


## Ex post evaluation

### Syrian volunteers in education, Jordan



<b>Title</b>	Support for the education sector from Syrian refugees (Phase I), Jordan		
<b>Sector and CRS code</b>	Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation (73010)		
<b>Project number</b>	2016 406 63		
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)		
<b>Recipient/Project-executing agency</b>	UNICEF		
<b>Project volume/Financing instrument</b>	EUR 6 million, BMZ budget funds		
<b>Project duration</b>	2017 - 2019		
<b>Year of report</b>	2022	<b>Year of random sample</b>	2021

### Objectives and project outline


The project aimed to improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan by providing employment opportunities as support staff in the education sector. At the same time, the aim was to improve the quality of education in schools with a high proportion of refugees. To this end, FC financed monthly incentive payments for Syrian refugees who were utilised in state schools, refugee camps and youth centres as educational, administrative or technical assistants. UNICEF implemented the measure.

### Key findings

The project has largely achieved its twofold goal of temporarily increasing Syrian refugee incomes and improving the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people in Jordan. The project is therefore rated as successful.

- The project's objectives were highly relevant for Syrian children and young people as well as Syrian support staff in the education system. It also supported the Jordanian government's own efforts in integrating Syrian refugees.
- The project successfully addressed women, who made up around half of the support staff workers, and particularly disadvantaged children and young people inside and outside the refugee camps. They also received holistic support from Syrian support staff in the special youth facilities (Makani centres) and state youth centres designed by UNICEF.
- The Syrian support staff acted as an important link between the Syrian community and the school system, but were only able to compensate for the various disadvantages suffered by Syrian pupils to a limited extent.
- Legal framework conditions, in particular the restricted labour market access of non-Jordanian nationals, impaired the effectiveness and sustainability of the measure.
- The partnership with UNICEF enabled the project to be implemented efficiently.

Overall rating:  
**successful**



### Conclusions

- The educational opportunities of vulnerable children and young people can be improved through supplementary informal offers.
- From today's perspective, such measures should benefit all refugees in Jordan.
- Cash-for-Work measures improve income in the short term, but cannot contribute to improving refugees' income in the long term as long as they are denied access to the regular labour market.

## Ex post evaluation – rating according to OECD-DAC criteria

### General conditions and classification of the project

Since 2012, around 6.6 million people have fled war and persecution in Syria, predominantly to neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. In 2017, a total of 734,824 registered refugees lived in Jordan, including 653,031 Syrians. Overall, the number of Syrians in Jordan was estimated at 1.3 million. Refugees thus accounted for over 10 per cent of the Jordanian population. The vast majority of Syrian refugees reached Jordan in 2011–2015, before Jordan closed the border with Syria. In 2018, around 82% of Syrian refugees lived in cities (Amman, Irbid, Mafrq, Zarqa) and a further 18% in camps (78,605 in Zaatari, 40,533 in Azraq, 6,903 in the Emirati-Jordanian Camp). Half of Syrian refugees were under 18 years of age. Refugee children were exposed to particular risks such as family separation, child marriage, child labour and violence in the family and at school. The influx of refugees strained Jordan's social infrastructure, including the education system. Refugees were and are still only legally allowed to work in a few sectors (all information: UNHCR).

As part of the 2016 international donor conference “Supporting Syria and the Region”, the Federal Republic of Germany committed itself to supporting Syria's neighbouring countries and creating prospects for refugees and internally displaced persons in these countries. Against this background, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) created “Partnership for Prospects” (BONO) for the Middle East, which is funded by the Special Initiative on Displacement and focuses on creating short-term employment and income opportunities (Cash-for-Work) in countries neighbouring Syria. With the creation of employment opportunities for Syrian aid workers in the Jordanian education system, the project evaluated here fit in with this initiative.

### Brief description of the project

The aim of the project was to provide employment opportunities for Syrian refugees in the education sector and to improve the quality of education for Syrian pupils. To this end, monthly incentive payments were made to Syrian aid workers in various educational institutions, including public schools, schools in refugee camps, state youth centres and the UNICEF's Makani centres.<sup>1</sup> This was intended to contribute to the livelihoods of the participating refugees. The refugees were utilised as assistant teachers (35%), cleaning staff (26%), security personnel (34%), caretakers, transport assistants, support staff and camp workers (5%). In their various roles, use of the support staff was intended to relieve the burden on the educational institutions and thus contribute to better educational quality. The direct target group was voluntary Syrian support staff in the education sector (approx. 1,000 people per school year), the indirect target group was refugee Syrian children and young people (approx. 120,000 per school year) as well as Jordanian children and young people. The project was implemented by UNICEF. The first phase of the project, which was implemented in 2018 and 2019, is evaluated here. At the time of the evaluation, the project was in its third phase.

Note on the exchange rate:


EUR 1 was equivalent to JOD 0.81256 (1 January 2018)

JOD 1 was equivalent to EUR 1.23 (1 January 2018)

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<sup>1</sup> Makani means “my space” in Arabic. They are youth centres run by various NGOs for particularly disadvantaged children and young people that work according to a holistic approach developed by UNICEF. This includes learning support, recreational opportunities, parental involvement and “life skills” training.

### Map: Absolute number of Syrian refugees in Jordan, their percentage distribution among the individual governorates and location of refugee camps



Source: UNHCR 2022

The map shows the absolute number of Syrian refugees in the individual governorates and refugee camps in Jordan, as well as their percentage distribution across the various governorates. It is clear that in 2022 – as in the project period – the majority of refugee Syrians will be located in Jordan in the Greater Amman area and in the northern governorates of Irbid and Al Mafraq on the Syrian border. The map also shows the location of the Zaatari refugee camp (ZAT) in Al Mafraq governorate, in which 10.7% of Syrian refugees live, and Azraq (AZR) in Zarqa governorate, in which 5.8% of Syrian refugees live. The project was active in the refugee camps of Zaatari and Azraq as well as nationwide. Various UNHCR data suggest that the total number and regional distribution of refugees has not changed significantly since the Syrian-Jordan border closed in 2017.

### Breakdown of total costs

The project costs amounted to EUR 6 million and were financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

		Inv. (planned)	Inv. (actual)
<b>Investment costs (total)</b>	<b>EUR million</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>6.0</b>
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	0.0	0.0
Debt financing	EUR million	6.0	6.0
<i>Of which BMZ funds</i>	<i>EUR million</i>	<i>6.0</i>	<i>6.0</i>

## Rating according to OECD-DAC criteria

### Relevance

#### *Policy and priority focus*

The project implemented the objectives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in Jordan. Since 2015, the objectives have been to create professional and economic prospects for refugees and locals, as well as to provide support for the country in receiving refugees. The project was also integrated into the Jordanian government's "Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis (2017–2019)". It aimed to provide high-quality education for children and young people affected by the Syrian crisis on a sustainable basis and emphasised the need to build up additional capacities in education. In order to improve the income situation of refugees, the plan's intent was to provide for the creation of short-term work opportunities within the scope of Cash-for-Work in addition to long-term approaches. At the same time, the project was in line with the Jordanian government's Accelerating Access to Education Initiative (2016–2020), which was intended to ensure free access for Syrian refugee children and young people with international support. Another reference framework was the Jordanian Ministry of Education's "Education Strategic Plan 2018–2020", which pointed out the additional burdens on education caused by the influx of refugees and envisaged an expansion of educational capacities.

The project took into account the legal framework conditions for refugees in Jordan, in particular with regard to the politically sensitive issue of work permits. At the 2016 donor conference, Jordan committed to issuing 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in return for improved access to the internal market of the EU. In practice, however, the awarding of work permits is still only possible for low-skilled occupations in the areas of agriculture, construction, industry and services that are not on the official list of professions "closed to foreigners" (ILO 2021). In view of the high unemployment rate among Jordanian nationals, the aim is to protect the national labour market from competition from refugees. Violations of labour law are punished by deportation or transfer to the high-security area in the Azraq camp. The project took these circumstances into account by defining the Cash-for-Work measures as "voluntary work". Accordingly, the Syrian "volunteers" did not receive an employment contract, but a "Memorandum of Understanding", and not a salary, but an "incentive" payment. This construct involved less attractive social protection than a regular employment contract. Regular follow-up employment of the assistants at the schools, some of whom were highly qualified, proved impossible, as the education sector is also one of the areas closed to foreigners. For this reason, the Syrian aid workers remained – in retrospect – dependent on the Cash-for-Work measure for years to come. Refugees' limited access to the Jordanian labour market limited the project's expected impact in two ways. On the one hand, the Syrian support staff were unable to develop long-term career prospects in the education sector, and on the other hand, it reduced the value of school education for Syrian pupils.

The project took into account the capacities and needs of the promoted educational institutions. The influx of Syrian and other refugees posed major challenges for Jordan's education system. According to the Ministry of Education, 126,127 Syrian children and young people attended public school in the 2016/2017 school year and thus accounted for around 10% of the total number of pupils. In cities with a high concentration of refugees, the share of Syrian pupils was 25.1% (Amman and Mafraq), 22.2% (Irbid) and 17.4% (Zarqa) (MoE 2018). The Syrian pupils were largely taught separately from the Jordanian children in 45 schools in the refugee camps and in around 248 "double-shift schools", in which a school building is used for Syrian pupils in the afternoon, after regular morning lessons for Jordanian pupils. According to the Ministry of Education, the establishment of double-shift schools – which already existed before the influx of Syrian refugees – led to a loss of quality for Jordanian pupils, as they shortened teaching time for the morning classes (MoE 2018). The Ministry of Education hired additional Jordanian teachers to teach Syrian children and young people. These teachers were co-financed by German Financial Cooperation (FC) (DEVAL 2021). Important challenges facing the Jordanian education system in 2017/2018 were inadequate infrastructure, problems with training and recruiting qualified teachers, and sometimes outdated learning content and methods. By providing Syrian support staff in the pedagogical and non-pedagogical areas (e.g. cleaning staff) for the double-shift schools and schools in the refugee camps, the project was able to make a limited contribution to reducing capacity bottlenecks in the education system. The focus on the double-shift schools was appropriate, as they taught the majority of Syrian pupils.

The project-executing agency UNICEF has decades of experience in Jordan and a broad network of state and non-state partners and was substantially involved in the project's design. UNICEF recognised at an early stage that it could not provide personnel management for the support staff with its existing resources and recruited a

commercial HR service provider for this purpose from March 2018, which also formally employed the support staff.

### ***Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders***

The project addressed the needs of Syrian children and young people for education. In 2017, around 1.3 million Syrian refugees lived in Jordan, 653,031 of whom were registered as refugees by the UNHCR. In addition, there were around 82,000 Iraqi, Yemeni, Sudanese and Somali asylum seekers in Syria. About half of the refugees were under 18 years of age. Around 82% of refugees lived in cities (Amman, Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa) and around 18% in the Zaatari camps (78,605 people) and Azraq (40,533 people) (UNHCR 2022). Unlike refugees of other nationalities, the Jordanian state granted refugee Syrian children and young people free access to the education system. However, this access only existed in the governorate where the family had registered with the Ministry of the Interior and had undergone a security check there. Due to missing or expired registrations, unauthorised departure from a refugee camp or the mobility of their parents (e.g. seasonal workers), around one third of Syrian children and young people were unable to attend school during the project period (UNICEF 2021).

In the 2017/2018 school year, the school attendance rate for Jordanian children aged 6–11 (primary school) was 95%, for Syrian children 80%, and for children of other nationalities 83% (UNICEF 2021). This had the effect of improving the school attendance rate of Syrian children compared to the beginning of the Syrian crisis, but was still below that of Jordanian children. In lower secondary school levels (ages 12–15), the school attendance rate among Jordanian young people was 94%, while it was only 57% for Syrians and 74% for other nationalities, with more boys than girls leaving school at this age. Among all young people, the main reasons for dropping out of school were work for boys (mainly in the informal sector) and early marriage for girls, both due to economic necessity. Other hurdles for refugees included administrative difficulties (e.g. lack of registrations), the costs of school materials and transport, the moderate quality of school lessons, experiences of discrimination and violence in the school (corporal punishment, bullying, beatings in the schoolyard). In addition, many refugee families saw little economic benefit in longer school education in view of the limited access to the labour market (UNICEF 2021, HRW 2020). The support staff utilised in the area of education as part of this project played an important role in overcoming at least some of the hurdles mentioned here. In the cities, they formed an important link between the Syrian community and the schools. They supported the Syrian families in registering for school and were in regular contact with their parents. When notice was given with regard to dropping out of school, they advocated for the continuation of school attendance with the parents. Within the schools, the educational assistants acted as contact persons for the Syrian pupils, particularly in conflicts with (Jordanian) fellow pupils and teachers. This may have reduced experiences of violence and exclusion. In this sense, the use of educational assistants met the needs of refugee pupils and their families.

Given the high number of Syrian (and Jordanian) children and young people who have never attended school or left school early, non-formal education is of particular importance in Jordan. The Ministry of Education offers complementary learning opportunities in its youth centres to support young people in school or to enable a transition to a regular school and acquisition of basic skills. Similar courses are also offered by various charitable institutions and non-governmental organisations. UNICEF is working with these organisations as part of its “Makani” programme, in which it provides multidimensional support to vulnerable children and young people. Syrian support staff were utilised in the state youth centres as well as the Makani centres, where they took on important tasks in childcare, tutoring and social work.

