

»» Ex-post evaluation

Support to the education sector by Syrian refugees, Jordan (Phase II)

Title	Support for the education sector by Syrian refugees (Phase II)		
Sector and CRS code	Primary education (1122000)		
Project number	2019 40 766		
Commissioned by	BMZ		
Recipient/Programme executing agency	UNICEF		
Project volume/Financing instrument	EUR 6,000,000		
Project duration	2020-2022		
Year of report	2024	Year of random sample	2024

Objectives and project outline


At impact level, the programme aimed to improve the living conditions of Syrian school support staff at Jordanian educational institutions in the short term and the learning conditions of Syrian children at formal and non-formal educational institutions in the refugee camps and host Jordanian communities. At the outcome level, the aim was to increase the income of auxiliary staff and strengthen the personnel capacities of educational institutions. A dual objective and a limited sustainability claim were confirmed. The programme financed expense allowances for Syrian assistant workers at educational institutions via the executing agency UNICEF.

Key findings

In the short and medium term, the programme contributed to improving the income of Syrian beneficiaries and to the educational success of Syrian children and young refugees in Jordan. However, the sustainability of the measures is at considerable risk. For the following reasons, the programme is nevertheless rated as "successful":

- Due to the virulent crisis situation, the limited capacities available and the target groups' inability to help themselves, the programme has a limited sustainability claim.
- The project addressed the needs of Syrian refugees for income and good working conditions as well as the needs of Syrian children and young people for a safe and orderly learning environment and individual support in line with the context and opportunities.
- The programme fulfilled the objectives at outcome level for the short-term employment of Syrian assistant workers and personnel support for educational institutions.
- The deployment of the Syrian assistants benefited a large number of Syrian children and young people and had a positive impact in the areas of language and reading skills, reducing violence in schools and preventing school drop-outs. As a link to the Syrian community, they promoted social integration.
- In a context in which the employment rate of female Syrian refugees was 7 %, the project was able to achieve a 60 % share of women among the Syrian auxiliary staff.

Overall rating:
Successful



Conclusions

- The project developed a successful model for supporting the educational pathways of refugee children and young people through support-ers with a similar refugee back-ground.
- The legal framework conditions, in particular the closure of the Jordanian education sector to foreign skilled workers, limited the sustainability of the programme. The educational institutions were therefore unable to take on the auxiliary staff on a permanent basis.
- The project showed that a high proportion of women among the project beneficiaries is possible if the project creates acceptable working conditions for women in suitable sectors.

Ex-post evaluation - assessment according to OECD DAC criteria

Overview of the rating per criterion:

Relevance	2
Coherence	2
Effectiveness	2
Efficiency	3
Overarching developmental impact	3
Sustainability	(4)
Overall rating:	2

Brief description of the project


The project "Supporting the education sector through Syrian refugees" (Phase II) aimed to improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees through the opportunity to volunteer and to improve the capacities of educational institutions through the deployment of Syrian refugees. This was to be achieved by creating short-term employment opportunities, which in turn gave Syrian refugee children and young people better access to educational programmes. To this end, monthly incentive payments were made to Syrian assistant workers in various educational institutions, including public schools, schools in the refugee camps, state youth centres and UNICEF-run children and youth centres (Makani centres). This contributed to the livelihoods of the participating refugees. The refugees were deployed as assistant teachers, cleaners, guards, caretakers, transport escorts, carers and camp workers. In their various roles, the auxiliary staff supported the educational institutions and helped to improve the quality of education there. The direct target group was voluntary Syrian refugee assistant workers in the education sector (approx. 1,000 people per school year), while the indirect target group was Syrian refugee children and young people (approx. 120,000 per school year) as well as Jordanian children and young people. Around 340 educational institutions, in particular schools, kindergartens, youth and Makani centres, in the refugee camps and host benefited from the work of the Syrian assistant workers. Regionally, the educational institutions where Syrian assistant workers were deployed were concentrated in the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps and the governorates of Amman, Al Mafraq, Irbid and Zarqa, where the majority of Syrian refugees were located. The project was implemented by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). It was implemented by local non-governmental organisations for the Makani centres and with the support of personnel management companies for the schools in close coordination with the Jordanian Ministry of Education (MoE), the Ministry of Youth (MoY) and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSD). The financial contribution totalled EUR 6,000,000. The second phase of the project, which was implemented from December 2019 to December 2021, is evaluated here. The fourth and final phase of the project will end in November 2024.

Breakdown of total costs

The total costs are broken down as follows:

In EUR million	Inv. costs (plan)	Inv. costs (actual)	AM (plan)	AM (actual)
Total costs	6,0	6,0	x	x
Own contribution	0,0	0,0	x	x
External financing	0,0	0,0	x	x
<i>of which budget funds</i>	<i>6,0</i>	<i>6,0</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>x</i>

Map of the project country incl. project areas: Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps and governorates in Jordan



The map shows the absolute number of Syrian refugees in the individual governorates and refugee camps in Jordan as well as their percentage distribution across the various governorates. It is clear that the majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan in 2022 were in the greater Amman area and in the northern governorates of Irbid and Al Mafrq on the Syrian border. The map also shows the location of the Zaatari refugee camp (ZAT) in Al Mafrq governorate, where 10.7 % of Syrian refugees lived, and Azraq (AZR) in Zarqa governorate, where 5.8 % of Syrian refugees lived. The programme was active in the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps as well as throughout the country. The number and regional distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan has remained largely constant since 2015 (UNHCR 2024).

Rating according to OECD DAC criteria

Relevance

1. Alignment with policies and priorities

The objectives of the programme were based on the BMZ's strategic guidelines valid during the project period. Since 2015, these have focused on creating professional and economic prospects for refugees and locals as well as supporting the country in receiving refugees.

The measure was funded by the Special Initiative "Tackling the causes of displacement, (re-)integrating refugees". Accordingly, the measure aimed to combat the causes of displacement by providing short-term employment opportunities for Syrian refugees. The measure was part of the BMZ's "Middle East Employment Initiative" (BONO), which aimed to "improve the living conditions of refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and vulnerable populations in host communities in the countries most affected by the Syrian crisis by providing short-term employment and income opportunities"¹ (BMZ 2021). In doing so, BONO envisaged community-orientated activities for refugees with a focus on education and health and also wanted to make a "contribution to social peace". With its dual objective of creating employment opportunities for Syrian refugees and promoting access to education for Syrian children and young people, the programme implemented the BMZ's political guidelines. It is a stand-alone measure that was not part of any development cooperation programme.

At an international level, the programme contributed to the "No Lost Generation" initiative launched by UNICEF and the World Bank in 2013, which advocated for access to protection and education for all children and young people affected by the Syrian crisis. The programme was also aligned with the objectives of the Jordanian government's "Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis (2020-2022)"⁽²⁾. This aimed to sustainably provide high-quality education for children and young people affected by the Syrian crisis and emphasised the need to build additional capacity in the education system. To improve the income situation of the refugees, the plan provided the creation of short-term work opportunities as part of the *Cash for Work* programme in addition to long-term approaches. The project was also in line with the Jordanian government's "Accelerating Access to Education Initiative" (2016-2020), which aimed to ensure free access to education for Syrian refugee children and young people with international support. Another frame of reference was the Jordanian Ministry of Education's "Education Strategic Plan 2018-2020", which pointed out the additional burden on the education system caused by the influx of refugees and provided for an expansion of educational capacity to accommodate the refugee pupils. The project also built on the "Jordan Compact" of 2016, in which the Jordanian government committed to issuing a total of 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees.

The design of the project was in line with the legal framework to which refugees in Jordan are subject. These include the need for a work permit for salaried activities and the closure of the education sector to foreign labour³. As a result of these regulations, the Syrians' work in the education sector had to be defined as "voluntary work". Instead of an employment contract, they received a "memorandum of understanding" and an "incentive payment" instead of a salary. In addition, their social security as volunteers under Jordanian labour law was worse than that of Jordanian employees. Due to the closure of the education sector to refugee workers, the Syrians were considered "*assistants*"⁽⁴⁾ despite having the relevant qualifications and were not allowed to take on any independent teaching tasks. In state schools, they were not allowed to enter the classrooms in the absence of the Jordanian teacher.

The programme had various references to the quality characteristics of the BMZ. By creating culturally appropriate work opportunities at reputable public institutions in the fields of education, training, social work and cleaning, the programme particularly appealed to women. This took place against the backdrop of a very low employment rate among Syrian women. Pupils with physical and mental disabilities have many disadvantages in the Jordanian school system. By deploying Syrian support staff to accompany affected pupils in everyday school life, among other things, the project was able to make a limited contribution to inclusion. Other important tasks of the Syrian assistant workers included improving communication between the Syrian families and the Jordanian school system as well as mediating disputes between Syrian and Jordanian pupils in the schoolyard. The project thus met the target groups' need for better integration of Syrian refugees and greater social cohesion. The programme contributed to Sustainable Development Goals 1 (No poverty), 4 (Quality education), 5 (Gender equality), 8 (Decent work and economic growth) and 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions).

¹ BMZ, 2021: Conceptual framework for the implementation of the Middle East Employment Initiative as part of the Special Initiative on Displacement. Bonn/Berlin.

² Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2020: Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2020-2022. Amman.

³ Stave, Sven Erik et al, 2021: Impact of work permits on decent work for Syrians in Jordan. Amman

⁴ Differentiation between higher qualified auxiliary staff (assistant teachers in the broad sense (break supervision, support with attendance checks, individual case support, etc.) and lower qualified work profiles (security and cleaning staff, etc.).

2. Alignment with the needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders

The project met both the need of Syrian children and young people who had fled their country to have access to high-quality education and the need of Syrian refugees for at least a temporary income. The Jordanian education system was already overburdened before the Syrian crisis. Jordanian schools were overcrowded, and lesson times were reduced due to the establishment of afternoon classes. Due to staff shortages, teachers had to teach very large classes and often did not have the necessary professional and pedagogical qualifications to do so. Male teachers in particular used violence as a means of disciplining pupils. The conditions resulted in high school drop-out rates and poor learning outcomes. For example, only 60 % of students in secondary school could read and write.⁵ This situation was further exacerbated by the arrival of large numbers of Syrian refugee children and young people from 2013 onwards.

