KfW Development Bank

Ex post evaluation
Water Loss Reduction Irbid/Jerash, Jordan

Title	Water Loss Reduction Irbid/Jerash		
Sector and CRS code	Water, sanitation and sewage management (14020)		
Project number	2000 65 318		
Commissioned by	BMZ		
Recipient/Project-executing agency	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan / Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ)		
Project volume/ financing instrument	EUR 18.2 million FC loan		
Project duration	2001-2019		
Year of report	2021	**Year of random sample**	2021

Objectives and project outline

The target at outcome level was to ensure a minimum cost-effective supply of drinking water within the programme area. The target at impact level was to make a contribution to efficient and sustainable management of the country's scarce water resources.

The project included reducing unaccounted for water in the governorates of Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun and Mafraq by restructuring and rehabilitating the supply network, replacing defective service connections and delivering machinery to support maintenance capacities.

Overall rating:
moderately unsuccessful



Key findings

With the exception of the supply frequency indicator, the programme did not achieve any of the target indicators by the time of the project's conclusion. It did not achieve the indicators that affect the supply security for the population nor did it achieve those connected to the economic situation of the project executing agency, the Yarmouk Water Company (YWC). The project has been rated "moderately unsuccessful" for the following reasons:

- The core problem was correctly identified and the measures were target-oriented. The project was also in line with the objectives of Jordan's National Water Master Plan (2004) and aimed to contribute to the FC target of sustainable and efficient management of water resources in Jordan.
- However, the project only achieved one of four target indicators.
- Instead of the four years planned, the implementation period lasted over 18 years.
- Reducing the total share of unaccounted for water from 50 to 25 % with specific investment costs of only around EUR 13 per resident was not an achievable target.
- As the target at outcome level was not achieved, the contribution on impact level was also only limited.
- The project did not lead to the desired improvements in operating cost coverage, nor did it lead to an appropriate total share of unaccounted for water (sustainability).
- It is also noteworthy that contracts with three engineering firms and one construction company were terminated prematurely during this project.

Conclusions

– Jordan has extremely scarce resources which have been placed under excessive strain in recent years due the population doubling and the influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq. It is therefore all the more important to manage the already scarce resources efficiently and with as few losses as possible.

– The negative evaluation of the project does not question the goals or the implementation of the project, rather, it is a reflection of the fact that the financial resources available for the project were far lower than what was needed.

– Measuring the impacts of a project that began nearly 20 years ago is only possible to a limited extent, especially because further projects were implemented at the same time as the evaluated project.

1 = very successful, 2 = successful, 3 = moderately successful, 4 = moderately unsuccessful, 5 = unsuccessful, 6 = highly unsuccessful

Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 4

Ratings:

Relevance	2
Coherence	2
Effectiveness	4
Efficiency	4
Impact	4
Sustainability	4

Breakdown of total costs

The total costs of the project amount to EUR 23.6 million (including an investment fund amounting to around EUR 1.5 million for the private operator). EUR 15.7 million of these costs were financed using an FC loan and EUR 7.9 million came from a counterpart contribution from Jordan (FC share 66.6 %). In addition, funds from BMZ No. 2000 65 318 financed part of two construction agreements implemented in the same region within the context of other projects for purposes that were generally consistent with the present project (Water mains in the northern governorates, BMZ No. 2006 66 255 and Water Supply for Syrian Refugees in Jordan I&II, BMZ No. 2013 66 814 and 2012 66 832). This made it possible to cover budget shortfalls in both projects caused by fluctuations in the exchange rate. Considering these additional costs, the actual total costs amount to EUR 26.0 million with an FC share of EUR 18.1 million and a counterpart contribution of EUR 7.9 million (FC share 69.7 %).

		Investment (Planned)	Investment[1)] (Actual)	Investment[2)] (Actual)
Investment costs	EUR million	24.5	23.6	26.0
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	8.8	7.9	7.9
Funding	EUR million	15.7	15.7	18.1
of which BMZ budget funds	EUR million	15.7	15.7	18.1

[1)] Actual costs of the measures financed within the scope of the present project BMZ No. 2000 65 318 (excluding additional financing from other projects, see footnote 2).