The project also met the needs of Syrian refugees for a regular and legal income. The Jordanian labour market is challenging. Even at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, only 67% of Jordanian men and 18% of Jordanian women of working age were working, which is one of the lowest figures in the world. In 2019, the official unemployment rate among Jordanian citizens was 19%. Among Syrian refugees, this was still significantly higher at around 27% (JRP 2020–2022). In 2017–2019, the Ministry of Labour issued around 46,000 temporary work permits per year as part of the “Jordan Compact” with the EU from 2016. Although the work permits brought significant improvements for those affected (legality, employment contract, minimum wage, social protection), they only benefited a few Syrian workers (ILO 2021). For this reason, around 95% of Syrian refugee workers worked in the informal sector during the project period, as did around 44% of Jordanian workers. The informal sector is characterised by low wages, problematic working conditions, lack of employment contracts and high exploitation potential (JRP 2020–2022).

In 2019, the average monthly income of a Syrian household was around JOD 200 (EUR 246) (FAFO 2019). The incentive payments for Syrian support staff outside the camps were JOD 190–250 (EUR 234 – 308), depending on their qualifications, with daily working hours of four to eight hours. In the camps, the incentive figures ranged

from JOD 80 (EUR 98) (playground supervision) to JOD 288 (EUR 354) (technical supervision) per month, with four to six working hours per day (KfW, final inspection 2020). The incentive payments thus corresponded roughly to the average income of a Syrian household and thus made an important contribution to stabilising the incomes of the beneficiary families. Only a few alternative sources of income were available to the qualified Syrian support staff. A few found employment at a Jordanian private school or gave online lessons. Outside the refugee camps, male support staff in particular pursued another, often low-skilled activity in order to make ends meet.

Reference has already been made to the need to support Syrian refugees in the transition from short-term employment opportunities through Cash-for-Work to long-term employment in the Jordan Response Plan 2018–2022. The project was unable to achieve this under the given legal framework conditions. Rather, the beneficiaries remained dependent on the Cash-for-Work measures in the long term.

With regard to the project's support for vulnerable groups, it should be noted that the project was particularly successful in providing employment opportunities for refugee women. While the labour force participation rate for Syrian refugee women was only 7% in 2019 (FAFO 2019), the proportion of women among support staff was 45%. Many of these women had already worked as teachers in Syria and were therefore particularly qualified. Overall, the project addressed highly qualified refugees. However, around half of the employment opportunities, such as cleaning staff, security personnel and bus escorts, were open to low-qualified refugees and thus particularly vulnerable people. Although only 18% of Syrian refugees live in the refugee camps, 66% of the employment opportunities were allocated there. This can be justified by the fact that refugees in the camps are particularly vulnerable, as they barely have access to gainful employment outside the camps (ILO 2021).

The vulnerability criterion played an important role in the selection of the educational institutions where the Syrian support staff were utilised. The schools in the refugee camps and the double-shift schools were attended by Syrian refugees, who represented a particularly vulnerable population group. UNICEF's state youth centres and Makani centres were explicitly aimed at vulnerable children and young people who have never attended school or left school early for social or economic reasons. With the Makani centres, UNICEF was even able to reach the most vulnerable groups such as the Dom ethnic group (ODI 2021) and migrant workers living in the "informal tented settlements".

From today's perspective, it would have made sense to provide all refugees with appropriate support within the framework of an overarching concept. In addition to Syrian refugees, another 82,400 refugees from other countries (Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, etc.) also would have needed support in Jordan in 2017. The project also did not benefit Syrian refugees not officially registered in Jordan due to regulatory requirements, which accounted for almost half of the total number of refugees.

### ***Appropriateness of design***

The evaluated project was the first phase of a new programme. For this reason, the project design was still subject to certain changes during the course of the project. The starting point for the conceptual considerations was Germany's desire to provide 1,000 skilled Syrian refugees with a short-term source of income through Cash-for-Work per year. It was originally planned that all these refugees would be utilised as educational support staff in the double-shift schools outside the refugee camps and in the Makani centres. Accordingly, UNICEF focused on finding employment opportunities for Syrian support staff outside the refugee camps in the first project year. However, the Ministry of Education only approved the utilisation of 180 Syrian support staff at double-shift schools, with one assistant each being utilised at a double-shift school. The recruitment of suitable Syrian support staff was slow due to administrative obstacles and the high requirements for the qualification of the assistants. For this reason, UNICEF, in consultation with the Ministry of Education and KfW, decided to utilise additional Syrian support staff in schools in the refugee camps and at state youth centres in the second project year. In the second year, in addition to the 180 educational assistants in the afternoon schools and 294 assistants at the Makani centres, 299 assistants were employed in the state youth centres, as well as 535 pedagogical and 992 non-pedagogical support staff in the refugee camps, which achieved the number of 2,300 support staff in the 2018/2019 school year (UNICEF Final Report 2019). While the highly qualified pedagogical and technical support staff were given the prospects of employment for an entire school year, a three to six-month rotation took place for low-skilled jobs such as cleaning or security. This took place in accordance with UNHCR regulations on the fair distribution of Cash-for-Work opportunities among all people in the refugee camps. UNHCR seeks to prevent conflicts among refugees by transparently regulating access to employment opportunities. Depending on their qualifications, refugees thus benefited to varying degrees from the work opportunities.

The selection and recruitment of Syrian aid workers utilised at the public schools, youth centres and refugee camps was carried out by the personnel service provider commissioned with this task in accordance with UNICEF's specifications and with the involvement of the Ministry of Education. The selection criteria included the registration of applicants as refugees with UNHCR, the security check by the Ministry of the Interior, the presence of their own children at the respective school, the proximity between the school and the place of residence of the applicant, as well as an academic qualification appropriate to the task (e.g. bachelor's degree). The positions were advertised publicly by the personnel service provider. Outside the refugee camps, many support staff members had a pedagogical (e.g. teachers) or technical (e.g. engineers) background. In the refugee camps, on the other hand, the level of education was lower. In public schools, the support staff generally worked half-days (four hours per day), and longer hours (six hours per day) in the youth centres. In addition to the incentive payments, the support staff also received health insurance. The support staff were employed through the personnel service provider, which also had to apply for a (temporary) work permit for them. The duration of the individual employment contracts ("MoUs") was only six months, even for highly qualified support staff. However, there was great interest in retaining highly qualified and well-trained support staff on a long-term basis. In the later project phases, UNICEF developed detailed specifications ("Standard Operating Procedures") for the recruitment and contractual situation of the support staff in cooperation with the personnel service provider. Social security and the remuneration of qualified support staff were also improved in later project phases. In this way UNICEF strived to create the best possible working conditions for the support staff under the given circumstances. In the Makani centres, the Syrian support staff were selected, hired and managed directly by national NGOs as the executing agency of the Makani centres.

At the start of the project, UNICEF faced the challenge of finding meaningful tasks for Syrian support staff under the given legal conditions. Since the teaching profession was and is one of the professions closed to non-Jordanian nationals, the Syrian support staff were not allowed to take on any independent pedagogical tasks. In the double-shift schools, one Syrian assistant per school was used as a contact person for Syrian children and parents and for various support activities. In the refugee camps, an average of ten assistants were utilised per school, each with specific tasks. These included a) support staff with social labour functions ("outreach"), who stayed in contact with parents and focused on preventing early dropouts, b) pedagogical assistants, who were used particularly in kindergartens and first grade to strengthen language and reading skills, and c) administrative assistants, who supported the school directors. In the youth and Makani centres, the Syrian assistants supported the full-time specialists in the implementation of athletic and educational measures, in supporting and educating parents, in the area of tutoring and in administration. In the first phase evaluated here, the support staff were still not very well prepared for their content-related tasks. This changed with the second phase, in which preparatory training on the topics of child protection, violence prevention and sexual violence were introduced.

The involvement of Syrian support staff in public (double-shift) schools proved difficult at the beginning, as there were major reservations both in the Ministry of Education and in the school directorates. However, the benefits of the Syrian aid workers quickly became apparent, which facilitated their integration into the college. They usually worked directly with the school authorities. In many youth and Makani centres, the Syrian support staff were well integrated into the Jordanian teams.

The project design was generally plausible and comprehensible. The aim of using Syrian support staff at double-shift schools was to improve the learning conditions of Syrian refugee pupils on the one hand and to give the assistants themselves access to a regular income on the other. The project indicators – the number of Syrian support staff hired, number of schools with Syrian assistants and number of pupils benefiting from support from the assistants – are generally easy to measure. However, the different working relationships of the support staff (short-term contracts, extensions of contracts over several school years, principle of rotation in the refugee camps) made it difficult to interpret the figures for the support staff benefiting from the project. While the number of institutions (schools, youth centres, Makani centres) where support staff worked can be easily identified, the number of children and young people benefiting from it must be estimated. For example, it is difficult to determine the extent to which all 500 pupils at a double-shift school have benefited from the presence of the Syrian support staff. UNICEF's figures on Syrian pupils benefiting from the scheme should be viewed more as estimates. UNICEF assumes a very different ratio of Syrian support staff to pupils (1:500 in the double-shift schools, 1:152 in the youth and Makani centres, 1:30 in the camp schools), so that the extent to which the pupils benefited from the support staff probably varied greatly.

The project was based on the following impact hypothesis: "The employment of Syrian refugees as voluntary assistants in formal and non-formal educational institutions for Syrian and Jordanian children and young people is intended to increase the income of refugees and improve the learning conditions of children and young people. The latter goal aims to break down barriers to access to education for refugees and increase the number of

Syrian children and young people attending school. This is ultimately intended to prevent a “lost generation” of refugee children and young people without access to education from developing in Jordan. Temporary employment is intended to improve the economic situation of refugees. This is also intended to achieve positive effects in the refugee settlements (e.g. psychosocial impact of employment, fewer conflicts).” The impact hypothesis was plausible, though ambitious. The Syrian support staff in the schools played an important role as trusted persons for the Syrian community and served as a link to the schools in terms of access as well as the retention of Syrian pupils in the schools. This role was also recognised and appreciated by the school authorities and the Ministry of Education, who were previously rather sceptical about the concept. It is plausible that the involvement of Syrian support staff was able to prevent some children from dropping out of school early. The effect of the measure on improving the economic situation of the support staff is certainly higher outside the refugee camps than inside the refugee camps, where people are highly dependent on external support. Furthermore, it is plausible that the Syrian support staff are contributing to social cohesion, especially with regard to conflicts between Syrian and Jordanian pupils as well as joint learning and playing in the youth and Makani centres.

The project design was created by UNICEF, which worked out the details of the measures in close cooperation with KfW. KfW was the only donor of the measure to be closely involved in the design and supported the project. UNICEF proved to be a very suitable implementation partner due to its many years of experience and its broad network in Jordan. KfW alone would not have had the necessary capacity to implement the project.

### ***Response to changes/adaptability***

After the first year, it turned out that there were not enough opportunities for 1,000 Syrian support staff in the double-shift schools and Makani centres. For this reason, the measure was extended to state youth centres and refugee camps. In the refugee camps, qualified pedagogical opportunities were created as originally planned, but jobs for low-skilled refugees were created as well. As a result, the project proved to be flexible in this initial phase.

### ***Summary of the rating:***

The project was geared towards the political priorities of the German and Jordanian governments and the capacities of the Jordanian education system. The legal framework conditions for the employment of non-Jordan nationals in education and beyond played an essential role in the design and effectiveness of the project. The project met the needs of Syrian refugees for income and Syrian children and young people for education. However, employment remained temporary and it was not possible to transition to long-term employment. The project offered an above-average number of women employment opportunities. Educational institutions were selected according to vulnerability criteria. The project design and the project’s impact hypothesis were plausible, but ambitious with regard to the overarching objectives pursued. The project proved to be adaptable by responding to reservations from the Ministry of Education with regard to the utilisation of support staff at the double-shift schools and identifying alternative deployment options in the short term.

**Relevance: 2**

### **Coherence**

The project integrated other Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) measures to create professional and economic prospects for refugees and locals in Jordan in the context of the Syrian crisis. As part of the 2016 international donor conference “Supporting Syria and the Region”, the Federal Republic of Germany committed itself to supporting Syria’s neighbouring countries and creating prospects for refugees and internally displaced persons in these countries. Against this background, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) created “Partnership for Prospects” (BONO) for the Middle East, which is funded by the Special Initiative on Displacement and focuses on creating short-term employment and income opportunities (Cash-for-Work) in countries neighbouring Syria. This is also used to finance the project evaluated here. Others from the BONO FC measures, in cooperation with the ILO and UNOPS, supported complementary Cash-for-Work measures to maintain and repair public infrastructure, including schools. Technical Cooperation (TC) also implemented Cash-for-Work measures in the water and waste sector. The project thus complemented a series of Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) measures to create short-term employment opportunities for Syrian refugees in the Jordanian public sector.