In 2020, there were 656,103 registered Syrian refugees living in Jordan, including 233,000 children and adolescents of school age (5-17 years) who were guaranteed free access to education by the Jordanian state.⁶ In the 2019/2020 school year, 136,400 (58 %) Syrian refugee children were enrolled in a formal educational institution in the 2019/2020 school year, compared to 143,765 in the 2020/2021 school year. 86.6 % of Syrian children in grades 1-10 attended school (compared to 96.6 % of Jordanian children), but only 30 % in grades 11 and 12 (compared to 74.4 % of Jordanians) (Ministry of Planning 2020). Around 19 % of Syrian refugees lived in refugee camps, while the remaining 81 % lived in Amman and cities in northern Jordan. In the refugee camps, the refugees attended their own schools, which were run by the Ministry of Education with Jordanian teaching staff. Outside the refugee camps, afternoon lessons for the refugee pupils were taught on the premises of regular schools, while the schools were used to teach Jordanian pupils in the mornings. In both types of school, the quality of teaching was below the level of the regular Jordanian schools. This was partly due to the shorter lesson times, the inadequate infrastructure and the lower qualifications and motivation of the Jordanian teaching staff, who were employed there on temporary contracts.⁷ At the same time, there were reports of a high level of violence, excessively harsh punishments for misbehaviour by pupils and frequent conflicts in the schools for Syrian refugees⁸. For these reasons, learning performance in refugee schools was significantly lower than in regular Jordanian schools. Other obstacles to school attendance included administrative challenges in registering pupils, the high cost of school materials, clothing and transport, as well as experiences of discrimination and violence at school. For economic reasons, many boys had to leave school early to work, while many girls were married off early⁹. Taken together, these factors restricted Syrian children and young people's access to education.

The deployment of the Syrian assistant workers at the afternoon schools and the schools in the refugee camps was aimed at overcoming some of these bottlenecks and thereby turning these children's right to education into reality. In the afternoon schools, the auxiliary staff was to support the regular teaching staff in ensuring discipline and order on the school grounds, in administrative tasks such as attendance control and distribution of school materials, and in dealing with learning and behavioural problems of individual pupils. In the refugee camps, the assistants were also deployed to promote the acquisition of reading skills in kindergarten and primary school. Their tasks also included acting as a mediator between the school and Syrian parents in the event of conflicts and intervening in cases of imminent school dropout due to child labour or early marriage. In the non-educational area, Syrian assistant workers were deployed in the refugee camps to ensure the safety and cleanliness of the educational facilities.

⁵ Presler-Marshall, Elizabeth et al, 2023: Education in Jordan: Post-COVID opportunities and challenges for young people. London: Gender and Adolescence Global Evidence.

⁶ UNHCR, Registered Syrians in Jordan, February 2020. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/74320>

⁷ UNICEF, 2020: Jordan Country Report on Out-of-School Children. Amman.

⁸ UNICEF/National Council for Family Affairs, 2021: National Study on Violence Against Children in Jordan 2019-2020. Amman.

⁹ Ibid.

To combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Education imposed far-reaching school closures from March 2020 to April 2021. To mitigate the consequences, the Ministry of Education developed the internet-based learning platform "Darsak" for grades 1-12 and television programmes to support distance learning. Nevertheless, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated learning inequality in Jordan, as many students could barely read and write, had no access to online services or were not supported by their parents. During the school closures, the educational assistants supported awareness-raising and prevention tasks, such as spreading hygiene messages distributing hygiene kits. They also maintained contact with the families of the Syrian pupils and supported them with e-learning through messages and videos on social media. They were also available to answer technical or content-related questions about the Darsak learning platform. In this way, they helped to maintain access to education for Syrian children and young people even during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Given the high number of Syrian (and Jordanian) children and young people who have never attended school or dropped out early, non-formal education is of particular importance in Jordan.¹⁰ The Ministry of Education offers complementary learning opportunities in its youth centres to support young people in school or to enable them to change to a regular school and acquire basic skills. Similar courses are also offered by various charitable institutions and non-governmental organisations. UNICEF works with them on its Makani programme, in which vulnerable children and young people can receive multi-dimensional support services. As part of the Makani programme, which is supported by various donors, UNICEF operates children's and youth centres in particularly disadvantaged districts, informal tent settlements and refugee camps via local non-governmental organisations. There, disadvantaged Syrian and Jordanian children and young people and their families receive integrated support services such as educational counselling, early education, literacy, leisure activities and vocational preparation. In 2021, UNICEF operated 140 Makani centres in 12 governorates and in the Azraq and Zaatari refugee camps, which were attended by a total of 160,000 children and young people.¹¹ Syrian assistant workers were deployed in the state youth centres and the Makani centres, where they took on important tasks in care, tutoring and social work.

The project also met the need of Syrian refugees for a regular income. In 2021, the poverty rate among Syrian refugees in refugee camps was 45%¹² and in host communities 62%¹³. Syrian refugees outside the camps were dependent on an income from work and, at 33 % (2021), had the same labour market participation rate as the Jordanian population. Due to the restrictive issuing of work permits, Syrians only find legal employment in the construction sector, agriculture, industry and the hotel and catering industry, where working conditions are precarious and pay is low. The education sector, like many other sectors, is closed to non-Jordanian nationals, i.e. no work permits are issued for employment in this sector.¹⁴ The access of people in the refugee camps to gainful employment is further restricted, as they are only allowed to leave the camps with a valid work permit. By far the most important work opportunity for them is therefore the temporary *incentive-based volunteering* (IBV) provided by various international actors, as offered by this project. According to the study, 62% of all employees in Azraq and 28% in Zaatari work in this type of auxiliary activity, followed by seasonal agricultural work, factory work and trade. In addition to income from their own work, Syrian refugees inside and outside the refugee camps received support services from UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP). In the refugee camps, the share of labour income in the total income of Syrian families was 20% (Azraq) or 36% (Zaatari), outside the camps it was 54%¹⁵. Against this backdrop, the work opportunities provided by the project a significant source of income, albeit a short-term one for the low-skilled labourers. The employment of the low-skilled auxiliary workers, who were deployed in particular at educational institutions in the refugee camps, was based on the rotation principle and lasted between two and six months. In contrast, the highly qualified auxiliary staff, who was employed in educational and social workers and administrative staff was employed for up to one year, although their employment could be extended. Only very few Syrian refugees succeeded in earning a stable income of their own, for example by providing online tutoring. It can therefore be concluded that the project was designed to make an important, but for the low-skilled workers only short-term, contribution to the economic stabilisation of the families of the beneficiaries.

¹⁰ Assaad, Ragui et al., 2022: Youth Transitions to Adulthood in Jordan: High Aspirations, Challenging Realities. Amman: UNICEF.

¹¹ Samuel Hall, 2022: Summative Impact Evaluation of the UNICEF Jordan Makani Programme. Amman: UNICEF.

¹² UNHCR, 2024a: Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Socio-Economic Survey on Refugees in Camps. Amman.

¹³ UNHCR, 2024b: Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Socio-Economic Survey on Refugees in Host Communities. Amman.

¹⁴ International Rescue Committee, 2017: Overview of Right to Work for Refugees. Syria Crisis Response: Lebanon and Jordan. Amman.

¹⁵ Ibid.

The programme aimed to meet the needs of particularly disadvantaged groups, which was reflected, among other things, in the selection of educational institutions where the Syrian assistant workers were deployed. Overall, the Syrian children and young people who have fled are to be considered vulnerable due to their precarious legal and economic situation.¹⁶ Among these, the Syrian assistant workers particularly supported children with learning and behavioural problems, disabilities and those who are at risk due to various vulnerabilities such as e.g. child labour or forced marriage were at risk of falling out of the education system. The informal education programmes supported by the assistant workers in the Makani centres were aimed at particularly vulnerable children and young people from all population groups - Jordanian and non-Jordanian - who either did not attend school or whose learning success at risk. Special mention should be made here of the children living in informal tent settlements¹⁷ of Syrian migrant workers, as well as members of the Dom ethnic group¹⁸, who among the most marginalised population groups. UNICEF was able to reach them with specially tailored programmes via locally recruited Syrian assistant workers.

The programme was particularly geared towards providing employment opportunities for refugee women. While the employment rate for Syrian women refugees was only 7 % in 2019, the proportion of women among the auxiliary workers was 60 %. Many of these had already worked as teachers in Syria and were therefore particularly qualified. Overall, the programme was aimed at highly qualified refugees who, for example, bachelor's degrees in psychology, education, teaching, information technology or engineering. However, around half of the employment opportunities, such as cleaning staff, guards and bus escorts, were open to low-skilled refugees and therefore particularly vulnerable people. This also includes the population in the refugee camps who are cut off from the labour market, where the project offered a particularly large number of work opportunities for Syrian auxiliary workers, including low-skilled ones.

From today's perspective, it can be criticised that the project focused exclusively on Syrian refugees and was not also open to around 70,000 refugees of other nationalities in Jordan (e.g. Iraqis, Afghans, Yemenis, Sudanese).¹⁹ At the time of the evaluation, these refugees had similar poverty rates to the Syrian refugees²⁰.

3. Appropriateness of design

The programme's objectives were not precisely formulated from an ex-post perspective. The programme objective (impact level) is: "Access to employment opportunities for Syrian refugees is created and their social protection is improved". Module objective 1 (outcome level) aims to "improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees through the opportunity to volunteer in educational institutions". Module objective 2 (outcome level) to "improve the capacities of educational institutions through the deployment of Syrian refugees". From today's perspective, it should be noted that the programme objective ("access to ...") located at the output level, while module objective 1 ("improving living conditions through voluntary service") is located at the programme objective or impact level. Module objective 2, on the other hand, is correctly located at outcome level.

The module objective indicator 1.1 (number of Syrian assistants working at educational institutions) measures an output of the programme and should therefore be placed at this level. Module objective indicator 2.1 ("Number of Syrian children and young people benefiting from the increased capacities at the educational institutions") is not suitable for measuring the improved capacity of the educational institutions envisaged in module objective 2. Rather, it measures the number of Syrian children and young people who attend a formal or non-formal educational institution in Jordan - with and without the help of the programme. Nevertheless, this indicator provides a rough overview of the number of children and young people who have potentially benefited from the work of the Syrian assistant workers. No detailed data was or is for the indicator, meaning that the number of children and young people can only be estimated. In the project documents, the estimate is justified by the unjustifiably high effort that would be required to accurately measure the indicator.

¹⁶ Gray Meral, Amanda et al., 2022: Inclusion and exclusion in urban refugee displacement in Jordan. HPG working paper. London: ODI.

¹⁷ UNICEF, 2021: Baseline Socio-economic Assessment of Households with Children and Youth Living in Informal Tented Settlements in Jordan. Amman.

