

## Ex post evaluation

# UNICEF WASH and NLG, Jordan

<b>Title</b>	UNICEF, Jordan WASH Berm and Education/NLG		
<b>Sector and CRS code</b>	Material relief assistance and services 72010		
<b>Project number</b>	2016 18 594		
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)		
<b>Recipient/Project-executing agency</b>	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)		
<b>Project volume/Financing instrument</b>	EUR 10 million/BMZ transitional aid		
<b>Project duration</b>	August 2016 – July 2018		
<b>Year of report</b>	2022	<b>Year of random sample</b>	2021

## Objectives and project outline


The objective at outcome level was to improve access to and use of an improved needs based drinking water supply and high-quality non-formal education and child protection services. At impact level, the aim was to contribute to alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian conflict and to strengthen social cohesion between Syrian refugees and host Jordanian communities. The two components of the project – WASH and Education/NLG – were not linked in terms of content and were implemented separately by UNICEF.

## Key findings

In the transitional aid project, there was only a limited claim to sustainability, which is therefore not considered in the overall evaluation. The project is rated as moderately successful overall.

- The transitional aid project, which was geared towards the needs of the target group and the development policy priorities of the Federal Government, was relevant as it contributed to alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian conflict. With two components that were disjointed in terms of content, the project revealed conceptual weaknesses, as synergies were not optimally utilised.
- The objectives of the project were achieved effectively and efficiently at the end of the project; no significant deficiencies – insofar as verifiable – were identified in the use of the funds; the costs per beneficiary corresponded to similar FC projects.
- UNICEF, as the project-executing agency, was increasingly flexible in responding to KfW's suggestions for procedural improvements in areas such as monitoring, financial controls, reporting, etc.
- The implemented water infrastructure was still in operation four years after the end of the implementation phase; but users complained about the quality and availability of drinking water. Furthermore, it was not possible to fully overcome the adverse effects of inadequate water supply on health.
- The non-formal educational opportunities in the camps and Jordanian settlements supported Syrian and Jordanian children and young people emotionally and socially; among other things, they learned to better manage and avoid problems; they also achieved better learning performance.

**Overall rating:**  
Moderately successful



## Conclusions

- Educational opportunities aimed at refugees and local populations are likely to promote social cohesion in host countries.
- NLG measures to improve access to non-formal education and child protection services can be replicated in other fragile contexts.
- Separate individual projects should be designed for relevant but content-related and locally unconnected components.
- The continuation of NLG activities is only ensured if UNICEF receives further financial support from the international donor community.

## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 3

#### Ratings:

Relevance	3
Coherence	3
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	2
Impact	3
Sustainability	[4]

Overall, we rate the project as satisfactory – without an assessment of sustainability; the results achieved are below expectations, but the positive results dominate in the effectiveness and efficiency criteria.

#### General conditions and classification of the project

The Syrian crisis has led to a sharp increase in the number of people fleeing to Jordan. About 670,000 refugees from Syria sought refuge in Jordan up to the end of 2020 under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The actual number of Syrian refugees is estimated to be significantly higher, as only a small proportion is registered in UNHCR camps; the majority have been accommodated in Jordanian communities, including the north-eastern region of Berm on the border with Syria. For the inhabitants of this desert-like area, the disastrous water shortage, from which the whole of Jordan suffers, means a desperate struggle for survival/to live.<sup>1</sup> The high refugee population in Jordan is overwhelming the ability of Jordanian society to integrate and absorb them<sup>2</sup>. In addition, the country is suffering from massive economic problems, exacerbated by the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. With the transitional aid project “UNICEF Jordan, WASH Berm and Education/NLG” (BMZ No. 2016 18 5294), Germany contributed from 2016 to 2018 to improving the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan and the local population particularly affected by the crisis. The financial contribution of EUR 10 million to UNICEF was intended to improve the water supply in the north-eastern border region of Berm and to expand access to non-formal education and child protection services for refugees and the local population on a supra-regional basis. The measures followed on from FC projects implemented through UNICEF to improve water supply and sanitation in a camp for refugees from Syria (BMZ No. 2014 68 297 and 2015 68 906) and continued German support for UNICEF engagement under the No Lost Generation (NLG) initiative (BMZ No. 2015 68 021 and 2015 68 898).

#### Relevance

By the summer of 2016, when the project began, 650,000 Syrians had registered as refugees in Jordan because of the war in their home country, the majority of whom had settled in the communities and refugee camps of northern Jordan not far from the border with Syria.<sup>3</sup> From 2016, the humanitarian situation deteriorated dramatically, particularly on the Syrian-Jordan border, in the Berm region. While around 5,000 people were still stranded there in 2015, this figure increased to an estimated 85,000 by the end of


<sup>1</sup> see <https://www.kfw.de/stories/kfw/stories/umwelt/natuerliche-ressourcen/wassermangel-jordanien-wird-verschaerft-durch-fluechtlingskrise/> (accessed 25.11.2022).