At the beginning of the refugee crisis, FC had already been active in Jordan's education sector for over two decades. There, it used funds from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the EU to finance the construction of new schools, which later also benefited refugee schoolchildren, as well as the salaries of around 7,000 teachers and administrative staff since 2016, who had to be hired to teach Syrian schoolchildren in the Jordanian public schools. In addition, there was already a cooperation between FC and UNICEF, which included the promotion of 32 Makani centres in various parts of the country. FC was involved in school rehabilitation, the promotion of extracurricular activities and the introduction of early childhood education into the Jordanian education system. The project evaluated here made a meaningful complementary contribution to these measures. In particular, it complemented the financially far more extensive measures to finance the salaries of Jordanian teachers utilised at the double-shift and camp schools and to support the Makani centres. This resulted in significant synergies. At the same time, the project was based on the existing cooperation relationship between KfW and UNICEF. In addition to supporting the Makani centres, this also included the expansion of the water supply in the Zaatari refugee camp.

The project supported the implementation of international norms and standards. These include human rights such as the right to education and the right to income, as well as the strengthening of gender equality. By supporting the integration of refugees into national structures, the project also contributed to the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees (2018).

At an international level, the project contributed to the "No Lost Generation" initiative initiated by UNICEF and the World Bank in 2013, which campaigned for access to protection and education for all children and young people affected by the Syrian crisis.

Together with the other German Development Cooperation (DC) measures mentioned above, the project supported the Jordanian government's efforts to integrate Syrian refugee children and young people into the public education system. It was based on the strategic requirements of the government, such as the Jordan Response Plan and the Accelerating Access to Quality Formal Education Initiative. These instruments were also used to coordinate the measures with other donors. For example, there was a division of labour with the EU with regard to the financing of Syrian support staff in the refugee camps, under which FC took on the financing of support staff in the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps.

Existing partner structures could only be used in part. Originally, the measure was designed to support the Ministry of Education's double-shift schools. However, as the Ministry of Education permitted only a limited number (180) of Syrian support staff at these schools, the project had to increasingly switch to the structures operated by UNICEF, such as the Makani centres and the camp schools.

Jordanian education administration played an important role in the care and monitoring of Syrian support staff, at least in public schools. In these schools, the school authorities were responsible for monitoring the presence and quality of the support staff's work. This information was shared with the personnel provider's external staff, who calculated salaries on this basis and conducted annual assessment interviews with the assistants.

### **Summary of the rating:**

The project was highly coherent with the other German DC measures to create short-term employment opportunities (Cash-for-Work) and to support the Jordanian education sector. There were significant synergies with the project for financing the salaries of Jordanian teachers working in the double-shift and camp schools, as well as support for the Makani centres. The project complemented the Jordanian government's own efforts to teach Syrian children and young people. However, the measure also met with reservations from the Jordanian authorities and was therefore only able to make limited use of existing partner structures such as the double-shift schools.

**Coherence: 2**

### **Effectiveness**

The project pursued a dual module objective. On the one hand, the possibility of volunteering in educational institutions was intended to improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees (module objective 1). On the other hand, the use of these Syrian support staff was intended to increase the quality of education at the double-shift schools (module objective 2).

The target achievement at outcome level is summarised in the table below:

Indicator	Status during PA	Target value PA/EPE	Actual value at final inspection (optional)	Actual value at EPE
(1.) Number of Syrian refugees involved in double-shift schools and learning centres	0	Around 1,000 refugees per year	Up to 2,612 over two years	2,162 (duration of individual employment relationships: 1 – 10 months)  Achieved.
(2.1) Number of schools that benefit from Syrian refugees	0	200	230	230 (172 afternoon and 58 camp schools)  In addition, 114 Makani centres and 65 youth centres benefited from the utilisation of Syrian support staff  Achieved.
(2.2): Number of Syrian refugee children, who indirectly benefited from the support from Syrian refugees	0	120,000	120,000	120,000  This figure is to be understood as an estimate. It nearly corresponds to the total number of Syrian children and young people enrolled in Jordanian schools (134,000 in the 2018/2019 school year).  Achieved.

### **Contribution to achieving targets**

#### Provision and use of services

The project provided its services, namely the financing of Syrian support staff in the Jordanian education sector, as planned. The services of these assistants were used extensively.

In the 2017/2018 school year, the project financed 524 Syrian assistants, in the 2018/2019 school year 2,129 assistants and in the 2019/2020 school year (partially financed by Phase II of the project) 1,310 assistants. The assistants were divided between the various educational institutions as follows: 180 pedagogical assistants in 172 double-shift schools, 926 pedagogical and non-pedagogical support staff in 58 camp schools and kindergartens, 294 pedagogical assistants in 114 Makani centres and 299 pedagogical assistants in 65 state youth centres. During the project period, 63,068 Syrian pupils visited around 200 double-shift schools and 32,250 Syrian pupils visited around 45 camp schools (HRW 2020). According to UNICEF, a further 50,119 Syrian and Jordanian children and young people attended the Makani centres supported by the assistants and a further 41,400 Syrian and Jordanian young people attended the supported state youth centres. The figures from the various sources vary slightly and cannot be independently verified.

The task profiles of the Syrian support staff differed between the various institutions. As they were prohibited under Jordanian law from taking on teaching tasks or independently guiding a group of children or young people, their role was always to support Jordanian specialists. In the public schools, one Syrian assistant was utilised per double-shift school with a maximum of 500 pupils. The tasks of these assistants included checking attendance, supporting school social workers in contacting parents, distributing learning materials, supporting pupils in their lessons, lab and library work, accompanying pupils to the bus stop, providing support for supervising breaks and informing school management about problems such as violence in the school yard. In particular, the Syrian

support staff acted as a trusted person for the Syrian pupils and their parents. Support staff were recruited with different task profiles for the camp schools. These included assistant teachers, cleaning staff, guards, facility managers, support staff for school transport, specialists for supporting parental involvement and supervisory staff. The profiles of pedagogical assistants in the camp schools were further refined from the 2018/2019 school year onwards. The pedagogical assistants were therefore utilised in three areas: monitoring school attendance and looking after vulnerable families (“outreach”), pedagogical support activities (working with small groups, reading support, games) and administrative support for school leadership.

In the state youth centres, the assistants supported the implementation of the “Maharati” programme developed by UNICEF. The programme consisted of four 30-hour modules, which enabled vulnerable young people to acquire basic life skills through sports and creative work. The 299 Syrian assistants supported the 130 Jordanian instructors trained by UNICEF in establishing contacts with the Syrian community, as co-trainers and for administrative tasks. In the Makani centres, UNICEF, in cooperation with national NGOs, offered comprehensive support services for vulnerable children and their families. In 2019, a total of 80,000 people visited the Makani centres, including 81% children, 65% vulnerable Jordanian nationals, 31% Syrian nationals, and 4% other nationalities. Syrian support staff were utilised in 114 of the 145 Makani centres. There they supported mother-child courses, after-school classes and recreational activities for children and young people. Particularly noteworthy are the Makani centres in the informal tent settlements, where Syrian and Jordanian agricultural workers move through the country in search of seasonal work. By recruiting support staff from this population, UNICEF has been able to provide these extremely vulnerable people with access to income and while offering children an opportunity for education at the same time.

After initial reluctance by the Ministry of Education and the Jordanian teaching staff, the performance of Syrian assistants in the various educational institutions was well received. In the Makani centres in particular, the support staff were well integrated into the pedagogical teams, worked independently and even took on management tasks in some cases. In the public and camp schools, on the other hand, there was a certain competitive relationship between the Syrian assistants and the Jordanian teachers, who were also precariously employed. Nevertheless, the ability of the support staff to act as a link between Syrian refugees and the Jordanian school system was also valued there and in frequent demand. Overall, the Syrian assistants were able to reach many Syrian pupils in Jordan.

The level of education of the Syrian support staff employed in the pedagogical area ranged from a completed school-leaving qualification to bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degrees. These included degrees in education, languages, teaching, engineering, information technology and business. Many assistants were utilised below their actual level of qualification or were utilised in a field other than their area of expertise within the scope of the project. As this was a voluntary activity, no job references were issued that could be relevant for later applications. The situation of the assistants in the Makani centres seemed to be the most favourable; there they benefited from extensive training and were sometimes utilised for qualified tasks. However, in view of the restrictive legal situation, there is no long-term prospect of qualified employment in Jordan for any support staff.

#### Equal access to services

As already described above, the project exclusively addressed refugees from Syria and not from other countries of origin due to regulatory requirements. However, some non-Syrian refugee children and young people probably indirectly benefited from the services of Syrian support staff in the double-shift schools, youth and Makani centres.

The work opportunities created by the project were only open to a small proportion of the Syrian refugee population. In principle, all Syrians who were registered as refugees by UNHCR and had the “Service Card” from the Ministry of the Interior (proof of a security check) were able to apply for the work opportunities. However, only close to half of Syrians in Jordan met these criteria. Furthermore, numerous positions required a higher level of education, which was also only available to a small proportion of Syrian refugees. However, low-skilled activities were also offered, especially in the refugee camps. In addition, there was a dilemma between opening up work opportunities for the widest possible group of people and the interest of the educational institutions in long-term cooperation with highly qualified and well-trained specialists. Some support staff have therefore been employed by the programme for almost five years now, while others do not have access to these work opportunities. Short rotation periods of one to six months avoided this situation for the low-skilled support staff in the refugee camps.

While access to working opportunities was limited, there was broad access to the educational institutions supported by the assistants. In addition to the camp and double-shift schools, informal educational institutions such

as the youth and Makani centres, which explicitly address vulnerable children and young people outside the formal education system, must be mentioned here. Many Makani centres offered activities in the morning so that the Syrian children could attend school in the afternoon. The percentage of girls in schools, youth centres and Makani centres was 51%. However, around 31% (51,000) of all Syrian children and young people ages 6–15 did not attend school during the project period and therefore did not benefit from the project measures (UNHCR 2020).

### Contribution to achieving targets

Working as support staff in the education system helped to improve the living conditions of the Syrian refugees who participated. In particular, the areas of income, social integration and a sense of well-being must be considered here. Assistants at double-shift schools received a monthly income of JOD 190 (EUR 234) for four working hours per day, JOD 200 (EUR 246) for six working hours at the youth centres and JOD 250 (EUR 308) for eight working hours at the Makani centres. In the Makani and youth centres, which were open all year round, the incentive payment was made over 12 months, and in the schools only over nine to ten months due to the unpaid school holidays. In addition, the support staff were insured against illness. In the refugee camps, the payment of support staff was based on UNHCR's standard operating procedures, which ensured uniform rates and conditions for the various donors' Cash-for-Work programmes. The rates ranged from JOD 80 (EUR 98) per month for the supervision of playgrounds to JOD 160 (EUR 197) for educational assistants through to JOD 288 (EUR 354) for management of the facility management team. It stands out that activities usually carried out by women (cleaning, playground supervision) were furnished with significantly fewer weekly working hours than activities carried out by men (facility managers, supervisors, warehouse clerks) and therefore led to lower incomes despite uniform hourly wages. The somewhat lower rates in the refugee camps were due to the free provision of accommodation and food in the camps. Overall, the incentive payments were based on the national minimum wage for non-Jordanian workers and were just above the average monthly income of a Syrian refugee household in Jordan, which was around JOD 191 (EUR 235) (UNHCR VAF 2022). This positive comparison should take into account the fact that half of Syrian households are unable to provide adequate nutrition. Accordingly, the support staff repeatedly complained that the incentive payment was not a sufficient livelihood. In addition to the economic aspect, the work opportunities contributed to the social integration of the support staff.

In their various roles, the Syrian support staff at the double-shift and camp schools contributed to improvements in the learning environment of Syrian pupils. This included monitoring attendance, better contact between schools and Syrian parents, support for discipline and order at the schools, monitoring breaks and intervention in conflict situations. Cleaning, maintenance and security of the school buildings were added in the refugee camps. By helping to make schools a safe, trustworthy and pleasant place, the support staff encouraged school attendance. Close contact with parents may have prevented early dropouts that arose due to misunderstandings between schools and parents. On the other hand, they were unable to address the economic causes of school dropouts.

The project's target achievement was influenced by a number of external factors. The legal framework conditions already discussed influenced the working conditions and income of Syrian support staff. As neither UNICEF nor government agencies were able to employ the support staff directly, a personnel service provider was used, initially resulting in delays and uncertainties. Many Makani centres were unable to obtain work permits for the support staff, which is why they employed them as "volunteers", which led to frustration among Jordanian colleagues, who feared cheaper Syrian competition.

### **Quality of implementation**

KfW provided the funding in the middle of the 2017/2018 school year, meaning that the support staff could only be utilised in the second half of the school year (from the beginning of 2018). The cooperation between KfW and UNICEF had to be established in this first project phase. UNICEF favoured largely independent technical work, while KfW wanted detailed coordination and close reporting. In principle, however, the cooperation between KfW and UNICEF was appreciative and constructive.

UNICEF implemented the project with parts of its core team in Amman and in the refugee camps. This included specialists in school education, Makani centres, follow-up and data management. Cooperation with a wide range of partner structures – the Ministry of Education as the executing agency of double-shift schools and camp schools, the Ministry of Youth as the executing agency of state youth centres and the non-state executing agency of the Makani centres – meant a considerable coordination effort for UNICEF. In this way, possible applications for the support staff had to be identified and task profiles coordinated. Regular field visits by the UNICEF team contributed to quality assurance.