¹⁸ ODI, 2021: Empowering adolescents through an integrated programming approach: exploring the effects of UNICEF's Makani programme on Dom adolescents' well-being in Jordan. Amman/London.

¹⁹ UNHCR, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/jor>

²⁰ UNHCR, 2024: Jordan Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Socio-Economic Survey on Refugees in Host Communities. Amman.

Output 1.1. refers to the number of employment opportunities created by the programme for Syrian refugees. To this end, output indicator 1.1. measures the number of jobs financed by the programme for Syrian assistants in the education sector. Output and indicator are correctly located at the output level. Output 2.1. is aimed at the number of afternoon schools supported by Syrian auxiliary staff, which is correctly measured by output indicator 2.1. However, it only became apparent during the course of the project that the Jordanian Ministry of Education only authorised the deployment of 180 auxiliary staff in afternoon schools, that alternative deployment options had to be found in order to achieve the target of 1,000 Syrian as auxiliary staff in the education sector (module objective 1.1.). For this reason, additional assistant workers were deployed to schools and kindergartens in the refugee camps and to the youth and Makani centres. This is not reflected in the indicator.

Some of the weaknesses of the project's target system are due to the fact that they were carried over from the first phase of the project. Due to the new nature of this project, many individual aspects were still unclear at the start of the first phase (2017), meaning that some of the objectives and indicators were not formulated appropriately. From a current perspective, the number of module target indicators was insufficient. The dual objective applied here no longer corresponds to the currently valid specifications²¹, but was appropriate for the design of this programme. The specific design of the programme was indeed aimed at creating income opportunities for Syrian refugees and at the same time improving the quality of education at facilities for Syrian refugee children and young people. The values of the indicators were appropriate and the target values were achieved with the available budget. The project was not assigned to a development cooperation programme.

The project is based on two interwoven results chains, which were reconstructed on the basis of the target system as follows: "Creating employment opportunities for Syrian refugees in formal and non-formal educational institutions for Syrian and Jordanian children and young people" (output) enables the employment of Syrian refugees as volunteers in these positions (outcome). As a result, refugees increase their income in the short term (outcome) and their living conditions (programme objective/impact level) are improved, at least in the short term. At the same time, the support provided to state schools and non-formal educational institutions by Syrian assistant workers (output) should help to improve their capacities (module objective 2) and increase the quality of the education on offer (impact level). Refugee Syrian children and young people should benefit from this."

The concept of the programme was fundamentally suited to tackling the dual problem of the lack of good employment opportunities for Syrian refugees and the insufficient capacity of the educational institutions created primarily for Syrian children and young people. On the one hand, the programme created temporary employment opportunities that could last several months for the low-skilled and several years for the highly skilled. At the same time, the employment of the Syrian auxiliary staff made a contribution - albeit a moderate one - to improving the learning conditions at formal and non-formal educational institutions inside and outside the refugee camps. As the auxiliary staff was not allowed to work independently in education for legal reasons, their contribution focused on providing educational support to the teachers, social work activities in the schoolyard and with the families of the children and young people, administrative activities and maintaining an orderly, safe and clean learning environment (e.g. through janitorial, storage, security and cleaning services). However, these capacities were always provided by the project on a temporary basis and in addition to the regular structures. The programme was not designed to anchor these capacities in the Jordanian education system in the long term.

While the employment of the highly qualified helpers was designed to be long-term, the employment of the low-skilled helpers was organised on a rotational basis in order to provide as many people as possible with this type of employment opportunity. In view of limited project funds, the income effect for the individual household always had to be weighed against the principle of fairness towards other equally needy households. The highly qualified assistants were employed on a long-term basis for at least one year, as they carried out more specialised activities that required more training. In addition, the children and young people should be given a stable, long-term relationship with a trusted person.

²¹ BMZ procedural information on the impact matrix

Overall, with its focus on around 1,000 assistant workers, the project was not geared towards broad-based employment promotion. In contrast, the assistant workers were able to reach a very large proportion of the Syrian school population in Jordan through their work in the schools, youth and Makani centres. The measure was aimed at improving the educational level of the young Syrian population in Jordan and thus at an important social dimension of sustainable development.

4. Adaptability – response to change

Building on the lessons learnt from the first project phase (2017-2019), some adjustments were made to the project concept in the second phase. These included the introduction of training measures for the Syrian assistant workers on topics such as child protection, violence prevention and database management, the formalisation of the recruitment and management of assistant workers, the development of *standard operating procedures* by the personnel service provider in consultation with UNICEF to increase the transparency and regularity of the assistant workers' personnel management, the introduction of transport and communication allowances and improved social security for the assistant workers, the introduction of a complaints mechanism and the termination of cooperation with the state youth centres.

Phase II (2020-2021) of the project was decisively shaped by the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated school closures. In close dialogue with KfW, UNICEF was able to quickly adapt the project to the new conditions. The pedagogical staff recruited in the first few months of 2020 (approx. 660 people) continued to be employed throughout, while the recruitment of security and cleaning staff was suspended due to a lack of demand²². In the refugee camps, the educational assistants were involved in the extensive UNICEF measures for health prevention and the maintenance of educational measures. This included the distribution of face masks and support for e-learning. After the end of the school closures, the Syrian assistant workers supported learning programmes such as "Learning Bridges"²³, which helped learners catch up on missed school material. KfW and UNICEF showed great flexibility in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, enabling important and appropriate adjustments to the project.

Rating summary

Due to the clear focus on the general conditions for Syrian refugees in Jordan and the capacities of the institutions there, the clear reference to the needs of the Syrian assistant workers and pupils, the convincing implementation of the dual objective of the project and its adaptability, the relevance of the project is rated as "successful". The unsatisfactory formulation of the target system from today's perspective has a limiting effect.

Relevance: 2

Coherence

5. Internal coherence

The project was part of an extensive development cooperation portfolio in Jordan. During the project period, the BMZ supported the creation of short-term employment and income opportunities (*cash for work*) as part of the "Middle East Employment Initiative" with the instruments of Financial and Technical Cooperation in various areas such as waste management, water management and the maintenance of public infrastructures. For decades, FC has had an extensive portfolio in the Jordanian education sector, with which there were numerous complementarities. For example, FC (BMZ no. 2018 49 686) financed the maintenance and repair of public schools via UNOPS, some of which may have been used as afternoon schools for Syrian refugees.

²² Security staff were also able to work during school closures (taking protective measures into account). Cleaning staff could only be rehired during the opening of educational institutions. During the continuous school closures in the first half of 2020, the salaries of the affected cleaning staff continued to be paid until the end of their contracts. However, new positions were only filled when schools temporarily reopened from September 2020.

²³ UNICEF, 2022: Learning Bridges. Impact Study. Amman.

An extensive FC programme financed the salaries of around 7,000 teachers and administrative staff who taught Syrian children and young people at the afternoon schools and schools in the refugee camps. The Syrian assistant workers supported by the programme evaluated here worked directly with the FC-financed Jordanian teachers. There was a further complementarity with the FC project (BMZ no. 2019 18 275), which supported UNICEF in the operation of 32 Makani centres, where Syrian assistant workers were also deployed. TC was also involved in the areas of school refurbishment, the promotion of extracurricular activities and the introduction of early childhood education in the Jordanian school system. As part of this policy, kindergartens were opened in the refugee camps, where Syrian assistant workers were deployed to provide support. Furthermore, FC (BMZ No. 2017 68 258) cooperated with UNICEF in expanding the water supply in the Zaatari refugee camp, so that this project was able to build on established working relationships between KfW and UNICEF. Overall, it can be seen that this programme is closely interlinked conceptually with other German development cooperation measures.

The relevant FC measures were managed by the KfW office in Amman. At the level of German development cooperation, there was a close exchange with the Jordanian Ministry of Labour with regard to issuing work permits for Syrian assistant workers. To this end, a separate DC-financed unit was set up in the Ministry of Labour. No information is available on the specific operational coordination of this project with other relevant projects, such as the school maintenance programme implemented by UNOPS. Within UNICEF, there was a close exchange between the units that managed the project evaluated here and those that managed the operation of the Makani centres. This facilitated the sensible and pedagogically demanding deployment of assistant workers at the Makani centres.

The programme supported the implementation of international norms and standards. These include the human right to education, international labour standards for the employment of Syrian assistant workers and gender equality. By supporting the integration of refugees into national structures, the programme also contributed to the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees (2018).

6. External coherence

Existing partner structures could only be partially utilised. The programme was originally designed to support the Ministry of Education's afternoon schools. However, as the Ministry of Education only allowed a limited number (180) of Syrian assistant workers at these schools, the project had to rely more heavily on the structures operated by UNICEF, such as the Makani centres and the camp schools. Coordination with the Jordanian education administration took place at the level of the individual afternoon schools. There was no fixed contact person for the project in the Ministry of Education. In the schools, the school management was responsible for monitoring the attendance and quality of work of the auxiliary staff. This information was shared with the external staff of the personnel service provider, who calculated the salaries on this basis and conducted annual appraisal interviews with the auxiliary staff.

The project was also part of UNICEF's overarching country programme in Jordan, which focuses on health, education, children's rights, young people, hygiene and social security.²⁴ During the project period UNICEF chaired the Education Working Group, which coordinated UN organisations and non-governmental organisations on educational measures inside and outside the refugee camps. UNICEF also took part in the *Cash for Work* Working Group meetings to coordinate with the Ministry of Labour and other international partners on the implementation of short-term job creation measures.

Rating summary

The coherence of the programme is rated as "successful" due to the sensible integration of the programme into the German development cooperation portfolio in the education sector, the efforts to ensure good coordination of the measures with other international partners and the - albeit difficult - cooperation with the Jordanian Ministry of Education in supporting the afternoon schools.

Coherence: 2

²⁴ Universalia, 2022: Jordan Country Programme Evaluation 2018-2022. Final Evaluation Report. Amman: UNICEF.

Effectiveness

7. Achievement of (intended) goals

The project pursued a dual module objective (outcome) at project appraisal: 1) The living conditions of Syrian refugees have improved thanks to the opportunity to volunteer in educational institutions. 2) The capacities at the educational institutions have been improved through the deployment of Syrian refugees. This target system was adapted as follows as part of the EPE:

Dual programme objective (impact level): 1. (Short-term) improvement of the living conditions of Syrian assistant workers at Jordanian educational institutions, 2. improvement of the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people at formal and non-formal educational institutions in the refugee camps and in the host Jordanian communities.