<sup>2</sup> According to World Bank data, education expenditure in Jordan was 9.9% of GDP in 2019. In a direct comparison, the share of public education expenditure in Germany was 11.2% in 2018. Public expenditure on the education of comparable countries in the same region as Lebanon was similarly high at 9.9% in 2020. See [Government expenditure on education, total \(% of government expenditure\) - Germany, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Arab Rep., Israel | Data \(worldbank.org\)](https://data.worldbank.org/SH.GOV.EPVS?locations=SI) (accessed 28/11/2022). Nevertheless, the data on public expenditure on education do not sufficiently take into account the heterogeneity of the respective educational structure of a country, as public schools are hardly, if at all, recorded in the public statistics.

<sup>3</sup> Bank 2016; available online at [https://pure.giga-hamburg.de/ws/files/23481134/web\\_nahost\\_03\\_2016.pdf](https://pure.giga-hamburg.de/ws/files/23481134/web_nahost_03_2016.pdf) (accessed 06/07/2022).

2016. In August 2017, the number was estimated to be between 45,000 and 50,000 people, around 80% of whom were women and children.<sup>4</sup>

For the most part, a permanent social infrastructure did not exist in the sparsely populated and low-rainfall Berm region. Instead, the social infrastructure of the surrounding communities close to the border, where – besides the capital Amman – the majority of the refugees from Syria have found refuge, has been put under considerable strain. The capacities of the children's agency UNICEF were also put under considerable strain. Besides protecting and realizing children's rights, UNICEF took the lead in ensuring clean and sustainable water and sanitation for refugees in Jordan. Against this background, the programme proposal of the FC project envisaged supporting UNICEF with two components to improve the situation in the particularly affected communities and refugee camps, which is worsening due to the massive influx of refugees (see for example Heat Map | Rukban).



Source: Unosat 2017; available online at <https://reliefweb.int/map/syrian-arab-republic/syria-jordan-border-shelter-density-map-rukban-border-crossing-imagery-2> (accessed 06.07.2022)

According to the programme proposal, the rehabilitation and creation of water infrastructure in component 1 and the financing of non-formal education in component 2 (output) were intended to improve access to drinking water supply as well as for child protection and non-formal education, which targeted both enrolled and non-enrolled Syrian and Jordanian children of school age (outcome).<sup>5</sup> This was intended to contribute to improving the living conditions of Syrian refugees and the local population particularly affected by the Syrian crisis (impact).

To take greater account of (i) the use of the services created by the target group, (ii) the context of the UNICEF programme in which the FC project was embedded, and which aimed to provide humanitarian

<sup>4</sup> Hajzmanova 2016, available online at <https://www.internal-displacement.org/taxonomy/term/254> (accessed 06/07/2022); Reasons for the decline in refugees in the Berm region are diverse and can be traced back, among other things, to continued refugee movements, closures of refugee camps and the return to Syria.

<sup>5</sup> The escalation in the conflict in the form of terrorist attacks in the Berm region, which resulted in the evacuation of the Hadalat refugee camp in 2017, had no impact on the project's concept.

support, and (iii) the dual objective of the project, the target system in the present EPE was modified.<sup>6</sup> The FC project's new objective at outcome level is to improve access to and use of a needs-based water supply and high-quality non-formal education and child protection services<sup>7</sup>. At impact level, the aim was to contribute to alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian conflict and to improving social cohesion between Syrian refugees and the local population (see Effectiveness/Overarching developmental impact).

The FC project was financed with transitional aid funds, which were intended to contribute to restoring the capacity of local structures to act at the interface between humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation by quickly restoring basic government services in social sectors.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the FC project's focus was primarily on the BMZ strategy for transitional aid. The measures were also planned in close coordination between UNICEF and the Jordanian government, in particular in component 1, in which the drinking water supply was to be monitored and ultimately replaced by the Jordanian water authority.

It was no longer possible to reconstruct at the time of the evaluation whether there were conceptual reasons for merging two components that were not directly related at the time of the programme proposal, in addition to reasons for the availability of funds. While component 1 aimed to address the core problem of increasing demand for water from refugees, which led to increasingly poorer hygiene conditions and social tensions, component 2 aimed to address the problem of the high number of Syrian and needy Jordanian children without access to education and not to create a lost generation.

From today's perspective, the respective measures of the two components, which were aligned with "do no-harm" principles and accordingly targeted both Syrian refugees and Jordanian residents as well as the relevant sector chapters of the Jordan Response Plan and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis (3RP), respectively, were purposeful in overcoming the identified core problems.<sup>9</sup>

However, the financing of two non-contiguous UNICEF programme components was neither necessary nor profitable from a conceptual perspective or for reasons of the impact logic, as the measures did not (reasonably) dovetail with one another, hardly any synergies can develop, and additive impacts are structurally limited. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the impact of the stand-alone components, through the use of the created and rehabilitated drinking water infrastructure and the improved non-formal education, will alleviate the worst effects of the Syrian conflict and thus contribute to the reduction of conflicts and the strengthening of social cohesion between the Jordanian host society and Syrian refugees, as the competition for scarce resources and services is reduced.