As planned in the project application, UNICEF commissioned a human resources management company in a public tendering procedure to assist in the recruitment and management of the support staff. This personnel service provider had extensive experience in providing personnel services to the public sector in Jordan as well as to international companies and was responsible for tendering the positions, setting up a suitable pool of applicants, subcontracting the support staff, applying for work permits, social security, preparing the support staff for their tasks, monitoring of the support staff (presence and quality of work) and conducting regular staff performance reviews. Monitoring presence and evaluating the assistants' work was done in close cooperation with the respective school management. Initially, the personnel management company only provided support for the assistants utilised in the double-shift schools, and in the following school year also those at the camp schools and the state youth centres. The support provided to the assistants by the personnel service provider was predominantly rated as good. The civil society executing agencies of the Makani centres recruited and supported their assistants themselves.

The Jordanian Ministry of Education was initially sceptical about the project. On the one hand, this was due to fears of an excessive influence of Syrian teachers on the Jordanian education system, and on the other hand, it was due to the political sensitivity of employing Syrian teachers against the backdrop of teacher protests in 2018 and 2019. In the schools and youth centres, the Syrian support staff were subordinate to the respective managers, who utilised them according to their specific needs and monitored their performance. While there was therefore close cooperation between the project and the Jordanian state structures at the level of schools and youth centres, the contribution of the Ministries of Education and Youth was rather small.

Overall, the quality of project management by UNICEF and its partners appears good.

***Unintended consequences (positive or negative)***

There is no evidence of any serious negative social, economic or environmental impacts of the project.

The working conditions of the assistants were precarious. The employment contracts of the pedagogical assistants were limited to a maximum of ten months. Only the hours actually worked were paid, so public holidays, examination phases, school holidays and illness led to loss of wages. Employment contracts included health insurance, but did not include pre-existing medical conditions and in particular pregnancy and childbirth, which put female assistants at a disadvantage. The support staff depended on the goodwill of the respective school management or the management of the youth and Makani centres, which regularly reported on their performance to the personnel service provider. At least some assistants were insulted, humiliated or prevented from working by the respective school leadership (IBV Monthly Reports 2018). This vulnerable position meant considerable stress for the support staff. It is unclear to what extent the project was able to protect the support staff in such situations. In the first phase of the project, there was not yet an independent complaints mechanism or supervision offer for the assistants.

***Summary of the rating:***

The project was able to achieve its objectives in terms of the number of assistants employed and the number of educational institutions benefiting from the support staff. It is also plausible that the target number of benefiting Syrian children and young people has been reached. The services provided by the assistants at the double-shift and camp schools as well as the youth and Makani centres were used intensively. Not all Syrian refugees had access to the work opportunities due to administrative and qualification requirements. For the duration of the work opportunity, this contributed to an improvement in the household income of the support staff. In their diverse roles, the assistants contributed to improving the learning environment at the schools and to expanding learning opportunities in the non-formal educational institutions. However, under the circumstances, their contribution to improving the quality of education and access to education for refugee children and young people remained limited. The quality of UNICEF's and its partners' project implementation was good. No serious negative impacts of the project were discernible. All in all, the support staff at the respective facilities remained in a very precarious situation.

**Effectiveness: 2**

## Efficiency

### *Production efficiency*

Between December 2017 and December 2019, project funds amounting to EUR 5,877,542 (98% of the EUR 6,000,000 provided) were spent. According to UNICEF, EUR 4,783,311 (81%) of this amount went directly and indirectly to the Syrian support staff (incentive payment, health insurance contribution, training). A further EUR 571,023 (9.7%) was spent on the staff management of the support staff; the payments to the personnel service provider accounted for a large part of these costs. The UNICEF Jordan Country Office (e.g. strategy, advocacy, monitoring, financial management) spent EUR 87,835 (1.5%) on the performance of cross-cutting tasks. In addition, UNICEF's general overhead costs amounted to EUR 435,374 (8%). With a share of 81%, a large proportion of the project funds directly benefited Syrian assistants. Expenditure of around 11% of the total for technical support and staff management of up to 2,300 assistants seems appropriate. The exact breakdown of overhead costs is not known, so their efficiency cannot be assessed.

The *unit costs* per assistant amounted to EUR 1,644 and were therefore significantly below the originally calculated EUR 3,000. The reasons for this were the late recruitment of support staff in the 2017/2018 school year and the large number of low-skilled and therefore more cost-effective support staff in the 2018/2019 school year, who were also only employed for a few months. The costs per assistant consisted of the actual incentive payment, the health insurance contribution (15%, only for assistants in double-shift schools), training costs and the administrative costs of the personnel service provider. The administrative costs of the personnel service provider were higher for the support staff at the double-shift schools, at around 35% of the incentive payment, than for those in the camp schools and Makani centres (8%). The administrative expenses estimated by the personnel service provider for the support staff at the double-shift schools seem quite high but may be explained by the increased support costs for the support staff utilised there.

The amount of the monthly incentive payments was based on the requirements of the respective task as well as the number of weekly working hours. These were JOD 190 for assistants at the double-shift schools, JOD 200 for youth centres and JOD 250 for the Makani centres. They were thus slightly above the national minimum wage for non-Jordanian staff (JOD 190), but significantly below the monthly salary of temporary Jordanian teachers ("daily paid teachers") (JOD 280 plus 13% social security expenditure) and regular teachers and administrators (JOD 460–480) (DEVAL 2021). Other German DC Cash-for-Work measures during the project period were based on the national minimum wage of JOD 220. Thus, the amount of incentive payments is considered reasonable nationally, albeit close to the actual cost of living. The salaries of the assistants were assigned by UNICEF and paid out using a mobile payment service provider.

In the first year of the project, there were delays in recruiting and utilising the support staff. The reasons for this were the delayed completion of the project, the necessary development of the task profiles of the support staff and their coordination with the Ministry of Education and Youth, as well as the identification of locations at which they could be utilised. Furthermore, there were uncertainties with regard to the formal requirements for taking up a support staff job, in particular with regard to work permits. There were also difficulties in filling highly qualified positions in remote parts of the country. These challenges are common at the start of a new measure with a new concept. In the second year, the assistants were utilised in a timely manner.

### *Allocation efficiency*

Under the circumstances, the selected concept was the most efficient solution to achieve the project's dual objective of improving the income situation of qualified refugees and improving the learning conditions of Syrian pupils in Jordan.

The Syrian assistants took on a wide range of tasks in the schools, youth centres and Makani centres, which complemented the regular provision of services by these institutions. This was done in a very cost-effective way due to the low remuneration for the assistants.

In the second year of the project, the job descriptions of the support staff were clarified, at least for the refugee camps. This was an important contribution to their efficient utilisation. It is unclear whether these types of job descriptions also existed for the double-shift schools, youth and Makani centres. With the high numbers of assistants at the camp schools, the question arises as to whether the focus here was partly on the employment aspect and less on the efficient provision of services. In order to assess this, more detailed data on the actual output of the various assistants would be necessary.

### Summary of the rating:

UNICEF’s implementation of the project was efficient. Over 80% of the project funds directly benefited Syrian support staff. However, the administrative costs of the personnel service provider seem to be somewhat high for the assistants at double-shift schools. Incentive payments were based on the national minimum wage for non-Jordanian nationals and were therefore appropriate. A further reduction in incentive payments or denomination of work opportunities would not have made sense for educational reasons, either. It was possible to implement the selected concept cost-effectively despite difficult framework conditions.

**Efficiency: 2**

### Impact

The objective of the project formulated in the project proposal was: “Access to employment opportunities for Syrian refugees has been established and their social protection has improved.” As part of the EPE, this objective was extended to include the following wording: “The income situation of vulnerable Syrian refugees and the teaching and learning conditions of Syrian children and young people in formal and non-formal educational institutions in Jordan have improved.” The indicators below were formulated retrospectively for this purpose.

Target achievement at the impact level can be summarised as follows:

Indicator	Status PA	Target value at PA	Actual value at EPE
(1) The additional income from volunteering leads to measurable improvements in the living situation of Syrian volunteers’ households during the project period.	Indicator formulated retrospectively	ditto	There are no reliable data on the income situation of Syrian support staff in the education sector. The amount of incentive payments was slightly higher than the minimum wage for non-Jordanian employees. The value of this income depended heavily on alternative sources of disposable income. However, a positive contribution to household income is plausible.  Not measurable.
(2) During the project period, the utilisation of Syrian volunteers reduces the percentage of school dropouts (differentiated by gender) in educational institutions with volunteers compared to those without volunteers.	Indicator formulated retrospectively	ditto	The Ministry of Education does not publish figures on school dropout rates at individual schools. Prevention of early school dropouts was an important task for the support staff. However, it is unknown how often they succeeded in doing so.  Not measurable.

There is no reliable data, such as monitoring studies, available for the two impact indicators of the project, the income development of the Syrian support staff supported by the project or the school dropout figures at the supported educational institutions. However, in order to obtain a sound assessment of these indicators, studies from secondary literature on similar topics are used here.

The DEval evaluation of Cash-for-Work measures of the Middle East Employment Initiative in Jordan and Turkey in 2016–2019 examined the impact of short-term employment on the income, employment prospects, social integration and self-esteem of participants (DEval 2021). These employment relationships offered – as in the case of the project considered here – remuneration at minimum wage and health insurance, but were limited to an average duration of 40 days. For Jordan, the researchers concluded that Cash-for-Work contributed to increasing household income for the duration of the respective measures, that the employees also benefited from social security and that the additional income was predominantly used for the repayment of debt and living expenses, but it was not sufficient for productive investments. Outside the refugee camps, many participants gave up previous

employment in order to be able to participate in the Cash-for-Work measure. In the medium term, this led to negative effects on their employment development after the end of the measure. The strained labour market and restrictive legislation did not allow them to find formal follow-up employment. Positive effects of Cash-for-Work measures on their social participation and self-esteem were observed.

It is plausible to transfer the results of this DEval evaluation to the Syrian assistants in the education sector, in particular to the low-skilled assistants with short employment relationships. In the case of the pedagogical assistants at the schools and Makani centres, the difference was that they have since already been employed through the project for several years for an entire school year – and across the various project phases. In the medium term, this work thus contributed to stabilising household incomes and to social protection (health insurance) for these people. However, all support staff remained highly dependent on the project, also because, as already explained, they had no prospect of qualified legal employment in the education system. Some highly qualified assistants were able to establish a self-employed activity (e.g. as IT consultants, online tutoring).

Positive effects with regard to social integration and the self-esteem of the support staff were clearly discernible in the group interviews conducted as part of this evaluation. The assistants recognised the added value of their work for the students. They linked their work to the hope of a better future for the Syrian community in Jordan. The day-to-day cooperation between Syrian and Jordanian colleagues promoted the integration and development of a social network. However, many Syrian assistants were also very frustrated by the fact that they were not used as teachers according to their actual qualifications, but only for supporting activities. This permanent professional degradation put a strain on the self-esteem of many assistants. On the other hand, the high number of women who were employed by the project is positive. The project offered women very attractive working conditions with respectable employers with fixed working hours that were equivalent to part-time employment in the area of education, which is often associated with women. The proportion of female assistants is around 50% and thus far above the average for female labour participation in Jordan.

The Syrian assistants' contribution to improving teaching and learning conditions at the double-shift and camp schools was limited, especially as they were only allowed to provide support. The quality of education at these schools was even as inadequate by the Ministry of Education itself (Ministry of Education 2018). The reasons for this were, on the one hand, the double-shift system, which was practised at both types of school and limited the available teaching time. In the refugee camps of Zaatari and Azraq, the weekly teaching time was 34% below the level of a Jordanian single-shift school. This meant restrictions on subjects such as sports, art and music. In the public double-shift schools, important resources such as libraries, labs and material rooms were often closed in the afternoon and school social workers only worked in the morning. Drinking water was often not available at the double-shift schools (IBV Monthly Reports 2019). In addition, Jordanian teachers employed in the double-shift and camp schools had insufficient experience and motivation in some cases. These teachers, who were financed by international donors, were not part of the official Jordanian teaching staff with the corresponding social protection and career opportunities, but had rather precarious positions as "daily paid teachers" and therefore lacked motivation. Many were not prepared to deal with pupils in precarious circumstances or who had been traumatised to some extent (DEval 2021). This had a negative impact on teaching quality. It was also reported that some teachers had prejudices against the refugee students, which manifested itself in derogatory remarks, lack of support and harsh punishments. At some double-shift schools, Syrian students were asked to clean their school during school hours. Teachers also frequently violent towards Syrian pupils, particularly in the case of behavioural abnormalities and learning difficulties (IBV Monthly Reports 2019, HRW 2020, DEval 2021). As a result, the academic level of the double-shift and camp schools was significantly lower than that of Jordanian state schools. Many Syrian pupils lacked basic reading, writing and arithmetic skills towards the end of secondary school. In view of the lack of progress in learning and the low value of school education on the highly regulated labour market, many young people dropped out of school early (ODI 2021).

In the Makani and youth centres, the Syrian assistants were more heavily involved in the implementation of education and support programmes for vulnerable children and young people and were able to improve the quality of education at these institutions as part of the existing programmes through their commitment. These non-formal educational institutions addressed particularly vulnerable children and young people. Various studies evaluate the integrated approach of the Makani centres, which combines learning assistance, life-skills training, psychosocial support and parental involvement, very positively (e.g. ODI 2021). However, there is no systematic impact data on the educational trajectory of the children and young people cared for there.

