


# Ex post evaluation

## Strengthening resilience in the context of the Syrian/Iraqi crisis, Jordan




<b>Title</b>	Strengthening resilience in the context of the Syrian/Iraqi crisis	
<b>Sector and CRS code</b>	Basic life skills for youth and adults 11230 (Phase I); primary schooling 22330 (Phase II)	
<b>Project number</b>	2015 6802 1 (Phase I) and 2015 6889 8 (Phase II)	
<b>Commissioned by</b>	BMZ	
<b>Recipient/Project-executing</b>	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	
<b>Project volume/ Financing instrument</b>	EUR 10 million/BMZ budget funds (Phase I); EUR 15 million/BMZ budget funds (Phase II)	
<b>Project duration</b>	2015-2017	
<b>Year of report</b>	2021	<b>Year of random sample</b> 2020

### Objectives and project outline

The objective at outcome level was for Syrian children and young people to have access to and participate in a quality education system. Furthermore, a protective environment was to be established to combat exploitation, abuse and neglect of vulnerable children. At impact level, the objective was to help strengthen the resilience of the refugee children and young people as well as the host Jordanian communities. The projects supported UNICEF activities under the No Lost Generation (NLG) initiative, which increased capacities of state-run schools in Jordan, broadened the range of informal, after-school and alternative education services, and supported child protection measures and psychosocial support.

Overall rating:  
**Successful**



### Key findings

- Measurable progress has been made in extending a quality education system and establishing a protective environment for children and young people.
- Reducing competition for resources in the Jordanian education sector and strengthening the resilience of Syrian children and young people are still relevant from today's perspective; due to the political situation in Syria, it is unlikely that Syrian refugees will be returning home in the near future.
- In line with the Do-No-Harm principle, the projects were coordinated with national, supra-regional and cross-sectoral plans; they formed a coherent overall approach. However, donors to the UNICEF NLG initiative had only limited opportunities to propose conceptual changes or to have a say in the allocation of funds.
- The project's effectiveness was below expectations because quantitative targets were not met; nevertheless, the overarching developmental impact of the projects is considered high because education measures foster resilience.
- Despite limited data, it can be assumed that the funds were used in a resource-saving manner; no evidence was available at the time of the evaluation of more cost-effective alternatives for implementing the measures.
- The Jordanian government lacks the capacity to continue UNICEF's services; further donor funding commitments are necessary to avoid jeopardising the sustainable developmental impact of the projects.

### Conclusions

- The findings suggest that the concept can be replicated in other fragile contexts where educational and psychosocial support needs to be provided to vulnerable refugee populations.
- Studies show that better educated Syrian refugees are more resilient. Therefore, it is plausible that educational measures within the framework of the NLG initiative contributed to strengthening resilience.
- Improving young refugees life prospects also requires investment in secondary education.
- FC approaches used so far in cooperation with UN specialised agencies allow only limited participation at the conceptual level as well as in the targeted allocation of funds.

## Rating according to DAC criteria

**Overall rating: 2 (for both projects)<sup>1</sup>**

### Ratings:

Relevance	2
Coherence	2
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	3
Impact	2
Sustainability	2

### General conditions and classification of the project

By the end of 2020, more than 670,000 refugees from Syria were registered in Jordan. Around half of these were children and young people with traumatic experiences of war, violence and displacement. For these children and young people, UNICEF's donor-funded No Lost Generation (NLG) initiative was designed to increase capacities of state-run schools in refugee camps and host communities, increase informal, alternative and after-school educational opportunities for Syrian refugee children and young people, and support child protection measures and psychosocial support. From 2015 to 2017, Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) supported UNICEF in implementing the multi-focal No Lost Generation initiative with two FC projects run by KfW (Strengthening Resilience in the Context of the Syria/Iraq Crisis, BMZ No. 2015 68 021 and Strengthening Resilience, Education 2015 68 898) totalling EUR 25 million. The two FC projects were embedded in the regional project "Strengthening Resilience in the Context of the Syria/Iraq Crisis (Regional Project Middle East)", which supported basic infrastructure projects in the neighbouring countries of the Syria and Iraq crises (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq) and in Syria<sup>2</sup>.