The combination of two components, on the other hand, offered UNICEF the advantages of a possibly more efficient exchange with KfW. The exchange between KfW and UNICEF served, among other things, to manage programme implementation and focus the project on developmental impacts, thereby ensuring the additionality of the project compared with emergency aid, including in follow-up projects, in particular in component 2. KfW's added value in the financing and implementation of the project is also based on its ability to control and influence programme implementation, compared with German participation in the financing of UN programmes via the multilateral BMZ title.

In summary, we only rate the relevance of the project as satisfactory due to conceptual weaknesses caused by the merging of two components that are not directly related. The overall assessment that the

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<sup>6</sup> There is a dual objective for projects that, in addition to an impact-level objective, also have the objective of peacebuilding and/or reducing fragility.

<sup>7</sup> State schools are also open to Syrian refugee children, but there are many obstacles to their participation in classes, as there are to Jordanian children. That is why UNICEF offers non-formal, non-certified programmes to (re)integrate children into the formal education system at best.

<sup>8</sup> At the time of the programme proposal, the BMZ policy paper "Strategy for Developmental and Structural Transition Assistance" (ESÜH) was authoritative. BMZ (2013); available online at <https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/bmz-strategiepapier.pdf> (accessed 06/07/2022).

<sup>9</sup> Further information on the Jordan Response Plan can be found at <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-response-plan-syria-crisis-2016-2018>; on the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans in Response to the Syria Crisis (3RP) at <https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/> and on the No Lost Generation Strategy at <https://www.nolostgeneration.org/> (accessed 06/07/2022)

project meets the objectives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's commitment to the people affected by the Syrian conflict from today's perspective also has a positive effect,

going beyond humanitarian emergency aid to preserving people's livelihoods and creating prospects for Syrian refugees and the people in the host Jordanian communities.<sup>10</sup>

### Relevance rating: 3

#### Coherence

With regard to internal coherence, the FC project was geared towards ensuring fundamental human rights and was therefore consistent with the international standards to which Germany's development cooperation is committed. Due to the target group focus on refugees and the focus on Jordanian cleaning communities, it was also coherent with the strategic objective of German development policy, which defines support for refugees and host communities as a priority area of development cooperation between Germany and Jordan in addition to the areas of water/wastewater, education/vocational training, and employment. Against this background, the FC project complemented a number of other TC and FC projects to support refugees and host communities in Jordan, which were used to combat the causes of displacement using funds from the special initiative, to reintegrate refugees, to finance transitional aid or other funds from the BMZ and the Federal Foreign Office.<sup>11</sup> However, double funding cannot be ruled out in the observation area, nor can the division of labour between the ministries and implementing organizations during the implementation period, which is not always segregated.<sup>12</sup>

In terms of external coherence, the 3RP plans established a framework for structured sector dialogues as well as harmonisation of donor contributions, which in the Jordanian water and education sector have been substantial, both to UNICEF and other international organisations as well as to government agencies.<sup>13</sup> The plans should also ensure the involvement of national, regional and local actors. The FC project was designed and implemented with the involvement of both the relevant ministries and, for example, the state Water Authority of Jordan, with whom a proven cooperation has already been established as part of bilateral development cooperation, in order to draw on existing structures and supplement and support the Jordanian government's own efforts in the water sector. In the education sector, too, the employment of Jordanian teachers and the coordination of curricula with the Ministry of Education ensured that existing systems and structures were used. At the same time, there were concerns from the Ministry of Education during the implementation period that the non-formal educational opportunities for Syrian and Jordanian children in the Makani centres could replace formal education in state schools and that funds for Makani centres could be concentrated.<sup>14</sup> For these reasons, the further development of the Makani

<sup>10</sup> Further information on BMZ involvement for the people affected by the Syrian conflict can be found at <https://www.bmz.de/de/laender/zehn-jahre-syrienkonflikt> (accessed 06/07/2022).

<sup>11</sup> These include, for example, the FC project to improve water supply and wastewater disposal at Za'atari Camp (BMZ no. 2014.6829.7 and 2015.6890.6) and the FC projects "Strengthening Resilience I, UNICEF Jordan" (BMZ no. 2015.6802.1) and "Strengthening Resilience, UNICEF Jordan Education" (BMZ no. 2015.6889.8). German TC also implemented projects in the context of the Syria crisis in the water sector and in the education sector in Jordan, such as the project to strengthen the resilience of water suppliers (2014.2481.1), to promote participatory resource management to stabilise the situation in refugee-receiving communities (2014.4065.0) or to improve the learning environment in public schools in receiving communities (2014.4064.3); however, UNICEF was not the project-executing agency in these projects.