The interviews showed that early dropouts were an important topic for Syrian parents and support staff. Many of the Syrian assistants' activities, especially at the afternoon and camp schools, were aimed at preventing early school leaving. As already shown under "Relevance", the dropout rates among Syrian pupils were higher than



among Jordanian ones. Syrian pupils were at particularly high risk of dropping out of school after the sixth grade as well as after ninth grade. More than half of Syrian young people in the UNICEF study cited here (2021) stated that they did so due to violence and insecurity in schools and on the way to school, while this reason played no role for Jordanian school dropouts. A lack of school success was cited by one third of Syrian school dropouts, while economic reasons or marriage were cited by only around one tenth. These figures indicate that discrimination and violence at schools, as well as poor teaching quality, were key factors in the young Syrians dropping out of school early. These factors were definitely addressed by the Syrian assistants. However, in view of a supervision ratio of 1:500 at the afternoon schools, it must be assumed that they were only able to influence these factors to a limited extent on their own, especially since they themselves were subject to discrimination in some cases. The support staff at the youth and Makani centres helped to address the shortcomings of the education system to some extent by providing additional support to young people at the periphery or outside the school system.

### ***Contribution to overarching developmental changes (intended)***

As described above, there is a lack of reliable figures on the income development of the support staff employed by the project and on the effects of their work at the various educational institutions. A positive, albeit temporary, impact of the project on the income of the support staff is plausible. The contribution of the assistants to improving the teaching and learning conditions of Syrian children and young people was different, at the various educational institutions, but limited. There is no reliable information on possible further impacts of the project with regard to the social and professional integration of children and young people and the coexistence of refugees and the host community.

The project's contribution to the further development of Jordan's education system was low. The overloaded Jordanian education system does not have the necessary resources to have regular personnel take on the tasks of the Syrian support staff later. Rather, the work of the Syrian support staff – also due to the competition with the equally precariously employed regular staff – was perceived as helpful, but not essential. In the Makani centres, the Syrian assistants took on some of the same tasks as their Jordanian colleagues. The continued employment of the support staff here was particularly dependent on the granting of work permits and the financial situation of the national NGOs.

### ***Contribution to impact (unintended)***

In addition to the original objective of the project, the support staff made a positive contribution – albeit small – to improving social cohesion in schools. Their utilisation at bus stops and at school exits enabled them to diffuse some of the conflicts that arose when Jordanian pupils from the first school shift regularly met Syrian pupils from the second school shift. However, they had to do this without special mediation training. Some assistants also supported community-enhancing extracurricular activities such as campaign days or celebrations. However, the segregation of Jordanian and Syrian pupils and the various disadvantages of double-shift and camp schools made social cohesion more difficult.

By supporting the Makani centres, which, among other things, addressed the needs of particularly vulnerable children and young people in informal tent settlements, the project contributed to improving the living conditions and future opportunities of vulnerable groups.

Corporal punishment and sexual assault are ubiquitous in Jordanian schools. Against this background, there was a risk that Syrian support staff also used violence against pupils. The Syrian assistants were made aware of the prohibition of violence against children and young people in the "Child Protection Code of Conduct" of the personnel service provider and in the one-day preparatory training. Violation of this prohibition could result in immediate dismissal. However, in this regard, it is unclear how the behaviour of the assistants at the respective locations at which they were utilised were monitored and how possible attacks were punished in practice.

### ***Summary of the rating:***

The project had a positive, albeit only temporary, impact on the income of Syrian support staff. At 50%, the proportion of women among support staff was above average for local conditions. The Syrian assistants contributed

to improving teaching and learning conditions at the various educational institutions and to preventing early drop-outs. However, in view of the difficult external circumstances, this remained limited. The utilisation of the assistants was in part aimed at particularly vulnerable children and young people. It is plausible that this has made a limited contribution to improving the social cohesion of refugees and Jordanians.

**Impact: 3**

## Sustainability

### *Capacities of participants and stakeholders*

The project was financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)'s special refugee initiative, was approved on an expedited basis and was commissioned with limited sustainability requirements. The project evaluated here was followed by two follow-up projects with comparable design (2019–2021, 2021–2023). The project is now in its third phase. During the course of the project, some conceptual adjustments were made, such as increasing the number of assistants at double-shift schools, phasing out support for state youth centres, reimbursement of transport and communication costs for the assistants and the establishment of complaint mechanisms. In principle, the measure continues to depend on financing from German DC.

The underfinanced and overburdened Jordanian education system will not foreseeably be able to employ Syrian assistants on a regular basis. In addition, this contradicts the now stricter legal requirements that rule out the employment of non-Jordanian nationals in the education system. A voluntary return of Syrian refugees to Syria is not expected in the foreseeable future, as fears of the regime there remain high. At the same time, the long-term integration of Syrian refugees into Jordanian society is not desirable and is prevented by the ban on working, among other things. This means that the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan remains precarious.

### *Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities*

The measure did not lead to any long-term changes in the capacities and approaches of the Jordanian government to integrate Syrian children and young people into the education system. Due to the scarce financial resources in the education system, it is unlikely that Jordanian schools will hire integrated staff for tasks similar to those of the Syrian aid workers in the future.

On the other hand, the project's contribution to increasing the resilience of the support staff and Syrian children and young people is plausible. Qualified support staff have now received a steady income from the project over several years. They were able to use this period to build up further economic pillars. However, it is unknown how many assistants have succeeded at this. Syrian children and young people will benefit in the long-term from the writing and numeracy skills acquired at school, possibly also from a school leaving certificate. However, the direct benefits of school education for young Syrians are limited, as only low-skilled and poorly paid activities are available to them on the Jordanian labour market. Particularly vulnerable children and young people are likely to benefit in the long-term from the life skills offered by the Makani centres.

### *Durability of impacts over time*

Numerous external factors influence the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan, including the political and security situation in Syria, the political situation in Jordan, the legal framework conditions, COVID-19, the war against Ukraine, inflation and food shortages as well as the ongoing economic crisis. These factors have a negative impact on the situation of Syrian refugees, particularly their employment and income situation, their access to education, and the social and professional integration of young refugees. In these circumstances, the sustainability of the project impacts in terms of income and educational success is limited. The tense economic situation also has a negative impact on social cohesion between refugees and Jordanians.

### *Summary of the rating:*

The sustainability of the project impacts was low. The income of the Syrian support staff depended on German FC's continued financing of the project; there is no independent long-term financing. The measure was unable to bring about any structural changes in the Jordanian education system; it was planned, appraised and implemented as an emergency aid measure under the special refugee initiative, so structural change was not the intent. For this reason, only limited sustainability requirements were set forth. As the sustainability potential of

education cannot be economically valued under the prevailing legal framework conditions in Jordan, and progress with regard to the social integration of refugees is threatened by the country's tense political and economic situation, sustainability is rated as moderately successful.

**Sustainability: 3**

### Overall rating:

With the dual objective of increasing the income of Syrian refugees and improving the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people, the project was highly relevant. Implementation was hampered by difficult legal framework conditions, in particular restricted labour market access for non-Jordanian nationals. It also successfully addressed women and particularly disadvantaged children and young people. The project supported the Jordanian government's own efforts to integrate refugee Syrian children and young people into the education system. At the same time, there were synergies with other German measures to support this process. More attention should have been paid to the experiences of discrimination among support staff and the prevention of possible attacks by support staff against children and young people. Due to the difficult circumstances in the country, the overarching development effectiveness and the sustainability of the project remained limited. Overall, the project was nevertheless rated as successful, as it provided its intended services in full and achieved the module objective of a (temporary) increase in the income of the support staff and improving the learning environment of Syrian children and young people. However, the increase in income was only temporary and no structural changes were achieved, although this is and was not requirement for an emergency measure like this.

**Overall rating: 2**

### Contributions to the 2030 Agenda

The project contributed to the following goals of the 2030 Agenda:

Sustainable Development Goal 1 (No Poverty):

The employment of Syrian support staff temporarily increased their incomes.

Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Quality Education):

The utilisation of Syrian assistants at double-shift and camp schools as well as at informal educational institutions contributed to improving the quality of education at these institutions.

Sustainable Development Goal 8 (Decent Work):

The employment relationships of the Syrian assistants were precarious, but included a labour association, a clear description of tasks, clearly defined working hours and health insurance.

Sustainable Development Goal 10 (Reduced Inequalities):

Half of the Syrian assistants were women. Many assistants were utilised to support particularly vulnerable children and young people.

### Project-specific strengths and weaknesses as well as cross-project conclusions and lessons learned

The project had the following strengths and weaknesses in particular:

- ✓ With the dual objective of increasing income and improving the learning conditions of Syrian refugees, the project met the needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan.
- ✓ Employment as an assistant in the education system enabled many higher-qualified Syrian refugees to earn a regular income, promoted their social integration and provided them with a meaningful activity. However, many assistants regretted that their tasks were far below their actual qualifications.
- ✓ The Syrian pupils benefited from the presence of a Syrian contact person, especially at the double-shift schools. Thanks to the efforts of the assistants, school dropouts were at least delayed.

- ✓ The project benefited particularly vulnerable children and young people from all population groups with the utilisation of Syrian assistants at informal educational institutions such as youth and Makani centres. This enabled Syrian support staff to also make a contribution to the host communities. The nationwide presence of the project is also worth positively highlighting.
- ✓ UNICEF proved to be a competent and well-connected implementation partner with a presence throughout the country and wide access. In this way UNICEF was able to implement the project nationwide in a short time.
- ✓ The project synergistically complemented other efforts by German DC to promote school attendance of Syrian refugee children and young people in Jordan, in particular the projects to finance teacher salaries and expand school infrastructure. However, it also highlighted the limitations of the other projects, particularly with regard to the quality of teaching in the double-shift and camp schools as well as the overburdened infrastructure.

The following were perceived as weaknesses:

- From today's perspective, the project's services should have been open to all refugees in Jordan.
- The Syrian assistants were not adequately technically prepared for their respective tasks. Further training on child protection, non-violent pedagogy, handling trauma and mediation would be plausible here. At the same time, there was a lack of structures that prevented the assistants themselves from attacking pupils.
- The Syrian assistants encountered discrimination and scepticism at some locations. They were largely exposed to this without protection, as their continued employment depended on the goodwill of the respective school management. In the meantime, a complaints mechanism has been set up to which the assistants can turn.
- The restrictive regulations on labour market access for non-Jordanian refugees limited the effectiveness of the project at many levels. They prevented the Syrian assistants from finding qualified follow-up work, as well as the value of Syrian pupils' educational qualifications. The project only supported its target groups (Syrian support staff and pupils) to a limited extent in developing prospects for dealing with these framework conditions, e.g. through self-employed activity.

Conclusions and lessons learned:

- The legal framework conditions for non-Jordanian labour market access had a decisive influence on the effectiveness of the project. The design of new projects should take such framework conditions into account at an early stage and find answers to them.
- Cash-for-Work measures do not contribute to improving the income of refugees in the long term, as long as they are largely denied access to the regular labour market. This applies all the more to refugees who are detained in camps.
- Despite diverse support measures by international partners, refugee children and young people remained disadvantaged in terms of access to education and the quality of education received. Closer coordination between the partners, in particular the German projects, would be helpful here. This would make it easier to identify gaps and find solutions.
- In countries with a high proportion of children and young people who do not attend school, the two-pronged support of formal and informal educational institutions is of great importance. The provision of educational activities for the most vulnerable population groups such as minorities, refugees and itinerant migrant workers is particularly positive.

## Evaluation approach and methods

### Methodology of the ex post evaluation

The ex post evaluation applied the methodology of a rapid appraisal, which is a data-supported qualitative contribution analysis and constitutes an expert judgement. This approach ascribes impacts to the project through plausibility considerations which are based on a careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. This also includes – when possible – the use of digital data sources and the use of modern technologies (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). Causes for any contradicting information are investigated and attempts are made to clarify such issues and base the evaluation on statements that can be confirmed by several sources of information wherever possible (triangulation).

#### Documents:

Project proposal, reporting and final follow-up by KfW, project application and annual reporting by UNICEF, regulations and progress reports by the personnel service provider, monthly reports by the support staff to the personnel service provider, DEVAL evaluation (2021), data and studies (including BICC, UNICEF, ILO, FAFO, UNHCR, Human Rights Watch, ODI) as well as Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and Jordanian government strategy papers

#### Data sources and analysis tools:

UNHCR database on Syrian refugees in Jordan (<https://reporting.UNHCR.org/jordan>)

#### Interview partners:

UNICEF, school administrators, management and teachers of kindergartens and Makani centres, parents of Syrian pupils, Syrian assistants in double-shift schools, camp schools, kindergartens and Makani centres, short interaction with Syrian pupils in double-shift and camp schools and Makani centres. Schools and Makani centres were visited in Amman, El Zarqa governorate, Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps, as well as in an informal tent settlement.

The analysis of impacts is based on assumed causal relationships, documented in the results matrix developed during the project appraisal and, if necessary, updated during the ex post evaluation. The evaluation report sets out arguments as to why the influencing factors in question were identified for the experienced effects and why the project under investigation was likely to make the contribution that it did (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure and its influence on results is taken into account. The conclusions are reported in relation to the availability and quality of the data. An evaluation concept is the frame of reference for the evaluation.