### Breakdown of total costs

Strengthening Resilience of Host Communities and Refugees Affected by Syria-Crisis (Phase I) Jordan UNICEF, BMZ No. 2015 68 021; Strengthening Resilience, UNICEF Jordan Education (Phase II), BMZ No. 2015 68 898.

		JOR UNICEF Phase I* (Planned)	JOR UNICEF Phase I* (Actual)	JOR UNICEF Phase II** (Planned)	JOR UNICEF Phase II** (Actual)
Investment costs	EUR million	10.00	10.00	15.00	15.00
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Funding	EUR million	10.00	10.00	15.00	15.00
of which BMZ budget funds	EUR million	10.00	10.00	15.00	15.00

\*) Random sample 2020; \*\*) Phase II added

### Relevance

Due to the ongoing conflict in Syria, refugees from the country continue to flow into Jordan, putting additional strain on social infrastructure and available resources such as housing, food and water, especially

<sup>1</sup> Ratings for each category are not listed for each project as it is not possible to rate each project separately for this evaluation due to interdependencies.

<sup>2</sup> The regional project has not been assigned its own BMZ number and is therefore referred to by name only.

in the municipalities in the north of the country bordering Syria. At times, populations there have doubled within a year as a result of the massive influx of Syrian refugees. At the beginning of 2021, four out of five Syrian refugees in Jordan were living in municipalities and towns, and one fifth in camps. At the end of 2020, more than 670,000 Syrian refugees were registered, almost half of them children and young people.<sup>3</sup> The Jordanian government has made significant efforts to integrate Syrian children and young people into the public education system. However, funding, capacity and quality issues in the Jordanian education sector have hampered attempts to ensure access to education for all children and young people living in Jordan.

Against this backdrop, UNICEF and World Vision introduced the NLG initiative in October 2013, a strategy to support the countries most affected by the Syrian and Iraqi crises (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt) to increase access to education for refugee children and young people. The NLG initiative also aims to provide a protective environment for children traumatised by war, violence and displacement that will combat the exploitation, abuse and neglect of vulnerable children.

UNICEF's activities in Jordan under the NLG initiative have been partly financed by the two FC projects. Many other public and private donors continue to support the initiative to this day, but funding commitments fluctuate considerably from year to year to the detriment of planning. In the past, this has led to the underfunding of individual components of the NLG initiative.

The activities of the NLG initiative were embedded in the Regional Refugee and Resilience (3R) Plans of the United Nations and the country-specific Jordan Response Plans of the Jordanian government<sup>4</sup>, which were aligned with Jordan's national development plans in the education sector. During the period under review, the 3R Plans and Jordan Response Plans clearly shifted from short-term to longer-term resilience-strengthening measures intended to benefit both refugee children and young people and vulnerable population groups in the host communities. In line with the Do-No-Harm principle, this approach provided the conditions for measures to be planned and designed in a way that was sensitive to potential conflicts and was to ensure peaceful coexistence between the population groups.

Accordingly, both Syrian refugees and local populations in the host communities were included in the target group in the programme proposal for the regional project in which the two FC projects were embedded. However, the urgency of the two FC projects meant that a detailed target group analysis was not carried out, nor was the target group involved in identifying project activities.

The FC projects were intended to support UNICEF in increasing the capacities of state schools in refugee camps and host communities, in increasing informal, alternative and after-school education for Syrian refugee children and young people, and in supporting child protection measures and psychosocial care. This was consistent with the BMZ's commitment to people affected by the Syrian conflict, which aimed to give them perspectives beyond humanitarian aid and to enable them to provide for themselves in the long term through education, vocational training and employment.<sup>5</sup>

In phase 1, the corresponding project activities were subdivided into three components in the design of the FC projects, whereas in phase 2 they were subdivided into four components (cf. Effectiveness). However, the project activities as well as the impact logic were the same in phases 1 and 2: the project activities were to contribute to improving the resilience of Syrian refugees through increased access to education and child protection measures. This impact logic was based on the assumption that supporting (basic) education will increase problem-solving capacity and resilience against future crises.

