

# Ex post evaluation

## Teachers Salary Program, Jordan

<b>Title</b>	Financing of Salaries in Support of Accelerating Access for Syrian Refugee Children to Formal Education in Jordan (Phases III and IV)		
<b>Sector and CRS code</b>	11220 Basic education		
<b>Project number</b>	BMZ Nos. 2018 49 678 and 2019 40 931		
<b>Commissioned by</b>	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)		
<b>Recipient/Project-executing agency</b>	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan – Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC)/Ministry of Education (MoE)		
<b>Project volume/ Financing instrument</b>	Phase III: EUR 25.5 million; Phase IV: EUR 19.00 million/FC grant from the special refugee initiative		
<b>Project duration</b>	Phase III: School year 2018/2019; Phase IV: School year 2019/2020		
<b>Year of report</b>	2022	<b>Year of random sample</b>	2022/2023

### Objectives and project outline


Salary financing was used to provide temporary employment opportunities for Jordanian teachers and administrative staff at formal schools to educate Syrian refugee children (outcome level). This was intended to contribute to social and economic participation through short to medium-term employment perspectives for Jordanian teachers and specialists and to improved living conditions and better future prospects for Syrian refugee children through access to formal education, also in order to prevent a “lost generation” (impact level).

### Key findings

The projects temporarily contributed to the employment of Jordanian specialists and the education of Syrian refugee children. Despite employment conditions that can be classified as precarious, the projects are still rated as successful due to the importance of education for children in crisis situations.

- In view of the overburdening of the Jordanian education system, which already existed before the Syrian crisis, and the need for social compensation through employment for Jordanian specialists in host communities, technical relevance is given. However, the continuation of the temporary approach does not do justice to a protracted crisis.
- The financing complemented the commitment of other donors as part of the Jordanian government’s Accelerating Access to Quality Formal Education Initiative (AAI) and the output-focused objectives with regard to education and employment at outcome level were achieved.
- Annual commitments cause a high degree of uncertainty for the executing agency, schools, specialists and pupils, result in high costs and are an impediment to longer-term approaches.
- Employment conditions are precarious, even though they are comparably widely applied in the Jordanian education sector and are derived from the cash-for-work approach of the German Partnership for Prospects Initiative.
- Due to the annual commitments, the impact is still temporary and associated with high risks and constant pressures due to uncertainty, particularly for employees.

Overall rating:  
**moderately successful**



### Conclusions

- The project’s temporary emergency aid approach, which is updated annually, no longer meets the longer-term needs of the ongoing crisis.
- Fundamental rights and obligations urgently need to be clarified transparently for FC-financed teachers and specialists.
- In terms of perspective, education cannot be valued in line with the Jordanian peers due to access restrictions on refugees to the labour market.

## Rating according to DAC criteria

### Overall rating: 3 (Phase III and IV)

Although expanding education for Syrian refugee children and the need for employment opportunities has high relevance, there are severe limitations with regard to employment conditions and prospects for the valorisation of education. The project, which was conceived as an emergency measure, has not adapted to the changed conditions of an ongoing crisis over the years.

The two evaluated phases III and IV do not differ significantly in terms of concept and are evaluated together.

#### Ratings (Phase III and IV):

Relevance	2
Coherence	2
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	3
Overarching developmental impact	3
Sustainability	(3)

#### General conditions and classification of the project

Phase VII (2022/2023 school year) of financing salaries for Jordanian teaching and administrative specialists to teach Syrian refugees in Jordan is underway. The support has two objectives that run structurally through this evaluation: an education goal for Syrian refugee children in Jordan and an employment goal for Jordanian specialists in the education sector. The ongoing commitment is part of the German Partnership for Prospects Initiative<sup>1</sup>, which intends to bridge the gap between humanitarian aid and structural development cooperation and is financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's special refugee initiative. The present evaluation considers the commitment in its conception on its own merits and thus the educational aspect to be equivalent to employment.

#### Relevance

The Jordanian **education system** was already overwhelmed before the Syrian crisis, capacity does not meet demand and quality is poor. The influx of an estimated 1.4 million Syrian refugees (of which only around 670,000 are registered with the UNHCR refugee aid organisation) has thus exacerbated an existing problem, particularly in the northern regions and in the Amman metropolitan area. Jordan has shown itself to be very open to receiving refugees and already gave Syrian refugees access to the formal education system as far as possible before the start of comprehensive donor programmes. Jordan pursues a policy of taking care of refugees within the framework of state structures – not least in light of the experience of parallel structures for taking care of Palestinian refugees in the country through UNRWA.

The socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated the situation in the education sector, as more than 250,000 children who previously attended private schools subsequently switched to public schools, which corresponds roughly to the number of registered Syrian refugee children of school age. Hybrid learning is therefore also envisaged as a long-term solution to capacity problems.

The situation on the Jordanian **labour market** is very difficult and the situation has been exacerbated again by the COVID-19 pandemic: the unemployment rate rose from 18% in 2017 to 23.3% in the fourth quarter of 2021 and from 35% to almost 50% among young people. Women's labour force participation

<sup>1</sup> For further information, see [Cash for Work | BMZ](#) and the evaluation of the DEval from 2021 [The effectiveness of Germany's development cooperation in the event of conflict-related refugee crises. The Middle East Employment Offensive | DEval – Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit gGmbH \(German Development Cooperation Evaluation Institute\)](#)

rate is one of the lowest in the world at 14%<sup>2</sup>. Due to the influx of refugees, competition on the labour market has grown, particularly in the low-wage sector and informal labour market. Despite the Jordan Compact concluded with the EU in 2016 for better access to education and legal employment for Syrian refugees, access is limited in other sectors and by barriers to obtaining work permits. In the area of education, only Jordanian citizens are allowed to teach – Syrians can only be deployed as assistants on a voluntary basis. There is an oversupply of Jordanian teachers awaiting permanent employment as civil servants; however, according to the MoE, around 40% of teachers are no longer employed by the Jordanian state on a long-term basis due to financial restrictions, but are covered by short-term employment. The chances of long-term employment for teachers are therefore very low.

The **core problem** continues to be that the Jordanian education system, in particular in the northern districts and Amman, is also heavily burdened to overburdened due to the Syrian refugees, so that a large number of Syrian children cannot be taught and, at the same time, there is a lack of employment opportunities. The situation has been exacerbated by the impact of the pandemic, with more Jordanians joining Syrians in precarious living conditions, a strong influx of private to public schools, and therefore a growing risk of rising social tensions.

**Formal education for Syrian refugees** is divided into three types: Type I – schools in refugee camps, Type II – double-shift schools with afternoon shifts for Syrian refugees (DSS) and Type III – teaching Syrian children together with Jordanian children in single-shift schools in the morning (ESS) – the project focuses on Type II schools, while Type I is covered by the EU in terms of salaries and Type III by the Jordanian state. Around 50% of Syrian pupils attend Type II schools and 25% each attend Type I and Type III schools.

The **conceptual approach** to FC commitment results from the cash-for-work of the German Partnership for Prospects Initiative. As a temporary solution, financing for Jordanian teachers and administrative specialists at double-shift schools should (a) meet the educational needs of Syrian children while (b) taking into account persistent unemployment in host communities, including teachers. This was also linked to the intention of preventing distribution conflicts and maintaining social cohesion in the communities. To enable employment for both Jordanians and Syrians, the project was originally developed in combination with a project implemented via UNICEF for voluntary Syrian aid workers in the education sector (see Coherence). In Phase III, an integration incentive was derived from the partial co-financing of specialists at single-shift schools in which Syrian and Jordanian children were taught together (Type III). In addition, the project was not based on a conceptual approach to integration. Equal access for all children within the spirit of the SDGs (irrespective of nationality and vulnerability) can only be achieved in the overall context of the Jordanian education sector.

From today's perspective, the provision of education services to Syrian children and the expansion of employment for Jordanian specialists remain very relevant. However, the strategy was based on an emergency-related, temporary approach, which from today's perspective does not fully meet the challenges of a long-lasting crisis and the necessary long-term support as well as the need for equal support for all vulnerable population groups.

**Relevance rating: 2**

### Coherence

The financing was provided by the **special initiative** "Tackling the root causes of displacement, reintegrating refugees" and is part of the "**German Partnership for Prospects Initiative**", which was launched by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) during the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in London in 2016. The aim of the German Partnership for Prospects Initiative is to contribute to creating prospects for refugees in the neighbouring countries of Syria, benefiting refugees and host communities in the process. It aims to build a bridge from short-term aid to long-term, structural measures for as many vulnerable people as possible. The initiative's cash-for-work approach is the basis for salary financing in education, although interviews revealed that local stakeholders are not aware of this and the approach does not match the long-term commitment of teachers.