On average, the methods offer a balanced cost-benefit ratio for project evaluations that maintains a balance between the knowledge gained and the evaluation costs, and allows an assessment of the effectiveness of FC projects across all project evaluations. The individual ex post evaluation therefore does not meet the requirements of a scientific assessment in line with a clear causal analysis.

#### The following aspects limit the evaluation:

The visits to the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps were accompanied by a staff member of the domestic intelligence service, who took notes during all the interviews. Open discussions were therefore not possible.

Discussions with Syrian assistants, Syrian parents and Syrian children and adolescents took place mainly in the presence of the respective school administration. This also made it difficult to have an open conversation.

The evaluation is mainly based on one-on-one discussions with UNHCR and the school administrations as well as group discussions with the Syrian assistants and Syrian parents as well as observations in the schools and youth centres visited. The use of further data collection methods was not possible in the given period and under the given administrative circumstances (approvals required by the Ministry of Education).

At the time of the evaluation mission, numerous other KfW missions took place in Jordan, including in cooperation with UNICEF and in the refugee camps. This limited the availability of UNICEF and its government partners. An interview with the Ministry of Education was not possible due to time constraints.

## Methods used to evaluate project success

A six-point scale is used to assess the project according to the OECD DAC criteria. The scale is as follows:

- Level 1** very successful: result clearly exceeds expectations
- Level 2** successful: result is fully in line with expectations and has no significant shortcomings
- Level 3** moderately successful: falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
- Level 4** moderately unsuccessful: significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
- Level 5** unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
- Level 6** highly unsuccessful: the project has no impact or the situation has actually worsened

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all six individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1–3 of the overall rating denote a “successful” project while rating levels 4–6 denote an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“impact”) and the sustainability are rated at least “moderately successful” (level 3).

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**List of annexes:**

Target system and indicators annex

Risk analysis annex

Project measures and results annex

Recommendations for operation annex

Evaluation questions in line with OECD DAC criteria/ex post evaluation matrix annex

## Target system and indicators annex

Project objective at outcome level		Rating of appropriateness (former and current view)			
<p>During project appraisal:</p> <p><b>Module objective 1:</b> Improving the living conditions of Syrian refugees through the opportunity to volunteer in schools.</p> <p><b>Module objective 2:</b> The quality of education at the double-shift schools is improved by utilising Syrian refugees.</p>		<p>The project has a dual objective, namely to increase the income of Syrian volunteers utilised in education and to improve the learning conditions for Syrian refugee children and young people in schools and extracurricular education facilities. It is therefore appropriate to formulate two module objectives. The terms “living conditions” and “quality of education” are vague and difficult to measure. In addition to the possibility of earning a regular income, “improving living conditions” also includes the value of meaningful employment. – Syrian volunteers were deployed not only at double-shift schools, but also at other educational facilities.</p>			
During EPE (if target modified): no modified target					
Indicator	Rating of appropriateness (for example, regarding impact level, accuracy of fit, target level, smart criteria)	Optional PA target level: EPE target level	PA status (year)	Status at final inspection (year)	Optional: EPE status (year)
Indicator 1 (PA): Number of Syrian refugees involved in double-shift schools and learning centres	The project completion report clarifies that the indicator refers to 1,000 beneficiary refugees per year, i.e. a total of 2,000 beneficiary refugees was targeted. This counting method prescribed by the special initiative Partnerships for Prospects Initiative (P4P) in the Middle East proved to be unfavourable, as many highly qualified assistants were employed over several years and would have been counted twice with this method. At the same time, many lower-skilled assistants were only employed for short periods (e.g. 1–3 months). The employment relationships are therefore very different and difficult to compare. – The indicator is not gender-disaggregated, but UNICEF reported on a gender-disaggregated basis.	1,000 refugees (per year)	0	A total of up to 2,612 (51% women) in the project period (January 2018 – December 2019)	Financing ended at the end of 2019
Indicator 2.1. (PA): Number of schools that benefit from Syrian refugees	Syrian volunteers were employed not only at schools for Syrian refugee children and young people inside and outside the refugee camps, but also at Makani centres and youth centres. The latter are aimed at children and young people who do not attend formal school. In addition to the	200 schools	0	230 schools (2019).	Financing ended at the end of 2019



	230 schools mentioned in the report, numerous Makani centres and youth centres benefited from the assistants.				
<b>Indicator 2.2. (PA):</b> Number of Syrian refugee children who indirectly benefit from support from Syrian refugees	According to the project completion report, a total of 136,000 Syrian children and young people were registered at formal educational institutions in 2019 (camp schools, double-shift schools for Syrians, regular schools with mixed instruction of Syrian and Jordanian pupils). Statistically speaking, one education assistant looked after 240 children. The intensity of support varied greatly between the individual educational facilities.	120,000 children	0	120,000 children (2019)	

<b>Project objective at impact level</b>		<b>Rating of appropriateness (former and current view)</b>			
<p><b>During project appraisal:</b> Access to employment opportunities for Syrian refugees has been established and their social protection has improved.</p>		<p>The formulation of the project objective was taken from UNICEF’s project proposal (“Overall objective: Provide vulnerable Syrian refugees living in Jordan with access to improved social protection and engagement opportunities.” The term “social protection” may be understood as more of a “social safety net”.</p> <p>According to the project proposal, the impact expectations for the project included increasing the school attendance rates of Syrian refugees and alleviating poverty. Data on these impact expectations could not be determined in the context of this evaluation. Given the large number of international support measures for Syrian refugees, it would be difficult to attribute any improvements to this one project.</p>			
<p><b>During EPE (if target modified):</b>no modified target</p>					
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Rating of appropriateness</b> (for example, regarding impact level, accuracy of fit, target level, smart criteria)	<b>Target level PA / EPE (new)</b>	<b>PA status (year)</b>	<b>Status at final inspection (year)</b>	<b>EPE status (year)</b>
<p><b>Indicator 1 (PA):</b> No indicators were formulated at impact level.</p>					

## Risk analysis annex

Risk	Relevant OECD-DAC criterion
Destabilisation of Jordan due to social, economic and political crises (PA)	<p><b>Impact, sustainability</b></p> <p>In view of the social tensions in Jordan, due in part to the difficult economic situation and the tense labour market situation among other things, the Jordanian Ministry of Labour pursued an increasingly restrictive policy during the project period when awarding work permits to refugees. This particularly affected the education sector, which was shaken by violent protests by Jordanian teachers in 2018 and 2019. Long-term employment of Syrian assistants in Jordan's education system was therefore out of the question.</p>
Delays in granting necessary permits by the Ministry of Education due to concerns about deploying Syrian refugees in schools, among other things (PA)	<p><b>Efficiency</b></p> <p>There were delays in the issuing of work permits for Syrian support staff by the Ministry of Labour (source: project completion report).</p> <p>Some school directors were concerned about the employment of Syrian support staff, which delayed the recruitment process.</p>
Delays in recruiting qualified Syrian support staff (PA)	<p><b>Efficiency</b></p> <p>There were delays in the recruitment of Syrian support staff, in particular at double-shift schools and Makani centres, due to the lack of qualified applicants in some regions and the reservations of some Jordanian school administrators regarding the recruitment of Syrian support staff (source: project completion report)</p>
Syrian support staff – as well as many Syrian pupils – were exposed to discriminatory treatment in some schools. At the same time, their continued employment depended on the goodwill of the respective school directors. (EPE)	<p><b>Effectiveness</b></p> <p>In the first phase of the project, there were still no independent complaint mechanisms that the assistants could have turned to.</p>

## Project measures and their results annex

The information on the number of temporary employment opportunities for Syrian support staff in the education sector that were created as part of this measure varies in the different reports, in particular UNICEF's final report and KfW's final review. The application of Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) requirements for Cash-for-Work employment relationships resulted in further figures. This is mainly due to the fact that, on the one hand, highly qualified support staff were employed for a total of three school years (2017/2018, 2018/2019, 2019/2020), whereby a new employment agreement was concluded in each school year. In some cases, each of these working arrangements was counted as a separate work opportunity. On the other hand, low-skilled assistants were only employed for short periods (one to six months). It is unclear whether follow-up contracts with the same person were counted as individual employment relationships or whether the total number of persons who participated in the Cash-for-Work measures is reported. In addition, some of the reporting relates to school years and some to calendar years.

According to the project completion report (KfW 2020), salaries were paid out to the following number of people as part of the project:

Fig.1: Übersicht aller finanzierten syrischen Hilfskräfte												
Bildungs- institu- tion	Kalenderjahr				Schuljahr						Anzahl der nach CfW- Methodology Note sowohl in 2018 als auch in 2019 ge- zählten Beschäfti- gungsver- hältnisse	
	2018		2019		2017/18		2018/19		2019/20			
Ges- chlecht	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M
Schulen in aufn. Gemein- den	189		220		186		223		183		180	
	114	75	137	83	111	75	138	85	113	70	108	72
Schulen in Camps	723		1.356		0		1.327		455		595	
	243	480	605	751	0	0	501	826	244	211	179	416
Makani- Zentren	338		407		338		388		354		269	
	221	117	266	141	221	117	269	119	144	210	171	98
Jugend- Zentren	191		318		0		191		318		86	
	114	77	199	119	0	0	114	77	199	119	58	28
Gesamt	1.441		2.301		524		2.129		1.310		1.130	
	692	749	1.207	1.094	332	192	1.022	1.107	700	610	516	614

According to UNICEF's final report (UNICEF 2019), salaries were disbursed to the following number of Syrian refugees in 2019:

Component	Reach during 2019	female:male
Schools in host communities	180	111:69
Makani centres	294	114:180
Youth centres	299	187:112
Schools in camps	1.527	617:910
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,300</b>	<b>1,029:1,271</b>

The high proportion of women at 44.7% of support staff is to be highlighted as positive.

## Recommendations for operation annex

The measure involves temporary salary payments for Syrian support staff in Jordanian education. A long-term continuation of the measures is not planned.

Evaluation questions in line with OECD-DAC criteria/ex post evaluation matrix annex

## Relevance

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting ( - / o / + )	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Policy and priority focus			2	0	
Are the objectives of the programme aligned with the (global, regional and country-specific) policies and priorities, in particular those of the (development policy) partners involved and affected and the BMZ?	To what extent did the project’s objectives correspond to the policies and priorities of the German Federal Government, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Jordanian government in the areas of displacement, employment and education during the project period (2018–2019)?	Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis (2017–2019) Accelerating Access to Education Initiative Plan Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Middle East Employment Initiative, 2016 UNICEF, No Lost Generation Initiative			
Do the objectives of the programme take into account the relevant political and institutional framework conditions (e.g. legislation, administrative capacity, actual power structures (including those related to ethnicity, gender, etc.))?	To what extent did the measures take into account the legal framework conditions for refugees in Jordan during the project period, particularly in the areas of residence, access to education and access to employment? Did they contribute to improving these framework conditions? To what extent did the framework conditions restrict the impact hypothesis of the measure (e.g. long-term value creation of education is not possible if there is no access to the labour market)? To what extent did the project take into account the capacities and needs of the promoted educational institutions? To what extent do the measures correspond to the implementation capacities of the project-executing agency UNICEF? To what extent did the measures take into account the relationships between the local population and Syrian refugees?	Interviews with the Jordanian Ministry of Education, Ministry of Youth and Ministry of Social Development were not possible due to scheduling difficulties. Interviews with directors of selected promoted institutions (double-shift schools, Makani centres, schools in refugee camps). It was not possible to visit state youth centres, as the project no longer cooperates with them. Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants			

<p>Evaluation dimension: Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders</p>			2	0	
<p>Are the programme objectives focused on the developmental needs and capacities of the target group? Was the core problem identified correctly?</p>	<p>To what extent did the measures meet Syrian refugees' needs for income and job prospects? How long did the individual employment opportunities last (e.g. duration in months)? Why was this specific duration chosen (e.g. fair distribution of income opportunities to as many beneficiaries as possible, children's need for continuous care)?</p> <p>To what extent did the measures meet the needs of Syrian and Jordanian children and young people, both within and outside the school system?</p> <p>To what extent did the measures meet the needs of Syrian and Jordanian girls and women?</p> <p>To what extent did the measures contribute to improving learning and development conditions in the Jordanian school system and in extracurricular institutions?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of selected promoted institutions (double-shift schools, Makani centres, schools in refugee camps)</p> <p>Interviews with UNICEF</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian assistants</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian parents</p>			
<p>Were the needs and capacities of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group taken into account (possible differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)? How was the target group selected?</p>	<p>To what extent did the measures contribute to stabilising the incomes of particularly vulnerable groups among refugees (e.g. single women, minorities, people with disabilities, people with low levels of formal education)?</p> <p>According to which criteria were the support staff actually selected? What social classes do the support staff come from?</p> <p>To what extent did the measures contribute to improving the learning and development conditions of particularly vulnerable groups among Syrian and Jordanian children and young people (e.g. girls, married girls, children with disabilities, children from tent camps, working</p>	<p>Interviews with UNICEF</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian assistants</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian parents</p>			