Double module objective (outcome level): 1.1. (Short-term) increase in the income of Syrian assistant workers, 2.1 Improving the personnel capacities of the above-mentioned educational institutions by employing Syrian auxiliary staff

Outputs: 1.1.1. creation of (partly short-term) employment opportunities for Syrian assistants at the educational institutions mentioned, 2.1.1. support for the educational institutions mentioned through the deployment of Syrian assistants

Proxy indicators are used to measure the achievement of the programme's objectives, which measure the number of Syrian assistant workers, the number of educational institutions where they were deployed and the number of children and young people who potentially benefited from the work of the assistant workers. UNICEF has reported to KfW on these indicators. Accordingly, the achievement of the project objectives at outcome level can be summarised as follows:

Table Target achievement Outcome:

Indicator	Status at PA	Target value according to PA/EPE	Actual value at PCR (optional)	Actual value at EPE
(1) Number of deployed Syrian refugees in educational institutions	0	1,000 per year (thereof 50% women)	2020: 1,279 (thereof 768 (60%) women) 2021: 1,222 (thereof 724 (60%) women)	0 (The measure has been terminated) Value fulfilled
(2) Number of Syrian refugee children and young people who benefited from the increased capacities at the educational institutions	0	67,000 children in schools 80,000 children in Makani and youth centres	Up to 76,293 (2020) and 81,487 (2021) in schools Up to 84,879 (2020) and 71,393 (2021) in Makani and youth centres	0 (The measure has since been terminated). Value fulfilled
(3) Number of educational institutions that benefited from the deployment of Syrian assistant workers	0	150 schools	169 schools (thereof 24 in refugee camps 94 Makani centres 75 Youth centres)	0 (The measure has been terminated) Value fulfilled

8. Contribution to achieving the objectives

Provision and utilisation of services

The programme has delivered its outputs as planned. It created employment opportunities for Syrian refugees (output 1.1.) by funding jobs as auxiliary staff in the education sector. With the creation of 1,043 jobs in 2020 and 938 jobs in 2021, it exceeded the target of 760 new jobs (output indicator 1.1.). A total of 1,279 people benefited from these job opportunities in 2020 and 1,222 people in 2021. In 2020, 184 auxiliary workers were deployed at state afternoon schools in the host communities, 612 auxiliary workers at schools and kindergartens in the Azraq and Zaatari refugee camps, 311 auxiliary workers at state youth centres and 172 auxiliary workers at Makani centres. In consultation with KfW, the incentive payments for the highly qualified Syrian assistant workers already recruited were continued during the school closures in 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and their tasks were adjusted. State schools that educate Syrian children and young people were supported by the Syrian assistant workers (Output 2.1.). During the project period, the Syrian assistant workers were deployed at 145 afternoon schools in host communities, 9 kindergartens and 15 schools in the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps, 75 state youth centres and 94 Makani centres. This included 45 Makani centres in informal tent settlements. In total, 340 educational institutions were supported by Syrian assistant workers²⁵.

UNICEF endeavoured to make access to the employment opportunities supported by this project as open and transparent as possible. For the highly qualified positions, the personnel service provider (for the schools) and UNICEF's implementation partners (for the youth and Makani centres) drew up a job profile and a job description, which they published on various social media platforms and circulated in the vicinity of the schools and youth centres as well as among former assistant workers. Applicants had to provide proof of registration as refugees with the UNHCR and the Ministry of the Interior. Candidates were selected on the basis of their qualifications and experience as well as two interviews. The applicants' training, professional aptitude, relevant work experience and social skills were taken into account. In the case of former auxiliary staff who reapplied for a position, the performance evaluation of their previous activities was also taken into account. The low-skilled positions in the refugee camps were filled on the basis of the rotation rules introduced there by UNHCR. Here, neediness and the avoidance of double funding were important selection criteria. The actual transparency and openness of the recruitment process could not be verified as part of this evaluation. No information is available on irregularities in the allocation auxiliary staff positions, although they cannot be ruled out. The Syrian assistants performed different tasks at their various places of deployment. At the afternoon schools in the host communities, the assistants supported attendance monitoring, distributed learning materials, supported the mobility of learners with disabilities, supervised the playground, communicated with Syrian parents in the event of imminent school dropout together with the school social workers and supported the schools' work with parents. During school closures, they communicated with parents and students via social media, supported students in using the Darsak learning platform and prepared them for their online exams. Together with the personnel service provider, UNICEF developed specific work profiles for the Syrian assistant workers at the kindergartens and schools in the refugee camps. In the highly qualified area, this included work as an assistant teacher with a focus on a) community work ("out-reach"), in particular monitoring attendance and supporting parents in the event of imminent school drop-out, b) early childhood education, in particular supporting language development through various educational activities in the kindergartens and first years of school, c) administration, in particular supporting the school management with documentation tasks. In addition, low-qualified auxiliary staff were employed as security and cleaning personnel, bus attendants, playground supervisors and caretakers. Some of these staff were also employed during school closures in order to keep the schools in good condition. During this time, the auxiliary teachers supported e-learning and later UNICEF's "Safely Back to School" and "Learning Bridges" programmes, which aimed to close learning gaps.

In the Makani centres, the Syrian assistants were deployed to provide early support for pre-school children and carry out parent-child activities as part of the "Better Parenting" programme.

²⁵ UNICEF, 2021: Progress Report to Government of Germany and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). Contribution agreement BMZ- 2019 40 766 (UNICEF reference: SC200012) for Support to the Education Sector by Syrian Refugees. Amman.

The Syrian assistant workers played an important role in the informal tent settlements. They were selected from among the residents of the tent settlements and thus enjoyed access to these otherwise very closed and highly discriminated groups. There they ran the Makani tents set up by UNICEF and carried out various measures to provide psychosocial support and learning support for the children there. The Makani centres also deployed the assistant workers as links to the local communities, to identify particularly vulnerable children, as bus attendants, for child protection, in "innovation labs" and to promote learning. The Makani centres continued their activities even during the curfews and school closures. At the state youth centres, the Syrian assistant workers supported the implementation of the "Maharati" ("My Skills") learning programme, which UNICEF developed to support particularly vulnerable and marginalised young people. In four modules, the programme taught basic skills such as critical thinking, decision-making, integration into the local community and identification of one's own abilities. In addition, Syrian assistant workers supported youth initiatives and the national platform for voluntary work by young people. Some of these activities were continued online during the lockdown.

The services of the Syrian assistant workers described here were used directly by Syrian and Jordanian children and young people. At the same time, they supported and relieved the regular staff at the respective educational institutions. In interviews, both the educational institutions and the parents and learners were very positive about the contribution of the Syrian auxiliary staff. Their role as a person of trust and contact person for the Syrian community was particularly highlighted. The utilisation of the capacities created by Syrian assistant workers at the educational institutions can thus be confirmed.

Equal access to benefits

The services provided by the Syrian assistant workers were designed to specifically support vulnerable children and young people and were open to them. The high proportion of women (60 %) among the assistant workers meant that a particularly large number of girls and young women could be reached. This was achieved in a context in which the labour force participation rate of Syrian women was only 7 per cent.²⁶ By creating positions for low-skilled assistants at the schools and Makani centres in the refugee camps, the project also enabled particularly disadvantaged groups among the refugees to gain access to an auxiliary activity. However, no data is available on the socio-economic background of the auxiliary staff.

The activities of the assistant workers at the schools, youth and Makani centres were mainly aimed at Syrian children and young people, who represent a disadvantaged group in Jordan. Within this group, many of the assistant workers' activities, such as social work with families and extracurricular education at the Makani centres, were aimed at particularly disadvantaged children and young people.²⁷ However, only children and young people who attended a school or a youth or Makani centre were able to benefit from the project measures. During the project period, around 30 % (50,000) of ultra-vulnerable Syrian children and young people aged 6-15 did not attend school and therefore did not benefit from the project measures²⁸.

Contribution to achieving the objectives

The project measures contributed to increasing the income of the Syrian assistant workers and thus indirectly to a (short-term) improvement in their living conditions. In a context of precarious working conditions and a lack of job opportunities for highly skilled workers, the incentive payments provided by the project were an important source of income for the Syrian assistant workers. The assistant workers were paid on an hourly basis and based on the rates set by the Jordanian Ministry of Labour for volunteers (*cash for work*). In the refugee camps, the incentive payments were based on the UN-HCR regulations. The qualification level, the number of daily working hours, the number of weekly working days and the respective hourly wage were determined for each job on the basis of the respective job description. During the project period, this was between 1 JOD for simple jobs (e.g. cleaner, security guard) and 2 JOD for highly qualified jobs (e.g. assistant teacher, supervisor). Depending on the number of hours worked per week, monthly earnings in the camps ranged from 80 JOD (playground supervisor) to 288 JOD (technical supervisor). With a daily working time of 4 hours, the assistant teachers earned 160 JOD per month. Outside the refugee camps, the wages of the auxiliary staff ranged from 190 JOD in the afternoon schools to 480 JOD for highly qualified full-time work in the Makani centres.

²⁶ United Nations, 2020: Meta-analysis on women's participation in the labour force in Jordan. Amman.

²⁷ UNICEF developed vulnerability criteria on the basis of which the most vulnerable people were identified as a target group.

²⁸ UNICEF, 2020: Country Report on Out-of-School Children. Jordan. Amman.

The length of the respective employment contracts also plays an important role with regard to the income security of the auxiliary staff. In the youth and Makani centres, three-month employment agreements were concluded, which could be extended. No data is available on the contractual details. In the schools, the assistants were only employed for the duration of the respective school term and were dismissed during the summer and winter holidays, which lasted several weeks. They had to reapply for employment in the following school year. In the interviews, however, some people were found who had already been employed by the project for several years - with the aforementioned uncertainties and interruptions. For the low-skilled jobs such as cleaners and guards, rotation systems were in place, according to which a job was only carried out for 3-6 months. In addition, the auxiliary staff had access to social security benefits such as accident and health insurance for the duration of their employment. The amount of the incentive payments provided by the programme roughly corresponded to the income earned by Syrian refugees outside the refugee camps in the industrial (278 JOD), wholesale (258 JOD) and tourism (230 JOD) sectors. It was higher than the usual income in the transport (183 JOD), construction (179 JOD) and agriculture (123 JOD) sectors ²⁹ and at the same time offered a minimum level of social protection. However, due to the short-term labour conditions and limited social security, the situation of the auxiliary workers remained precarious. The programme thus increased the number of job opportunities for Syrian refugees in Jordan but did not put them in a better financial position than Syrians in regular employment. However, the project offered better working conditions than the free market due to the conclusion of the aforementioned Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the regular payment of incentives, a secure working environment and regulated working hours.