[2)] Costs of all measures financed within the scope of BMZ No. 2000 65 318, including the partial financing of two construction contracts implemented within the scope of other projects (Water mains in the northern governorates, BMZ No. 2006 66 255 and Water Supply for Syrian Refugees in Jordan I&II, BMZ No. 2013 66 814 and 2012 66 832).

Relevance

Water is extremely scarce in Jordan. The renewable water resources available per capita and year in Jordan is only 60[1] to 105m³[2], far below 500m³, the threshold at which the World Bank classifies a country as suffering from severe water scarcity. A key problem for water resource management in Jordan is therefore the lack of water, which has got worse in recent years. The population in the northern governorates of Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun and Mafraq rose from around 1.3 (2000) to around 3.1 million (2020) inhabitants. Two waves of refugees from Iraq in 2003 and from Syria in 2011 led to further growth in the population to be

[1] Source: GIZ (https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/17213.html)

[2] https://www.marketscreener.com/news/latest/World-Bank-Reforms-in-Energy-and-Water-Sectors-Help-Jordan-Achieve-Sustainable-Development--32463746/?utm_medium=RSS&utm_source=googlenews&utm_content=20210217 (World Bank: “Reforms in Energy and Water Sectors Help Jordan Achieve Sustainable Development”, 17 February 2021)

supplied with water. At the end of 2020, 316,000 Syrian and 1,100 Iraqi refugees lived in camps in the northern governorates. As a result, the pressure on water resources grew substantially once again. In this respect, the relevance of the project has increased significantly since the programme appraisal (PA).

The Jordanian government therefore aims to make efficient use of the scarce water resources that are available. The National Water Master Plan from 2004 and the National Water Strategy 2016–2025 focus on tapping additional resources and reclaiming wastewater as well as reducing technical and commercial unaccounted for drinking water from the public utility corporations. The priority objective of the Jordanian water strategy is to supply the population with a sufficient quantity and high quality of drinking water. Building on the Jordanian water sector strategy, key elements of efficient water resource management were agreed between the governments of Germany and Jordan in a priority area strategy paper in 2001. The development strategies, which were jointly defined and used as a basis for the project, also reflect the Millennium Development Goals introduced at the time of the PA, in particular Goal 7 (ensuring environmental sustainability). From today's perspective, the intention is to contribute towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6 (ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all).

The topographical situation and sub-optimal distribution of the supply networks resulted in high water pressures (pressures exceeding 16 bar were measured at 19 of the total 39 measuring points before 2000[3]). The excessive pressures and an outdated, corroded pipeline network combined with administrative losses at the time of PA led to total water losses (not-invoiced consumption, apparent and real losses[4]) of approximately 75 % in Mafraq and around 50 % in Irbid, Jerash and Ajloun.

The project comprised measures for restructuring the distribution networks, rehabilitating the distribution networks by replacing defective main lines, replacing defective water meters, service connections and tertiary pipelines as well as procuring equipment for leak detection and system maintenance. The selected project approach for reducing technical water losses is generally suitable for improved use of the scarce water resources and can be viewed as the only option. The restructuring will also prevent high pressures in the drinking water pipelines, which in turn will reduce pipeline damage, thus also lowering drinking water losses, and ultimately, commercial losses.

Improving cost coverage is part of the National Water Strategy 2016–2025. However, no data with regard to this matter was available for the four governorates at the time of the PA. In addition, reducing unaccounted for water also improves the economic situation of the utilities services providers and thus increases the relevance of the approach.

From today's perspective, the programme measures continue to be appropriate and consistent with the objectives of the National Water Master Plan from 2004 and the recommendations of the National Water Strategy 2016–2025, and also take into account the guidelines agreed between the governments of Germany and Jordan in a priority area strategy paper in 2001. The relevance of the programme was rated highly during its appraisal and is currently still highly rated.