<sup>2</sup> World Bank, Country at a Glance May 2022: [Jordan overview: Development news, research, data | World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/country-at-a-glance/jordan)

The Financial Cooperation (FC) measure is allocated to the German **Development Cooperation programme Education and Employment Promotion** in Jordan. FC has also been supporting the education sector in Jordan for many years with school construction programmes and approaches to strengthen maintenance and repair. In addition, the DC programme measures for vocational training and employment generally have the potential to increase the expected benefits from school attendance, but the regulatory framework conditions, among other things, limit the employment of (trained) refugees to a great extent.

FC support is in line with the **Jordan Response Plan** and is part of the Jordanian Ministry of Education's multi-donor initiative "**Accelerating Access to Quality Formal Education Initiative**" (AAI) for accelerated access to high-quality formal education for Syrian refugee children. In addition to Germany, AAI is supported by the EU, DFID, Norway, Canada and Australia. Germany has the largest donor share, followed by the EU. Complementary to the German commitment, the EU finances salaries at formal schools in camps (Type I). The other donors also finance school materials, teacher training and operating costs of the schools under a joint financing agreement. In its second phase, AAI (AAI 2.0) is focusing on all vulnerable groups in order to better take into account the current situation of increasing levels of vulnerability in Jordanian society. The implementation of the various components is more donor-driven, as is the monitoring and reporting that is collected – but not coordinated – by the Development Cooperation Department in the MoE. This gave the impression during the evaluation that the AAI is more of a common framework than a real coordinating body.

The evaluated financing should be viewed in close conjunction with the **UNICEF projects** supported by FC, which (a) promote access to (non-)formal education for Syrian refugee children and support for Makani centres and psychosocial support as part of the "no lost generation strategy", and (b) address the involvement of Syrian children in formal education opportunities by generating voluntary work for Syrian refugees in the education sector. The EU-financed Madrasati initiative aims to improve the learning environment for Jordanian and Syrian students in host communities.

Subsidiarity to the Jordanian government's own efforts is given by providing support to Syrian refugees at single-shift schools, for which Jordan receives no donor contributions apart from the small co-financing from FC.

From today's perspective, the approach is fulfilled both internally through embedding between the long-standing FC engagement in the education sector and the approaches to mitigating the Syria crisis, as well as externally through the division of tasks within the AAI and the complementarity with UNICEF's engagement. The aim would be to strengthen the leading role of the AAI in coordinating donor activities in order to exploit more synergies in planning and follow-up as well.

**Coherence rating: 2**

### **Effectiveness**

The objective at outcome level in the supported school years is (a) to ensure or expand employment opportunities for Jordanian teaching and administrative specialists for the education of Syrian refugee children and thus (b) to improve access to formal and qualitatively appropriate educational opportunities in Jordanian schools for Syrian refugee children.

Due to its temporary focus on financing salaries, the achievement of the outcome-level objective can be summarised as follows using output-oriented indicators. In addition, the current figures for the last school year 2021/2022 (Phase VI) are provided.

Indicator	Target value at appraisal	Status according to final inspection
(1) Number of financed teaching and administrative specialists (FK) at single and double-shift schools (ESS and DSS) in the supported school year.	<b>Phase III:</b> <b>ESS: 2,035</b> - 1,730 teachers - 305 administrative specialists  <b>DSS: 4,515</b> - 3,865 teachers - 650 administrative specialists	<b>Phase III (06/2019):</b> <b>ESS: 2,035</b> - 1,730 teachers - 305 administrative specialists  <b>DSS: 5,207</b> - 4,090 teachers - 1,117 administrative specialists
	<b>Phase IV:</b> DSS: 4,898 - 4,164 teachers - 734 administrative specialists	<b>Phase IV (06/2020):</b> DSS: 4,800 - 4,000 teachers - 800 administrative specialists ESS*: 6,576
(2) Number of pupils enrolled in formal Jordanian schooling in the financed school year (aged 6–18 years)**	<b>Phase III:</b> approx. 135,000 <b>Phase IV:</b> approx. 136,000	<b>Phase III:</b> 134,000 (06/2019) <b>Phase IV:</b> (06/2020) 136,000

\*) Only relates to 2 months and was not planned at the time of the appraisal.