The project also contributed to improving the capacities of the educational institutions through the deployment of Syrian assistant workers. With their activities described above, the Syrian assistants relieved the regular staff of the educational institutions and enabled additional educational programmes, e.g. language and reading support for young children. Thanks to their special relationship with the Syrian community, the auxiliary staff also supplemented the Jordanian staff's scope for action, especially when dealing with parents. The interviews also mentioned that the commitment of many assistant workers went beyond their actual job description. For example, some of them provided access to social and economic support services for Syrian families in need. The administrative support staff, transport attendants, caretakers, guards and cleaners also contributed to a safe and orderly learning environment. It can therefore be said that the Syrian assistant workers improved the quality of the educational institutions' capacities, albeit to a limited extent. These improvements directly benefited the intended beneficiaries - Syrian and Jordanian children and young people. A better learning environment and targeted educational measures increased the likelihood of a successful educational career for them. By deploying assistant workers to Makani and youth centres, which offer informal education for particularly vulnerable children and young people, the project endeavoured to reach particularly disadvantaged groups.

The project succeeded in increasing the proportion of women among the Syrian assistant workers to 60 % compared to the previous phase. This was achieved by offering jobs in the education sector, where many women had already worked in Syria. The limited number of hours per day and the safe working environment were particularly attractive to women. In Jordan's gender-segregated education system, the employment of female assistants is essential in order to provide services at girls' schools. Women are also needed in the youth and Makani centres to carry out educational measures with girls and mothers. The programme has thus fully exploited its gender impact potential.

The contribution of Syrian assistant workers to improving the capacities of educational institutions remained limited due to external factors. These include the inadequate financial and material resources of the educational institutions inside and outside the refugee camps, the low level of qualification of the regular staff and existing discriminatory attitudes towards Syrian refugees, which lead to a variety of disadvantages.

9. Quality of implementation

The quality of project implementation was good. In its second phase, the project was able to build on the lessons learnt from the first phase (2017-2019). The programme was implemented by UNICEF, which realized the measure with various implementation partners.

²⁹ UNHCR, Ibid.

For the recruitment and personnel management of the assistant workers, UNICEF worked with a Jordanian company that specialised in personnel services and worked for various UN organisations, including in the refugee camps. It was selected in an open tendering process. During the transition from the first to the second project phase, there was a change of personnel service provider for unknown reasons. In addition, UNICEF worked with the respective Jordanian non-governmental organisations that operated these centres to send assistant workers to the Makani centres. These organisations - as well as the state youth centres - selected the assistant workers independently in open tender procedures and also took over their personnel management.

The measure was managed by UNICEF's education team, which also ensured the coherence of these measures with other ongoing UNICEF programmes. At the same time, the project benefited from the extensive technical expertise of the education team. The deployment of the assistant workers to various educational institutions - schools inside and outside the refugee camps, state youth centres, Makani centres - required UNICEF to increase its management efforts, as the measures had to be coordinated with the Ministry of Education and Youth and numerous other stakeholders. This went largely smoothly.

For legal reasons, UNICEF was unable to employ the Syrian assistant workers itself. For this reason, UNICEF worked together with the Jordanian personnel service provider to manage the assistant workers deployed at the afternoon and camp schools. The tasks of the personnel service provider included advertising the work opportunities, setting up a suitable pool of applicants, subcontracting the assistants, applying for work permits, social insurance for the assistants and preparing them for their tasks. Furthermore, the company - together with the respective school directorate - monitored the attendance and work quality of the assistants and calculated their incentive payments, which were then transferred by UNICEF via a mobile payment service provider. Mobile payment service providers are widespread in Jordan and are used by many international organisations to transfer payments directly to the beneficiaries' mobile devices. This is in line with local payment practices and also ensures greater speed, flexibility and transparency in the payment of allowances to assistant workers. At the same time, this minimises susceptibility to corruption, e.g. for cash payments of expense allowances. For women, this payment method has the additional advantage that they receive the money directly on their own mobile devices, which reduces the accessibility of male relatives.

The civil society sponsors of the Makani centres and the non-governmental organisation through which UNICEF supported the state youth centres took over the recruitment and management of the assistant workers themselves on the basis of their own regulations. An important innovation in the second phase was the improved preparation of the Syrian assistant workers for their respective tasks. The implementation partners conducted introductory training sessions in which the auxiliary staff was informed about tasks, the Code of Conduct, child protection and the prevention of sexual violence as well as professional duties. In camp schools and Makani centres in particular, the support staff received further specialist training.

The Jordanian Ministry of Education supported the programme by approving the deployment of the assistant workers in the state education system and selecting the afternoon and camp schools to be supported. The school directors were responsible for the daily management and monitoring of the auxiliary staff, thereby contributing to the programme. Otherwise, the Ministry of Education's contribution was minimal.

UNICEF's monitoring was gender-disaggregated. The number of female and male assistants was recorded separately. In contrast, no data is available on possible gender-related assaults against female assistants or gender-related assaults by assistants on female and male pupils. The literature indicates that such assaults are common in the Jordanian education system. There is also little gender-related impact data available. Of particular interest here is the number of cases in which the deployment of support staff has prevented the early marriage of girls or child labour of boys through educational work.

10. Unintended effects (positive or negative)

There is no knowledge of any serious negative social, economic or ecological effects of the project. However, they cannot be ruled out.³⁰ Possible tensions between the refugees and the host communities were mitigated by the fact that the services provided by the assistant workers at the youth and Makani centres were open to all children and young people. When taking up a new position or renewing a contract, the Syrian assistant workers received introductory training on topics such as rules of behaviour for assistant workers, child protection, prevention of child abuse, and feedback and complaints mechanisms. This also served to educate the Syrian assistant workers about the consequences of abusive behaviour towards those in need of protection. UNICEF also introduced a multi-level complaints mechanism to which children and young people, as well as assistant workers, could turn. The topic of child protection was also addressed during the regular monitoring visits by the personnel service provider. It is not known whether and which complaints were submitted there. Any violations of child protection by the support staff are not documented in the available reports.

Rating summary

The programme was implemented professionally and largely smoothly. It was quickly adapted to the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic and thus ensured ongoing support for Syrian children and young people. The programme was largely able to achieve its objectives, with disadvantaged groups benefiting in particular from the programme's measures. There are no findings on unintended negative effects. The effectiveness of the programme is therefore rated as successful.

Effectiveness: 2

Efficiency

11. Production efficiency

Between January 2020 and December 2021, project funds totalling EUR 5,941,187 (99% of the EUR 6,000,000 provided) were spent. According to UNICEF, EUR 1,868,976 (31.1%) of this went directly and indirectly to Syrian assistant workers in the camp schools, EUR 816,737 (13.6%) to assistant workers in the afternoon schools in the host communities, EUR 1,252,542 (20.9%) to assistant workers in the Makani centres and EUR 1,017,689 (17.0%) to assistant workers at the state youth centres. In addition, EUR 297,357 (5.0%) was spent on the technical management of the programme by UNICEF and EUR 247,798 (4.1%) on overarching tasks (e.g. strategy, monitoring, communication, financial management) within UNICEF in Jordan. Added to this was the standard contribution of EUR 440,088 (7.3%) for UNICEF's general expenses. This means that 16.4% of the project funds went to UNICEF for the technical management and administrative handling of the project. UNICEF did not publish any figures on the administrative fees of the personnel management companies and non-governmental organisations that contracted the Syrian assistant workers on behalf of UNICEF. For this reason, it remains unknown what proportion of the project funds actually went to the Syrian assistant workers for incentive payments, insurance and training. It is also not possible to determine the total amount of incentive payments, as UNICEF breaks down the total number of Syrian assistant workers by qualification level and communicates the amount of the respective hourly wages, but not the respective contract duration³¹.

The UNICEF lists show that 37% of the project funds spent exclusively on the Syrian assistant workers went to the assistant workers in the two refugee camps. 25% went to the Makani centres, 20% to the state youth centres and only 16% to the schools in the host communities, although the majority of Syrian children and young people are educated in the latter. This corresponds to the fact that the majority of Syrian assistant workers were deployed in the refugee camps, even though the total number of pupils there is lower. The uneven distribution of project funds can be explained by the fact that the programme was under pressure to employ at least 1,000 Syrian assistants each year and that these positions could only be created easily in the refugee camps.

³⁰ The data was collected remotely by a local expert. In this constellation, it is difficult to find out about problematic aspects of a project.

³¹ Due to the single audit procedure of the UN organisations, KfW has no means of requesting more detailed information.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the local population is more dependent on such work opportunities, as they have less access to paid work outside the camps.

The annual costs per auxiliary worker were EUR 1,981.32. They consisted of the actual incentive payment, the health insurance contribution (15%), training costs and the administrative costs of the personnel service provider. The amount of the monthly incentive payments was based on the requirements of the respective task and the number of hours worked per week. These were JOD 190 (EUR 247) for auxiliary staff at the afternoon schools, JOD 250 (EUR 325) for the youth centres and JOD 250-480 (EUR 325-624) for the Makani centres. This put them above the national minimum wage for non-Jordanians (190 JOD / 247 EUR), but below the monthly salary of temporary Jordanian teachers ("daily paid teachers") (280 JOD / 364 EUR) plus 13% social security expenses) and regular teaching and administrative staff (460-480 JOD) (DEVAL 2021). Other German DC cash-for-work measures during the project period were based on the national minimum wage of JOD 220 (EUR 286). This means that the level of incentive payments appears to be appropriate in a national comparison, albeit low considering the actual cost of living. The incentive payments in the refugee camps were significantly lower. They ranged from 80 JOD (104 EUR) for a playground supervisor to 240 JOD (312 EUR) for the manager of the security staff or the warehouses. The incentive payments are based on the standardised values specified by UNHCR for the refugee camps. These take into account the fact that some of the refugees in the camps are provided with food free of charge. The standardisation of the incentive payments made by various donors and non-governmental organisations in the camps serves to ensure transparency and prevent competition and conflict among the refugees. It is therefore appropriate that UNICEF has also orientated itself towards these values. The duration of employment was based on the type of activity. In the refugee camps, the shortest employment periods were 2-3 months for cleaning staff, while security guards, caretakers and playground supervisors were employed for 6 months. Although the employment of highly qualified auxiliary staff at the schools and the youth and Makani centres was long-term, only short employment contracts were concluded here too. The auxiliary staff at the schools were dismissed during the summer and winter holidays and then rehired. A new application was necessary for this. Short-term employment contracts are common in Jordan, but this situation led to great uncertainty among the auxiliary staff. The precarious nature of the work opportunities limited their contribution to a long-term improvement in the living conditions of the Syrian assistant workers (programme objective), despite an income appropriate to the context.