	<p>children, survivors of violence against children)?</p> <p>Which children and young people mainly attend the formal school system, which attend the extracurricular educational facilities (supplementary offers and alternative non-formal educational opportunities)?</p>			
<p>Would the programme (from an ex post perspective) have had other significant gender impact potentials if the concept had been designed differently? (FC-E-specific question)</p>	<p>How could the proportion of female support staff and the proportion of girls who benefited from the measure have been further increased? How could female support staff have been recruited for better paid activities typically associated with men (e.g. facility manager)?</p> <p>How could the tasks of the support staff have been geared more towards the needs of girls and young women?</p>	<p>Interviews with UNICEF</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian assistants</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian parents</p> <p>Note: This question is not part of the original evaluation concept.</p>		
<p>Evaluation dimension: Appropriateness of design</p>			2	0
<p>Was the design of the programme appropriate and realistic (technically, organisationally and financially) and in principle suitable for contributing to solving the core problem?</p>	<p>How were the support staff recruited? What was their professional background? To what extent were the support staff prepared for their tasks?</p> <p>What were the working conditions of the assistants (working hours, insurance, remuneration)?</p> <p>How were the support staff involved in the schools and training centres with regard to organisation? How is the cooperation with MoE teachers?</p> <p>What were the assistants' tasks in the schools and training centres?</p> <p>What alternative income options were available to the support staff?</p>	<p>Interviews with UNICEF</p> <p>Interviews with staff management companies</p> <p>Interviews with managers of the promoted schools and extracurricular educational facilities</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian assistants</p> <p>Interviews with regular Jordanian teaching staff</p>		
<p>Is the programme design sufficiently precise and plausible</p>	<p>Is the objective of the measure clearly formulated?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers</p> <p>Interview with UNICEF</p>		



<p>(transparency and verifiability of the target system and the underlying impact assumptions)?</p>	<p>Was the financing part of an UNICEF programme? How is it integrated into the concept? Were the FC funds intended for specific use(s) (earmarking)?          Is there a plausible connection between the promoted activities (financing of management and expense allowances for Syrian support staff) and the desired objectives (income for refugees, better learning conditions for refugee children)?          Are the most important variables measurable (use of Syrian support staff, income of support staff, learning conditions of children)?          Was the situation of girls and women sufficiently taken into account in the design?          How was gender-separated education taken into account in schools and, where applicable, Makani centres?          What role did KfW play in the conception and design of the measures? Does KfW have an influence on certain decisions?</p>	
<p>Please describe the results chain, incl. complementary measures, if necessary in the form of a graphical representation. Is this plausible? As well as specifying the original and, if necessary, adjusted target system, taking into account the impact levels (outcome and impact). The (adjusted) target system can also be displayed graphically. (FC-E-specific question)</p>	<p>The project is based on the following impact hypothesis:          The employment of Syrian refugees as voluntary assistants in schools and non-formal educational institutions for Syrian and Jordanian children and young people is intended to increase the income of refugees and improve the learning conditions of children and young people. The latter goal aims to break down barriers to access to education for refugees and increase the number of Syrian children and young people attending school. This is ultimately intended to prevent a "lost generation" of refugee children without access to education from developing in Jordan.          Temporary employment is intended to increase the resilience of refugees. This is also intended to achieve positive effects</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers          Interview with UNICEF</p>

	<p>in the refugee settlements (e.g. psycho-social impact of employment, fewer conflicts). The plausibility of this impact hypothesis should be investigated.</p>			
<p>To what extent is the design of the programme based on a holistic approach to sustainable development (interplay of the social, environmental and economic dimensions of sustainability)?</p>	<p>To what extent is the measure aimed at both economic and social improvements for the target groups (Syrian volunteers and children / young people)? Were environmental aspects taken into account in the design of the measure (e.g. environment as a topic in extracurricular teaching)?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF</p>		
<p>For projects within the scope of DC programmes: is the programme, based on its design, suitable for achieving the objectives of the DC programme? To what extent is the impact level of the FC module meaningfully linked to the DC programme (e.g. outcome impact or output outcome)? (FC-E-specific question)</p>	<p>. The project is part of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's (BMZ) Middle East employment initiative. This supported a number of Cash-for-Work projects for Syrians and Jordanians in Jordan. A project to provide financial support to Jordanian teachers complemented this project.</p>			
<p>Evaluation dimension: Response to changes/adaptability</p>			2	0
<p>Has the programme been adapted in the course of its implementation due to changed framework conditions (risks and potential)?</p>	<p>Were there conceptual adjustments during the course of the measure (e.g. recruitment of support staff, organisation of education for Syrian refugees, functioning of the Makani centres)?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF</p>		

## Coherence

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Internal coherence (division of tasks and synergies within German development cooperation):			2	0	
To what extent is the programme designed in a complementary and collaborative manner within the German development cooperation (e.g. integration into DC programme, country/sector strategy)?	Which other DC measures took place in Jordan parallel to the project during the project period? To what extent was the project designed to complement these measures? What specifications in this regard were used as a basis for the project (e.g. regional and country strategy)?	Interview with KfW project managers Overview of FC and TC involvement in Jordan (2018–2019)			
Do the instruments of the German development cooperation dovetail in a conceptually meaningful way, and are synergies put to use?	What other DC measures took place in Jordan in 2018/2019 in the areas of Cash-for-Work / employment and education? What were the common objectives of these measures? Where were connecting factors with regard to content? Where were there overlaps? Where were there gaps?	Interview with KfW project managers Overview of FC and TC involvement in Jordan (2018–2019)			
Is the programme consistent with international norms and standards to which the German development cooperation is committed (e.g. human rights, Paris Climate Agreement, etc.)?	To what extent does the project contribute to the realisation of human rights (e.g. right to education, right to income, right to asylum)? To what extent does the project contribute to the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees (2018)? To what extent does the project take into account international agreements to strengthen gender equality?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF			

<p>Evaluation dimension: External coherence (complementarity and coordination with actors external to German DC):</p>			2	0	
<p>To what extent does the programme complement and support the partner's own efforts (subsidiarity principle)?</p>	<p>What were the Jordanian government's general lines of refugee policy in 2018–2019? What specific policy has been pursued with regard to Syrian refugees' employment and education opportunities? What resources did Jordan itself provide to supply the refugees?</p>	<p>Interviews with managers of the supported schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interview with UNICEF</p>			
<p>Is the design of the programme and its implementation coordinated with the activities of other donors?</p>	<p>To what extent did KfW and UNICEF coordinate with other donors (e.g. the EU) when designing and implementing the measure? To what extent did the project fit into the AAI?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF</p>			
<p>Was the programme designed to use the existing systems and structures (of partners/other donors/international organisations) for the implementation of its activities and to what extent are these used?</p>	<p>To what extent did the measure rely on national structures (e.g. schools, youth centres) and strengthen their capacities to receive refugees? To what extent did the measure promote the inclusion of refugees in the formal education system?</p>	<p>Interviews with managers of the supported schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interview with UNICEF</p>			
<p>Are common systems (of partners/other donors/international organisations) used for monitoring/evaluation, learning and accountability?</p>	<p>To what extent did the follow-up of the measure rely on the data collected by UNICEF and the national government structures (e.g. schools, Ministry of Education)?</p>	<p>Interviews with managers of the supported schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interview with UNICEF</p>			

## Effectiveness

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Achievement of (intended) targets			2	0	
Were the (if necessary, adjusted) objectives of the programme (incl. capacity development measures) achieved? Table of indicators: Comparison of actual/target	To what extent was the project able to achieve its impact indicators? How many female and male volunteers with what qualifications were employed by the measure? How many girls and boys benefited from the measure?	Interview with UNICEF Random interviews with educational institutions, support staff, learners			
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to achieving objectives:			2	0	
To what extent were the outputs of the programme delivered as planned (or adapted to new developments)? ( <i>Learning/help question</i> )	How many Syrian volunteer support staff in the education system received financial support? What services did the support staff provide? How many educational institutions benefited from the support staff? How many children and young people benefited from the work of the support staff?	Interview with UNICEF Interviews with staff management companies			
Are the outputs provided and the capacities created used?	To what extent will the voluntary Syrian support staff model continue to be used in the education system? How has it been further developed in the meantime? How were the services offered by the support staff used in the educational institutions? How were the schools, Makani and youth centres that received assistance from support staff used? (Number of enrolled children and young people,	Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents			

	<p>number of school-leaving qualifications, gender-disaggregated, 2018–2022)          How did the children access the offers from a time perspective as well (afternoon lessons at double-shift schools – supplementary offers at Makani centres)          To what extent have the refugees been able to use the knowledge they gained through volunteering for their further professional development?</p>	
<p>To what extent is equal access to the outputs provided and the capacities created guaranteed (e.g. non-discriminatory, physically accessible, financially affordable, qualitatively, socially and culturally acceptable)?</p>	<p>To what extent did all refugees have access to volunteer positions? According to which criteria were the support staff selected?          To what extent did children and young people, especially girls and members of vulnerable groups, have access to the services provided or supported by the support staff?          Were there specific offers for children and young people, especially girls who do not attend school?</p>	<p>See previous question</p>
<p>To what extent did the programme contribute to achieving the objectives?</p>	<p>To what extent have the incentive payments to Syrian voluntary support staff in the education system contributed to improving their income?          To what extent has the work of volunteer support staff contributed to improving the learning and development conditions of refugee children and young people? To what extent were the specific factors taken into account that lead to girls and boys dropping out of school early?</p>	<p>See previous question</p>
<p>To what extent did the programme contribute to achieving the objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?</p>	<p>See previous question.</p>	<p>See previous question.</p>

<p>Did the programme contribute to the achievement of objectives at the level of the particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups involved and affected (potential differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)?</p>	<p>To what extent have particularly vulnerable refugees benefited from the creation of volunteer positions? To what extent have particularly vulnerable children and young people, especially girls, benefited from the work of the support staff?</p>	<p>See previous question</p>			
<p>Were there measures that specifically addressed gender impact potential (e.g. through the involvement of women in project committees, water committees, use of social workers for women, etc.)? (FC-E-specific question)</p>	<p>To what extent were women involved in project-related decision-making processes and shaped them? To what extent did the task profiles of the support staff take into account the specific needs of pupils and girls outside of school?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities</p> <p>Note: This question is not part of the original evaluation concept.</p>			
<p>Which project-internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)</p>	<p>Was KfW able to provide the financing on time so that it could be used as intended? What role did the staff management company commissioned by UNICEF play in the implementation of the measure?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with staff management companies</p>			
<p>Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended objectives of the programme (also taking into account the risks anticipated beforehand)? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)</p>	<p>What role did the issue of work permits for Syrian refugees play in the implementation of the project? What role did formal barriers play in Syrian children's and young people's access to the education system? What role did factors such as child labour, child marriage, violence in schools and discrimination play in the access of Syrian children and young people to the education system?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents</p>			
<p>Evaluation dimension: Quality of implementation</p>			2	0	

<p>How is the quality of the management and implementation of the programme (e.g. project-executing agency, consultant, taking into account ethnicity and gender in decision-making committees) evaluated with regard to the achievement of objectives?</p>	<p>What role did UNICEF and its implementation partners (e.g. NGOs, staff management company) play in the implementation of the measure? How would UNICEF and its partners rate the quality of project management? Were gender aspects adequately taken into account?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with Syrian assistants</p>			
<p>How is the quality of the management, implementation and participation in the programme by the partners/sponsors evaluated?</p>	<p>What role did Jordanian state structures play in the utilisation of Syrian volunteers in the education system, especially in the area of education and youth? How would you rate the quality of the contribution of Jordanian government structures to the project?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with UNICEF</p>			
<p>Were gender results and relevant risks in/through the project (gender-based violence, e.g. in the context of infrastructure or empowerment projects) regularly monitored or otherwise taken into account during implementation? Have corresponding measures (e.g. as part of a CM) been implemented in a timely manner? (FC-E-specific question)</p>	<p>How was follow-up done for the project? Was there gender-disaggregated follow-up? How did the project deal with gender-specific risks? How was it ensured that female support staff had a safe workplace and students had a safe learning environment? How was the risk of (gender-specific) violence against the learners by the Syrian support staff handled?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities</p> <p>Note: This question is not part of the original evaluation concept.</p>			
<p>Evaluation dimension: Unintended consequences (positive or negative)</p>			3	0	
<p>Can unintended positive/negative direct impacts (social, economic, ecological and, where applicable, those affecting vulnerable groups) be seen (or are they foreseeable)?</p>	<p>Were there any negative social, economic and possibly environmental impacts of the project? Did the project exacerbate existing inequalities? Were significant population groups excluded from the project?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents</p>			



	<p>Did the project contribute to exacerbating conflicts, especially between refugees and the host community?          Were people exploited as part of the project?          Were people exposed to particular risks as part of the project?          How was it ensured that volunteer support staff did not engage in physical or psychological violence, including sexual violence, against children and young people?          How was it ensured that no bribes or sexual favours were demanded when recruiting the volunteer support staff?          Did the project have unintended positive effects?          What was the duration of and social protection for the volunteering commitment (e.g. in the event of illness-related absence, right to vacation, duration of the volunteer assignment)?          Was there an independent point of contact that could be reached by the support staff in the event of problems?          Were support staff provided with supervision to help them process their impressions and problems?</p>	
<p>What potential/risks arise from the positive/negative unintended effects and how should they be evaluated?</p>	<p>What are the consequences of the above-mentioned potential negative effects on the people affected, in particular women and girls?          How can unintended positive impacts (in the future) be further reinforced? Is there an established exchange between the schools or centres and the support staff in order to share experiences and learn from them?</p>	<p>See previous question</p>

