

Ex-post evaluation

Labour-intensive investment programme, Jordan

Title	Labour-intensive investment programme for Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan, phases III–V		
Sector and CRS code	Social security (16010)		
BMZ number	2017 49 977 (Phase III), 2018 496 60 (Phase IV), 2019 407 58 (Phase V)		
Commissioned by	BMZ		
Recipient and executing agency	International Labour Organisation (ILO)		
FC financing volume and instrument	EUR 5 million (Phase III), EUR 20 million (Phase IV), EUR 7.9 million (Phase V)		
Project duration	2018-2022	Reporting year	2025
		Year of random sample	2024

Project objectives and implementation

The adjusted objective at the outcome level was to improve the employability of Syrian refugees and Jordanians in the project areas in the short to medium term. The adjusted objective at the impact level was to temporarily stabilise the living conditions of Syrian refugees and Jordanians as well as social cohesion in the project areas. The programme financed labour-intensive cleaning and maintenance measures on roads and municipal infrastructure, which created a large number of temporary jobs for vulnerable population groups.


Key findings

The programme successfully created around 15,000 short-term jobs lasting 60-80 days, enabling the target groups to earn between EUR 936 and EUR 1,456. The jobs complied with international labour standards. However, the project concept failed to offer medium-term solutions for Syrian refugees in Jordan, whose prospects of returning home were still highly uncertain at the time of implementation. The sustainability of the cleaning and maintenance measures for public infrastructure was limited. Despite fully fulfilling its core tasks in providing short-term employment, it is appraised as "limited success" due to the aforementioned shortcomings.

- The programme achieved a 27 % share of women and a 4 % share of people with disabilities among its beneficiaries by tailoring its measures to local cultural conditions (e.g. gender-segregated teams).
- The programme promoted the implementation of core labour standards in the context of public employment programmes (*cash-for-work*). To this end, it developed models and instruments that were adopted by other international actors, which increased the broad impact of the programme measures.
- The cash-for-work activities, which were designed for all target groups, improved personal exchanges between Syrian and Jordanian workers, helping to break down prejudices and having a positive impact on social cohesion.
- The programme achieved a satisfactory work intensity of 64 % through savings in management and material costs.

Overall rating

moderately successful



Conclusions

- Labour-intensive investment programmes are suitable for short-term stabilisation in crisis situations, but have no sustainability in terms of their impact on the labour market integration of beneficiaries.
- Labour-intensive investment programmes require a complex set of instruments to prevent fraud and ensure compliance with labour law standards. Complaint mechanisms (e.g. hotlines) can contribute to this and are used extensively.
- The evaluated programme is a positive example of the targeted promotion of women and people with disabilities through the appropriate application of culturally sensitive measures.
- The sustainability of the infrastructure measures should be increased through integration into regular investment or maintenance programmes.

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List of abbreviations

PCR	Final inspection
GDP	Gross domestic product
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BONO	Middle East Employment Initiative
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EUR	Euro
EZ	Development cooperation
FC	Financial cooperation
FC E	FC Evaluation
GAM	Greater Amman Municipality
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
HDI	Human Development Index
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JOD	Jordanian dinar
MOLA	Ministry of Local Administration
MPWH	Ministry of Public Works and Housing
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PA	Project review
PAR	Project appraisal report
PSU	Project Support Unit
PV	Programme proposal
SIGA	Special initiative for refugees and host countries
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TC	Technical cooperation
USD	US Dollar

Overview

General conditions and classification of the project

During the project period from 2018 to 2022, there were around 750,000 officially registered refugees in Jordan, including 660,000 Syrians. The total number of registered and unregistered Syrian refugees in Jordan was estimated at 1.3 million. Since the change of government in Syria in December 2024, many Syrians have returned to their homeland, reducing the number of registered Syrian refugees to 527,740 in August 2025.¹

Jordan suffers from chronically high unemployment. The unemployment rate among Jordanian citizens was 16.8% in 2019. With the economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, this rose to 21.3% in the first half of 2025.² In 2019, the employment rate for Syrian and Jordanian men was 59%. For Syrian women, the employment rate was 7%, half that of Jordanian women. Around 12% of Syrian refugees were employed in short-term cash-for-work programmes in 2019.³ Syrian refugees had to accept significantly worse working conditions than Jordanian workers. They worked for lower wages, in shorter-term employment relationships, mostly without employment contracts, and usually informally without valid work permits. The average monthly income of Syrian refugees in 2024⁴ was JOD 217 (EUR 282), which was below the Jordanian minimum wage of JOD 260 (EUR 338). These figures are also reflected in the poverty rate among Syrian refugees, which stood at 69% in 2023⁵.

In order to offer Syrian refugees and their host countries long-term prospects, Jordan and several European countries signed the Jordan Compact in early 2016. In it, Jordan agreed to issue 200,000 work permits in specific sectors (e.g. agriculture, construction, textile industry) to Syrian refugees and, in return, was to be granted easier access to the European single market. From 2016 onwards, the BMZ – alongside other Western donors – supported the implementation of the London Compact as part of the Middle East Employment Initiative (BONO). BONO is financed by the Special Initiative on Refugees and Host Countries (SIGA) (formerly: Special Initiative on Refugees). The aim of BONO was to "improve the living conditions of refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and vulnerable populations in host communities in the countries most affected by the Syrian crisis through short-term employment and income opportunities."⁶ A particular focus was placed on creating short-term job opportunities by establishing and maintaining productive and social infrastructure. These were intended to benefit 90% of the beneficiaries, while 10% of the beneficiaries were to be placed in the labour market in the longer term through training measures and the promotion of self-employment as part of "Cash-for-Work Plus". Sustainability aspects were explicitly not a priority in these measures. In this context, the programme "Employment-intensive investment programme for Jordanians and Syrian refugees" was developed, phases III, IV and V (2018-2022) of which are evaluated together below.⁷ The phases were implemented by the project executing agency, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which has been supporting partner governments worldwide for several decades as part of its *Employment Intensive Investment Programme* (EIIP) to create good jobs through labour-intensive investments in public infrastructure and has developed a comprehensive set of tools for this purpose. Phases III-V were implemented by the ILO as a "single donor project" financed exclusively by the FC. In addition to the programme in Jordan evaluated here, the ILO carried out similar labour-intensive investment programmes in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq during the evaluation period (2018-2022).

Brief description

With the aim of creating short-term employment opportunities and improving access to the labour market for Syrian refugees and Jordanians in the medium term, the FC provided funding for the ILO's labour-intensive investment programme in Jordan from 2018 to 2022 through phases III-V. This primarily involved the implementation of labour-intensive maintenance and repair measures on municipal infrastructure, roads and rural roads in 27 municipalities with a high proportion of Syrian refugees in the governorates of Irbid, Mafrq, Ajloun, Amman, Jerash, Zarqa and Karak. In addition, in line with the Cash-for-Work Plus approach, approximately 5% of beneficiaries were offered short vocational training courses to promote their integration into the labour market. The labour-intensive measures were implemented in close cooperation with the *Ministry of Public Works and Housing* (MPWH) in the area of road construction and with the *Ministry of Local Administration* (MOLA) and local authorities in the area of municipal infrastructure. In order

¹ <https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/jor> [accessed on 10 September 2025]

² Jordan Department of Statistics, 2025. <https://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/category/news/unemployment-rate/> [accessed on 10 September 2025]

³ Tiltne, Åge A./Tylidum, Guri, 2019: Syrian refugees in Jordan: better off than before but still vulnerable. Oslo: Fafo Institute for Labour and Social Research.

⁴ UNHCR, 2024: Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Socio-Economic Survey on Refugees in Host Communities. Amman.

⁵ Ibid. The poverty rate was calculated on the basis of a poverty line of JOD 86.

⁶ BMZ, 2021: Conceptual framework for the implementation of the Middle East Employment Initiative as part of the Special Initiative on Refugees. Berlin.

⁷ Implementation phase Phase III: October 2018 – May 2021, Phase IV: November 2018 – August 2021, Phase V: November 2019 – August 2022. A cross-phase evaluation is carried out because the phases partly overlap in terms of implementation period, were partly carried out in the same governorates, and a joint final review of phases III and IV took place. Therefore, it is not possible to ensure a clear-cut assessment of the impact of the phases. Phases IV and V were part of the random sample for 2024, and phase III was added to the bundle. For the evaluation of phases I and II, see: KfW, 2023: ex-post evaluation of the Employment-Intensive Investment Programme for Jordanians and Syrian Refugees (EIIP), phases I and II, Jordan. https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/PDF/Evaluierung/Ergebnisse-und-Publikationen/PDF-Dokumente-E-K/Jordanien_EIIP_2023_D.pdf

to enable them to implement the measures independently, the technical and administrative staff of these institutions were offered a comprehensive training and coaching programme, which also included training units on gender equality in the workplace. As part of this programme, the ILO has also been supporting the establishment and work of the Project Support Unit (PSU) at the Ministry of Labour since 2021, in cooperation with GIZ. The PSU supports the issuance of work permits for participants in donor-funded cash-for-work measures. In total, the programme targeted around 14,800 low-income Syrian and Jordanian women and men.

Breakdown of total costs

	Phase III (Plan)	Phase III (Actual)	Phase IV (Plan)	Phase IV (Actual)	Phase V (Plan)	Phase V (Actual)
Investment costs (total) in million EUR	5.0	5.0	20	20.0	7.9	7.9
Own contribution in EUR million	0	0	0	0	0	0
External financing in EUR million	0.0	0	0	0	0	0
of which BMZ funds in EUR million	5.0	5.0	20	20.0	7.9	7.9

Table 1: Breakdown of costs.

Map of the project region




Figure 1: Map of the project country incl. project areas and locations.

Source: Own illustration.