No explicit distinction was made between outcome and impact levels in the programme proposal or in the final inspection of this impact logic, nor was there a definition of resilience. In monitoring and evaluating the projects, the differences in reporting by UNICEF and KfW also proved problematic; in contrast to KfW's reporting according to the three or four components, UNICEF structured its reports according to the three pillars of education, child protection, and youth and adults.

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<sup>3</sup> The actual number is higher because not all Syrian refugees are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). According to estimates by the Jordanian government, a total of around 1.3 million Syrians were residing in Jordan in 2020.

<sup>4</sup> For the period under review – 2015 to 2017 – the 3RP /Jordan Response Plans 2015 and 2016-2018 were relevant.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. BMZ information on the Syria crisis. Accessible on the internet at <https://www.bmz.de/de/laender/syrien> (3 April 2021).

Despite these reporting weaknesses, cooperation with UNICEF is generally assessed as appropriate and beneficial, as UNICEF is an experienced, effective and visible executing agency of education projects. Furthermore, from today's perspective, the FC project activities were based on actual needs and appropriately addressed the core problems identified in the programme proposal. To this day, high levels of immigration are straining the basic infrastructure in the countries affected by the Syrian crisis, jeopardising social cohesion in host countries and harbouring further potential for escalation and displacement.

In summary, we rate the relevance of the two FC projects as high and, against the backdrop of the unresolved Syrian conflict that threatens the future of an entire generation, as still significant today.

**Relevance rating: 2**

### Coherence

The German government took into account the high relevance and urgency of measures in the region affected by the Syrian crisis by, among other things, increasing humanitarian aid from German Federal Foreign Office funds and setting up special initiatives and specific budget items<sup>6</sup>. Since a clear differentiation was not always possible between the Federal Foreign Office's humanitarian aid and BMZ measures on supporting development and building structures in the regions and countries affected by crises and conflicts during the period under review, there was a call for a fundamentally improved coordination process between the ministries.<sup>7</sup> However, medium- to long-term project activities designed as part of the FC projects, such as after-school or alternative education programmes, were clearly distinct from the assistance provided by the Federal Foreign Office. Therefore, in terms of additionality it can be assumed that the funds added value.

With regard to external coherence, it has been possible to establish a framework at international level with several international donor conferences for a cross-sectoral approach.<sup>8</sup> The 3R plans were crucial for the procedure (cf. Relevance). The NLG initiative is an integral part of these plans and complements other projects within the 3R plans from multilateral organisations in the water, health and food sectors. To ensure a coherent approach, regular meetings were held between UNICEF and other donors to the NLG initiative and implementing organisations. UNICEF and the Jordanian Ministry of Education also worked closely together, for example on developing curricula for formal and non-formal education.<sup>9</sup> However, donors were not given the opportunity to propose conceptual changes, nor were they given a say in allocating funds. For this reason, FC developed an approach in further projects that enabled it to have both a much greater say as well as targeted financing of specific measures.<sup>10</sup>

Regarding internal coherence, FC financing of the UNICEF activities made sense in the context of other bilateral FC and TC projects in Jordan that had been initiated in response to the Syria crisis. These included, for example, FC projects to improve drinking water supplies for Syrian refugees in Jordan (BMZ No. 2012 66 832 (Phase I); BMZ No. 2013 66 814 (Phase II)). German TC implemented projects to improve water security for displaced persons and to improve psychosocial support services in Jordanian host communities.