How did the programme respond to the potential/risks of the positive/negative unintended effects?	What measures has the project taken to prevent any negative effects? What measures has the project taken to use or reinforce any unintended positive impacts?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with directors of schools and Makani centres
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## Efficiency

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting ( - / o / + )	Reason for weighting
<b>Evaluation dimension: Production efficiency</b>			2	0	
How are the inputs (financial and material resources) of the programme distributed (e.g. by instruments, sectors, sub-measures, also taking into account the cost contributions of the partners/executing agency/other participants and affected parties, etc.)? (Learning and help question)	What is the cost structure of the project?	UNICEF reporting KfW, final inspection			
To what extent were the inputs of the programme used sparingly in relation to the outputs produced (products, capital goods and services) (if possible in a comparison with data from other evaluations of a region, sector, etc.)? For example, comparison of specific costs.	Were the total financial costs per assistant reasonable? What cost components made up this total expenditure? Was the compensation (wages) paid to the support staff appropriate? Was it sufficient to make a living, especially in the case of single women? Did the support staff incur additional costs for the educational institutions? Who was responsible for these costs?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interview with support staff			
If necessary, as a complementary perspective: To what extent could the outputs of the programme have been increased by an alternative	Could a larger number of assistants have been employed with the same funds? What would have been necessary for this?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF			

<p>use of inputs (if possible in a comparison with data from other evaluations of a region, sector, etc.)?</p>	<p>Are there comparative figures from other donors (e.g. EU) on the unit costs for the utilisation of assistants in education and other sectors (e.g. health) in Jordan? Which benchmarks can be used to evaluate the amount of incentive payments for the assistants (e.g. Cash-for-Work payment, income of the “teachers daily paid” and permanent employees of the Ministry of Education (JOD 280/month plus 13% social security for teachers), minimum wage)</p>		
<p>Were the outputs produced on time and within the planned period?</p>	<p>Were UNICEF’s administrative expenses and overhead (8%) reasonable? Were the assistants recruited in time for the start of the school year and made available to the educational institutions?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF</p>	
<p>Were the coordination and management costs reasonable (e.g. implementation consultant’s cost component)? (FC-E-specific question)</p>	<p>Were the costs for the staff management company reasonable?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with staff management companies</p>	
<p>Evaluation dimension: Allocation efficiency</p>			<p>2      0</p>
<p>In what other ways and at what costs could the effects achieved (outcome/impact) have been attained? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)</p>	<p>What alternatives were there to improve the income situation of refugees, especially in the area of cash transfers or Cash-for-Work? What opportunities and risks would the awarding of work permits to Syrian refugees entail? Would the current legal situation enable work permits to be issued? Would there be an opportunity to offer Syrian assistants permanent employment relationships? Who would pay for the long-term financing of these</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with staff management companies</p>	

	employment relationships and their resulting costs (e.g. health and unemployment insurance)? Could similar improvements in learning conditions for Syrian refugees also have been achieved through other, more cost-efficient measures?	
To what extent could the effects achieved have been attained in a more cost-effective manner, compared with an alternatively designed programme?	How could the project have been implemented more efficiently within the existing concept? Is there potential for further savings during project implementation? What consequences would these have had on the quality of the service provided? How was planning done for the Syrian assistants' needs? How was their recruitment, their monitoring and the payment or invoicing for work performed carried out?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with staff management companies
If necessary, as a complementary perspective: To what extent could the positive effects have been increased with the resources available, compared to an alternatively designed programme?	Could more support staff positions been created or more children and young people have been reached with the same funds? In what way? Could alternative approaches and concepts have achieved more impact in a more cost-effective manner?	Interview with KfW project managers Interview with UNICEF Interviews with staff management companies

## Impact

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting ( - / o / + )	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Overarching developmental changes (intended)			3	0	
Is it possible to identify overarching developmental changes to which	How did the income and employment situation of Syrian assistants develop in the long term, especially for women?	Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with UNICEF			

<p>the programme should contribute? (Or if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)</p>	<p>How did the school-leaving qualification rates (differentiated by year and degree) and the social and professional integration of Syrian children and young people, especially girls and those from vulnerable backgrounds, develop at the supported educational institutions? How did the numbers of pupils dropping out of school develop? Are there qualifications in the area of non-formal education that qualify for further education opportunities? How did the drop-out and school-leaving figures develop in this area? How did topics such as early marriage of girls, child labour and violence against children develop at the supported educational institutions? How did the coexistence of refugees and the host community develop in the environment of the supported educational institutions?</p>	<p>Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents</p>			
<p>Is it possible to identify overarching developmental changes (social, economic, environmental and their interactions) at the level of the intended beneficiaries? (Or if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)</p>	<p>See previous question</p>	<p>See previous question</p>			
<p>To what extent can overarching developmental changes be identified at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group to which the programme should contribute (Or, if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)</p>	<p>See previous question</p>	<p>See previous question</p>			
<p>Evaluation dimension: Contribution to overarching developmental changes (intended)</p>			<p>3</p>	<p>0</p>	

<p>To what extent did the programme actually contribute to the identified or foreseeable overarching developmental changes (also taking into account the political stability) to which the programme should contribute?</p>	<p>To what extent can changes in the employment and income situation of assistants, school attendance and school success of learners, the social and professional integration of children and young people outside schools, as well as the coexistence of refugees and the host community, be attributed to the temporary employment of Syrian assistants in the education system?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents</p>
<p>To what extent did the programme achieve its intended (possibly adjusted) developmental objectives? In other words, are the project impacts sufficiently tangible not only at outcome level, but also at impact level? (E.g. drinking water supply/health effects)</p>	<p>To what extent was the measure able to contribute to increasing the income of assistants and to increased school attendance (enrolment) and completion rates, especially of girls, through improved learning conditions? Was it possible to reduce drop-out rates? What other positive effects did the employment of assistants have (e.g. meaningful activity, continuous support for children and young people)?</p>	<p>Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents</p>
<p>Did the programme contribute to achieving its (possibly adjusted) developmental objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?</p>	<p>What positive effects did the measure have for children and young people, especially girls and those from vulnerable groups who attend the educational institutions receiving help from assistants? Were children and young people, especially girls, also able to be reached outside these facilities? In this regard, which measures (outreach) were aided by assistants (e.g. work with parents, education, awareness-raising)?</p>	<p>Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents</p>
<p>Has the programme contributed to overarching developmental changes or changes in life situations at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group (potential differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.) to which the</p>	<p>See previous question</p>	<p>See previous question</p>

<p>programme was intended to contribute?</p>		
<p>Which project-internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended developmental objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)</p>	<p>See similar question under “Effectiveness”</p>	<p>See similar question under “Effectiveness”</p>
<p>Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended developmental objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)</p>	<p>What opportunities are there for refugee children and young people to continue their education and gain access to the formal labour market? What factors contribute to child labour and early marriage, which in turn affect the use of education?</p>	<p>Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian parents and young people</p>
<p>Does the project have a broad-based impact?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To what extent has the programme led to structural or institutional changes (e.g. in organisations, systems and regulations)? (<i>Structure formation</i>)</li> <li>- Was the programme exemplary and/or broadly effective and is it reproducible? (<i>Model character</i>)</li> </ul>	<p>What structural changes did the employment of “voluntary assistants” in Jordan’s education system entail? What consequences did the use of voluntary assistants have for the regular Jordanian school staff, especially women? To what extent have the volunteer assistants created new task profiles that can now be taken on by permanent staff? How was the use of volunteer assistants in the education sector adopted by other organisations and in other countries?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with Jordanian teaching staff</p>
<p>How would the development have gone without the programme? (<i>Learning and help question</i>)</p>	<p>What alternative sources of income are available to Syrian refugees, especially women, in Jordan? What opportunities do Syrian children and young people, especially girls, have to participate in the regular education system in Jordan?</p>	<p>Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions Interviews with Jordanian teaching staff</p>

	<p>Are there alternative regular support services for Syrian children and young people in Jordan?</p> <p>What activities do other donors support under the Accelerated Access Initiative (AAI) Joint Financing Agreement?</p>			
<p>Evaluation dimension: Contribution to (unintended) overarching developmental changes</p>			2	0
<p>To what extent can unintended overarching developmental changes (also taking into account political stability) be identified (or, if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)?</p>	<p>What (unintentional) positive or negative changes in the employment and income of Syrian assistants, the access of refugees to education and the coexistence of refugees and the host community can be observed in the environment of the supported educational institutions?</p>	<p>Interviews with directors of schools and extracurricular educational institutions</p> <p>Interviews with UNICEF</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian assistants</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian parents</p>		
<p>Did the programme noticeably or foreseeably contribute to unintended (positive and/or negative) overarching developmental impacts?</p>	<p>To what extent are these changes due to the deployment of Syrian assistants at the respective educational institutions?</p>	<p>See previous question</p>		
<p>Did the programme noticeably (or foreseeably) contribute to unintended (positive or negative) overarching developmental changes at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups (within or outside the target group) (do no harm, e.g. no strengthening of inequality (gender/ethnicity))?</p>	<p>Did the measure exacerbate inequalities or marginalise certain groups? Alternatively, did the measure succeed in improving the living conditions and future opportunities of particularly vulnerable refugees, children and young people?</p>	<p>See previous question</p>		



## Sustainability

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting ( - / o / + )	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Capacities of participants and stakeholders			3	0	
Are the target group, executing agencies and partners institutionally, personally and financially able and willing (ownership) to maintain the positive effects of the programme over time (after the end of the promotion)?	<p>To what extent was the model of the utilisation of voluntary Syrian assistants in the Jordanian education system to support vulnerable children and young people continued after the end of the project (2019)? By FC? By the international community? By the Jordanian government?</p> <p>What are the chances that these employment opportunities for refugees will be converted into regular employment relationships? How can these be financed?</p> <p>What is the current position of the Jordanian government towards awarding work permits to Syrian refugees?</p>	Interview with UNICEF			
To what extent do the target group, executing agencies and partners demonstrate resilience to future risks that could jeopardise the impact of the programme?	<p>What is the future of Syrian refugees in Jordan?</p> <p>Do refugees voluntarily return to Syria? Are there or will there be large-scale returns to Syria?</p> <p>Has the Jordanian government established adequate framework conditions for the long-term integration of Syrian refugees?</p> <p>How will international financing for refugee aid measures develop in Jordan, taking into account the influence of the Ukraine crisis, among other things?</p> <p>How will this impact the Cash-for-Work measures?</p>	<p>Interview with KfW project managers</p> <p>Interview with UNICEF</p> <p>Interviews with Syrian assistants</p>			

<p>Evaluation dimension: Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities:</p>			3	0	
<p>Did the programme contribute to the target group, executing agencies and partners being institutionally, personally and financially able and willing (ownership) to maintain the positive effects of the programme over time and, where necessary, to curb negative effects?</p>	<p>The project is a transitional aid measure. Therefore, there is no requirement that the partner government must continue the measure unchanged. Has the Jordanian government created the capacities and taken concrete measures to support the integration of Syrian children and young people into the education system?</p>	<p>Interview with UNICEF Interview with KfW project managers</p>			
<p>Did the programme contribute to strengthening the resilience of the target group, executing agencies and partners to risks that could jeopardise the effects of the programme?</p>	<p>Has the measure strengthened the resilience of Syrian assistants and Syrian children and young people so that they can now better deal with the adverse circumstances of their refugee situation? Can refugees generate value from their education?</p>	<p>Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents</p>			
<p>Did the programme contribute to strengthening the resilience of particularly disadvantaged groups to risks that could jeopardise the effects of the programme?</p>	<p>Did the measure strengthen the resilience of particularly vulnerable assistants as well as vulnerable children and young people?</p>	<p>Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian learners and users of the extracurricular educational opportunities Interviews with Syrian parents</p>			
<p>Evaluation dimension: Durability of impacts over time</p>			3	0	
<p>How stable is the context of the programme (e.g. social justice, economic performance, political stability, environmental balance)? <i>(Learning/help question)</i></p>	<p>Which external factors have a significant influence on the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan (including the political and security situation in Syria, political situation in Jordan, legal framework conditions, COVID-19, Ukraine crisis, inflation, food shortages, economic crisis)?</p>	<p>Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian parents</p>			

<p>To what extent is the durability of the positive effects of the programme influenced by the context? <i>(Learning/help question)</i></p>	<p>What influence do these factors have on the situation of Syrian refugees, in particular their employment and income situation, their access to education and the social and professional integration of young refugees?</p>	<p>Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian parents</p>
<p>To what extent are the positive and, where applicable, the negative effects of the programme likely to be long-lasting?</p>	<p>Under these conditions, how long-term is the project impact (income, education, integration) assessed to be?</p>	<p>Interviews with UNICEF Interviews with Syrian assistants Interviews with Syrian parents</p>