Relevance rating: 2

Coherence

Taking into account the strategies set forth in the National Water Master Plan, several FC projects for water loss reduction were implemented in addition to the present programme "Water Loss Reduction Irbid/Jerash" for the governorates of Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun and Mafraq, as well as for other governorates including for Amman, Karak, Zarqa and Aqaba. In addition, the project is associated with the FC project that was implemented at the same time and aimed for "Water loss reduction northern governorates", which provided a "Repair and Rehabilitation Fund" (RRF, BMZ No. 2002 65 405) to reduce technical water losses with financial resources that could be used flexibly. The "Water mains in the northern governorates" project (BMZ No. 2006 66 255) aimed to reduce unaccounted for water and improve the water supply. In addition, GIZ implemented rehabilitation measures for the water distribution networks in Samar, Fouara, Al Karraj, Beit Ras, Ibder, Dougra, Natefah, Ham and Zobeia in the governorate of Irbid. Since 2014, further projects aiming to expand and rehabilitate the water supply network and thus reduce technically un-

[3] WAJ's detailed engineering generally uses maximum pressures of 5–6bar as a basis.

[4] https://www.yumpu.com/de/document/read/14092407/reale-wasserverluste

accounted for water have been implemented with support from USAID (USA), JICA (Japan) and Italian development cooperation.

All projects were discussed and agreed in regular negotiations between the donors, the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI) and the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ). This played a significant role in ensuring the complementary nature of the interventions by the various actors despite the similar targets that the projects in the four governorates followed. The share financed by the executing agency WAJ was 33 % of the total programme costs, which is a high percentage when compared with similar projects.

Implementation of the IWRM approach was agreed by the German and Jordanian governments in a joint sectoral strategy paper in 2001. The rational allocation of the scarce water resources, efficient and customer-oriented water supply and wastewater disposal as well as the introduction of measures to improve the water inventory (reducing unaccounted for water, reuse of treated wastewater, use of marginal water) was agreed within the scope of this integrated approach. As mentioned above, this project is based on the development strategies defined by the German and Jordanian governments, also with regard to the Millennium Development Goals introduced at the time of the PA, in particular Goal 7 (ensuring environmental sustainability).

From today's perspective, the programme was sufficiently coordinated with other projects in Jordan, particularly those in the northern governorates (external coherence) and was in line with the strategic targets for the sector set by the governments of Jordan and Germany (internal coherence).

Coherence rating: 2

Effectiveness

The aim of the project was to ensure a cost-effective minimum supply of drinking water within the programme area. When preparing the project appraisal report in 2000, the total costs of the project were estimated at around EUR 24.5 million. At the request of the Jordanians, the programme area was expanded in 2003 to include all of the northern governorates, including Ajloun und Mafraq, in addition to the original governorates of Irbid and Jerash to thus cover the entire operating range of the future private operator. Approval was granted to increase the funds by EUR 3.9 million in 2004.

As a feasibility study was not available at the time of the PA, the necessary financing requirements were estimated based on several sources of information. An estimate of the specific investment costs per resident in the programme area at the time (around EUR 13 per resident) would already have made it clear at that, with an estimated total unaccounted for water rate (technical and administrative losses) of around 50 % on average in the governorates of Irbid and Jerash in the previous years, the intended programme measures and the estimated budget would not be able to secure a reduction to 25 %, and that the approved funds were only able to cover a fraction of the actual need[5]. In 2014 and 2015, i.e. after the main construction measures were completed, the total unaccounted for water rates in the project area were 47 % or 45 %. The unaccounted for water in YWC's overall supply area in 2020 was 37 % and thus still significantly above the target of 25 %. It should also be stated that the reduced losses at that time must be viewed as an overall result of all of the projects implemented in the programme area since 2000.

To conclude, the target with regard to reducing unaccounted for water was too ambitious. In this case, the target level should actually be adjusted accordingly for the evaluation. However, given the unreliable nature of the available data with regard to actual unaccounted for water and the projects conducted in parallel in the project region that aimed to reduce unaccounted for water, adjusting the target is not reasonable in this case. The project funds in the current programme were insufficient and the project area was too large to achieve an acceptable rate of unaccounted for water. According to an analysis conducted in 2000, pressures exceeding 16 bar were recorded at 19 of the 39 measuring points in total. On the other hand, only six of the measuring points achieved the pressure of 5–6bar set forth in WAJ's detailed engineering. Random measurements taken over the course of three months in five streets after the main construction measures were concluded in 2013 also recorded pressures exceeding 6 bar, i.e. up to 15 bar (more recent pressure measurements are not available). The restructuring measures implemented for the

[5] In addition, it should be noted that, at the time of the PA, no additional projects in the programme area had the target of reducing unaccounted for water during their implementation or planning.

water distribution network thus did not lead to the desired target of eliminating excessively high pressures to a sufficient degree. Since excessive pressures generally lead to more leaks in the tertiary pipelines and thus to excessively large amounts of technical water losses, it was only possible to expect very limited positive impacts on water loss reduction.