\*\*) This figure includes all Syrian pupils at formal Jordanian schools – including in camps and non-financed schools. The share of pupils who are taught at the 201 DSS schools is close to 50%, a quarter in 62 camp schools and a quarter in 2,343 ESS schools.

The output-related figures were achieved in both phases and are still included in the following phases to this day. It must be considered that indicator (2) covers all Syrian refugee children educated at formal schools (Types I, II and III, see Relevance). The financing of salaries at double-shift schools (Type II) has led to **better provision of education services to Syrian children**, relieved some of the burden on the national education system and provided temporary employment. Nevertheless, there are barriers to access, for example due to a lack of safe and affordable transport options (particularly for children with disabilities and girls), the need for children to work and early marriage. Of the Syrian children, almost 20% did not attend primary school in 2017/2018, while the figure for the Jordanian population was only just under 2%. Overall, the attendance of the Syrian children enrolled is rated as satisfactory to good according to the schools. The attendance of teachers is very good and they are perceived as highly motivated and committed. In the comparison between schooling in the morning (Type III) and in the afternoon (Type II), disadvantages have become apparent in the following aspects (non-exhaustive list), which, however, have been gradually mitigated in part over the years: (a) equipment with teaching materials, (b) access to specialised rooms such as workshops, computer rooms and libraries, (c) lower qualifications/experience of teachers and (d) lower number and length of lessons in the afternoon. The latter should be compensated by Saturday classes, but this is not well accepted. Sports lessons do not take place in the afternoon shifts. In some cases, supply-side support has been and is increasingly being supplemented by demand management measures (outreach teams and awareness campaigns) with UNICEF's support.

Jordanian **teachers and administrative specialists** at double-shift schools are hired on a temporary basis for a maximum of 10 months of the school year on the basis of the needs assessment of the decentralised Education Directorates, with no salary during the summer break. Based on the enrolment figures, the requirements are determined according to the prescribed ratios of pupils/teacher and teachers/administrative specialists and in some cases adjusted during the year. The ratio of continued employ-

ment in the following school year is over 80% (Phase IV to Phase V 82.24%) and depends on the requirements and the performance assessment by the school management (certificate of experience)<sup>3</sup>.

Even in the subsequent phases, the specialists do not hold any employment contracts or any other form of transparent documentation of their rights, duties and obligations. At JOD 250 for teachers and JOD 240 for administrative specialists, the salary was slightly above the Jordanian minimum wage<sup>4</sup> and thus significantly below the salary of long-term teachers who earned twice as much or more. Administrative specialists usually work in the morning shift as civil servants with additional assignments as part of the project in the afternoon. Despite the financing of social security contributions<sup>5</sup> (13%), it remains unclear to what extent entitlement to benefits without written contracts and without ongoing employment could be claimed by the specialists. Health insurance cover was and still does not exist, and there was and is no continued payment in the event of illness; payment is only made for the actual service provided (days). In the event of incapacity for work due to illness, accident, birth or similar, the specialists are dependent on the goodwill of the school management and the Education Directorates – employment is terminated after absences of 3 (–7) days at the latest according to information on site. The temporary employment with limited weekly hours, a two-month break in employment, and the low salary level and lack of security and rights makes for a **precarious employment situation**, which can only be rated positively as a meaningful form of employment against the background of otherwise impending unemployment and compared with even shorter-term cash-for-work. This situation also poses risks to the quality of education and continuity, as second jobs limit capacities and good workers are attracted by better conditions in other sectors.

The framework conditions so far have not allowed for more long-term employment for two reasons: firstly, financing is provided in annual instalments as part of the special initiative and it also follows that, secondly, the Jordanian government is not prepared to conclude long-term contracts resulting in future payment obligations (e.g., in the form of unemployment benefits/pensions) that Jordan cannot afford without donor financing.

In addition to double-shift schools, specialists at **single-shift schools** were co-financed as planned in Phase III (subsequently in Phase IV), which was associated with an integration intention. In general, mixed education of children increases the intensity of contact, which can prevent conflicts and contribute to understanding – however, it is questionable whether this measure adds value.

Financing for teachers and administrative specialists has improved access to the formal education system for Syrian children, but with compromises in quality, especially in the case of afternoon shifts. Meaningful employment has been achieved for teachers and administrative specialists as an alternative to unemployment, but under precarious conditions and without formal contracts.