Project-specific strengths and weaknesses of the project

The strengths include in particular:

- Based on its many years of experience in implementing labour-intensive investment programmes (EIIP), the ILO was able to quickly and efficiently provide the short-term employment opportunities desired by politicians.
- Thanks to the ILO's special expertise, the programme succeeded in creating good and secure job opportunities in a precarious context – even if these were short-term due to political constraints. Particular praise was given to the good organisation of the construction sites and the competent management of the numerous short-term workers.
- The programme invested a great deal of time and resources in strengthening the capacities of its national partners (Ministry of Construction, local authorities, construction companies) in order to embed important labour standards and efficient management principles.
- The programme actively promoted the employment of women and people with disabilities. It adapted the work tasks and working conditions so that they were also acceptable to these groups.
- Due to its capacities as a UN organisation, the ILO was well suited to implement a measure that the Jordanian government did not consider itself responsible for, given its focus on the employment of Syrian refugees.
- The programme set up a permanently staffed telephone hotline as a complaints mechanism, which was used intensively by workers. This enabled many issues to be resolved at short notice.

The weaknesses include in particular:

- Some of the programme's basic assumptions, such as increasing employability through short-term work assignments and training or converting short-term employment relationships into long-term ones, proved to be inaccurate. The programme had no impact on the fundamental problem of Syrian labour market integration, namely the restrictive legal framework and high level of informality for guest workers.
- The infrastructure measures promoted by the programme were small-scale, albeit in coordination with the Ministry of Construction and local authorities. They were not integrated into overarching strategies or plans, e.g. for the maintenance of the public transport network or for municipal development. Such integration could have increased the benefits and sustainability of the infrastructure measures. As a result, the sustainability of the individual measures (e.g. street cleaning) remained very limited.
- The vocational training and further education measures proved unsuccessful for some participants. They did not correspond to the life situation of many participants, which was characterised by short-term and often informal employment relationships that demanded a great deal of flexibility and made it difficult to commit to training for at least two months. In addition, the further training measures were insufficiently embedded in measures for business start-ups or integration into the labour market.
- Coordinating the funded short-term employment measures (*cash-for-work*) with other German development cooperation measures and those of other donors proved difficult. At the time of the evaluation, there were geographical overlaps and slight differences in working conditions and remuneration in the cash-for-work programmes offered by German development cooperation actors. It was not possible to assess with any certainty during the evaluation whether the competitive situations that arose during the implementation period still existed at the time of the evaluation. The ILO was involved in the Cash-for-Work Working Group in order to achieve standardisation of conditions and greater geographical coordination between the measures, but this was only partially successful.

General conclusions/lessons learned

- The *Employment Intensive Investment Programme* (EIIP) programme developed by the ILO has proven to be a successful model for offering a large number of unskilled jobs to disadvantaged population groups in the short term. However, the sustainability of this approach is limited in terms of both the jobs created and the infrastructure built. This makes it particularly suitable for crisis contexts.
- The programme developed an exemplary model for the implementation of core labour standards in short-term employment relationships, which can be used for similar measures.
- The programme has shown that the employment of women can also be promoted in a conservative social context. To this end, appropriate framework conditions (e.g. gender-segregated work crews, construction sites shielded from view) must be created that are accepted by the women and their families.
- A stronger sectoral focus of labour-intensive measures can increase the sustainability of the infrastructure created. This can be achieved, for example, by concentrating on reforestation or the rehabilitation of school buildings.
- The close integration of training and education measures with work assignments within the framework of cash-for-work measures is essential for a structural improvement in the employability of beneficiaries. Training programmes should be designed to accompany employment rather than stand alone in order to make optimum use of synergies and to take sufficient account of the opportunity costs of participants in the training measures resulting from the temporary loss of income. The conceptual anchoring of compensation payments for temporary loss of income when participating in training measures or comparable incentives are further conceivable means of sensibly anchoring training programmes within the framework of cash-for-work measures.
- Targeting training programmes at specific target groups is challenging in a socio-culturally highly segregated labour market such as Jordan's, as employment potential and thus labour market-relevant skills can vary among target groups consisting of different nationalities and labour rights. In order for training programmes to achieve sustainability, they should be sufficiently differentiated to promote the employment potential of all beneficiaries equally, avoid misallocations and still ensure that the training measures are designed in a conflict-sensitive and non-discriminatory manner.
- In general, training measures designed for a longer period of time should specifically target young target groups who are able to take advantage of such offers due to their more flexible living circumstances. Shorter training and further education measures, on the other hand, are also useful for older target groups, as they can be more easily integrated into their everyday lives and are therefore in greater demand and more widely used.

Assessment according to OECD DAC criteria

Relevance

1. Alignment with policies and priorities

With its focus on creating short-term employment opportunities for low-skilled Syrian refugees and vulnerable members of host communities, the programme was aligned with the BMZ's strategic guidelines valid during the implementation period (2018-2022). In the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the BMZ launched the Special Initiative on Refugees (now known as the Special Initiative on Refugees and Host Countries), which aims to reduce the causes of flight, stabilise host regions and support refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees. To this day, a key component of the Special Initiative on Refugees is the Middle East Employment Initiative (BONO), which served as the basis for the programme's measures. This initiative focuses on creating short-term job opportunities for refugees and vulnerable members of host communities, ideally in the area of public infrastructure. In addition, the jointly carried out work was intended to help reduce tensions between Syrian refugees and host communities. **The programme under consideration here fully implemented these conceptual guidelines by offering Syrian and Jordanian women and men short-term job opportunities in the cleaning and maintenance of municipal infrastructure and roads.** By specifically promoting respectful coexistence in the workplace, the programme also fitted into the core theme of "Peace and Social Cohesion" and the field of action "Refugees and Migration" of the "BMZ 2030" reform concept. It also contributed to the implementation of the German Federal Government's Action Plan on Migration and Development (2016) and its guidelines on preventing crises, managing conflicts and promoting peace (2018), as well as the BMZ's sector concept on development for peace and security (2013). At the same time, the programme supported the implementation of the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), which the German government has signed up to. **It was a stand-alone measure that was not part of any development cooperation programme.**

On the Jordanian side, the programme was integrated into the "Livelihood and Food Security" component of the Jordanian government's "Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2019-2020" and its subsequent versions.⁸ **However, the Jordanian government's focus was more on creating long-term jobs and stimulating the Jordanian economy, which differs from the explicit emergency aid nature of BONO.**

The programme design was based on Jordan's legal framework for the employment of Syrian refugees, in particular the requirement for a work permit specific to the job in question and the exclusion of Syrian workers from sectors other than agriculture and construction. **By defining the refugees' area of employment as street cleaning and maintenance, the programme succeeded in finding a field of work in which Syrian refugees could be legally employed.** In order to facilitate the time-consuming process of issuing work permits by the Ministry of Labour for Syrians employed on a short-term basis, the phases also included the establishment of a Project Support Unit as a processing centre by the ILO in cooperation with GIZ for all applications for work permits for donor-funded employment programmes. **This made it possible to standardise the approval process and, in particular, to speed it up compared to previous phases.** Before the project began, the local authorities involved and the *Ministry of Public Works and Housing* (MPWH) had only limited capacity to implement labour-intensive measures on their own. **The concept of the phases logically provided for extensive technical and administrative training measures by the ILO to enable the national institutions involved to implement public employment programmes. The programme was thus geared to the capacities of its institutional partners.**

By selecting the Ministry of Public Works and Housing and the local authorities as implementation partners for the labour-intensive measures, the project concept took into account the existing institutional responsibilities. The Ministry of Public Works and Housing is responsible for the expansion and maintenance of the public road network outside the *Greater Amman Municipality* (GAM) area. It has a technical team of 30 engineers who coordinate the maintenance programme. This includes regular appraisals of road conditions. The Ministry of Construction awards around 70% of maintenance contracts to private service providers, while around 30% of maintenance work is carried out by its own staff.⁹ Local authorities are responsible for maintaining public infrastructure in their municipalities.

The project concept had various links to the BMZ's quality criteria. The involvement of the ILO as the implementing organisation was intended to contribute to the creation of decent jobs and compliance with international core labour standards, and to promote the quality criterion of human rights. This applies equally to the inclusive nature of the measures, which explicitly provided for the involvement of people with disabilities in the employment measures. Despite the difficult conditions surrounding the programme, in particular the need to carry out the activities in public spaces, the programme aimed to achieve a 20 per cent share of women. Integrity and transparency were to be ensured by selecting project participants through a public lottery process and

⁸ Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018: Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2018-2020. Amman.

⁹ World Bank/ILO, 2018: Assessment of Infrastructure Investments in Transport and Job Creation. Examples from Road Sector Investments in Lebanon and Jordan. Amman/Beirut.

providing intensive support to national partners in implementing the measures. The programme design was conflict-sensitive by balancing its focus on both Syrian refugees and members of the host communities. Overall, the project design was geared towards reducing poverty, at least in the short term. The objectives of the programme were therefore also aligned with Sustainable Development Goals 1 (No Poverty), 5 (Gender Equality), 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions).