Coherence is rated good overall, despite the limitations mentioned above. Key here is the coherent, content-based orientation of the FC projects for partial financing of UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative,

<sup>6</sup> For example, a special initiative on stabilising and developing North Africa and the Middle East, a special initiative on combating the causes of flight and (re)integrating refugees, and a budget item on crisis management, reconstruction and infrastructure.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Spending Review (2017/2018 cycle) on the policy area of humanitarian and transition aid, including the interfaces of crisis prevention, crisis response, stabilisation and development cooperation. Accessible on the internet at [https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche\\_Finanzien/Spending\\_Reviews/Abschlussbericht-der-AG-zum-Politikbereich-Humanitaere-Hilfe.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=1](https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzien/Spending_Reviews/Abschlussbericht-der-AG-zum-Politikbereich-Humanitaere-Hilfe.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1) (14 February 2021).

<sup>8</sup> On structuring and formalising the international donor conferences, see the BMZ information on the Syria crisis. Accessible on the internet at <https://www.bmz.de/de/laender/syrien> (3 April 2021).

<sup>9</sup> Some religiously oriented providers of non-formal education showed little interest in coordinating their activities. Since they were not accessible within the outlined framework, there was no coordinated approach between providers of non-formal education.

<sup>10</sup> These FC projects included UNICEF Jordan, NLG/Makani Center Phase I (BMZ No. 2018.1833.5); UNICEF Jordan, NLG/ Makani Center Phase II (BMZ No. 2019.1827.5), UNICEF Jordan, NLG/Makani Center Phase III (BMZ No. 2020.1803.4). These FC funds are used, among other things, to specifically finance the operating costs of Makani centres where Syrian children and young people have the opportunity to take part in afternoon educational courses and receive psychosocial help.

which is consistent with the BMZ's development policy goals for the region (cf. Relevance). Moreover, since the NLG initiative is embedded in the 3Rs plans, it contributes to a coherent overall approach for Syrian refugees in the region affected by the Syrian crisis.

### Coherence rating: 2

#### Effectiveness

The objective at outcome level of both FC projects underlying this EPE was for Syrian children and young people to have access to and participate in a high-quality education system. Furthermore, a protective environment was to be established to combat the exploitation, abuse and neglect of vulnerable children.<sup>11</sup> The projects were therefore consistent with the objectives of UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative.

To achieve the objective, the two FC projects partly financed UNICEF activities across four components. These comprised increasing the intake capacities in the formal education system (component 1), increasing and supporting informal education (component 2), after-school and alternative education (component 3) as well as child protection measures and psychosocial care (component 4).<sup>12</sup>

Component 1 aimed to provide at least 132,000 Syrian refugee children with access to formal education; at 134,121 children, this target was not reached until 2018 – one year after the conclusion of the FC projects. The reason for the delay, according to UNICEF, was insufficient funding for increasing formal education.<sup>13</sup> However, the proportion of Syrian children enrolled in school has risen steadily since 2014. A survey on the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan for the years 2017 and 2018 even puts school enrolment rates for 6 to 11-year-old children at almost 100 % – but this is usually only possible by running schools on a 2-shift system and having a high teacher–pupil ratio.<sup>14</sup> It has also been shown that school enrolment rates for children aged 12 and over have steadily declined, with a particularly high number of children dropping out of school after year 6. With the proportion of Syrian pupils not attending school in Jordan standing at 36 % in 2018<sup>15</sup>, improving access to quality secondary education remains one of the greatest challenges – especially for Syrian refugee boys, whose gross enrolment rates are slightly lower than girls' at both primary and secondary levels.<sup>16</sup>

Component 2's informal education opportunities were to benefit children and young people who were not integrated into the formal school system or who had difficulties at schools. Included here were measures such as tutoring, catch-up and drop-out programmes.<sup>17</sup> During the implementation period, only around 54,500 of the targeted 90,000 children and young people were reached. One reason for this was that UNICEF used significantly less funding for component 2 than planned. The reason given by UNICEF in its final report to KfW was that there was a greater need for funds especially in component 1, and this made it necessary to reallocate funds among the components of the FC projects. There were also significant delays in the opening of catch-up centres due to a lack of personnel and institutional capacity on the part of the Jordanian Ministry of Education.<sup>18</sup> Component 3, which included vocational and life-skills training, also fell short of its targets, with only around 10 % of 15–24-year-olds making the transition into formal employment.