The water supply network operated intermittently once a week on a regular basis before the project was implemented. Evaluations from data loggers in different supply regions indicate only one day/week or one day every two weeks for the supply windows in 2013. According to more recent information from the YWC, the supply times are now at one to three days per week, thus achieving the target.

Within the scope of the EPE, interviews with users were not conducted about the supply situation since, on the one hand, most of the construction measures took place around ten years before, while on the other hand, improvements in the situation were made through several projects that took place simultaneously. It would therefore not have been possible to unequivocally attribute the impacts to the present programme.

The programme's success was very limited from a business perspective. Unaccounted for water probably declined from around 50 % (in the governorates of Irbid and Jerash in 2000) to 37 % (in all four governmental districts in 2020)[6], but remains high based on the amount of non-revenue water (NRW). In addition to technical losses, administrative losses are causes of this. Administrative losses include illegal connections to the distribution network and the manipulation of legal connections, in particular. According to implementation agreements, the intention was for WAJ to take all the necessary steps to prevent the illegal abstraction of drinking water for irrigation purposes in the governorate of Mafraq. However, the share of unaccounted for water in Mafraq remains high, suggesting that illegal abstraction continues to play a role.

The quality of the construction measures is generally satisfactory; however, subsequent construction work has already been conducted on the roads in Irbid, where the asphalt surfacing was only repaired provisionally. The quality of the visible elements of one construction section (section C3) is flawed to some extent: HDPE pipes at intersections are exposed in a roadside ditch and are thus susceptible to damage and potential microbial contamination. The pipe trenches in Sakhra were apparently only filled with sand or gravel as a temporary measure once construction ended, and the road surface was never restored.

The implementation agreements stipulated that before tendering for the construction contract, WAJ had to demonstrate that a private operator was contracted to operate the water supply and wastewater disposal in the governorates of Irbid, Jerash, Mafraq and Ajloun, and had commented on tender documents for the project. The operation of the water supply was initially transferred to the semi-autonomous Northern Governorate Water Authority (NGWA) established in 2001, which received support from a managing consultant between 2006 and 2009. WAJ transferred NGWA into the publicly owned Yarmouk Water Company (YWC) at the beginning of 2011. Starting in September 2011, the private company Veolia Water Jordan LLC took over the management and operation within the scope of a management agreement. Within the context of the Arab Spring, the management agreement received criticism as a large agreement with an international company. Although the team under the management agreement had performed well up to that point, WAJ terminated the agreement in March 2013 for political reasons. As a wholly-owned subsidiary of WAJ, YWC has been solely responsible for facility operation since 2011. The implementation agreements were thus only fulfilled in part. Water supply and wastewater disposal in the northern governorates also certainly suffered from the lack of continuity in the administrative and management structures over the past 20 years.

The target achievement at outcome level is summarised in the table below.

[6] The two depicted rates of unaccounted for water cannot be compared directly as they refer to different areas. However, only 20% of all of the supplied residents in the programme area live in the governorate of Mafraq, and 6% live in the governorate of Ajloun. The total rate of unaccounted for water in all four governorates was estimated at around 53% in 2000.