2. Alignment with the needs and capacities of stakeholders and beneficiaries

The project concept provided for the short-term employment of Jordanian and Syrian nationals, with a quota of 50% for each group. **The programme's objectives were fundamentally geared towards the need of Syrian refugees and low-income Jordanians for at least a temporary income. However, the programme did not have the necessary instruments to address the different needs of both groups in a targeted manner and was not able to improve the need for a structural improvement in the living conditions of Syrian refugees. Although the primary focus on providing short-term measures was in line with BONO's objectives, it is not considered appropriate in the evaluation and has a negative impact on the relevance of the programme. At the time of the project review and implementation of the phases, the prospects for the return of Syrian refugees were uncertain, so that measures aimed exclusively at the short term were considered too limited and a stronger integration of longer-term measures would have been useful in order to give Syrian refugees medium-term prospects for improving their living conditions.**

The Jordanian economy has long been shaped by various migration movements.¹⁰ Since the 1970s, the Jordanian government has promoted the labour migration of professionally and academically qualified Jordanians to the Gulf states and has greatly expanded the education sector for this purpose. In return, it benefited from the extensive remittances sent home by this group. Today, the Gulf states continue to be an important outlet for the Jordanian labour market, but now only accept highly skilled migrant workers. As a result, Jordan continues to have large numbers of academically qualified young people with bachelor's degrees who are no longer internationally competitive with the educational level of the Gulf states and who, with an unemployment rate of 37% in 2024, represented the population group most affected by unemployment.¹¹ Some of the Jordanian participants in the labour-intensive measures belonged to this group. Around 61% of the participating Jordanians were aged between 18 and 27, many of them unemployed university graduates¹². However, the majority of them are not seeking permanent employment in street cleaning or road construction, but hope to find employment in the public sector or an opportunity to migrate. **With the tools at its disposal, the programme was unable to provide a solution to the high unemployment rate among young Jordanian academics.**

At the same time, since the 1970s, the Jordanian economy has relied on migrant workers from abroad, who are employed mainly in agriculture, construction, industry and hotels.¹³ The agricultural and construction sectors are dominated by men from Egypt and Syria, while Southeast Asian women work in the hotel sector and, since the 1990s, in the textile factories of the free trade zones. **This has been accompanied by the development of a segregated labour market. This comprises a protected public and private sector with relatively high wages and job security, which is reserved for Jordanian nationals. Alongside this, there is a sector dominated by migrant workers in agriculture, construction, the service industry and the textile industry, which is characterised by informality, low wages and a lack of occupational safety.** This is particularly true for those migrants who were employed under the "kafala" system¹⁴. It is estimated that these two sectors employ the same number of people each.¹⁵ After 2011, Syrians who had fled the Assad regime were integrated into the secondary labour market. Under the Jordan Compact (2016), they were granted easier access to work permits compared to refugees of other nationalities in return for trade facilitation with the EU. However, this legal access to the labour market has always been limited to agriculture, construction and some areas of the service sector, where few Jordanian nationals work. Frequent changes in legal regulations have also increasingly restricted this legal access to the labour market over the years. Since 2024, stricter regulations on social security contributions and drastically increased fees for the issuance of work permits have made it almost impossible for refugees and many migrants to work legally in Jordan. At the same time, the Jordanian government is carrying out large-scale deportations of foreign workers as part of a campaign against informal work.¹⁶

The programme's objectives were geared towards the needs of particularly disadvantaged groups such as women and people with disabilities. The programme design envisaged a 20% share of women among short-term employees, whereas

¹⁰ Chatelard, Géraldine, 2010: Jordan: A Refugee Haven. Migration Policy Profile. Migration Policy Institute.

¹¹ Jordan Strategy Forum, 2025: In Facts and Figures – An In-Depth Analysis of the Unemployment Reality in Jordan. Amman.

¹² Id:rc, 2021: Final Report. Conducting a Research on Jobs and Resilience. Amman: ILO/KFW.

¹³ ILO, 2015: The Jordanian Labour Market: Multiple segmentations of labour by nationality, gender, education and occupational classes. Beirut: Regional Office for Arab States Migration and Governance Network (MAGNET).

¹⁴ The kafala system legally binds foreign workers to their employer, who acts as a guarantor and thus has a decisive influence on their residence and work permits, among other things. This creates a strong relationship of dependency that can significantly restrict workers' freedom of movement and their ability to resign.

¹⁵ Jordan Strategy Forum, 2025: In Facts and Figures – An In-Depth Analysis of the Unemployment Reality in Jordan. Amman.

¹⁶ Lenner, Katharina et al., 2025: Refugees caught in Jordan's campaign against informal work. 14 October 2025. Open Democracy. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond-trafficking-and-slavery/refugees-caught-in-jordans-campaign-against-informal-work/> [accessed on 1 December 2025]

the employment rate among Syrian refugee women was only 7% at the start of implementation in 2019. To achieve this, the concept provided for explicit awareness-raising measures for women and adapted the work measures to cultural customs (e.g. use of gender-segregated teams, deployment of women in visually protected locations). The programme's implementation concept was explicitly designed to address vulnerable groups as well. The ILO aimed for a share of around 5% of people with disabilities and provided for awareness-raising measures and the adaptation of work tasks to the respective capabilities of the participating people with disabilities.

With the exception of Karak, the selection of project regions corresponded to the regions with the highest proportion of Syrian refugees in the population and was therefore relevant (see Figure 2). The governorate of Karak, which has only a 1.6 per cent share of Syrian refugees in its population, was included at the explicit request of the partner ministry, which wanted Jordanian citizens to benefit more from the measures.




Figure 2: Distribution of Syrian refugees across the individual governorates in Jordan (as of 2022).

Source: Own illustration.

The project concept provided for a criteria-based and transparent selection process for participating municipalities and individual beneficiaries. The municipalities were to be selected in consultation with the Ministry of Local Administration on the basis of criteria such as local economic performance, poverty and the presence of Syrian refugees. For the selection of beneficiaries, the programme formulated criteria such as gender, nationality, place of residence and income in cooperation with the municipalities, on the basis of which applicants were to be preselected. The actual selection was to be made by means of a public lottery. **However, an internal evaluation of the programme indicates that poverty criteria may not have been sufficiently taken into account in this process.**¹⁷

The programme's objectives were in line with the entire population's need for clean and usable municipal infrastructure and roads. Jordan is an important transport hub in the Middle East, connecting Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the Palestinian territories. In recent decades, the government has invested heavily in expanding the road network, whose total length

¹⁷ Vaidya, Kirit, 2023: Cluster Evaluation of Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programs in Lebanon (Phase III & IV) & Jordan (Phase V). Beirut: ILO.

increased from 2,178 km in 2000 to 9,089 km in 2020.¹⁸ The transport sector contributes around 5.5% to the gross national product. Maintaining the ageing road network poses a major challenge. In an international comparison of road quality, Jordan ranked 68th out of a total of 137 countries in 2018.¹⁹

The poor condition of some roads increases safety risks and vehicle wear and tear when using the roads concerned. In 2018, transport-related inefficiencies were estimated at 5% of gross domestic product and the economic costs of traffic accidents at 1.6% of gross domestic product.²⁰ **Given these figures, it is not surprising that the Jordanian government's current Strategic Plan for the Transport Sector (2024-2030) continues to prioritise the maintenance of the existing road network over the construction of new roads.** Accordingly, the Ministry of *Public Works and Housing* invested JOD 3.5 million in 2020, or 4% of its total budget, in road maintenance.²¹ Such investments can yield significant benefits. According to estimates by the World Bank and the ILO, every dollar invested in road maintenance saves 3-4 dollars in repair work later on.²²

At the time of the evaluation, the condition of public infrastructure in municipalities with a high proportion of Syrian refugees at the time of the project review is unknown. Public infrastructure generally includes inner-city roads, parks, cemeteries, waste management, water supply and social services. It is assumed that these are still heavily used today and are in need of maintenance. **The programme's objectives were therefore in line with the need for maintenance of municipal infrastructure. However, the concept only provided for superficial maintenance measures such as street cleaning, cleaning of parks and public spaces, and painting kerbs and walls.** The selection of these measures was in line with the goal of creating short-term job opportunities. The proportion of the funding allocated to material costs was to be kept as low as possible in favour of wage payments. Due to the politically desired high labour intensity²³ of the measures, only limited funds were available for work equipment (e.g. brooms, shovels, protective vests) and building materials (e.g. paint, cement, stones). **As a result of these priorities, the programme was not geared towards the structural and long-term maintenance of public infrastructure. The programme therefore only met the need for clean and well-maintained public infrastructure for a limited period of time. The tension between high labour intensity and the low sustainability of the infrastructure measures was repeatedly discussed among those involved. Ultimately, the political priority was to create and finance as many short-term employment opportunities as possible.**

3. Appropriateness of design

During the project appraisal (phases III and IV), the programme pursued the following objective at outcome level: "Creation of short-term employment opportunities for Syrian refugees and Jordanians through labour-intensive maintenance and repair measures in host communities, as well as easier access to the labour market for the target group in the medium term." The following objective at outcome level was defined for phase V: "Strengthening resilience by creating employment opportunities for refugees and members of host communities in Jordan through labour-intensive infrastructure measures." The overarching development policy objective (impact) for all three phases was: "Improving the living conditions of Syrian and Jordanian women and men through increased access to employment and improved infrastructure."

Although the original target system is fundamentally logical and comprehensible, it also has shortcomings. The wording no longer complies with the BMZ's current formal requirements, as the levels of impact were not always clearly defined and inadmissible connections ("and") and instrumental relationships ("through") were used. In terms of content, the original target formulation at the outcome level for phases III & IV did not reflect the use of the capacities created by the programme, as the "creation of employment opportunities" and "easier access to the labour market in the medium term" themselves reflect the capacities created and can therefore generally be assigned to the output level. The objective formulated for phase V, "Strengthening resilience by creating employment opportunities for refugees and members of host communities in Jordan through labour-intensive infrastructure measures", also reveals weaknesses. In view of the primarily short-term focus of the employment measures, strengthening resilience as an immediate impact result appears too ambitious. **The combination of the originally low-threshold outcome goal of phases III and IV and the ambitious impact goal also reveals a large gap between the impact levels.** For this reason, the EPE replaced the original two-part objective at outcome level (outcome) of creating short-term employment opportunities and facilitating medium-term access to the labour market for the target group with the more ambitious but still realistic objective of "short- to medium-term improvement in employability". This takes particular account of the cash-for-work plus approach through the medium-term orientation of the impact horizon. In addition, the wording was supplemented to include the geographical catchment area. **The adjusted objective at outcome level is therefore: "The employability of Syrian refugees and Jordanians is improved in the project areas in the short to medium term."** The original

¹⁸ Ministry of Transport, 2024: Transport Sector Strategic Plan (2024-2028) Amman.

¹⁹ World Bank ILO, 2018: Assessment of Infrastructure Investments in Transport and Job Creation. Examples from Road Sector Investments in Lebanon and Jordan. Beirut/Amman.