In the second project phase considered here, the administrative processes were already well established so that all auxiliary staff could be recruited in good time.

12. Allocation efficiency

Under the given circumstances, the chosen concept was an efficient solution to achieve the dual objective of the project in the short term, namely to improve the income situation of Syrian refugees and to improve the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people in Jordan. The employment of Syrians, some of whom are highly qualified, as "volunteer assistants" was the only and at the same time a cost-effective way to deploy them directly at educational institutions, especially as the Jordanian education sector is formally closed to foreign labour. Through various thematic training programmes, attempts were made to maintain and further develop this considerable human capital, even if the auxiliary staff will not be able to work as a qualified employee in Jordan for the foreseeable future. The highly qualified Syrian assistant workers in particular contributed to improving the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people through their educational, social work and administrative activities, albeit to a limited extent. The project complemented other BMZ-funded projects to finance teachers' salaries, maintain schools and promote non-formal education in the Makani centres. By deploying Syrian assistants to formal and non-formal educational institutions, the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people at these institutions could be improved at low cost, while at the same time improving the income of the assistants. The allocation of project funds was therefore efficient. However, the project did not create any sustainable structures; rather, both effects were dependent on the continued availability of project funds. This limits the efficiency of the investments made here.

³² In Phase I, the costs per auxiliary worker were EUR 1,644. Possible reasons for the cost increase are the adjustment of the incentive payment to the increased minimum wage, longer contract terms for individual auxiliary staff and a higher administrative flat rate for the implementation organisations. However, no data is available on this.

UNICEF proved to be a suitable partner due to its technical expertise and long-standing presence in Jordan. The costs charged by UNICEF for project implementation appear moderate. Since UNICEF, as a UN organisation, was unable to employ any Syrian volunteers itself, it had to rely on cooperation with non-governmental organisations (for the Makani and youth centres) and personnel service companies (for the refugee camps and afternoon schools). As the costs of these implementation partners are not reported, it is not possible to assess whether their use was efficient.

As described above, UNICEF based the remuneration and organisation of rotation periods for staff in the refugee camps on the UNHCR guidelines that apply to all employment measures (*cash for work*) in the camps. This is intended to ensure equal treatment of all people in the camps and avoid disputes. Outside the camps, UNICEF orientated itself on the employment practices in schools and the national minimum wage. This was appropriate. Initially, the incentive payments at some Makani and youth centres appear somewhat high. With lower incentive payments and shorter rotation periods, more people could have been employed. However, the payments would then no longer have been sufficient to secure their livelihoods, meaning that the programme would have failed to achieve an important project objective, namely improving the living conditions of the Syrian assistant workers. For this reason, the project also decided to continue paying the assistant workers despite the school closures in 2020 and 2021, even if they were unable to work on site.

After the end of BMZ funding in November 2024, there was initially no prospect that the Syrian assistant workers could continue to be employed at the Jordanian educational institutions or that the Jordanian state would be willing or able to have Jordanians fulfil the functions performed by the assistant workers (such as working with Syrian parents).

For years, UNICEF has been trying to anchor the Makani centres in the Jordanian education system in the long term, but this was long unsuccessful. With the withdrawal of important donors to the Makani programme, the first centres have already had to be closed.³³ In the closures to date, care has been taken to ensure that these have taken place in areas with more than one Makani centre and that UNICEF's vulnerability criteria have been applied.

In retrospect, it must therefore be recognised that funds have been invested over the years in structures that will not continue to exist after the end of BMZ funding. Alternatively, the income and education situation of Syrian refugees could have been effectively improved in the long term, e.g. by promoting business start-ups by Syrians and structural measures to improve the quality of education for Syrian children and young people. This observation limits the efficiency of the measure. On the other hand, it is positive to note that the deployment of assistant workers has opened up educational opportunities for children and young people that are likely to strengthen their resilience in the long term.

Rating summary

The project was largely implemented efficiently. It was suitable for achieving the dual objective of better learning conditions for Syrian children and young people and an improvement in the living situation of Syrian refugees in the short term. The measures were implemented in a targeted manner and with relatively low overheads. The deployment of the auxiliary staff represented an additional benefit for the educational institutions. The short-term nature of the work opportunities and the associated uncertainty for the auxiliary staff as well as the limited long-term developmental impact of the measure limit the allocation efficiency of the measure. Overall, the efficiency of the measures is therefore assessed as limited.

Efficiency: 3

³³ Due to declining donor contributions, UNICEF had to carry out a rationalisation exercise for the Makani programme in Q4 2023 with the result that 3 centres had to be closed in October 2023 and a further 18 centres in Q1 2024.

Overarching developmental impact

13. Overarching (intended) developmental changes

The project objective (impact) formulated in the programme proposal was: "Access to employment opportunities for Syrian refugees has been created and their social protection improved." From today's perspective, the programme objective is not appropriately located at the impact level, but rather describes an output of the project. The programme also did not work on the topic of "social protection" in the sense of establishing social security systems. For this reason, the programme objective (impact) was adjusted as follows as part of the EPE: 1. (Short-term) improvement of the living conditions of Syrian assistant workers at Jordanian educational institutions, 2. improvement of the learning conditions for Syrian children and young people at formal and non-formal educational institutions in the refugee camps and in the host communities.

The achievement of the objective at impact level can be mapped as follows. These are reconstructed proxy indicators based on existing qualitative and quantitative data.

Table Target achievement Impact:

Indicator	Status PA	Target value according to PA	Actual value at EPE
New: (1) The additional income from volunteering leads to measurable improvements in the living situation of the Syrian volunteers' households during the project period.	Subsequently formulated indicator	Dito	There is no reliable data on the income situation of Syrian assistants in the education sector. The amount of the incentive payments was slightly above the minimum wage for non-Jordanians. The value of this income relies heavily on alternative available sources of income. A positive contribution to household income is plausible. Not measurable, but indications of temporary positive effects
New: (2) The deployment of Syrian volunteers reduces the percentage of early school leavers (differentiated by gender) in the educational institutions with volunteers compared to those without volunteers during the project period.	Subsequently formulated indicator	Dito	The Ministry of Education does not publish figures on school dropout rates at individual schools. The prevention of early school leaving was an important task of the support staff. However, it is not known how often they were successful. Not measurable, but indications of selective positive effects

No systematic studies are available on the two impact indicators of the programme, the income development of the Syrian assistant workers supported by the programme and school dropouts at the supported educational institutions. The following assessments are therefore based on the interviews conducted during the evaluation mission and the reporting by UNICEF and KfW.

With regard to improving the income situation of Syrian assistant workers, it can be stated that the project has created temporary work opportunities for around 1,200 of the 303,577 Syrians of working age (18-59 years) living in Jordan each year. Some of the highly qualified personnel were employed throughout the project period (2018-2024) i.e. phases 1 to 4, and thus had access to a relatively stable income for six years.³⁴ The amount of the incentive payments was slightly higher than the average monthly income of a Syrian family (e.g. 232 JOD (302 EUR)) in Jordan³⁵. The incentive payments barely covered the cost of living. It was therefore not possible for the assistant workers to save and later invest their income productively.

³⁴ The project phase II considered here covers the years 2020 and 2021.

³⁵ UNHCR, *ibid*

In view of the withdrawal of many international NGOs from Jordan during the project period, the project in the refugee camps was one of the few remaining sources of income. In the interviews, it became clear that the social security of the Syrian assistant workers was not harmonised between the various employers (NGOs, personnel management company) and did not always with UNICEF's requirements. Some Syrian assistant workers stated that they had no social insurance. Due to the short contract periods and limited social security, the employment situation of Syrian assistant workers was precarious, although better than many alternatives on the free market. Without the prospect of regular employment in the education sector, the Syrian assistants remained dependent on the employment opportunities provided by the programme. As a result, the overarching impact on improving the living conditions of Syrian refugees (programme objective) resulting from the measures financed by the project remained limited in time.

Positive effects in terms of social integration and the self-esteem of the assistants were clearly recognisable in the group interviews conducted as part of this evaluation. The assistants recognised the added value of their work for the pupils. They associated their work with the hope of a better future for the Syrian community in Jordan. The daily collaboration with Syrian and Jordanian colleagues promoted integration and the development of a social network. However, many Syrian assistants were also very frustrated that they were not employed as teachers in line with their actual qualifications, but only for auxiliary tasks. This permanent professional degradation had a negative impact on the self-esteem of many auxiliary staff.

On the other hand, the high number women who became professionally active as a result of the is positive. The programme offered women attractive working conditions with respectable employers with a fixed working time structure equivalent to part-time employment. The proportion of female auxiliary staff was around 60 %, well above the average female labour force participation rate in Jordan. In focus group discussions, the female Syrian auxiliary workers emphasised that their own income gave them greater economic independence, better social integration and increased self-esteem.

The Syrian assistant workers made an important positive contribution to improving the learning conditions for Syrian children and young people at the formal and non-formal educational institutions where they were deployed. As cleaners, security staff and warehouse workers, the low-skilled auxiliary staff made important contributions to the cleanliness and security of the educational institutions and the availability of learning materials. As administrative assistants, highly qualified Syrian assistants were responsible for managing student attendance, providing them with learning materials and supporting the school management with various administrative tasks. In the interview, some pupils pointed out the important contribution of the Syrian assistants to the good organisation of their schools. The pedagogical assistants supported the teachers during lessons, independently carried out various learning programmes developed by UNICEF for kindergarten and primary school children as well as remedial lessons after the COVID-related school closures. This work was also highly appreciated by learners and parents. This also applies to the work of the teaching staff in the Makani centres. The contribution of the support staff in the acquisition of reading skills was particularly emphasised. Of particular importance was the work of the social workers, who were valued as a link between the school and the parents. Their work was particularly emphasised in the case of impending school drop-outs. A number of examples were mentioned in the interviews in which the support staff were able to prevent children from dropping out of school through their positive influence on the child's parents and the organisation of necessary assistance such as learning materials or warm clothing and shoes for school attendance in winter. However, these cases are not systematically documented, nor are official figures on school dropouts at schools with Syrian assistant workers available. Furthermore, the positive influence of the Syrian helpers on the school climate and the reduction of conflicts within the schools was emphasised. Their work, such as the organisation of school parties, also promotes the social integration of Syrian families in their neighbourhoods.