**Effectiveness rating: 3**

### Efficiency

The simple-looking concept of financing salaries initially suffered greatly from a **lack of transparency** during implementation. With the 2018/2019 school year, clear criteria for the subcontracting of specialists under the Jordanian Rules and Regulations for School Formation were agreed with fixed ratios of pupils to teachers (18/1) and then administrative specialists to teachers (15/85). However, the mobility of Syrian families, whose members often work as migrant workers, led to fluctuations in school enrolment data, which the programme also responded to during the year. The procedures for the recognition of the attendance of staff at school level with the provision of accompanying documents for the payment to the local directorates and the forwarding of the payroll and accompanying documents in paper form to the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs were very time-consuming, inefficient and non-transparent in the evaluated phases; the first parallel digitisation steps took place in subsequent phases. Conflicting information from the open database of the MoE's education management information system (openEMIS) also

<sup>3</sup> Continued employment was promoted by donors in order to achieve continuity of teaching, which is particularly important in the area of primary education. The skilled workers employed by the Ministry of Education on short notice are changed every few months to enable more specialists to gain professional experience.

<sup>4</sup> With the increase in the minimum wage in 2021, salaries were also increased slightly in the subsequent phases.

<sup>5</sup> Social security contributions were financed for the teachers. Administrative specialists were only financed if they were not employed in parallel in the morning shift and were covered by social security.



complicates planning. The short-term nature of the planning, both at the beginning of the school year and in the event of adjustments during the year, led to considerable delays in the payment of salaries due to the need to review the information, resulting in discontent among the financed specialists. The FC funds were also not made available on time due to annual appraisals and subsequent procedural dependencies; the financing agreements in both phases were not concluded until after the school year had begun.

The deployment of two **consultants** to support the executing agency in the implementation of the project and the necessary follow-up could only be carried out at the end of Phase III (May and July 2019). At least this has improved the transparency of supervising and reporting, and one of the consultants still works in the MoE today, which currently also has its own focal point for the financing line, which is very beneficial for building capacity at the executing agency.

For Phase IV, monthly reports were agreed with the MoE regarding staff hired and on Syrian pupils enrolled and attending classes, as well as a final report on the retention rate of specialists from previous phases. In addition, the disbursement structure for Phase IV was modified, but not consistently complied with. Efforts to increase efficiency at least in the disbursement process through digital solutions (e.g. online transfers) were not a success for a long time and could only be introduced from Phase VI onwards.

The **partial financing of salaries in morning shifts** was intended as an incentive for the integration of Syrian children into standard classes. At the time of the appraisal, the salaries of these teachers were JOD 460 (approx. EUR 540) excluding social security contributions (JOD 400 excluding social security contributions for administrative specialists) and were partly financed at JOD 300 (approx. EUR 350) and JOD 280 (approx. EUR 330) respectively. This meant that the expenditure per teacher and pupil was higher than at double-shift schools, where more specialists could have been financed with the same funds and more pupils could have been taught – but the previous double-shift schools were already fully financed. Whether the integration effects justify the higher costs per pupil taught cannot be conclusively assessed. Subsidiarity to the Jordanian state is also questionable, as it effectively finances the teachers on the morning shifts.

The allocation efficiency of social security contributions is questionable due to the uncertainty as to whether benefits can be claimed at all (see Effectiveness).

The coordination effort due to annual planning, financing contracts and the re-employment of specialists as well as adjustments during the year is extremely high compared with a long-term project and comes with considerable uncertainty for all parties involved. The short-term nature is a result of the terms of financing of the emergency aid measure and does not correspond to the ongoing commitment of specialists and the ongoing needs of Syrian children in the context of a crisis that has persisted for more than 10 years. The lack of transparency and inefficient procedures have additionally increased the coordination effort, with the current support through the focal point and the consultant being rated positively. Efficiency is limited and below expectations.

**Efficiency rating: 3**

### Overarching developmental impact

The impact objectives of the project are contributions (a) to social and economic participation through short to medium-term employment for Jordanian teachers and specialists, (b) to improved living conditions and better future prospects for Syrian refugee children through access to formal education and thus to avoid a “lost generation”. No indicators were defined at impact level during the appraisal, which is understandable due to the temporary measure. The plausibility of the target achievement is validated below on the basis of available data and findings on site.