²⁰ World Bank/ILO, 2018: *ibid.*

²¹ Ministry of Transport, 2024: *ibid.*

²² World Bank/ILO, 2018: *ibid.*

²³ Labour intensity describes the ratio of wage payments to the total costs of the measure.

impact-level objective of "improving the living conditions of Syrian and Jordanian women and men through increased access to employment and improved infrastructure" is too ambitious given the political framework of BONO. The projects financed by BONO have the primary objective of creating short-term employment opportunities that are not designed for sustainability and are intended to alleviate acute emergencies. The objective has therefore been adjusted to a realistic level of ambition, focusing on the temporary stabilisation of living conditions and supplemented by the specific scope of the programme measures and the aspect of social cohesion. The latter addresses the programme's aim of improving social cohesion between Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens and is in line with the dual objectives of projects/programmes permitted in fragile contexts. **The adjusted impact-level objective is therefore: "Temporary stabilisation of the living conditions of Syrian refugees and Jordanians and of social cohesion in the project areas." Some of the indicators and values assigned were appropriate.** The comprehensive system of indicators developed during the project appraisal was simplified slightly during the evaluation, so that only indicators directly relevant to the achievement of the objectives are now taken into account when assessing effectiveness. The values of the remaining indicators are taken into account as background information.

The programme was based on the following impact logic, as shown in Figure 3: The implementation of labour-intensive repair measures for roads and municipal infrastructure, following the cash-for-work logic, was intended to create a large number of job opportunities in the short term at low investment costs. The use of short-term job opportunities in street cleaning, construction, civil engineering and landscaping was intended not only to temporarily increase income, but also to improve the employability of Syrian and Jordanian people in the project regions (outcome) in the short to medium term by introducing them to the Jordanian labour market and teaching them employment-related skills. They can use the income generated by short-term employment to support their households in the immediate term, thereby temporarily stabilising their living conditions, or to make an investment in economic projects such as training or self-employment (impact). The complementary provision of vocational training and further education measures should also increase the employability of a small proportion of the workforce in structural terms. Comprehensive advisory and training measures for the Ministry of Construction, local authorities, construction companies and engineers should help to select suitable construction and maintenance projects and implement them independently in a labour-intensive manner in accordance with international labour standards. These institutional support measures should also work towards the future independent implementation of labour-intensive construction projects. Training courses for the Ministry of Construction, local authorities and construction companies explicitly focused on gender equality in the workplace should also raise awareness of the issue and help to create suitable conditions for female workers. This should enable more women to participate in labour-intensive measures, which in the long term should lead to a reduction in prejudices against the employment of women in the public sphere. Ultimately, the joint employment of Syrian and Jordanian workers in labour-intensive measures should promote exchange between the two groups and build trust, which in turn should contribute to improving social cohesion (impact).




Figure 3: Impact logic phases III-V.

Source: Own illustration.

At the time of the appraisal, the impact logic is considered fundamentally plausible, particularly in light of the containment provided by BONO and the resulting focus on short-term effects. However, the measures were not designed to help solve the structural problems faced by Syrian refugees – and other refugees – in Jordan, in particular

the uncertainties surrounding their legal status, the restrictions on their employment opportunities to a few sectors, and the extremely problematic working conditions under which they – like other migrant workers and refugees – have to earn their living in Jordan. **These problems stem from political decisions and the segregated labour market that has developed over decades and is deeply rooted in society, and were fundamentally beyond the scope of the project concept.** However, the concept provided for the granting of temporary work permits to Syrian participants in the cash-for-work measures, with the aim of at least achieving a short-term improvement in the legal situation of the participants. **The conceptually parallel qualification programme for former CfW workers, which was to be implemented through appropriate vocational training and further education measures, is generally considered useful for ensuring sustainability in improving employment opportunities on the labour market. However, in this specific case, both at the time of the project review and at the time of the evaluation, it appears conceptually unlikely that this will improve the employability of participants in the medium term.** Although vocational training and further education measures were only planned for around 5% of the total target group²⁴ and were therefore in line with the main areas of action of BONO programmes, at the time of the evaluation it is questionable why training measures were considered an effective means in such a segregated labour market context. Although the content of the short training courses was relevant to the skills required in the construction sector – and thus to the labour market accessible to Syrian refugees – such as painting, electrical installation, plumbing and carpentry, it was insufficiently tailored to the needs of the Jordanian target groups. These groups generally have better access to the labour market and therefore require different labour market-relevant skills, which they were only able to improve to a limited extent through the training programme designed primarily for Syrian refugees. **The project concept thus risked a misallocation of training opportunities. Furthermore, there was a lack of meaningful coordination between the employment opportunities to be created and the training measures.** The project concept envisaged that short training courses lasting two months should be held once or twice a year for some of the short-term employees. **These took place at different times to the respective work assignments and did not take into account the temporary loss of income for the target groups associated with participation. The project concept did not provide for compensation payments or comparable incentives for participation in the training courses.**

The project concept integrated measures to improve social cohesion with measures to increase the income of the target groups. It thus pursued a holistic approach. **The project was not part of an overarching development cooperation programme.**

4. Adaptability – response to change

Phases III-V of the EIIP programme were designed to follow each other in quick succession and were largely carried out in parallel (see Fig. 4).

2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
	Phase II			
		Phase III		
		Phase IV		
			Phase V	

Figure 4: Implementation sequence of phases III-V.

Source: Own illustration.

The phases were essentially based on the same concept. However, minor adjustments were made between phases with the aim of increasing the employment impact and sustainability of the measures and gradually improving compliance with quality standards. Major adjustments had already been made during the transition from phase II to phase III (termination of work assignments in agriculture, introduction of *performance-based contracts* with local authorities). The most important changes introduced during phases III-V were the increase in the specified proportion of women in the short-term workforce from 10% (phase III) to 20% (phase V), the recruitment of environmental and social standards officers and *occupational health and safety (OSH) coordinators*, the resumption of maintenance work on interurban roads, the extension of project measures to governorates in the centre and south of the country, and the participation of the ILO in the Project Support Unit (PSU) set up by German development cooperation to support the cash-for-work sector in Jordan. In Phase IV, cooperation with the Ministry of Construction from Phase I was continued with the resumption of road maintenance measures. **No fundamental**

²⁴ The training measures were only explicitly included in the project/programme from phase IV onwards. The training programme was planned for 4.4% (phase V) and 3.8% (phase IV) of the CfW participants. In fact, just under 4% (phase IV) – 6.5% (phase V) of the CfW participants benefited from these measures.

changes were made to the principle of labour-intensive measures, which aimed to create as many short-term job opportunities as possible while keeping investment costs low.

Major conceptual adjustments were introduced in the subsequent Phase VI. The duration of short-term job opportunities was extended from 40 to 90 days, which represented a substantial improvement for the workforce and at the same time eased the burden on human resources management. In order to increase the sustainability of the infrastructure created by the labour-intensive measures, the share of material costs in the project budget was increased in phase VI so that smaller infrastructure projects (e.g. city parks) could also be financed. In addition, the municipalities had to compete for project funds with their own ideas and at the same time contribute a higher share of the material costs themselves. At the same time, support for the Jordanian government's reforestation programme began in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture. In Phase VI, KfW ended its cooperation with the ILO and concentrated its measures exclusively on supporting the reforestation programme in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture.

Rating summary of relevance: **moderately successful (3)**

The programme design, with its focus on creating a large number of short-term job opportunities and improving access to the labour market in the medium term, was in line with the German government's policy objectives and Jordan's political priorities. The measures met the Syrian and Jordanian target groups' need for readily available income, but were not designed to strengthen these groups' employability or reduce structural problems in their access to the labour market. The impact logic, with its focus on income, promoting women's employment, promoting social cohesion and improving public infrastructure, was fundamentally plausible, but the focus on promoting medium-term 'employability' was misguided and, in some cases, beyond the scope of the programme. From the outset, the potential impact of the training measures was limited, particularly due to the complex and highly socio-culturally segregated labour market context. The targeted focus on the various target group needs was insufficient and there was a risk of misallocation of the training provision. Due to the prioritisation of labour intensity (high wage share) in the measures, only a few measures of sustainable infrastructure (e.g. street cleaning) with low material costs were implemented. Based on learning experiences, the ILO continuously developed its tools for implementing labour-intensive measures over the course of the three phases. Overall, the relevance of the programme is therefore appraised as "limited success".

Coherence

5. Internal coherence

The programme was part of the BMZ's extensive development cooperation portfolio in Jordan. During the evaluation period (2018-2022), the BMZ supported the creation of short-term employment and income opportunities (*cash-for-work*) as part of the "Middle East Employment Initiative" using financial and technical cooperation instruments, including in the areas of education, waste management, water management and maintenance of public infrastructure. On behalf of the BMZ, FC financed a similar programme for the labour-intensive maintenance and repair of schools (BMZ No. 2020 40 574) through the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), among others. Through the TC instrument, the programme "Generating positive energy from waste" was implemented by three international partner organisations between 2015 and 2023, creating short-term employment opportunities for Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians in waste collection and recycling. TC also supported the creation of short-term job opportunities in the rehabilitation and maintenance of green infrastructure, such as public parks, through local partner organisations. Other relevant TC activities during the evaluation period included supporting the reform of Jordanian (local) government, strengthening vocational education and training, and promoting the private sector.

At the operational level, coordination between the various labour-intensive measures (*cash-for-work*) promoted by the various FC and TC instruments proved difficult. This concerned the standardisation of wages and working conditions as well as geographical overlaps with regard to the supported partner communities and labour-intensive measures. **According to interview information, during the implementation period there was even competition between different German development cooperation-funded providers of labour-intensive measures in some regions. In some cases, this led to some workers leaving one measure after a short time in order to participate in another measure with what they considered to be more favourable conditions.** In view of ongoing coordination difficulties between German development cooperation-funded organisations in the area of cash-for-work and bureaucratic hurdles in issuing work permits for short-term Syrian workers, the *Cash-for-Work Working Group* (see External Coherence) proposed the establishment of a *Project Support Unit (PSU)* to serve as the central coordination instrument for general development cooperation actors in Jordan and thus also for German development cooperation. This was established in 2021 and staffed by GIZ personnel and the ILO coordinator for social and environmental standards. In addition to further developing the standard operating procedures and the geoinformation

register (see below) for the purpose of coordinating cash-for-work measures, the PSU was tasked with structuring and providing practical support for applications for work permits for short-term Syrian workers to the Jordanian Ministry of Labour. **The PSU succeeded in negotiating a special work permit for participants in short-term labour-intensive measures (cash-for-work) and in standardising and centralising the application process. This accelerated the issuance of work permits and reduced costs.** The main beneficiaries were the actors in the cash-for-work sector financed by German development cooperation. **However, the preliminary review of work permit applications by the PSU, which had to be signed off by both the TC and the ILO, proved to be time-consuming in the medium term and led to delays.** From 2024 onwards, the Jordanian government tightened the requirements for granting work permits to Syrians and introduced significantly higher fees. This led to their de facto exclusion from the legal labour market, which posed new challenges for the PSU's work. **Despite these co-ordination efforts, there were still overlaps in the selection of partner communities within German development cooperation at the time of the evaluation (April 2025)²⁵. Based on information from individual interviews, differences in remuneration for equivalent cash-for-work measures and in working conditions between the various development cooperation actors continued to exist²⁶. The extent to which this led to continued competition between the various providers after the programme was completed cannot be validly assessed within the scope of the evaluation.**

The programme supported the implementation of international norms and standards, in particular compliance with international labour standards and gender equality in the workplace. Both are part of the core mandate of the implementing partner ILO. With its efforts to integrate Syrian refugees into the Jordanian labour market, the programme contributed to the implementation of the *Global Compact on Refugees* (2018).