The work of many Syrian assistant workers was focused on supporting particularly vulnerable Syrian children and young people. On the one hand, this was done by preventing children from dropping out of school due to child labour or early marriage, which particularly affects vulnerable young people. The assistant workers made an important contribution to this by talking to parents and providing humanitarian support, e.g. by establishing contacts with NGOs. In the Makani and youth centres, the Syrian assistant workers advised particularly vulnerable families on parenting issues as part of the "Better Parenting" programme, offered children from disadvantaged backgrounds meaningful leisure activities and supported them with homework supervision and extra tuition. They also carried out special learning measures such as the aforementioned Maharati programme for young people with no school education.

It is also worth mentioning the deployment of the Syrian assistant workers in the informal tent settlements where particularly disadvantaged families live. External evaluations of the Makani centres confirm their positive effects on the personal development, academic skills, school attendance rates, social integration, conflict resolution skills and attitudes towards gender roles of young people who attend the centres.³⁶ The youth and Makani centres thus make an important contribution to improving the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people.

Despite the efforts of the Syrian assistant workers and many other actors, challenges in school attendance among Syrian children and young people remained at the end of the project period. On a positive note, the general school attendance rate had risen to 77% of children aged 5 to 18 by 2022. The school attendance rate continues to develop positively and was 78% in the 2023/2024 school year.³⁷ No data is available on the school attendance rate and school dropouts at the schools supported by the programme. However, the school attendance rate continued to fall sharply from the age of 15. The main reasons for not attending school were financial difficulties and the distance of the school from home. For girls, marriage was an additional factor from the age of 16. Among children and adolescents who attended school, 19% of boys and 13% of girls were affected by bullying, while a further 13% of girls and 15% of boys experienced a lack of safety, humiliation and physical or verbal attacks at school³⁸.

These figures show the importance of the Syrian assistant workers' commitment to a safe school environment, but also the extent of the challenges they faced. The development of the general school attendance rate of Syrian children and young people in Jordan cannot be directly attributed to the deployment of Syrian assistant workers but shows a generally positive trend. More decisive here was the financial support for the salaries of Jordanian teachers who were deployed at the schools for Syrian refugees. The difficult learning conditions at the schools, especially at the schools for refugees, are structurally anchored in the Jordanian education system and at the same time reflect the social marginalisation not only of Syrian refugees, but also of refugees from Palestine and other countries. The influence of the Syrian assistant workers on these factors was extremely limited, so that any improvements or deteriorations in terms of violence and discrimination in schools for Syrian refugees cannot be attributed to their work.

14. Contribution to overarching (intended) developmental changes

As described above, there are no reliable figures on the income development of the auxiliary staff employed by the programme or on the effects of their work at the various educational institutions. It is plausible that the programme had a positive, albeit temporary, influence on the income of the auxiliary staff. A relatively small group of around 700 highly qualified Syrian assistant workers, some of whom worked for the project for several years, benefited the most from the programme. Their share of the total number of Syrian assistant workers was around 60%.

The contribution of the assistant workers to improving the teaching and learning conditions of the Syrian children and young people was positive but limited at the various educational institutions. No reliable information is available on the possible overarching effects of the project with regard to the social and professional integration of the children and young people and the coexistence of refugees and the host communities.

The programme's contribution to the further development of the Jordanian education system was minimal. The overburdened Jordanian education system did not have the necessary resources have the tasks of the Syrian assistant workers carried out later by regular staff. Instead, the work of the Syrian assistant workers was perceived as helpful but non-essential, partly due to the competition with the regular staff, who were also precariously employed. In the Makani centres, the Syrian assistant workers sometimes took on the same tasks as their Jordanian colleagues. The continued employment of the assistant workers depended in particular on the continuity of the Makani programme and the financial situation of the respective NGOs supporting the Makani centres.

36 Samuel Hall, 2022: Summative Impact Evaluation of the UNICEF Jordan Makani Programme. Amman. Presler-Marshall, E., Jones, N., Małachowska, A. and Oakley, E., 2022: UNICEF Jordan's Makani Programme: supporting students, building resilience. Policy brief. London: Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence.

37 UNHCR, 2024: Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Socio-Economic Survey on Refugees in Host Communities. Amman.

38 UNHCR, ibid.

15. Contribution to overarching (unintended) developmental changes

Beyond the original objective of the project, the helpers made a positive contribution to improving social cohesion in the schools. Through their work at bus stops and school exits, where the Jordanian pupils from the morning school regularly encountered the Syrian pupils from the afternoon school and got into arguments with them, they were able to defuse conflicts. However, they had to do this without special mediation training. Some assistants also supported community-building extracurricular activities such as activity days or festivals. Many parents reported that the support staff had a positive influence on the children's behaviour. However, the segregation of Jordanian and Syrian pupils and the various disadvantages of the afternoon and camp schools made social cohesion more difficult. This limited the broad impact of the Syrian assistant workers' efforts to improve social cohesion.

Physical violence and sexual assaults are omnipresent at schools in Jordan.³⁹ Against this backdrop, there was a risk that Syrian auxiliary staff would also commit violence against pupils. In the "Child Protection Code of Conduct" of the personnel service provider and in the one-day preparatory training sessions, the Syrian assistant workers were made aware of the prohibition of violence towards children and young people. A violation of this prohibition could lead to immediate dismissal. However, it is unclear how the behaviour of the assistant workers in this regard was monitored at their respective locations and whether any assaults were punished in practice.

In principle, the establishment of parallel structures for schooling refugees outside the refugee camps should be viewed critically, as these promote social segregation and are less well equipped than the schools for the local population. By sending Syrian assistants to the afternoon schools, the project promoted this parallel structure. In terms of social integration, joint schooling of Syrian and Jordanian children would have been desirable. However, the decision to provide separate schooling for refugee Syrian children and young people dates back to the early years of the Syrian crisis and was therefore outside the sphere of influence of the programme evaluated here.

Rating summary

The programme had a positive impact on the income situation of Syrian assistant workers, the employment and thus economic independence of women, and the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people at formal and informal educational institutions. By promoting the education of refugee children and young people, especially those in very precarious living conditions, it contributed to their educational success in the long term. However, the employment opportunities for Syrian auxiliary workers were limited in time from the outset and could therefore only have a temporary effect. For these reasons, the impact of the programme is assessed as limited.

Overarching developmental impact: 3

Sustainability

16. Capacities of the beneficiaries and stakeholders

The programme was financed by the BMZ's Special Initiative on Displaced Persons and Host Communities at the time and was commissioned with a limited sustainability claim. The evaluation confirms the limited sustainability claim due to the current crisis situation, the temporary nature of the programme design (*cash for work*), the limited ability of the target groups to help themselves and the difficult legal framework conditions for the sustainable employment of Syrians in the Jordanian education system.

The project analysed here was followed by a third and fourth phase with a comparable concept (2022-2024). The last phase of the overall programme ended in November 2024 and there are no plans to extend the overall programme any further. In the third phase, some conceptual adjustments were made, such as increasing the number of auxiliary staff at afternoon schools and phasing out support for state youth centres. In addition, as an exit strategy, the Syrian assistant workers were offered various training courses on cross-cutting skills (e.g. IT) and job application training to prepare them for the labour market.

³⁹ UNICEF, 2021: National Study on Violence Against Children in Jordan 2019-2020. Amman.

Throughout the entire project period, the programme was dependent on funding from German development cooperation. The Jordanian state did not make any contributions of its own to the project. This would have contradicted the official policy, according to which Jordan tolerated the Syrian refugees on its territory but considered their care to be the responsibility of the international community⁴⁰. In the interview, the Ministry of Education confirmed that it was not in a position to employ the Syrian assistant workers from its own resources. This even applies to the cleaners and guards in the refugee camps, who are actually irreplaceable there. In addition, there are still reservations among Jordanian staff about employing Syrians as auxiliary staff in the education system. For political and financial reasons, the ministry is therefore not planning to continue the work of the Syrian assistants, even though it recognises their positive role in the schools. The non-governmental organisations such as Makani centres or youth centres supporters, that employed Syrian assistant workers, would also not be able to continue employing them due to a lack of funding. At the same time, they are affected by cuts to UNICEF's Makani programme and have already had to close some Makani centres, which has led to the dismissal of both Jordanian and Syrian staff.

In December 2024, an extension of the employment of Syrian auxiliary staff at Jordanian educational institutions was announced. In coordination with the MoE, Syrian volunteers are to be transferred for one year as part of the "Financing of Teacher Salaries Phase V" (TSP, BMZ no. 2023 40 545) project funded by the Special Initiative for Displaced Persons and Host Communities (SI GA).

Despite the change in the political situation in Syria at the beginning of December 2024, a voluntary, swift and orderly return of Syrian refugees to Syria is not yet to be expected, as the country is not (yet) stable. At the same time, the long-term integration of Syrian refugees into Jordanian society is not desirable and is prevented by the ban on labour, among other things. The situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan therefore remains precarious.

17. Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

In practice, the measure has not led to long-term changes in the Jordanian government's capacities and approaches to integrating Syrian children and young people into the education system. A future employment of integration staff at Jordanian schools with similar tasks as the Syrian assistant workers was not planned for political and financial reasons.

The Makani programme is to be transferred to the Jordanian Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) from mid-2025. Established structures are to be maintained as far as possible and gradually transferred to local responsibility with the support of UNICEF and local NGOs. As the project executing agency, the MoSD has already assumed clear ownership of the Makani centres in the host communities, where Jordanian and Syrian children and young people are cared for. This is to be done in 2025 for the Makani centres in the tent settlements and in the refugee camps. It remains to be seen to what extent this will actually support the Makani centres with Syrian children and young people, as the Jordanian Ministry of Education and Social Affairs has so far limited its funding exclusively to Jordanian children and young people.

At the target group level, the programme has at least temporarily contributed to improving the living conditions of Syrian assistant workers and the learning conditions at formal and non-formal educational institutions for Syrian children and young people. The programme provided qualified assistant workers with a relatively steady income over a period of two years. They were able to use this period to build up further economic pillars. In view of the adverse legal and economic circumstances, only a few succeeded in doing so. In the long term, the Syrian children and young people will benefit from the writing and maths skills they have acquired at school, and possibly also from a school-leaving certificate. The project has therefore been able to have a certain sustainable impact at an individual level.

⁴⁰ Government of Jordan, 2020: Jordan Response Plan 2020-2022. Amman.

However the immediate benefits of school education for young Syrians were low, as only low-skilled and poorly paid jobs are available to them on the Jordanian labour market. Vulnerable children and young people in particular are likely to benefit in the long term from the life skills courses offered by the youth and Makani centres.