<sup>11</sup> This objective was adapted as part of the EPE in order to enable differentiation between the effects at outcome and impact levels (cf. Relevance). Since the FC projects partly financed UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative in Jordan, the objective was also adapted to the results framework of UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative, the impact logic of which is judged to be plausible.

<sup>12</sup> Dividing the activities into four components is in line with phase 2, but is also applied to phase 1 in this EPE because distinguishing between the impacts according to phase 1 and phase 2 is not possible due, among other things, to reallocations of funds by UNICEF.

<sup>13</sup> In 2015, more than 220,000 Syrian children of school age (5-17 years) were registered in Jordan.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Tiltne, Age/Zhang, Huafeng/Pedersen, Jon (2019): The living conditions of Syrian Refugees in Jordan. Results from the 2017-2018 survey of Syrian refugees inside and outside camps. Fafo report. Accessible on the internet at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/67914.pdf> (13 September 2021).

<sup>15</sup> The proportion is even higher in Lebanon (2018: 46%), and similarly high in Turkey (2018: 37%); cf. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68406.pdf> (6 April 2021).

<sup>16</sup> The gender parity index for gross enrolment rates also shows that slightly more girls than boys are enrolled in school in Syria as well as in other countries neighbouring the Syrian crisis; cf. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68406.pdf> (28.20.2021).

<sup>17</sup> Catch-up programmes aimed to address learning deficits of refugee children and reintegrate them into the formal education system; drop-out programmes were specifically designed for young people aged 12+.

<sup>18</sup> The catch-up and drop-out programmes in particular have only been able to reach 16,131 children and young people since 2015.

Reasons for failing to meet targets within the three components are manifold. In addition to the aforementioned financial constraints of the NLG initiative and time delays, fundamental barriers to access proved problematic, such as costs for transport and school materials, inappropriate class times, unsafe routes to school and the bullying and harassment of girls.<sup>19</sup> UNICEF cited similar reasons for component 2 in its final report to KfW and responded by financing support measures, such as introducing school buses, which were partly financed with funds from the two FC projects. Furthermore, UNICEF implemented national campaigns and measures to reduce verbal and physical violence in schools and to strengthen social cohesion between Syrian and Jordanian children.

In addition to the three components on increasing access to and participation in quality education, component 4 on access to child protection measures and psychosocial services was intended to establish a protective environment for children and young people. In 2016, psychosocial support and child protection interventions were provided for 187,677 children and young people, around 85 % of the target.<sup>20</sup>

Indicator <sup>a</sup>	Status at project appraisal (2014/2015); Target value at project appraisal	Status during Implementation period (2016/2017); Status at ex post evaluation (2020)
(1) Access to and participation in formal education for children	130,000 <sup>b</sup> 132,000 <sup>b</sup>	124,801 (2016/2017) <sup>b</sup> ; not achieved* 136,437 (2019) <sup>c</sup> ; achieved
(2) Access to and participation in informal education for young people	30,000 <sup>b</sup> ; 90,000 <sup>b</sup>	54,525 (2016) <sup>b</sup> , 54,436 (2017) <sup>b</sup> ; not available (2020)
(3) Access to and participation in after-school and alternative educational opportunities		
a) Further education courses	2,490 <sup>b</sup> ; 3,500 <sup>b</sup>	3,117 (2016) <sup>b</sup> , 1,839 (2017) <sup>b</sup> ; not achieved N/A
b) Life-skills training for 10–24-year-olds	33,553 <sup>b</sup> ; 58,000 <sup>b</sup>	86,677 (2016) <sup>b</sup> ; 31,028 (2017) <sup>b</sup> ; not achieved 55,534 (2019) <sup>d</sup> , Nashatati programme); not achieved
c) Social cohesion initiatives	0 <sup>b</sup> ; 5,000 <sup>b</sup>	1,600 <sup>b</sup> ; N/A
(4) Access to child protection measures and psychosocial services	210,763 <sup>b</sup> ; 218,000 <sup>b</sup>	187,677 (2016) <sup>b</sup> , 50,022 (until 05/2017) <sup>b</sup> ; not achieved 73,348 (2019; target for 2019: 80,000) <sup>e</sup> ; not achieved