6. External coherence

In order to improve coordination between the various actors involved in cash-for-work programmes in Jordan, the ILO, among others, proposed the formation of a working group (*Cash-for-Work Technical Working Group*) in 2018, within which the various actors (e.g. UN organisations, non-governmental organisations) would regularly exchange information and coordinate their activities. The working group played an important role in coordinating the various actors during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which fell entirely within the implementation period of the three phases considered here. Other important coordination initiatives concerned the development of uniform standards (*Standard Operating Procedures*, SOP) and the establishment of a GIS register for the geolocation of the various measures. The ILO made a significant contribution to this with its specific labour-related expertise. As the programme was implemented by the ILO as the implementing organisation, the implementation of the cash-for-work measures was coordinated with other donors through the aforementioned coordination initiatives.

In a broader sense, the programme supported the Jordanian government's efforts to take in over 1 million Syrian refugees and provide them with access to income and basic social services. The programme attached great importance to ensuring that all measures had a local sponsor (e.g. Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Local Administration) with whom the individual measures were coordinated and formalised in implementation agreements. This was to ensure that they actually corresponded to the interests of the partner country and were thus meaningfully aligned with Jordan's own efforts.

In addition to this programme, the ILO implemented other labour-intensive employment programmes in Jordan during the evaluation period with funding from other donors (Italy, the Netherlands, Norway). These projects/programmes followed a similar pattern to the FC measures, but differed in some details, such as the promotion of women's employment or the additional implementation of vocational training measures. This resulted in economies of scale for the ILO, for example when it was able to draw on existing implementation manuals or training materials when implementing the measures. The project also fitted into the ILO's global programme for the promotion of public employment programmes (*Employment Intensive Investment Programmes*, EIIP), which has been in place for several decades²⁷. For this purpose, the ILO has developed a comprehensive set of concepts, manuals and training materials that could be used for this project.

Rating summary of coherence: **moderately successful (3)**

The programme was part of an extensive development cooperation portfolio in Jordan, which focused, among other things, on creating short-term employment opportunities (*cash-for-work*) through the maintenance of public infrastructure. Despite various efforts, such as the establishment of a cash-for-work working group and the *Project Support Unit*, it proved difficult to coordinate

²⁵ During the evaluation mission in the municipality of Berein (Zarqua Governorate) addressed in Phase V, a notice was seen from an international NGO commissioned by TC that wanted to carry out cash-for-work measures in the municipality and was looking for workers (with the German development cooperation logo).

²⁶ It was challenging to fully harmonise the cash-for-work measures offered by various German development cooperation actors, as the respective measures were implemented by different implementing organisations. While in the case of the FC projects/programmes, the ILO as the implementing organisation passed on an established set of labour standards to the subordinate agencies (ministries or local authorities) through capacity development measures in the form of training and education, the implementation of the cash-for-work measures at TC was carried out by NGOs that did not necessarily follow the ILO's regulations.

²⁷ ILO, 2018: *Employment-Intensive Investment Programme. Creating jobs through public investment*. Geneva.

the individual labour-intensive measures and to standardise wages and working conditions among German development cooperation actors. The programme supported Jordan's own efforts and worked specifically with local institutions. The programme benefited from the involvement of the ILO as the implementing organisation, which initiated various coordination mechanisms to coordinate with other donors. Due to the below-expectation results of internal coherence and good external coherence, overall coherence is appraised as "moderately successful".

Effectiveness

7. Achievement of objectives

The outcome-level objective adjusted within the framework of the EPE was: "The employability of Syrian refugees and Jordanians is improved in the project regions in the short to medium term."

The following indicators were used to measure the outcome objective:

Indicator	Status at time of review	Target value at EPE (review)	Actual value at PCR	Actual value at EPE
(1) Number of jobs created by the programme with a minimum duration of 40 days, disaggregated by gender, disability and nationality	No baseline available	Phase III: 3,200 Phase IV: 6,439 Phase V: 3,560	Phase III: 3,417 (27% women); achieved Phase IV: 7,169 (27% women); achieved Phase V: 4,267 (31% women); achieved	No new actual value Target value achieved
(2) Number of working days created by the programme (disaggregated by gender, disability, nationality and type of activity)	No baseline available	Phase III: 193,920 Phase IV: 488,857 Phase V: 274,328	Phase III: 197,996 (27% women); achieved Phase IV: 515,837 (25% women); achieved Phase V: 265,278; not achieved	No new actual value Target value achieved
(3) Number of employees of local authorities, the Ministry of Construction and private construction companies who have participated in training courses on the implementation of employment-intensive measures	No baseline available	Phase III: 50 Phase IV: 150 Phase V: 124	Phase III: 129; achieved Phase IV: 207; achieved Phase V: 216; achieved	No new actual value Target value achieved
(4) Number of cash workers who have participated in vocational training measures (disaggregated by gender, disability, nationality)	No baseline available	Phase IV: 250 Phase V: 155	Phase IV: 285; achieved Phase V: 278 (38% women); achieved	No new actual value Target value achieved
(5) Proportion of graduates of vocational training programmes who find employment within one month of completing the programme and remain in that employment for at least four months (disaggregated by gender, disability, nationality).	No baseline available	Phase IV: 50% Phase V: 20%	Phase IV: 0%; not achieved Phase V: 8%; not achieved	No new actual value, employment situation remains difficult Target value not achieved

Table 2: Outcome target achievement.

Source: Own illustration.

8. Contribution to the achievement of objectives

Provision and use of services

The programme delivered the following services as planned across phases III-V:

The programme created 14,853 short-term jobs with a minimum duration of 40 days. The number of working days created was 979,111, with women accounting for 27% and people with disabilities accounting for 4%. 10,405 jobs (70%) were created in cooperation with 21 selected municipalities in six governorates in the maintenance of municipal infrastructure, and 4,448 jobs (30%) were created in cooperation with the Ministry of Construction in the cleaning and maintenance of roads. The average length of employment was 60 days in the municipalities and 80 days in road construction.

In phases IV and V, the programme enabled 563 people to participate in a vocational training programme lasting several weeks in the fields of mosaic laying, solar and electrical engineering, carpentry, plumbing and painting. Women accounted for 38% of participants, and people with disabilities for 3%. Of these people, 20% had found employment one month after completing the training programme, and 30% of them were still in employment after four months. Overall, 8% of participants in the vocational training programmes were still in employment after four months. This figure was below the original target of 20% (phase V) and 50% (phase IV). In addition, some short-term workers were introduced to more complex tasks (e.g. painting, tiling, tree planting) by experienced foremen through workplace-based on-the-job training. This additional qualification was intended to increase their employability.

The programme trained 552 employees from local authorities, the Ministry of Construction and private construction companies in the technical and administrative aspects of implementing labour-intensive infrastructure measures. This took place in preparation for and alongside the tendering and implementation of the employment-intensive measures. The training courses included an introduction to the tendering procedures for the measures, the preparation of application documents, the preparation and implementation of maintenance measures, and the management of short-term workers in accordance with the principles of "good work". They were supplemented by on-the-job training for the same target group. In addition, the programme conducted specific courses to promote women's employment for 312 participants from the same group of people (phases IV-V). The training courses were offered in cooperation with renowned training providers such as the Jordanian Engineers Association (JEA) and were partially certified, thus adding value to the participants' further professional development.

In phases IV and V, 2,473 km of main and secondary roads were maintained in the northern governorates of Irbid, Mafrqa, Jerash, Amman, Zarqa and Ajloun. The maintenance work included road cleaning, cutting back vegetation on the roadsides, cleaning drainage pipes, minor repairs and stabilising the roadsides with simple walls and stone embankments. In addition, public infrastructure such as roads, parks, playgrounds and cemeteries were maintained in 27 municipalities during phases III-V. This included cleaning work, cutting back vegetation, constructing and painting footpaths, cleaning drainage pipes and planting trees.

In interviews conducted as part of this evaluation, the short-term workers said that they appreciated the measures primarily because of the good pay and working conditions. With a monthly wage of JOD 240–JOD 280, they were able to earn significantly more than was usual in agriculture (JOD 123) or the construction sector (JOD 179) during the implementation period.²⁸ Some participants stated that the labour-intensive measures of the programme in 2020 and 2021 provided them with a social safety net after they lost their regular jobs due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The generally positive image was also reflected in the high level of interest in participating in the cash-for-work measures. With an average age of 25–44, the majority were women and men who, as heads of households, were responsible for numerous dependents (e.g. children).²⁹ This population group needed the income from the labour-intensive measures to cover the daily living expenses of their households.