18. Durability of impacts over time

Numerous external factors influence the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan, the conflict dynamics in Syria, geopolitical factors, the country's economic development and the withdrawal of international development partners, who are increasingly turning their attention to other crisis regions. These factors have a negative impact on the employment and income situation, access to education and the social and professional integration of Syrian refugees. Under these circumstances, the sustainability of the project's impact in terms of income and educational success is limited. In addition, the economic situation and political tensions in the region threaten social cohesion between Syrian refugees and Jordanians.

Rating summary

Due to the low sustainability of the measure with regard to the income and employment of the Syrian assistant workers and the simultaneous positive long-term individual effects on the children and young people, who have enjoyed a better education, the sustainability of the programme is assessed as rather unsuccessful. As the programme was planned with a limited sustainability claim, the assessment of sustainability is not included in the overall evaluation of the FC measure.

Sustainability: (4)

Overall rating

With its dual objective of (temporarily) increasing the income of Syrian assistant workers and improving the personnel capacities of formal and non-formal educational institutions for refugee Syrian children and young people by employing Syrian assistant workers in Jordan, the project was highly relevant. It met the needs of the target groups and was integrated into the relevant strategies of the German and Jordanian sides. At the same time, the programme was part of an overarching German portfolio to support the Jordanian education system and create short-term sources of income for Syrian refugees, which it complemented well. The programme successfully targeted women and particularly disadvantaged children and young people. The project achieved its objectives with regard to the employment Syrian auxiliary staff and support for Jordanian educational institutions despite difficult framework conditions, in particular the closure of the education sector to foreign labour. The work of the Syrian assistants was highly appreciated by all sides and led to better reading skills, the reduction of violence in schools and the prevention of school drop-outs. The implementation of the measures was largely efficient. Due to its special design as a *cash-for-work measure*, the programme only had a temporary positive impact on the income situation of the Syrian assistant workers and on improving the learning conditions of Syrian children and young people. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the improved school education will have a long-term positive impact on the children and young people's future lives. By being located in the education sector, where the proportion of women in employment in Syria and Jordan is high, the project has succeeded in offering numerous women a job opportunity and the associated economic independence and social recognition, at least temporarily. The functions created by the project (e.g. assistant teachers) were not integrated into the Jordanian education system and are therefore not sustainable. The high relevance of the dual objective of the programme, the convincing implementation of this dual objective, its precise integration into the overall portfolio of German development cooperation in Jordan and its high level of effectiveness are all taken into account in the overall assessment. Its limited effectiveness and sustainability, on the other hand, have a negative impact on the overall rating.

Due to its positive results during the project period, the programme is nevertheless rated as successful.

Overall rating: 2

Contributions to the 2030 Agenda

The programme contributed to the following goals of the 2030 Agenda:

Sustainable development goal 1 (poverty reduction): The employment of Syrian assistant workers has temporarily increased their income.

Sustainable development goal 4 (good quality education): The deployment of Syrian assistant workers at afternoon and camp schools and informal educational institutions contributed to improving the learning conditions at these institutions.

Sustainable development goal 8 (good work): The employment relationships of the Syrian assistant workers were precarious, but included a work agreement, a clear job description, clearly defined working hours and health insurance.

Sustainable Development Goal 10 (less inequality): Over half of the Syrian assistant workers were women. Many assistant workers were deployed to support particularly vulnerable children and young people.

The project implemented the principle of shared responsibility and accountability by supporting structures that were also supported by other donors in the form of the afternoon and camp schools and the Makani centres. However, cooperation with the Ministry of Education and its structures proved to be difficult, as it only recognises its responsibility for Syrian pupils to a limited extent. Deploying Syrian assistant workers to educational institutions, the programme successfully combined the social dimension of development (education for Syrian children and young people) with the economic dimension (income for the assistant workers). No negative interactions were recognisable. The programme specifically targeted a particularly disadvantaged population group, namely refugee Syrian children and young people. By supporting non-formal educational institutions, it offered educational opportunities in particular for children and young people who do not attend school and therefore belong to the ultra-vulnerable groups. The programme also successfully reached out to Syrian women who had fled their country and enabled them to gain qualified employment. It is regrettable that the programme only targeted refugees from Syria and was unable to benefit refugees from other countries. It is plausible that the resilience of Syrian children and young people increased in the long term as a result of improved school education.

Project-specific strengths/weaknesses and general conclusions/lessons learned

The strengths of the project include in particular

- ✓ UNICEF and its network of local partners were capable to implement the project professionally and smoothly.
- ✓ UNICEF and its partners were capable to overcome the initial resistance to the deployment Syrian assistant workers in educational institutions, even though reservations persisted.
- ✓ The work of the Syrian assistants was highly appreciated by the teachers, parents and pupils. Their contributions to reading promotion and conflict management were particularly important as well as to prevent early school leaving.
- ✓ Many Syrian assistant workers had a high level of intrinsic motivation and endeavoured to create good learning conditions for the Syrian children and young people over and above their formal tasks.
- ✓ The programme offered the Syrian assistant workers, who were deployed in schools, various general and specialist training courses to help them carry out their tasks.

The following weaknesses were identified:

- The working conditions of the Syrian assistant workers differed between the various employers (NGOs, personnel management company), particularly with regard to the level of incentive payments, social security and training. Greater standardisation would have been desirable.

- In the second phase, the complaints mechanism was still poorly developed. It is unclear to what extent the Syrian assistant workers, as well as the children and young people, had easily accessible contact persons for problems. This relates in particular to experiences of discrimination by the Syrian support staff and possible assaults against the pupils.
- The programme invested in structures that were known to be unsustainable. As a result, the funds were not available for alternative measures (e.g. support for business start-ups by Syrian refugees) that might have had a longer-term impact.
- The exit strategy of the programme consisted of offering further training opportunities for the Syrian assistant workers. The programme had no influence on the legal framework, which made it impossible for the Syrian assistant workers to continue working in the education sector. The hope the national NGOs would continue to employ the assistant workers was also not fulfilled due to cutbacks in the Makani programme.
- The monitoring of the objectives and indicators of the measure was inadequate with regard to the impact matrix to be applied. For this reason, no data-based statements can be made on some questions, such as the income development of the Syrian assistant workers or the impact of their work.

Conclusions and lessons learned:

- The project developed a successful model for supporting the schooling of refugee children and young people by professionals with a refugee background in a context in which last-who denied regular employment in the education sector. The model is transferable to other contexts.
- Volunteer assistants who are deployed at educational institutions should be adequately prepared for this task. In addition to a general pedagogical induction, this also includes further training on mediation techniques and child protection.
- The sustainability of job creation measures (cash-for-work) such as this one is low. In future, in comparable constellations, it should be examined whether the available funds could be invested more sensibly in long-term effective measures such as school education for the younger generation and economic development for the adult generation.
- A major obstacle to the long-term success of the measure was the ethnic segregation of the labour market in Jordan, including the closure of individual sectors, such as the education sector, for foreign labour force. This also affected numerous other projects of German development cooperation and other international partners in Jordan. Such hurdles should be discussed by the international community in a coordinated manner with Jordanian partners.
- With the afternoon and camp schools, the programme supported parallel structures for the education of Syrian children and young people, which hinder their social integration in the long term. The decision to set up these structures was not made by the project, but should be taken into account in such a project design process and repeatedly addressed in the political dialogue.

Evaluation approach and methods

Methodology of the ex-post evaluation

The ex-post evaluation follows the methodology of a rapid appraisal, i.e. a data-supported, qualitative contribution analysis and represents an expert judgement. This involves attributing impacts to the project through plausibility considerations based on the careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. Where possible, this also includes the use of digital data sources and the use of modern technologies (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). Causes of any contradictory information are investigated, attempts are made to eliminate them and the assessment is based on statements that are confirmed by several sources of information where possible (triangulation).

Documents:

Project proposal, reporting and final review by KfW, project proposal and annual reporting by UNICEF, regulations and progress reports by the personnel service provider, external evaluations of the UNICEF Makani programme, UNHCR surveys on the socio-economic situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan (2024), strategy papers by the BMZ and the Jordanian government, secondary specialist literature

Data sources and analysis tools:

UNHCR database on Syrian refugees in Jordan (<https://reporting.unhcr.org/jordan>)

Interview partner:

KfW, UNICEF, Ministry of Education, school headmasters, heads of Makani centres and state youth centres, heads of non-governmental implementation partners, personnel management companies, Jordanian teachers, Syrian assistant workers, Syrian parents, Syrian pupils

The analysis of impacts is based on assumed interdependencies, documented in the impact matrix already developed during the project appraisal and, if necessary, updated during the ex-post evaluation. The evaluation report presents arguments as to why which influencing factors were identified for the identified impacts and why the analysed project presumably made which contribution (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure is taken into account with regard to its influence on the results. The conclusions are set in relation to the availability and quality of the data basis. An evaluation design is the reference framework for the evaluation.

For project evaluations, the method offers a - on average - balanced cost-benefit ratio, in which the knowledge gained and the evaluation effort are in equilibrium, and allows a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of FC projects across all project evaluations. The individual ex-post evaluation can therefore not fulfil the requirements of a scientific assessment in the sense of a clear causal analysis.

The following aspects limited the evaluation:

Fragile context (remote evaluation, no on-site visit possible), limited data, high expectations of the interviewees regarding the evaluation in view of the project closure already announced by KfW, thus possibly too much focus on the positive aspects of the project.

Methodology of the performance evaluation

A six-point scale is used to assess the programme according to the OECD DAC criteria. The scale values are assigned as follows:

- Level 1** Very successful: result significantly above expectations
- Level 2** Successful: result fully in line with expectations, without significant deficiencies
- Level 3** Moderately successful: below expectations, but positive results dominate
- Level 4** Moderately unsuccessful: is significantly below expectations and negative results dominate despite recognisable positive results
- Level 5** Unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
- Level 6** Highly unsuccessful: the project is useless or the situation has worsened

The overall rating on the six-point scale is based on a project-specific weighting of the six individual criteria. Levels 1-3 of the overall rating indicate a "successful" project, levels 4-6 an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally only be considered developmentally "successful" if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness") and the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") as well as the sustainability are rated as at least "moderately successful" (rating 3).

The annex of this report is available upon request (German only).

List of abbreviations:

AK	Final inspection
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EUR	Euro
FC	Financial cooperation
FC E	FC Evaluation
HDI	Human Development Index
PP	Project review
PPB	Project appraisal report
PV	Project proposal
TC	Technical co-operation
USD	US Dollar

Imprint

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