<sup>12</sup> See the Spending Review (2017/2018 cycle) on the policy area "Humanitäre Hilfe und Übergangshilfe einschließlich der Schnittstellen Krisenprävention, Krisenreaktion, Stabilisierung und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit" [Humanitarian aid and transitional aid, including the interfaces of crisis prevention, crisis response, stabilisation and development cooperation]; available online at [https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche\\_Finzen/Spending\\_Reviews/Abschlussbericht-der-AG-zum-Politikbereich-Humanitaere-Hilfe.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=3](https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finzen/Spending_Reviews/Abschlussbericht-der-AG-zum-Politikbereich-Humanitaere-Hilfe.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3) (accessed 07/07/2022).

<sup>13</sup> In the implementation period, several non-governmental actors, such as Abdul Aziz Al Ghurair Refugee Education Fund, were also active in the education sector and/or as part of the financing of the UNICEF education component in addition to state actors, such as the European Union, Japan or Canada; further information on the donors of the education component can be found under [Donors | No Lost Generation](#) (accessed: 10/10/2022).

<sup>14</sup> See Ecorys Polska (2019): Evaluation of UNICEF's Makani Programme in Jordan (January 2018-January 2019). In the meantime, responsibility for the Makani programme has been transferred to the Ministry of Social Development and, for example, a joint programme of UNICEF and the MoSD 2021 has been created with the "Takaful Plus", which encourages Jordanian social welfare recipients to enrol their children in courses at Makani centres.



approach paid even greater attention to a separation between formal and non-formal educational opportunities.<sup>15</sup>

As the measures were not fully fit due to the aforementioned internal and external constraints during the implementation period, we rate the coherence only as satisfactory.

**Coherence rating: 3**

### Effectiveness

At outcome level, the objective of the FC project underlying this EPE was to improve access to and use of a demand-oriented drinking water supply and of high-quality non-formal education and child protection services.

At the time of the final inspection of the project in May 2019, the target values under component 1 had been achieved. Around 103,000 people in the north-eastern border region benefited from the (i) renovation and rehabilitation of WASH facilities in schools, a hospital and vulnerable households in Ruwayshed,<sup>16</sup> (ii) the planned development of new agricultural boreholes in Ruwayshed, Rukban and Hadalat, (iii) rehabilitation of an old borehole in Ruwayshed and (iv) the establishment of two new semi-permanent water and sanitation systems in Rukban and Hadalat.

At the time of the EPE, it was not possible to obtain reliable information on the output-level indicators 1 and 2, which are used as proxy indicators for the achievement of objectives at outcome level.

However, on-site visits to Ruwayshed in June 2022 showed that the water infrastructure there was being used. However, four years after the end of the project, the maintenance of the water infrastructure, the reliability of the water supply and the water quality were described by the beneficiaries and the project managers as partly insufficient, among other things because the drinking water filters were replaced too late and the work by the state water supplier took longer than necessary. Overall, the people in Ruwayshed were dependent on buying drinking water on a regular basis. In interviews during the field visits to Ruwayshed, the additional costs for this were put at 35 to 40 USD per month and per household, which in relation to the average monthly per capita income of approx. USD 637 represents 5.5 - 6.3% and thus has a significant impact on consumer spending.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the water supply for the Ruwayshed site was rated as improved at the time of the EPE, but still as expandable.

A sufficient public water supply for all Ruwayshed residents is still not guaranteed, but it can be assumed that without the implemented measures a significantly worse water supply situation would prevail. The level of ambition of component 1 of the FC project, to improve the water supply but not to ensure a complete state water supply, appears appropriate given the precarious starting situation and is considered accordingly in the evaluation of effectiveness.

According to UNICEF, the water infrastructure in Rukban was well maintained and operational, providing water to the residents of the settlement there on a daily basis. During the implementation period, it was possible to increase the volume of water pumped from 7 to 19 liters per day per person, but defined target values are missing so that it is not possible to assess the target achievement.

The water infrastructure in Hadalat was handed over to the government in 2017 and, according to UNICEF, was used by the Jordanian armed forces at the time of the EPE. Against this background, the measures implemented at the Hadalat site are not considered for the assessment of effectiveness.

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<sup>15</sup> See CPMS MAINSTREAMING CASE STUDIES SERIES (2016): Child Protection and Education “Makani (“My Space”) Approach in Jordan: Integrating child protection, education, youth empowerment and psychosocial support for Syrian children”; available online at [Child Protection and Education “Makani \(“My Space”\) Approach in Jordan: Integrating Child Protection, Education, Youth Empowerment and Psychosocial Support for Syrian Children” | ALNAP](#) (accessed 10/10/2022).