However, demand for vocational training and further education measures fell short of expectations. Many former Syrian workers who had previously been involved in cash-for-work activities could not afford to attend a course lasting several weeks and earn no money from follow-up employment during this period. Interview statements also indicated that the vocational training measures may not always have been suitable for the age group of Syrian workers reached. The majority of cash workers were in the 30–50 age group, whose lives were often strongly tied to their families and for whom a regular income was essential for the wider family. The opportunity costs of participating in a training programme were therefore even greater. Jordanians, on the other hand, do not aspire to manual work in the informal sector, for which the training courses prepared them. The training and education programmes were therefore not fully valued, indicating a partial misallocation of training measures. In general, only a few participants were able to establish themselves professionally after completing the courses. The mosaic artists were the most successful, with some now supplying wholesalers in Amman or selling their products online. It is possible that the courses lacked basic knowledge on how to start a business and did not provide the basic equipment needed to practise the newly acquired skills. There was also a lack of integration of the training into labour market integration measures such as the placement of internships or support for start-ups.

²⁸ UNHCR, 2024: Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Socio-Economic Survey on Refugees in Host Communities. Amman. Idrc, 2021: Final Report. Conducting a Research on Jobs and Resilience. Amman: ILO/KFW.

The limited success of the vocational training measures seems to be due not only to the difficult economic conditions but also to the discrepancy between the needs of the target groups and the support offered. The benefits of on-the-job training for short-term workers also appeared to be limited. In surveys conducted after the measures had ended, many of them stated that the activity had not taught them any labour market-relevant skills other than soft skills such as punctuality and teamwork.³⁰ In addition, many of the participants already had previous work experience, so that additional vocational skills could not fundamentally improve the vulnerable position of refugees on the Jordanian labour market.

Equal access to benefits

The project sought to make access to short-term employment as open and transparent as possible. The planned labour-intensive infrastructure measures were advertised publicly in the communities and by the Ministry of Construction, including on social media. All applicants were appraised on the basis of criteria defined in agreement with the partners, such as gender, nationality, disability, place of residence and vulnerability. Since Phase III, the final selection of beneficiaries has been made through a public lottery. A transparent box containing the names of all applicants was placed in a public location in the community, and the designated number of beneficiaries was drawn in the presence of all key officials. The process was broadcast via livestream on the internet. This process was considered transparent and fair by all parties involved and was generally accepted.

Despite these measures, some short-term workers reported irregularities in the selection of workers in a survey commissioned by the programme. Some of the workers were relatives of the building contractor or the engineer responsible for the construction site. These individuals often did not show up for work or only rarely, but were recorded as present in the lists. Some contractors demanded high advance payments from workers for transport costs and made this a condition of their employment in the programme. Some workers, in turn, took advantage of the job opportunities created by the programme several times using different identities. In several cases, Jordanian women were selected as beneficiaries but did not want to work. Instead, they sent a Syrian woman to the construction site, with whom they shared half of the wages.³¹ These irregular occurrences may have counteracted the inclusion of vulnerable persons in the measures offered, as it may have made it more difficult for them to gain equal access. In principle, the programme ensured through various measures that women and people with disabilities could also participate in the short-term work. In Jordan, it is unusual for women to perform physically demanding work in public spaces, with the exception of agriculture. Such activities are generally socially sanctioned. Similarly, mixed-gender work teams are undesirable in Jordan. For this reason, the programme conducted training measures for its partners, carried out awareness-raising work among the potential target groups and introduced gender-segregated work units. In addition, the programme actively sought to recruit people with various disabilities for the work. They were assigned adapted tasks that they could perform while sitting in a wheelchair, for example.

Contribution to the achievement of objectives

The programme successfully created short-term employment for its target group of vulnerable Syrian and Jordanian women and men. The income earned in this context was highly valued by the short-term workers, especially as it was slightly above the usual wage and the working conditions were relatively good. However, the programme was unable to make a significant contribution to the employability of the target groups (outcome target) or improve their access to the labour market. In various surveys, the workers stated that they were mainly employed for simple tasks such as sweeping and weeding, which did not teach them any skills relevant to the labour market.³² However, some workers were able to benefit from the social capital they had built up during their work assignments. Some received information about other job opportunities through their new social contacts.

Many of them had difficulty finding follow-up employment after their work assignment for the programme, so that the unemployment rate among short-term workers initially rose after the measures.³³ An external monitoring report from Phase IV³⁴ states that around 62% of short-term employees did not have regular employment before participating in the programme. There were significant differences between women (89%) and men (52%) as well as Jordanians (65%) and Syrians (59%). Those who had previously worked did so in the usual sectors of agriculture (23%), construction (31%) and as day labourers in various fields (27%). After completion of the measure, only 5% of the workforce had found new employment, again in the above-mentioned sectors, while around 90% described themselves as job seekers. Although this finding may be influenced by the special conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, it points to the limited effect of the project measures on participants' access to the labour market. Anecdotal information from beneficiaries during the evaluation mission suggests that many Syrian and Jordanian women did not find further employment after the programme. Some work

³⁰ Excel Consulting, 2021: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase IV of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman: ILO/KfW.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Excel Consulting, 2021: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase IV of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman:

³³ Id:rc, 2021: Final Report. Conducting a Research on Jobs and Resilience. Amman: ILO/KfW.

³⁴ Excel Consulting, 2021: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase IV of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman: ILO/KfW.

independently from home, but this requires skills other than those taught by the programme. Among the Jordanian women were also some students who used their wages to finance the completion of their studies and now work as pharmacists, for example.

In contrast, the majority of Syrian men were already employed before the measure and continued to be so after the measure. Most Syrian men worked informally as day labourers in agriculture or construction. The latter can benefit to a limited extent from the skills acquired during the maintenance measures (e.g. painting, tiling) when looking for work. However, many already had this knowledge from Syria or previous jobs, especially since the Jordanian construction sector relies heavily on Syrian workers. **Jordanian men generally do not seek unskilled work in the construction sector, so the programme's impact on the labour market was less significant in this area. Overall, the programme did not contribute to overcoming the structural barriers to access to the Jordanian labour market for Syrian refugees. The rationale for these barriers is the restrictive granting of work permits and the ethnic segregation of the labour market, which only offers Syrian workers informal and precarious employment opportunities (see also relevance). The effectiveness assessment remains unaffected by this aspect, as it was not the objective of the programme.**

9. Quality of implementation

The programme was implemented by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Founded in 1919, the ILO sees itself as an international mediator between governments, employers and employees. It promotes good working conditions, labour rights, dialogue between employers and employees, and universal social security systems worldwide. Within this framework, the ILO has been pursuing the approach of public employment and investment programmes (*Employment Intensive Investment Programmes*, EIIP) for several decades in order to create good jobs in crisis situations and, at the same time, to create infrastructure for public benefit.³⁵ According to its own information, the ILO has already implemented such programmes in over 40 countries. This has resulted in a comprehensive set of strategies, concepts, technical guidelines, management tools and certified training courses.

Phases III-V benefited from the ILO's experience with labour-intensive measures and its commitment to *decent work*. The quality features of the ILO's work included intensive capacity development of national partners (Ministry of Construction, local authorities, local contractors) on all aspects of implementing labour-intensive infrastructure measures, the complex legal structuring of short-term employment relationships based on national and international labour standards (employment contracts, work permits, social security, sick pay), and the implementation of comprehensive control mechanisms to protect workers (unannounced inspections, complaint mechanism (helpline), coordinators for environmental and social standards, training on occupational safety, protective equipment).

The ILO attached great importance to the partners' own responsibility for implementing the measures. For this reason, it concluded detailed *implementation* agreements with the Ministry of Construction and the local authorities, specifying the services to be implemented, the number of short-term jobs to be created and the available budget. On this basis, the Ministry of Construction put individual maintenance measures out to tender to private construction companies, while the municipalities generally carried out the cleaning and repair measures on their own. The ILO required the use of performance-based contracts for this, in which costs were only reimbursed after the specified services had been provided. The recruitment and management of short-term workers was carried out by the respective agencies (local authorities, companies) in close cooperation with the ILO in order to rule out irregularities. Following public complaints from workers in 2019, the ILO tightened its controls on construction sites and work recording systems. Wage payments were made directly by the ILO to Jordanian workers via a Jordanian bank and to Syrian workers via the UNHCR's e-wallet system. The financial institutions were also responsible for appraising recipients against EU sanctions lists. Finally, each implementation agreement was subject to an audit. With this multi-level system, the ILO sought to ensure maximum transparency and control while maintaining a high degree of ownership on the part of its partners. However, the infrastructure measures were small-scale. It is not clear to what extent they were based on local development plans or similar planning instruments and thus complemented local efforts in a meaningful way.

The ILO had a complex monitoring and evaluation system in place. In addition to measuring project indicators, monitoring included representative "before and after studies" and "workers' surveys" on various impact dimensions of the programme. In addition, each programme phase was subject to an external evaluation.

Based on the interviews, cooperation with the ILO within the framework of the programme was described as unreservedly good, with the commitment and expertise of ILO staff being particularly appreciated.

Any problems that arose during implementation were addressed immediately and purposefully by the ILO. After irregularities occurred in the selection process for participants in one municipality in 2019, close monitoring of ILO activities was introduced in

³⁵ ILO, 2018: Employment Intensive Investment Programme. Creating jobs through public investment. Geneva.

conjunction with stricter reporting requirements. At the same time, the ILO expanded its tools for monitoring municipalities in the implementation of employment-intensive measures.

10. Unintended effects (positive or negative)

The evaluation identified a number of positive and negative unintended effects of the programme/project. The unintended positive effects of the programme/project include the adoption of the principle of performance contracts by the Ministry of Construction and , as well as greater awareness of the cleanliness of public spaces in the project municipalities. Another positive aspect was the predominant employment of Jordanian project staff. Unintended negative effects occurred particularly at the beginning of the implementation period, when there were irregularities in the selection of beneficiaries in one municipality and an attempt at fraud in another. In addition, there have been reports of inappropriate behaviour by some foremen and unequal treatment of Syrian workers, who had to work longer hours and perform heavier tasks than their Jordanian colleagues.³⁶ In some cases, female workers were verbally abused, harassed and even threatened by passers-by.³⁷

The ILO responded to these complaints by providing further training for its national partners on labour standards, social cohesion and gender, as well as by stepping up controls. The establishment of a helpline as a complaint mechanism from phase III onwards also played an important role. The helpline, which was staffed by a full-time employee, provided a single telephone number that temporary workers could call to raise their concerns. They made extensive use of this service. In phase V, for example, 7,300 contacts were recorded. The most important issues were financial (e.g. delays in the payment of wages, loss of bank cards) (62%), social concerns (e.g. conflicts with foremen) (21%), and requests for financial support (16%). The ILO endeavoured to deal with all concerns within 1-2 days.