a) The indicators are taken from the final inspection of phase 1 and 2. To triangulate the impact measurement, further indicators on the educational situation and establishment of a protective environment have been included in the supporting text.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Human Rights Watch (2020): "I Want to Continue to Study". Barriers to Secondary Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Jordan. Accessible on the internet at [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/jordan0620\\_web\\_0.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/jordan0620_web_0.pdf) (6 April 2021).

<sup>20</sup> As can be seen from the impact matrix attached to the final inspections and from UNICEF's final report to KfW, boys and girls benefited largely equally in all components during the implementation period; furthermore, people with disabilities also benefited from the various measures, as did Jordanian children and young people.



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- b) The values are taken from UNICEF's impact matrix attached in the final inspections, which correspond to UNICEF's Final Report.
  - c) The values are taken from project documents of the NLG initiative. Accessible on the internet at <https://www.nolostgeneration.org/reports/continuous-learning-syrian-children-and-youth> (6 April 2020).
  - d) The values are taken from project documents of the NLG initiative. Accessible on the internet at <https://www.unicef.org/media/63031/file/EdStrategy-2019-2030-CountrySolution-Jordan.pdf> (6 April 2020).
  - e) The values are taken from UNICEF project documents. Accessible on the internet at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020-HAC-Syrian-refugees.pdf> (6 April 2020).
- \*) At the time of the project appraisal, it was assumed that the official figures were overestimated. This is probably why an increase of only 2,000 students was targeted. The decreased value at the time of the final inspection is therefore also due to adjustments in the survey of student numbers. Duplicate counts and other errors were corrected there.

The results presented here refer to the entire UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative in Jordan. This is because a clearly differentiated impact measurement of the FC projects was not possible for several reasons. First, the indicators used in the programme proposal and in the final inspection already refer to baseline and target values for the entire UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative, and not to baseline and target values in relation to the FC projects. Second, UNICEF used the funds flexibly, contrary to the programme design, or used the FC funds for activities that were only conceived at the time of implementation, such as introducing school buses.

Regarding overall UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative, significant progress can be observed in expanding a quality education system despite the quantitative targets missed during the implementation period. There are also positive results on establishing a protective environment to combat the exploitation, abuse and neglect of vulnerable children. Indications here are the decrease in verbal and physical violence at schools and the low percentage of child labour (roughly 1 % of 9 to 14-year-olds). We therefore rate the effectiveness of the FC projects that partly financed UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative as below expectations, but still positive.

**Effectiveness rating: 3**

### Efficiency

The extent to which FC funds contributed to UNICEF's activities at the outcome level cannot be clearly determined because use of funds by UN organisations can only be audited to a limited extent under the single audit principle. The project executing agency also reallocated funds in the FC projects in an uncoordinated manner, and its reporting suffered from a lack of transparency in differentiating the financed activities.

UNICEF was not obliged to submit a detailed cost and performance account for the use of FC funds, which would be a prerequisite for a transparent assessment of production and allocation efficiency. According to UNICEF's Final Report on the use of FC funds in the four components of the projects, most FC funds were used for component 1 (increasing intake capacities in the formal education system) with a share of 41.0 %, followed by component 4 (child protection measures and psychosocial support) at 20.3 %, component 2 (informal education services) at 18.6 % and component 3 (after-school and alternative education services) at 8.6 %.<sup>21</sup>

The indicator UNICEF cited for the use of outputs was the number of people directly reached by FC-funded services in the four components, as well as the total number of people reached.<sup>22</sup> Accordingly, 91,966 people benefited from FC-financed services; in total, more than 1 million people were reached by UNICEF activities. This level of coverage is considered appropriate for EUR 25 million.

