these difficulties. This means that the target values for the period under review, which were created in the UNHCR results matrix with a longer-term outlook, were not reached. However, the FC project did make investments from which a target group of around 50,000 refugees benefited within the scope of an emergency-type measure. We rate the effectiveness of the FC-financed measures as only just satisfactory, in view of the greatly increased number of camp residents over the relevant time-frame (shortly before the FC measure) and the growing number of children reached (see also “Impact”).

**Effectiveness rating: 3**

### Efficiency

UNHCR has operated the refugee camps in Kenya since the 1990s and has coordinated the cooperation with the partner organisations. Existing implementation structures for swift procurement and distribution were used along with the FC cofinancing. This way, the FC funds could be deployed very quickly.

The annual budget for the refugee camps is financed on the basis of a comprehensive needs assessment (CNA). This is carried out in Nairobi each March for the following year and forwarded to headquarters in Geneva. UNHCR’s total budget for refugees in Kenya was around USD 251 million in 2013, providing an average of USD 1.17 per refugee per day. UNHCR calculated total costs of around USD 14.3 million as being needed for the school education sector at Dadaab and Kakuma for 2012. Only around USD 11.5

<sup>5</sup> At the time of the evaluation, these materials were far past their useful lives of around three years. The same applies to the approximately 9,700 school uniforms that were procured.

million managed to be covered via external financing (USD 9 million for Dadaab, USD 2.4 million for Kakuma). Since underfunding was to be expected, a flexible use of the FC funds was ultimately agreed in order to give some leeway for priority measures (access to education and school equipment). Components for training teachers and creating financial incentives were therefore not executed with FC funds.

This flexible use of the EUR 1 million FC contribution within scope of application enabled UNHCR to respond quickly to the changing needs and make productive use of the funds. UNHCR reported that the situation of around 50,000 children of compulsory school age (6-13 years old) could be improved with the FC contribution.

The production efficiency remains only just satisfactory for both camps. The teaching and learning conditions have indeed improved somewhat due to the equipment that was financed, though the intended indicator values are unattained. In this context, it is necessary to take note of the fact that the EUR 1 million FC financing only covered a small portion of the UNHCR commitment's costs and the indicators span the full range of measures in the education sector in the camps. A positive point to note is that Kakuma received 50% of the FC funds despite being smaller than Dadaab in size, since the shortfall is greater here due to less donor involvement. The allocation efficiency must be rated differently for the two camps. At Kakuma, the net school enrolment rate increased significantly leading up to the time of the EPE (see "Impact" criterion section), which is attributable to UNHCR's involvement as the largest implementing organisation in the education sector.

The FC project was executed in line with the FC/TC "expedited process in the event of natural disasters, crises and conflicts" guidelines. UNHCR took stock of measures that were performed with an annual project report. No programme-related audits could be implemented by independent external auditors within the scope of the cofinancing.

The chosen mechanism of implementation via the UNHCR structures was appropriate and efficient. Therefore, even though the production efficiency and allocation efficiency are still below expectations, we rate the FC project's efficiency as satisfactory overall.

### Efficiency rating: 3

### Impact

The development objective was to alleviate the emergency predicament of the children in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. The children could be offered an ordered daily routine for a limited time. The lives of around 50,000 of the children living in the camps were positively influenced by the FC financing. The following indicators illustrate the trend:

Indicator	Status PA (2012), target value (in brackets)	Project completion: late 2013	EPE (2017)
Net school enrolment rate: children of primary school age (6-13 years old)	Dadaab: 32%, ( - ) Kakuma: 36%, (58%) Overall: 34%, (38%)	Dadaab: 34% Kakuma: 46% <sup>6</sup> Overall: 40%	Dadaab: 30% Kakuma: 70% Overall: 46%
Pass rate	Kakuma: -	Kakuma: 86%	Kakuma: -

Source: UNHCR reports 2012, 2013, 2016, 2017

Especially noteworthy is the fact that the primary school pass rate among refugees at Kakuma (where there are around 22 primary schools with approximately 50,000 pupils, as of 2017) is higher at 86% than Kenya's national pass rate of 78%. Close to half of the children regularly going to school were girls. UNHCR stated in 2017 that the learning success of the children at Kakuma has improved substantially. For

<sup>6</sup> Statistic includes secondary school enrolments

instance, 90% of the almost 4,000 pupils passed the final examination (at least 200 out of 500 points), with this rate also proving to be higher than the national average (76.3%). This would have additionally enabled these pupils to go to a secondary school – although there is a lack of infrastructure in this area, as well. Kakuma’s schools were recognised as part of the national educational system, which made it easier for the pupils to integrate and switch to national schools.

Less progress was made with the school enrolment rates in Dadaab. By the time of this document’s publication, 3,419 pupils (including 962 girls) had been registered for the final primary education examination, held in late 2017. There is no more detailed information about school completion, learning success or transition to secondary education, which prevents us from being able to judge whether education levels managed to improve at Dadaab.

On the whole, the children were offered a regular daily routine and safety at school. There are terrorist groups active in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps (most prominently Al Shabaab militant group), which carry on conflicts around power and distribution, and threaten the safety of the people. The children’s primary education also adds to their opportunities for secondary education or vocational training and, in turn, offers better opportunities for their long-term future outlook. This reduces potential for escalation and is likely to make recruitment more difficult for the terror groups.

It is not possible to estimate exactly how much the FC disbursement of EUR 1 million has contributed to the impacts. However, the measures implemented by UNHCR and cofinanced by FC did help to achieve the ultimate development policy objective of “alleviating the emergency predicament of the children in the refugee camps”, even though the extent to which the target group’s education level was improved is not quantitatively documented – especially for Dadaab.

**Impact rating: 3**

### **Sustainability**

The FC project was an emergency measure by its nature and did not follow an approach that was structurally effective for the long run. Today, UNHCR is still responsible for issues in the refugee camps in Kenya and coordinates the partner organisations CARE, LWF and IRW in the education sector. These organisations are supported by external donors. The primary and secondary schools are still running as of the EPE. Kakuma continues to receive refugees from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi. While the population at Dadaab has fallen to around 242,400, the population at Kakuma and the newly established Kalobeyei settlement is close to 184,000 in total.

Despite persistent efforts, many children of primary and secondary school age in the camps are still not at school. Due to gaps in financing and investments in the secondary school sector, even primary school alumni who have passed are missing out on moving up to secondary level. According to UNHCR, the classroom–pupil ratio is extremely high in particular cases, reaching up to 1:150 implying weak educational success levels. The need for teaching materials remains very high in the camps. Textbooks, classroom materials and uniforms do not normally last for longer than three years. The wear and tear is exacerbated by the fact that a number of students share these. Official information states that there are still lockers and desks present. However, there is still a lack of sanitation and play facilities. After the total number of teachers had risen to around 1,600 in 2013, the numbers had decreased by 2017 due to people returning home. The teacher–pupil ratio of 1:96 at the EPE, insufficiently trained teachers and a lack of learning materials also contribute today to an education quality that is weak overall and will not improve in the foreseeable future in light of the stagnant or declining levels of external funding. For instance, the funds that UNHCR can afford per person per year has fallen from USD 223 (2010) to USD 148 (2017). Significant new commitments have not yet been promised.

The FC project had no claim to sustainability by design. The approach of promoting education in emergency situations should be understood as sustainable, however, as the children benefit from the education and cognitive ability they gain, both in the acute situation (safety, guaranteed daily routine, school meals where appropriate) and for their whole life. Educated people are more tolerant of others and are more likely to be able to independently improve their standard of living and make their own way out of poverty.

**Sustainability rating: 3**

### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).