A before-and-after study by the ILO suggests that it was not always easy for some short-term workers to find further employment afterwards, even if they had been employed before.³⁸ Rather, it shows a slight increase in unemployment among short-term workers, albeit in an economic context marked by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this finding indicates that participation in the labour-intensive measures entailed certain opportunity costs for the workers. Some of them gave up other jobs to participate and were not always able to find subsequent employment.

Rating summary of effectiveness: **successful (2)**

The programme delivered all of its planned outputs and exceeded a number of indicators. There was high demand for the short-term job opportunities, which enabled the target groups to earn much-needed income. However, neither the employment measures nor the accompanying vocational training component had a significant impact on the medium-term labour market integration of the beneficiaries. Thus, the programme's objective was only partially achieved. The implementation of the measures benefited from the ILO's many years of experience in implementing employment-intensive investment programmes and its existing tools. In a few cases, there were irregularities in the selection of short-term workers, discriminatory behaviour by foremen and harassment of female workers by outsiders. The programme responded to this in a targeted manner with stricter controls and an expansion of its complaints mechanism. Due to the secondary focus on medium-term impact, the shortfall in the area of training measures is given less weight, so that the effectiveness of the programme is still appraised as "successful".

Efficiency

11. Production efficiency

Between 2018 and 2022, project funds amounting to EUR 32.9 million were spent (Phase III: EUR 5.0 million, Phase IV: EUR 20.0 million, Phase V: EUR 7.9 million). In Phase V, 63.9 per cent of the total costs were attributable to short-term labour, 4.8 per cent to investment and material costs (e.g. building materials, tools), and 2.9 per cent to training activities and communication. 17.9% of the costs were attributable to direct project management by the ILO (of which 77.5% were personnel costs, 14.7% were operating, travel and communication costs, and 7.0% were monitoring and evaluation costs)³⁹. A further 9% of the total costs were attributable to the ILO's general administrative costs, which are set at a standard rate of 10% of direct costs and cover services provided by the ILO office in Geneva and the regional office in Beirut. In addition, there was a 1% UN levy. The costs for short-term workers consisted of wage costs and the costs for work permits and compulsory social insurance.

³⁶ NAMA – Strategic Intelligence Solutions, 2019: Workers Survey – Phase II. Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan. Analytical Report. Amman.

³⁷ Excel Consulting, 2021: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase IV of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman: ILO/KfW.

³⁸ Id:rc interdisciplinary research consultants, n.d., Final Report. Conducting a Research on Jobs and Resilience. Amman.

³⁹ Information on the individual cost items for phases III and IV was not available at the time of the evaluation. Subject to this limited data availability, the conclusions must be classified under Production efficiency.

The ILO project team consisted of an international project manager, seven national engineers, two community development, communication and safeguards officers, and nine administrative staff. This team implemented the activities of phases III-V in seven governorates, partly in parallel. **Over the three phases (2019-2022), the programme concluded and supervised 31 implementation agreements with local authorities and 28 implementation contracts with the Ministry of Construction. The contracts had an average value of EUR 300,000, an average duration of nine months and each created around 250 jobs.** The contracts were implemented in different municipalities within a governorate or on different road sections. **The team size appears appropriate given the budget to be managed and the complexity of the small-scale project implementation.**

All phases were extended several times at no additional cost. Phase III was extended by a total of 11 months from its original duration (January 2018 – June 2019) to May 2021. Phase IV (originally planned from December 2018 to August 2020) was even extended by 12 months to August 2021. The additional costs were covered by interest income. Phase V was extended by 8 months from its original duration (November 2019 – December 2020) to August 2022, with an increase of EUR 0.9 million. The extensions were necessary due to various challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and bureaucratic delays (JORISS registration of the ILO, issuance of work permits). In some cases, they led to higher personnel costs at the ILO, which had a negative impact on the labour intensity of the projects/programmes (e.g. the share of wage payments for the target groups in the total costs of the programme). However, at around 64%, this share remains satisfactory.

In the implementation agreements between the ILO and its partners, labour intensities of 80% were achieved with the local authorities and 53% with the Ministry of Construction (excluding ILO management costs). The lower labour intensity of the measures with the Ministry of Construction can be explained by the higher material costs for road maintenance and the involvement of construction companies with their own profit margins. Overall, attempts were made to achieve high labour intensity by cutting material costs. A further increase in labour intensity would only have been possible through savings in project management, which could have compromised the quality of the measures.

According to the guidelines of the Middle East Employment Initiative (BONO), short-term employment was considered a "job" if it lasted at least 40 working days. The political goal was to create as many such "jobs" as possible. **From an operational perspective, such short-term employment relationships were uneconomical due to the high administrative costs involved.** These included advertising the positions, organising a fair and transparent selection process, applying for work permits, issuing employment contracts, registering with social security, holding a preparatory workshop for the workers and training them for their respective tasks. This work was mainly carried out by the participating local authorities and construction companies, for whom the rotation of short-term workers after 6-8 weeks represented a considerable additional expense. **For these reasons, and due to the necessary specialist knowledge, the ILO extended the employment period of the skilled workers employed in road construction on behalf of the Ministry of Construction to four to five months. In the municipalities, too, qualified specialists could be employed for three to four months for pragmatic reasons. The extended employment periods have a positive effect on the appraisal of Production efficiency, as they have reduced administrative costs. Despite these cost-saving efforts, the predominant provision of employment opportunities proved to be only partially efficient due to the short average duration of only 60-80 days and offers further potential for improvement.**

In general, the programme was aimed at achieving the highest possible labour intensity. This could only be achieved through low investment costs (e.g. tools, building materials). For this reason, the programme mainly involved light and less sustainable maintenance measures such as cleaning roads and parks and limited painting and repair work on roads and municipal infrastructure. The input/output ratio is considered appropriate in relation to the targeted high labour intensity, as light infrastructure measures were implemented with a high level of labour input.

There were delays in the implementation of the programme due to bureaucratic obstacles and the COVID-19 pandemic, for which the project team was not responsible. These were offset by cost-neutral extensions.

12. Allocation efficiency

Against the backdrop of the 2015 refugee crisis, the political objective of the programme was to quickly and visibly create short-term employment opportunities for Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals. The aim was to increase their income and thus reduce the causes of migration. Given the difficult economic situation in Jordan and the restrictive legal regulations on Syrian refugees taking up employment, there were few alternatives to the approach chosen by this programme. Due to the legal requirements, the job opportunities had to be created in either the agricultural or construction sectors in the broader sense. At the same time, the work projects had to be such that large numbers of women and men could perform unskilled tasks. Since the aim was to employ as many people as possible – even if only for a short period – the measures had to be highly "labour-intensive", meaning that the ratio of wage payments to the total cost of the measure had to be high. Efforts were therefore made to keep

material and equipment costs low. In addition, the work was intended to contribute to the common good.⁴⁰ The intersection of these requirements resulted in activities such as street cleaning and simple maintenance work on public infrastructure. Parallel cash-for-work projects financed by development cooperation rehabilitated water infrastructure, renovated schools or collected and recycled waste. **The programme under consideration here successfully created short-term employment opportunities, but left behind little visible infrastructure, so that the allocation of the inputs used by the programme does not appear entirely appropriate. A stronger sectoral focus, e.g. on road construction or the rehabilitation of specific public infrastructure (e.g. health centres), would have promised greater overarching effects in terms of stabilising the living conditions of the target groups. However, this would have increased material costs and reduced the number of jobs created, which was not politically desirable. In principle, the labour-intensive measures implemented in this form were a good way of achieving the political goal of quickly providing a large number of short-term job opportunities (outcome level), but this decision inherently reduced the programme's potential impact at the higher level (impact). In general, the road works implemented by the Ministry of Labour had higher Allocation efficiency than the measures in the municipalities, which focused mainly on clean-up and beautification work.**

For long-term improvement of the income situation of Syrian and Jordanian women and men, development cooperation has a wide range of instruments at its disposal, some of which were also used in Jordan. These include the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises, vocational training, the strengthening of employment services, the promotion of growth sectors, and the creation of favourable conditions for the development of the private sector. However, such measures mainly benefit the Jordanian population, as Syrian refugees are not allowed to work in many sectors. **This meant that there were few alternative instruments available to improve the income situation of this part of the target group. An important lever for this would be to improve working conditions in those sectors where Syrian nationals and other non-Jordanians already work, often under precarious conditions, particularly in agriculture and construction.** However, the reforms necessary to achieve this would be politically difficult to implement, especially since parts of the Jordanian elite benefit directly from the lower unit labour costs of foreign workers.

Rating summary of efficiency: **moderately successful (3)**

Within a short period of time, the programme created numerous short-term job opportunities for its target groups that met the requirements of "good work". However, this was only achieved with high overhead costs, some of which were associated with high administrative expenses, to which the programme responded with moderate extensions of some employment contracts. High labour intensity was achieved through low investment costs, but only at the expense of compromising the sustainability of the repair measures. Given Jordan's difficult economic situation and the restrictive legal framework for the employment of Syrian refugees, there were few alternatives to the approach chosen by the programme to create short-term employment relationships. Nevertheless, potential in terms of Allocation efficiency remained partially untapped, as the labour-intensive employment opportunities were insufficiently targeted at sectors with greater overall impact potential. Due to the aforementioned compromises, despite the fundamentally appropriate use of funds given the context, the efficiency of the programme is therefore appraised as "moderately successful".

Impact

13. Overarching developmental changes

The development policy objective adjusted within the framework of the EPE was: "The living conditions of Syrian refugees and Jordanians and social cohesion in the project areas are temporarily stabilised. The following indicators were used to measure the impact objective/no indicators were specified.