**Basic education** is a crucial prerequisite for Syrian refugees’ further personal development and future. In 2018/2019, almost 87% of registered Syrian children were enrolled in primary education, meaning that Jordan is ahead of the global average, which stands at only 63% of refugee children of school age (Human Rights Watch). Valid figures on the total number of children not registered could not be found either, which is why education participation for all Syrian children is estimated to be lower. According to conversations on site, students enjoy going to school and perform well – sometimes even better than their Jordanian peers, especially in the lower grades, where the pupils have received ongoing education in Jordan.

Nevertheless, the quality of education is still considered poor; almost 88% of schools demonstrated poor to very poor quality standards in the EU's 2019 progress report.

School enrolment rates fall drastically from the age of approx. 12 years, and in secondary school, Syrian children lag far behind their Jordanian peers (15–30% up to 80% depending on the source). Besides the early marriage of girls and the increasing number of boys who go to work, the lack of future prospects for refugees to put a value on their achievements plays a decisive role. Those who complete the 10 mandatory years of basic education have the right to attend secondary schools, universities and vocational training institutions, but the barriers to higher education (transport costs, tuition fees, etc.) and to the labour market are high for refugees. This would require an adjustment of the legal framework conditions, particularly in view of the lack of prospects for a (quick) return to Syria.

In combination with the various measures to support Syrian refugees from the state, humanitarian and donor sides, longer-lasting positive impacts from access to primary education are to be expected, especially in conjunction with UNICEF's complementary measures. However, training on psychosocial issues and psychological support for traumatised pupils is not yet sufficiently developed and appropriate support staff are often lacking. However, if education cannot be valued or can only be valued to a very limited extent, it alone cannot prevent a "lost generation".

Although **social cohesion** in the Jordanian host communities is generally considered to be good, there are always latent tensions, and a balance has to be struck in taking into account all vulnerable groups. Expanding education and additional employment potentially reduces competition and counters social tensions, not least by reducing negative coping strategies such as criminalisation and radicalisation. Education is considered to promote resilience, but the lack of perspective described above counteracts this somewhat and leads to frustration. In both education and employment, it would generally be preferable to mix Jordanians and Syrians in order to strengthen social contacts. However, this would in turn lead to crowding out effects, which would cause additional tensions. UNICEF also demonstrated in 2020 that refugees in double-shift schools have an 11% lower risk of dropping out of school. The arguments for and against mixed education do not allow a conclusion to be drawn. Headteachers also reported, as a positive approach, on extracurricular initiatives that bring the pupils from the morning and afternoon shifts together. The 2018 national teacher survey found that close to 90% of teachers in Type II and Type III schools agreed that peace, inclusion and tolerance prevailed among Jordanian and Syrian pupils at the schools in the host communities.

Teachers' **employment** is precarious (see Effectiveness) and positive only in comparison to unemployment. The lack of rights must be assessed critically in the context of the Convention on Human Rights and the Social Pact. The teaching of (traumatised) refugee children in particular places high demands on the specialists. Due to the precarious employment situation, they are very committed so as not to lose this employment, and at the same time they are frustrated with the conditions the teachers employed as civil servants at Type III schools receive. The headteachers also clearly demonstrated their dissatisfaction, as the teachers are increasingly being trained specifically for the precise needs of Syrian children and have years of experience in dealing with them. The teachers like to teach, but they do not feel they are recognised for their work, and precarious employment reduces social standing to such an extent that it prevents marriages, for example, as one headteacher reported. In the 2019/2020 school year, the proportion of female teachers at double-shift schools was 70%, which is higher than at single-shift schools (61%). DEval also concluded that the contractual conditions for specialists are classified as precarious in terms of salary levels, job stability and psychological and physical strain, despite high motivation due to meaningful employment.

From the perspective of the financed specialists, temporary employment leads to temporary alleviation of the socio-economic situation, but the employment conditions do not offer any prospects and security for the specialists and their families and limit social participation. The increasing professional experience potentially does at least increase the chances of longer-term employment in the education sector, although the prospects of a permanent position are generally poor due to the MoE's restrictions.