<sup>16</sup> However, the new water connections in private households financed with the project did not directly benefit Syrian refugees, as the houses in Ruwayshed are exclusively owned by Jordanian citizens.

<sup>17</sup> The monthly average income relates to data from 2017: [Kingdom's average monthly salary stands at \\$637 — report | Jordan Times](#) (accessed: 28/11/2022)

Indicator	Status PA 2016; Target PA 2016	Final Review 2019; EPE 2022
<b>Component 1: Drinking water supply</b>		
(1) Number of Syrian refugees in the north-eastern border region who benefit from improved access to drinking water	0; 100,000	103,000 (2017/2018; approx. 85,000 Syrians, approx. 18,000 Jordanians); → <b>achieved</b> n/a → <b>unclear target achievement</b>
New <sup>a</sup> : (2) Volume of water pumped per person per day	7 liters (Rukban); n/a	Rukban (2018): 19 liters → <b>unclear target achievement</b> Ruwayshed: n/a → <b>unclear target achievement</b> n/a → <b>unclear target achievement</b>
New: (3) Adapted water infrastructure is in good condition and is also used after commissioning	0; rehabilitation of deep wells, including installation of water treatment plants, generators and pump houses, redevelopment of deep wells and installation of water tanks and extraction points	N/A Ruwayshed: Use available, water infrastructure was maintained, but maintenance insufficient → <b>unclear target achievement</b> Rukban: Use available, water infrastructure is well maintained → <b>achieved</b> Hadalat: Handed over to the government in 2017, is now used by the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) → <b>unclear target achievement</b>

<sup>a</sup> Information on the indicator comes from Appendix 4 of the final inspection.

Source: Internal project documents (programme proposal and final inspection) as well as interviews with UNICEF and on-site visits to Ruwayshed in 2022.

In component 2, most of the indicators were achieved. Therefore, after the two-year project period of the FC programme, 20,472 children and adolescents nationwide benefited from non-formal education services, which were aimed at both enrolled and non-enrolled children and were intended to support them in achieving a formal school connection (Learning Support Services). 18,560 children benefited from child protection services and psychosocial care as well as 12,196 young people from Life Skills Training.<sup>18</sup> The fact that fewer young people benefited from the life skills training than planned was due to higher average unit costs, which in turn were due to more intensive support and vocational preparation of the beneficiaries in the training.

In component 2, an additional 5,663 school transportations were also provided in 2018 due to reallocations of funds (target: 5,500), as journeys to school were often several kilometres long, many parents worried about the safety of their children or children with disabilities could not travel to school independently. 87% of Syrian children benefited from school transport, for girls it was 46%.<sup>19</sup>

At the time of the EPE, it seems plausible that the above-mentioned support services in Makani centres, where more than 15% Syrian refugees were employed, had a positive effect on (re-)enrolment. School transportation also had a positive effect. For example, one study showed that children from remote areas

<sup>18</sup> Information on gender distribution was not available for the number of children and adolescents reached through the FC funds. The overall values of all children and adolescents reached by UNICEF's measures show that slightly more girls than boys benefited from the education and child protection services.

<sup>19</sup> UNICEF (2018): Final Report to The Government of Germany through KfW On Humanitarian support to girls, boys, women and men, most affected by the Syria crisis in Jordan.

or informal tent settlements are more likely to attend school if safe transport is provided.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, 82% of the students who left school were re-enrolled after attending the Makani centres. Parents of children attending courses at Makani centres in Amman, Mafrqa or Ramtha, as well as students, also confirmed in interviews conducted as part of this evaluation that Makani services in the form of learning support services, child protection services and psychosocial support as well as life skills training had a positive impact on the ability to concentrate, problem-solving skills and social behaviour such as willingness to help. However, during the implementation period, UNICEF was forced to close Makani centres due to insufficient funding from the European Union, Japan, Canada and other donors to finance coverage at the previous level.<sup>21</sup> However, the financing of 32 UNICEF Makani centres from FC funds continued to be secured until the end of 2022, thus financially guaranteeing the continuation and partial expansion of the measures in component 2.

Indicator	Status PA 2016; Target PA 2016	Final Review 2019; EPE 2022
<b>Component 2: Non-formal education and child protection services</b>		
(1) Number of children and young people in need who benefit from improved access to non-formal education (Learning Support Services/basic courses)	0; 16,692	20,472 (2017/2018) → <b>achieved</b> ; 21,814 (2021) → <b>achieved</b>
(2) Number of children in need who are adolescents benefiting from improved access to protection and psychosocial care	0; 16,692	18,560 (2017/2018) → <b>achieved</b> ; n/a → <b>unclear target achievement</b>
(3) Number of young people in need who benefit from improved access to non-formal education (life skills)	0; 16,692	12,196 (2017/2018) → <b>not achieved</b> ; 9,514 (2021) → <b>not achieved</b>
(4) Number of children who benefit from school transport	0; 5,500	5,663 → <b>achieved</b> ; 2,381 (2021) → <b>not achieved</b>
(New) (5) Re-enrolment of early school leavers	N/A	n/a; 82.6%a (2021) → <b>unclear target achievement</b>

Source: Internal project documents (programme proposal, final inspection, Makani Phase I-IV reporting); a. The figures are taken from Makani Phase I-IV reporting and have been converted from absolute to relative values.