When using the total number of persons reached as the basis for allocation efficiency, the funds used amounted to EUR 93 per person for component 1, EUR 11 per person for component 2, EUR 20 per person for component 3 and EUR 15 per person for component 4. Taking into account the funds used for cross-component measures and the flat rate for administrative costs, the costs per person reached totalled EUR 26. Alternatively, when using the number of people reached directly through FC-financed

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<sup>21</sup> 4.2 % of the FC funds were used for cross-component measures; UNICEF charged 8 % of FC funds used for measures as an administrative fee.

<sup>22</sup> The validity of this indicator is not guaranteed, however, partly because of the possibility of double counting and the problem of differentiating the FC funds used in the four components.

measures, as cited by UNICEF, the total costs per person reached were considerably higher at EUR 307. Basing allocation efficiency on this number of persons, however, is problematic. An exact allocation of the persons reached with FC funds is almost impossible due to the large number of overlapping interventions of UNICEF's range of services. Furthermore, different recording and reporting methods were used to calculate the above-mentioned numbers of persons.

The administrative fee of 8 % of FC funds spent was a significantly higher flat rate charged by UNICEF, for example, than for a UNICEF project in Afghanistan co-financed by FC in the years 2014 to 2019 (4.5 %; BMZ No. 2015 67 783). Nevertheless, it is in line with UNICEF's standard administrative fees. This puts the multilateral organisation above WHO's administrative fees for an FC co-financed project in Afghanistan (7 %; BMZ No. 2015 67 783) and UNRWA's flat administrative fee for a project in the Gaza Strip (7 %; BMZ No. 2012 67 277).

Both projects ran for a total of 21 months rather than the originally planned 18 months. Despite the 3-month extension, time efficiency is rated as good considering the complexity of the projects and the difficult general conditions.

The limited audit of the use of funds could not verify the extent to which "unit costs" were a result of the project's minimum-cost production efficiency. Whether there could have been more cost-effective alternatives for implementing the ambitious project therefore remains hypothetical. However, UNICEF is generally regarded by the international donor community as a competent and strong executing agency which, with its many years of experience in fragile settings, plans and implements programmes on a needs basis and focusing on results. It can therefore be assumed that the objectives of the two FC projects were achieved in a resource-efficient manner and that the use of funds under the most difficult conditions in the refugee camps and in the host Jordanian communities was appropriate. We therefore rate efficiency as satisfactory, despite the limited data basis.

**Efficiency rating: 3**

## Impact

The objective at impact level was to help increase the resilience of refugee Syrian children and young people as well as the host communities through FC projects financing UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative.<sup>23</sup> The FC projects were also intended to strengthen social cohesion between refugees and Jordanian society (dual objective).

On the objective of strengthening the resilience of Syrian refugee children and young people, resilience is understood as the ability to cope with crises, to survive them without long-term adverse effects and consequences, and to identify abilities and strengths. A recent study shows that the resilience of Syrian refugees in Jordan is influenced by social determinants such as place of residence, employment, income and level of education.<sup>24</sup> The study concludes that while Syrian refugees in Jordan are far less resilient than other populations living there, resilience increases among those who live in refugee camps rather than in Jordanian communities, who are employed, earn an income above subsistence level, and are better educated. Against this backdrop, educational measures such as those from UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative attest to a significant contribution to strengthening resilience.