Indicator	Status PA, target PA	Ex post evaluation *)
(1) Tariff revenues covered the operating costs.**)	108 % (WAJ in Jordan overall, status for Irbid and Jerash not indicated in the PA), greater than 100 %	Not achieved: Cost coverage varied over the past 15 years between 30 und 85 % (with the exception of 2012 at 112 %), with a declining trend. Cost coverage was 29 % in 2019.
(2) The overall loss rate for drinking water does not exceed 25 %.	Around 50 % for Irbid and Jerash (for 2000, the overall water loss rate for all four districts together is estimated at around 53 %), less or equal to 25 %	Not achieved: Total losses in 2020 were 37 %.
(3) The average water pressure does not exceed 6 bar.	At 19 of the 39 measurement points in total: pressure > 16 bar (for Irbid and Jerash), less or equal to 6 bar	Not achieved: In 2013, the measured pressures at randomly selected locations at several positions in the distribution network exceeded 6 bar. No more recent data are available.
(4) Water in the programme area is regularly supplied one day of the week.	Sometimes less than one day per week (for Irbid and Jerash), at least one day/week	Achieved: Once per week (eight hours).

*) All status information at the time of the ex post evaluation pertains to the total programme area, including the governorates of Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun und Mafraq.

**) The original formulation of the indicator “Degree of cost coverage of WAJ in Irbid and Jerash is higher than the running costs” was made more precise for the purposes of the EPE.

Therefore, only one of the four indicators defined at the time of the ex post evaluation was achieved. The main objective of the measure – reducing technically unaccounted for water to an acceptable level – was not achieved based on measurements after the construction measures ended. The effectiveness is therefore rated as inadequate, which can ultimately also be attributed to overambitious target setting and project funds that were insufficient for the objective.

Effectiveness rating: 4

Efficiency

As the measures took place on a large scale in all four governorates, the target group comprises the entire population of the northern governorates. The costs per resident are around EUR 9, taking into account the overall investment costs and number of inhabitants in 2016 (or EUR 13/resident based on the number of inhabitants in 2000). Taking into account these extremely low specific investment costs, no significant water loss reduction could be expected.

The building prices were determined in the competitive bidding process, meaning that the measures were put together at an appropriate price. The production efficiency is therefore considered appropriate.

At the project appraisal, the aim was to implement investment measures between 2001 and 2005 (4 years). The main measures were actually implemented between 2001 and October 2014 (13 years). Hiring the implementation consultant was already postponed by two years due to protracted coordination processes when awarding the contract. In addition, for tendering the construction contracts the implemen-

tation agreements required the WAJ to demonstrate that a private operator would be contracted to operate the water supply and wastewater disposal in the governorates of Irbid, Jerash, Mafraq and Ajloun, and comment on tender documents for the project for the WVRP. Competitive bidding for the operator was cancelled in 2006 and a new operator concept was developed. This delayed progress in the water loss reduction project. If the additional measures for procuring and installing home water meters are added, the implementation period for the project measures increases to the period from 2001 to 2021 (20 years). The exceeded deadlines were due to delays when awarding contracts, construction delays and "institutional" delays caused by repeated reorganisation of the operator structure. The measures were carried out in three construction contracts. Generally, the local companies took much longer than planned to complete the construction. One construction contract was terminated by WAJ due to the building contractor's low quality and significant construction delays. Arbitration proceedings against this company were initiated in 2013. 9,000 meters are still yet to be installed (status: June 2021).

YWC currently employs 1,386 staff in the area of water supply in the four governorates. With 345,000 service connections, this corresponds to four employees per 1,000 connections, which is within the international target range of 4–6. This target – which refers to YWC's entire supply region and can thus only be used for comparison to a limited extent – is significantly more economical than the values provided in 2000 of 9.5 in Irbid or 13.5 employees per 1,000 connections for Jerash.

The water tariff is based on consumption-based block tariffs. This has increased significantly since the PA 20 years ago. So, for example, the price per cubic metre for an average block tariff of 40m³/quarter increased by 320 % after being adjusted for inflation. The collection rate at the time of the PA is unknown. In 2020 it was 81 %, and requires further improvement to bring cost coverage up to an acceptable level.

The inadequate collection rate and the continued high rates of unaccounted for water in particular put pressure on the operator's economic situation. YWC was also required to absorb the cancellation of power supply subsidies. As a result, the operating cost coverage continually deteriorated from 2013 (72 %) until 2019 (30 %). Operation is therefore inefficient with regard to both technical and economic aspects.

The allocation efficiency is very difficult to evaluate as the insufficient effects at impact level are coupled with insufficient funds. A meaningful evaluation of the relationship between impact and cost is thus hardly possible, especially because further measures have also influenced the results at impact level.