Except for indicator 3, component 2 indicators were largely met at the time of the final inspection. Despite the lack of data at the time of the EPE of Indicator 2, it seems plausible that the number of children and adolescents benefiting from protection services will continue to reach the defined target four years after the end of the project's implementation, as BMZ funding continues to be secured. However, in view of the lower financing commitments of other donors described above, it can be estimated that this will have a negative effect on the coverage ratio of the Makani centres in the medium to long-term. Failure to meet indicators 3 and 4 of component 2 at the time of the evaluation adversely affects the evaluation of effectiveness.

Overall, both Syrian refugees and the local Jordanian population benefited from the measures in components 1 and 2, which was also intended in accordance with the programme design to avoid re-resource conflicts between the Jordanian population and Syrian refugees and to strengthen social cohesion. Reliable

<sup>20</sup> REACH 2020; available on the Internet at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/REACH-Jordan-VOC-Assessment-Final-Report-May-2020.pdf> (09.07.2022).

<sup>21</sup> In 2018, 86 of the 235 Makani centres had to be closed. KfW final review (2019) of the project "UNICEF, Jordan, WASH Bern and Education / No Lost Generation".




data on the relationship between Syrian refugees and the Jordanian population in terms of benefits from the measures was not available.<sup>22</sup>

In summary, the measures can be assessed as largely effective in terms of achieving the objectives, even if they did not always fully meet the needs of the population, for example with regard to the reliability and quality of the drinking water supply or the provision of non-formal education.<sup>23</sup> Despite the good implementation quality, the effectiveness of the FC project is only rated as satisfactory. This takes into account the partial underachievement of component 2 at the time of project completion and, in the case of this component in particular, the declining impact at outcome level up to the time of the evaluation.

**Effectiveness rating: 3**

**Efficiency**

UNICEF, as the project-executing agency, was not obliged to submit detailed cost and performance accounts for the measures implemented. This is consistent with the standard procedure for cooperation with UN organisations. The cost structure that can be derived from the evidence available shows that UNICEF covered direct costs of USD 3.9 million (35.8%) for component 1 measures (WASH) to improve the water supply and USD 5.7 million (52.4%) for the NLG activities in component 2. A further USD 0.5 million was used by UNICEF to finance indirect project costs across its components. UNICEF also charged a flat-rate administration fee of USD 0.8 million, representing 7.4% of the total direct project costs of USD 10.1 million. If cross-component implementation costs and the management fee are allocated pro rata to the implementation costs in the two components, the FC funds are used as follows: 41% for component 1 and 59% for component 2. The FC funds were therefore predominantly used to increase access to non-formal education, child protection and psychosocial support for vulnerable children and young people in the project region.



Source: Internal project documents (UNICEF Final Report, Donor Statement by Activity, final inspection)


Overall, 107,000 people benefited from the measures financed with FC funds in component 1, while the measures in component 2 reached almost 33,000 people. In component 1, the costs per beneficiary

<sup>22</sup> At the time of the EPE, however, fewer Syrian refugees were benefiting from the measures than during the implementation period, as their numbers at the project locations have been significantly reduced.

<sup>23</sup> In interviews, parents said that additional activities were needed, such as English courses or offerings for families.

totaled USD 41, which is significantly more than the “unit costs” of just under USD 6 in a similar FC project with UNICEF as the executing agency in Ethiopia (BMZ No. 2015 69 144).<sup>24</sup> However, the UNICEF project in Ethiopia was able to use incremental costs to build central water supply systems, while the UNICEF project evaluated in Jordan had a cost-increasing effect on the large number of individual measures for decentralised improvement of the water supply for refugees and residents of Jordanian communities. Taking into account the difficult implementation conditions in the intervention region on the border with Syria, we rate the production efficiency in component 1 as satisfactory.

The NLG activities in component 2 cost a total of USD 197 per person. The highest direct “unit costs” in component 2 were USD 279 for the measures of the Makani centres for non-formal education and learning support services. Child protection activities and psychosocial support cost USD 96 per person, while offering young people skills to participate in everyday life cost USD 84 per person. To promote social cohesion, children and young people from the refugee population and the local Jordanian residents had access to the activities of the Makani centres. The direct per capita costs for the NLG activities corresponded roughly to the “unit costs” of comparable FC projects in Jordan with UNICEF as the project-executing agency (BMZ no. 2015 68 021 and BMZ no. 2015 68 898).<sup>25</sup> We consider the effort required to achieve the module objectives in component 2 to be appropriate and rate the production efficiency in component 2 as good.