UNICEF evaluations also show that alternative education programmes, such as life skills training, have significantly improved the skills Syrian and Jordanian children and young people need to strengthen their resilience. For example, the percentage of children and young people who showed themselves able to speak in front of others, not to use violence in conflicts, and to play with younger or older children or with

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<sup>23</sup> The objective at impact level was formulated within the framework of the present EPE. The Results Framework of UNICEF's activities under the NLG initiative did not formulate an objective at impact level; in KfW's project documents, the objectives at outcome and impact level were identical (cf. relevance/effectiveness).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Alduraidi, Hamza/Dardas, Latefa (2020): Social Determinants of Resilience Among Syrian Refugees in Jordan. Accessible on the internet at [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342614836\\_Social\\_Determinants\\_of\\_Resilience\\_Among\\_Syrian\\_Refugees\\_in\\_Jordan](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342614836_Social_Determinants_of_Resilience_Among_Syrian_Refugees_in_Jordan) (4 March 2021).



different nationalities increased by up to 35 %.<sup>25</sup> Such measures, which were designed for Syrian and Jordanian children and young people and financed with funds from the two FC projects, also helped to strengthen social cohesion between Jordanian children and young people (dual objective).<sup>26</sup>

Regarding the objective of strengthening the resilience of the host communities, which is understood as improved provision of basic infrastructure and social infrastructure, it is evident that in addition to refugees, the local population has also gained access, for example, to the Makani centres.<sup>27</sup> This attests to the regional project having contributed to the objective of guaranteeing access to basic infrastructure and social infrastructure for refugees and the local population in neighbouring countries affected by the Syrian and Iraqi crises.

Overall, resilience-strengthening effects as well as contributions to supporting social cohesion and the objectives of the regional project can only be attributed to the UNICEF activities as a whole and not to the FC projects individually. Given this limitation, we rate the overarching developmental impact of the FC projects partly financing UNICEF activities under the NLG initiative as good and in line with expectations, also because no unintended negative effects were observed.

**Impact rating: 2**

### Sustainability

The security situation and underlying political conditions in Syria will not change significantly in the foreseeable future, so a mass return of the refugees located in Jordan seems unlikely. The overall risk of the two FC projects was rated as high in the 2015 appraisal and 2018 final inspection. This rating is still considered valid at the time of the ex post evaluation.

From today's perspective, the positive effects of the two projects at outcome and impact levels will not be sustainable if UNICEF has to reduce or completely discontinue NLG services due to a lack of donor funding. School and out-of-school support for children and young people in the refugee camps and host communities could then no longer be guaranteed. The Jordanian government lacks the necessary capacity and resources to continue UNICEF's services on its own. Given this situation, it is understandable that UNICEF – expecting further donor funding approvals – does not have an exit strategy.<sup>28</sup>

The sustainability risk remains high, with little ability to influence it, but if UNICEF's engagement continues, the generally positive development effectiveness up to the time of the evaluation will persist. Considering the commitment of international donors to financial support under the Jordan Compact of 2016<sup>29</sup>, and assuming that UNICEF's services will continue and be further improved, we rate sustainability with a rating of just about good.

**Sustainability rating: 2**

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. UNICEF's evaluation results Accessible on the internet at <https://www.unicef.org/media/63031/file/EdStrategy-2019-2030-CountrySolution-Jordan.pdf> (6 April 2020).

<sup>26</sup> Project workers reported, however, that no basic evidence exists to suggest that tensions between the local population and refugees have significantly reduced. Due to the social and economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, it can even be assumed that the Jordanian population's reservations about Syrian refugees are growing.

<sup>27</sup> The Makani centres take a holistic approach to education, social and psychosocial support. To date, the Makani project has been significantly extended with FC support. The concept behind the Makani centres as places for children to grow up without violence also makes a case for replicating such centres in other intervention contexts.

<sup>28</sup> The programme proposal did not include a limited appraisal requirement on sustainability, which necessitates the formulation of an exit strategy.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Barbelet/Hagen-Zanker/Mansour-Ille 2018; Schubert/Haase 2018.

### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

### Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).