The water supply cannot be described as efficient due to the continually high amount of technically unaccounted for water and the operator's low cost coverage in particular.

Efficiency rating: 4

Impact

As the FC measure's development policy objective, the cooperative programme aimed to make a contribution to efficient and sustainable management of the scarce water resources for the country. From today's perspective, this goal must be expanded to include the improvement of living conditions for the target group. No indicators are defined to achieve this overarching target - it was implied that achieving the module targets would also lead to the achievement of the overarching development objectives. To the extent that the project aimed to ensure a cost-effective drinking water supply in the programme area, it was to be expected that this would also contribute indirectly to improving water resource management in Jordan and continue to improve the living conditions of the target group. However, as the effectiveness of the project is rated unsuccessful, the contribution to efficient and sustainable management of the scarce water resources was also limited. Additional strain was placed on the northern governorates and YWC due to the influx of refugees as a result of the crisis in Syria.

Specific support for the poor population was not planned, and based on the type of measure, not reasonable either.

The unaccounted for water must be viewed as particularly relevant for evaluating efficient water resource management, and the project measures could not reduce this factor by the expected degree. However, it should also be noted that the expectations for the measures were not in proportion to the project funds.

The living conditions of the target group improved to some extent due to the measure. At the time of the PA, the invoiced water consumption was at 48 litres/capita/day; this increased to 73 litres/capita/day in

2020. Supply security has improved slightly. Before the project was implemented, water supply was intermittent throughout most of the year, sometimes less than one day per week; the supply times have now increased to one day per week (eight hours) regularly. The programme was not particularly poverty-oriented.

In summary, the target achievement at impact level was rather limited as no substantial contribution was made to efficient and sustainable management of the scarce water resources. In fact, given the available funds, these targets were unattainable.

Overarching developmental impact rating: 4

Sustainability

The water supply for the northern governorates is based on local groundwater reserves (currently 210 wells and several springs). According to a study from 2013[7], the average decreases in the Azraq, Yarmouk and Zarqa groundwater basins (the resources used in the northern governorates) were -0.8, -1.1 and -1.1 m per year. Based on this information, the resources continue to be overexploited, as was already the case at the time of the PA. Since 2000 the total water loss rate has not improved significantly, from 53 to 37 % (2020, average loss rates of four governorates).

The insufficient financial sustainability of operation is reflected in the very unsatisfactory operating cost coverage of 29 %. This is attributed to the high amounts of unaccounted for water and the low collection rates. Fortunately, however, cross-financing from the state has been reliable for several years. Nevertheless, Jordan's increasing national debt presents an increasing risk for the further settlement of this deficit.

The structural condition of the constructed facilities found during the ex post evaluation and final inspections was also rated to assess sustainability. The bulk of the investments, specifically into the underground water supply pipes that were replaced, could not be evaluated in their state. The quality of the construction measures is generally satisfactory; however, subsequent construction work has already been conducted on the roads in Irbid, where the asphalt surfacing was only repaired provisionally. The quality of the visible elements of one construction section (section C3) is flawed to some extent: HDPE pipes at intersections are exposed in a roadside ditch and are thus susceptible to damage and potential microbial contamination. The pipe trenches in Sakhra were apparently only filled with sand or gravel as a temporary measure once construction ended, and the road surface was never restored.

YWC documented around four repairs per kilometre of pipeline in 2018, mainly for leaky pipes. For a supply network of average quality, less than one repair per km/year is expected. It can thus be assumed that the distribution networks continue to be in need of rehabilitation or renewal.

The project focused exclusively on construction measures. Complementary measures to support the operator were not planned within the scope of the programme, these were to happen under the management agreement instead. In this respect, the programme could not be expected to exert a significant influence on the sustainability of the executing agency's structures.

Sustainability rating: 4

[7] USGS: "Groundwater-Level Trends and Forecasts, and Salinity Trends, in the Azraq, Dead Sea, Hammad, Jordan Side Valleys, Yarmouk, and Zarqa Groundwater Basins, Jordan", Open-File Report 2013.

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, overarching developmental impact** and **sustainability**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

Level 1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
Level 2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
Level 3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
Level 4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
Level 5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
Level 6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).