Source: Internal project documents (UNICEF Final Report, Donor Statement by Activity, final inspection)

If the number of beneficiaries is interpreted as an indicator of output utilization from the perspective of the target group, then the allocation efficiency of the project can be rated as good in both components. In component 1, over 100,000 people benefited from the improved water supply for refugees and the local population, of which an above-average number were children and women. The measures in component 2 benefited a total of about 33,000 children and young people, slightly more of them girls than boys (see Effectiveness). In the allocation of funds to component 2, the emphasis on supporting children’s learning, for which 70% of the direct costs of the NLG offers were incurred, is particularly positive. When assessing allocation efficiency, it should also be considered that more than half of the funds for NLG activities were used in several Makani centres, which corresponded to the actual needs of refugees.<sup>26</sup> In general, the allocation and location selection of components 1 and 2 was based on the needs assessment carried out by UNICEF.

<sup>24</sup> Low unit costs in the FC project in Ethiopia resulted, among other things, by mainly rehabilitating existing water and sanitation facilities, while in Jordan mainly new construction measures were carried out to improve the water and sanitation supply; considerable differences in wage levels between Ethiopia and Jordan and the significantly higher average income in Jordan compared with Ethiopia must also be taken into account; the per capita gross national income (in purchasing power parities) in Jordan was USD 9,154 in 2017, while in Ethiopia it was only USD 2,010.

<sup>25</sup> In the two FC projects in Jordan with UNICEF as the project-executing agency, the “unit costs” of NLG activities in 2015-2017 per person ranged from USD 71 for after-school training for young adults and alternative education, to USD 138 for child protection measures and psychosocial services, to USD 289 for the expansion of informal education for Syrian refugee children and youth. (Conversion rate: 1 USD = EUR 0.9015 = 1 USD).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Effectiveness section.

The flat administrative fee of 8% of the project costs charged by UNICEF was in part higher than the flat administrative fees charged by other UN organisations as project-executing agencies of FC projects; however, at least for the NLG component of the evaluated project, a comparably competent project-executing agency such as UNICEF would hardly have been available under the local conditions.

The term of the project was extended by 10 months compared with the programme proposal; the causes of the delay in the implementation of the project included government access restrictions to the intervention area of component 1, the Berm region and the precarious security situation there, as well as the reallocation of budget items agreed with KfW at the request of the project-executing agency. Taking these factors into account, we rate the project's time efficiency as good overall, as the delays mainly occurred in component 1.

From today's perspective, there are no significant shortcomings in the use of the funds in the project; the objectives were achieved economically. Although we rate the efficiency for component 1 as only satisfactory, the results are in line with expectations as the majority of FC funds were used for component 2. We therefore rate the efficiency as good.

### Efficiency rating: 2

## Impact

The FC project's objective at impact level, which forms the basis of this evaluation, was to contribute to alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian conflict and to improving social cohesion between Syrian refugees and the local population.

Among the worst material impacts of the Syrian conflict and the accompanying massive influx of Syrian refugees to Jordan were the overloading of the water infrastructure and the insufficient absorption capacity of the Jordanian education system. The adverse effects of a lack of education and drinking water on health and on individual and societal development prospects are undisputed in the development policy discussion.<sup>27</sup> The adverse effects of scarce resources on social cohesion and peaceful coexistence between host society and refugees are also discussed. Against this background, the overarching developmental impacts are assessed, which at the same time can only be considered in the context of the UNICEF WASH and NLG programmes in which the FC measures were embedded.<sup>28</sup>

With regard to improving access and the use of a needs-based drinking water supply in component 1, it has not been possible to fully alleviate the effects of the inadequate water supply on health. For example, several cases of waterborne diseases were mentioned in the interviews for this evaluation. In addition, the need to purchase drinking water was described as financially and psychologically burdensome.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, it was confirmed that without the measures implemented, the situation would be significantly worse.

From a development policy perspective, the measures to improve access to and use of high-quality non-formal education and child protection services that, according to the beneficiaries, had a positive impact on learning performance in the formal education system and provided emotional and social support are more positive. As a result of participating in services in Makani centres, problems could be better managed and avoided, self-confidence increased, and new friendships formed (see Effectiveness). In addition, surveyed parents, young people and children were more positive about the future. During the Covid-19 pandemic, services were delivered digitally, and tablets were distributed to Syrian refugee families with school-age children who were participating in the Makani programme.<sup>30</sup> This helped to partially cushion

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<sup>27</sup> See for example, the results of the Human Capital Project of the World Bank; [Human Capital \(worldbank.org\)](https://www.worldbank.org/) (accessed 10/10/2022).

<sup>28</sup> Embedding the FC measures in these programmes also has an impact on the existing allocation gap between FC measures and impacts, as even more external factors have a positive or negative impact on target achievement at impact level as a result.