The **COVID-19 pandemic** was a severe setback for the socio-economic situation in general but especially for the provision of services to the vulnerable population in Jordan – unemployment increased, participation in distance learning was difficult if not impossible for vulnerable groups and an increase in negative coping strategies such as child labour and early marriage is to be expected, as well as increasing distribution conflicts and corresponding social tensions in the communities. Since participation in education is



strongly dependent on income and in percentage terms more Syrians permanently lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic, there are also more widespread setbacks among Syrian children. The specialists continued to be funded during the lockdown from mid-March 2020 until the end of the school year. Due to the deterioration of the economic situation, many Jordanian children have switched from private schools to state schools (in the 2021/2022 school year around 130,000 Jordanian pupils, according to the MoE). The latter is currently exacerbating the overburdening of the education system; learning losses are difficult to make up for.

Overall, compared with a situation without the continuous financing over the past few years, positive contributions to the development of children aged 6–15 years through expanded access to formal education in host communities are plausible despite the lack of quality, as are positive income effects and meaningful employment for teaching and administrative specialists despite the precarious conditions. With regard to the one-year financing tranches without long-term planning, however, these impacts come with high risks and are only achieved through ongoing commitments. Syrians' limited prospects on the Jordanian labour market limit the future prospects for better living conditions.

### Overarching developmental impact rating: 3

#### Sustainability

Like the German Partnership for Prospects Initiative, the programme itself has only very limited sustainability requirements with the aim of bridging short-term emergencies for as many people as possible. However, there has been no transition from humanitarian aid to structural DC, the concept has not been adapted over the years and an exit strategy has not been developed. Under the current circumstances of Jordan's limited capacity and the German aspiration of combating the causes of flight, it cannot be presumed that costs will transfer to the Jordanian state. It is clear that Jordan will not be able to supply basic provision for refugees without support while state structures are overburdened, and that a decline or even discontinuation of international financing will lead to exacerbated provision bottlenecks, internal tensions and distribution conflicts. Taking into account the global challenges, not least due to the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, there are high risks that the commitment of the humanitarian organisation and the donor community will remain. The longevity of the effects is subject to extreme risks. The German share of financial support for Jordan in the education sector has been very high over the years and Germany also ranks first among public donors in supporting UNICEF, resulting in a high dependency on significant financial contributions from Germany, particularly for the education of Syrian refugee children.

If the educational offering and the necessary social benefits associated with attending school (cash transfers, transport subsidies, etc.) are interrupted due to a shortage of funds, the probability of the children returning to the education system is estimated to be low. Interruptions in education lead to massive setbacks in terms of long-term educational success, professional career and subsequent income, as numerous studies in connection with COVID-19 lockdowns have shown. For success in basic education to have a lasting impact, it is also necessary to make secondary education more accessible to Syrian refugees, as well as the formal labour market.

One positive aspect is the continuation of the Accelerating Access to Education Initiative in a second phase since 2021 by the Jordanian government with the support of the donors and the conceptual adjustment carried out therein in the sense of "education for all" – i.e., all vulnerable groups are explicitly addressed, including refugee children of other nationalities<sup>6</sup>, children with disabilities and "out of school children". The general focus on vulnerable children, regardless of their origin, is to be welcomed in order to counteract tensions and envy resulting from the focus on Syrian children, also given the background of increasing vulnerability due to the effects of the pandemic. However, the financing of this second phase was not secured at the time of the evaluation.

Pure working capital financing was examined with a limited approach towards sustainability, which is why sustainability is not included in the overall rating as part of the evaluation but is nevertheless assessed before the financing's own claim. In line with the requirement in the new concept framework for the German

---

<sup>6</sup> While basic education is free for Syrians, this does not yet apply to other nationalities.

Partnership for Prospects Initiative, a longer-term and reliable solution approach must urgently be developed in this long-term refugee situation. In addition, worsening overburdening in the state education sector and the expansion of international challenges are diminishing the prospects for sustained positive effects of the measure in the area of education and employment.

**Sustainability rating: 3**

### Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance**, **coherence**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency**, **impact and sustainability** and a final **overall rating** of the development effectiveness. The scale is as follows:

<b>Level 1</b>	very successful: result that clearly exceeds expectations
<b>Level 2</b>	successful: fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
<b>Level 3</b>	moderately successful: project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
<b>Level 4</b>	moderately unsuccessful: significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
<b>Level 5</b>	unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
<b>Level 6</b>	highly unsuccessful: the project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1–3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4–6 denote a negative assessment.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all six individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1–3 of the overall rating indicate a “successful” and levels 4–6 an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be rated developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“overarching developmental impact”) **and** the sustainability are rated at least “moderately successful” (level 3).