<sup>29</sup> However, the problem of water scarcity is not to be understood exclusively in the context of the Syria crisis, but is a fundamental problem in Jordan, and especially in the Berm region.

<sup>30</sup> See UNICEF's information on this; available online at <https://www.unicef.org/jordan/stories/maximizing-use-technology-support-vulnerable-children-jordan> (accessed 25/11/2022).

the negative impact of the pandemic on children and young people on educational outcomes and social ties.<sup>31</sup>

When asked directly, beneficiaries and project managers also positively assessed the social cohesion between the Jordanian and Syrian population, which should be promoted through equal access for refugees and the local population to non-formal education opportunities or also through the cooperation of Jordanian teaching and Syrian support staff in Makani centres (see Effectiveness).<sup>32</sup> There have only been a few reports of tensions between Jordanian and Syrian young people, such as in Mafraq. In focus group discussions, however, it became apparent that basic coexistence was not always based on joint activities between Jordanian and Syrian children and young people, but often meant the independent, albeit peaceful coexistence of different groups.

Despite allocation gaps and a lower-than-expected result – in particular for component 1 – we rate the overarching developmental impacts as satisfactory overall, as the projects embedded in UNICEF’s overall commitment made a contribution to alleviating the worst effects of the Syrian conflict and to improving social cohesion between Syrian refugees and the local population.

**Impact rating: 3**

### Sustainability

The transitional aid project was intended to implement fast-acting measures of acute crisis management for the vulnerable population at several Berm locations on the one hand and educational measures supra-regionally in Jordan on the other. The sustainability of the project was therefore not the focus, and this evaluation is based on a reduced claim to sustainability, similar to the final inspection. According to this, sustainability is considered, but no evaluation is made for the overall assessment.

The risks for the continuation of the measures in components 1 and 2, which were pointed out in the 2019 final inspection, continue to exist. Neither the Syrian refugees nor the local population are in a position, either financially or in terms of personnel, to continue with the measures of the two components independently; approaches for institutionalised organisation of self-help by the target group were not discernible at the time of the evaluation. UNICEF, as the project-executing agency, can also only continue the measures that achieved positive results with external financial contributions. This also applies to non-governmental organisations contracted by UNICEF through partnership agreements with the NLG activities in the Makani centres. In view of the country’s strained economic situation, the Jordanian government is not expected to provide any substantial financial support for the continuation of all WASH and NLG activities of the evaluated project. The tasks assigned to a state-owned company for the operation and maintenance of the water infrastructure in Ruwayshed were continued after the end of the project; however, continued improvement of these services would require additional financial resources for the company, which are not sufficiently generated by the water user charges alone. Concepts of non-formal education and psychosocial support in component 2 have not been adopted by the Jordanian Ministry of Education. In any case, the Jordanian government is hesitant about expanding its commitment to Syrian refugees for domestic political reasons. In terms of sustainability, the project’s ability to be connected is rated positively, as component 2 is still being financed at a later date.<sup>33</sup>

At the time of the evaluation, however, the sustained development effectiveness of the positive results achieved in components 1 and 2 had not been guaranteed and will instead deteriorate without further financial support from the international donor community of WASH and NLG activities. This applies to the operation and maintenance of parts of the water infrastructure implemented with FC funds and to the continuation of the NLG services. In this respect, the sustainability of the project would not be rated as suffi-

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<sup>31</sup> See Jones et al. (2022); available online at [Compounding inequalities: Adolescent psychosocial wellbeing and resilience among refugee and host communities in Jordan during the COVID-19 pandemic | PLOS ONE](https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244444) (accessed 09/07/2022).

<sup>32</sup> The positive assessment of social cohesion is also in line with the findings of the evaluation report of the Makani centres, according to which 95% of the beneficiary parents felt that the Makani programme had helped their children to feel more connected to the community and that 92% of young people felt safer in their community thanks to Makani offers; see Hall (2021): UNICEF Jordan: Makani Summative Evaluation 2021 – Final Report.

<sup>33</sup> Germany has already made commitments to finance 32 UNICEF Makani centres, including all services offered there, as well as to provide Makani services in informal refugee tents.

cient. As the project was designed from the outset with a reduced claim to sustainability and is only intended to have a bridging effect in the logic of transitional aid, the assessment of sustainability is not considered in the overall assessment of this evaluation.

**Sustainability rating: [4]**



### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance**, **coherence**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency**, **impact** and **sustainability**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's development effectiveness. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	very successful: result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	successful: fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	moderately successful: project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	moderately unsuccessful: significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results.
<b>Level 5</b>	unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	highly unsuccessful: the project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all six individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1–3 of the overall rating denote a “successful” project while rating levels 4–6 denote an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the development objective (“impact”) **and** the sustainability are rated at least “moderately successful” (level 3).