Indicator	Status at time of review	Target value at EPE (review)	Actual value at PCR	Actual value at EPE
(1) Number of Jordanian and Syrian men and women benefiting from access to improved infrastructure and services	No baseline available	Phase III: 200,000 Phase IV: 8,000,000 Phase V: 350,000	Phase III: 225,902; achieved Phase IV: 9,175,000; achieved Phase V: 350,000; achieved	No new actual value, but Phase VI continues activities The use of the infrastructure is confirmed on the basis of observations.

⁴⁰ BMZ, 2021: Conceptual Framework for the Implementation of the Middle East Employment Initiative as Part of the Special Initiative on Refugees. Berlin.

				Target value achieved
(2) Number of Jordanian and Syrian men and women benefiting from increased income.	No baseline available	Phase III: 16,000 Phase IV: 32,000 Phase V: 18,000	Phase III: 17,525; achieved Phase IV: 37,375; achieved Phase V: 22,201; achieved	No new actual value, but Phase VI continues activities The increase in income only relates to the duration of employment through the programme (approx. 40-80 days).
				Target value achieved
(3) Change in the proportion of cash workers willing to interact with members of other population groups (disaggregated by nationality and governorate)	No baseline available	Phase V: 25%	Phase V: 83.4% ⁴¹ ; achieved	No new actual value, but Phase VI continues activities
				Target value achieved

Table 3: Impact target achievement.

Source: Own illustration.

Note: The specific achievement of targets is considered in the following section, as the selected indicators are project-specific and thus represent the direct contribution to the achievement of targets.

14. Contribution to overarching intended developmental changes

The programme aimed to bring about development policy-relevant changes in the areas of income, women's employment, social cohesion and access to improved infrastructure. In all these areas, the programme contributed to positive changes, but these remained limited in terms of time and space.

Indicator 1: As part of their work assignments in the communities, the short-term workers cleaned streets, public spaces and cemeteries, cut grass, painted footpaths and walls, decorated bus stops and village entrances, repaired public wells, planted trees and laid footpaths in the 27 beneficiaries. The municipal infrastructure and roads are used by the population on a permanent basis. In the municipalities, cleaned roads improved general hygiene. Newly painted roadsides and pavements increased road safety. The planting and maintenance of trees and green spaces, as well as the cleaning of sewers, improved water management and the microclimate in the communities. On behalf of the Ministry of Construction, workers cleaned drainage and overflow channels on rural roads, repaired cracks and holes in the roads, and stabilised the roads with simple walls and stone embankments. These measures increased the service life of the roads and also reduced damage to vehicles, e.g. from potholes. Cleaning the roadsides, which were heavily littered with plastic, improved overall hygiene and reduced plastic pollution. **This results in a selective macroeconomic benefit, but one that cannot be quantified and is fundamentally limited by the temporary nature of the work. Some interviewees reported that the project measures had led to increased demand in the municipalities for road cleaning, waste management and maintenance of public spaces. This had resulted in some municipalities now investing more funds themselves in cleaning and maintenance measures, especially if they expected this to have a positive effect on the tourist appeal of their municipality. During the evaluation trip, municipal staff were observed carrying out street cleaning and gardening work in some project municipalities, and improved hygiene was noted.**

Indicator 2: Between 2018 and 2022, the programme enabled around 14,800 people to earn between JOD 12 (EUR 15.60) and JOD 14 (EUR 18.20) per day, with an average employment period of 60-80 days, amounting to between JOD 720 (EUR 936) to JOD 1,120 (EUR 1,456) per day, with an average employment period of 60-80 days⁴². This amount benefited both the short-term employees and their households, which had an average of five additional members, meaning that a total of around 70,000 people indirectly benefited from the increased income. Most Syrian workers used the income to pay rent, repay debts and buy food. Jordanian workers used the income for a wider range of expenses, such as education and health costs, home repairs and the purchase of household appliances.⁴³ Some younger Jordanian workers used the measures to finance their studies. **It is striking that the majority of workers were unable or unwilling to save part of their income and invest it in productive projects.**

⁴¹ Fafo, 2022: Final Report. Conducting Workers Survey. Phase V of the project/programme: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman. The Workers Surveys for phases III and IV, which were conducted by the companies idrc and Excel Consulting, also come to positive conclusions regarding the project/programme's influence on social cohesion between Syrian and Jordanian participants. All workers surveys combine quantitative and qualitative data. However, no baselines are available.

⁴² In consultation with the Ministry of Labour and GIZ, the project/programme paid a net wage of JOD 12 (EUR 15) per day for unskilled workers and JOD 14 (EUR 18) per day for semi-skilled workers in phases III-V for the maintenance of municipal infrastructure in the communities. For workers in road construction in cooperation with the Ministry of Construction, the project/programme paid a net wage of JOD 14. In addition, there was a social security contribution of JOD 3 (EUR 4) (21% of the net wage) paid directly by the employer.

⁴³ Excel Consulting, 2021: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase IV of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman: ILO/KfW.

This meant that the development policy effectiveness of the measure was limited to providing a short-term social safety net for people on low incomes.⁴⁴

In general, the wage level set in the programme is considered appropriate for stabilising the living conditions of the target groups in the short term. Assuming 20 working days per month, the monthly net remuneration of short-term workers was between JOD 240 and JOD 280 (EUR 312–364). This was above the monthly minimum wage for Jordanian workers of JOD 220 (EUR 286) applicable since 2018 and significantly above the minimum wage for non-Jordanian nationals of JOD 150 (EUR 195). The minimum wage for Jordanian workers was raised to JOD 260 (EUR 338) in 2021. However, the Jordanian minimum wage is repeatedly criticised for not being sufficient to live on.⁴⁵ **The wage level of the programme thus reflects the effort to pay the target groups a living wage that takes into account their different socio-economic starting points without unduly distorting the market.**

In addition to temporarily improving incomes, the programme aimed to improve the employability of participants through the professional skills they acquired directly during their work assignments. **However, the employment effect of the programme measures was low. Various surveys showed that the employment rate and income of participants were lower after the end of the measures than before.**⁴⁶ This may be partly due to the difficult economic situation in 2021 caused by the pandemic, which saw unemployment rise throughout Jordan. However, the findings also indicate that some participants gave up their previous jobs in order to benefit from the higher wages offered by the short-term measures and later had difficulty reintegrating into the labour market. The short-term jobs did not generally provide any job-related qualifications. Many Syrians already had professional knowledge and many years of work experience in the construction sector. In Jordan, Syrians are considered skilled builders and make up the majority of workers on Jordanian construction sites. Only a few beneficiaries of on-the-job training stated in interviews that they also benefited professionally from their new skills (e.g. tiling, painting, tree planting). **The qualifications offered were less attractive to young Jordanians, as they aspire to employment in the public sector or self-employment and, due to a relatively generous social welfare system, are under less pressure to accept any job. Mosaic making seems to be an exception. Here, some training participants reported that they now make mosaics themselves and sell them online or through retailers in Amman.**

The ILO's implementation contracts with the local authorities had a volume of JOD 100,000 – 400,000 (EUR 130,000 – EUR 520,000). In addition to salary payments and administrative costs, they covered the costs of work materials (e.g. shovels) and raw materials (e.g. paint, sand, stones), which were mainly sourced locally. The labour-intensive measures carried out under phases III-V thus also contributed to a selective strengthening of the local economy, as positive spillover effects (e.g. through the involvement of local construction companies, suppliers, landlords, food retailers, stabilisation of local purchasing power) were realised. However, these cannot be quantified. **Together with other cash-for-work projects financed by German development cooperation and other donors, the programme contributed to the establishment of a subsidised labour market in which, according to various estimates, around 12% of Syrian refugees were employed during the evaluation period (2018–2022), particularly in the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps. In line with other international donors, the programme thus made a significant contribution to the economic support of Syrian refugees in Jordan.**

The programme achieved a high proportion of women (27%) and people with disabilities (4%). This was achieved through careful planning and organisation of the work assignments (e.g. gender-segregated work crews, deployment of women to maintain less frequented side roads or protected areas such as parks and cemeteries, close monitoring of construction sites) and training measures for national partners on women's labour rights. In many cases, reservations about employing women had to be overcome through dialogue with families. For many women, the programme enabled them to pursue paid work outside the home for the first time in their lives. In interviews and various surveys, many women stated that this had given them greater self-confidence, that they were proud of their newly acquired skills, and that they benefited from the social networks they had built up during the work assignments. Some reported that their income had enabled them to participate more in household decisions. **In interviews, some men and women reported that, partly as a result of the programme, it was now more widely accepted in their community for women to work outside the home to contribute to the family income. These impressions are also supported by survey data⁴⁷, according to which the proportion of women actively seeking employment increased after the end of the measure, indicating a potential change in mentality in the project communities. Nevertheless, only a few female participants in the labour-intensive measures succeeded in establishing themselves in the labour market in the long term.** In interviews and standardised surveys, the majority state that they are now back home and use their new skills at most in their own gardens or for maintaining their own homes. A few Syrian women are

⁴⁴ Fafo, 2022: Final Report. Conducting Workers Survey. Phase V of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman.

⁴⁵ Tamkeen, 2019: Subsistence Level. The Minimum Wage in Jordan. Amman. [accessed on 10 September 2025]

⁴⁶ Excel Consulting, 2021: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase IV of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman; ILO/KfW; Idrc, 2021: Final Report. Conducting a Research on Jobs and Resilience. Amman: ILO/KfW; Fafo, 2022: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase V of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman.

⁴⁷ Idrc, 2021: Final Report. Conducting a Research on Jobs and Resilience. Amman: ILO/KfW; Fafo, 2022: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase V of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman.

engaged in income-generating activities from home, while some Jordanian women are working in skilled jobs (e.g. as pharmacists) after completing their vocational or university education.

Indicator 3: The programme had a positive effect on reducing tensions between Syrian and Jordanian participants in the measures and improving social cohesion among them. In various surveys⁴⁸, participants stated that working in mixed teams had enabled them to get to know and appreciate Syrians and Jordanians better. In interviews, Syrian and Jordanian respondents – especially women – reported new friendships that had developed through working together. In systematic surveys, many participants stated that their trust in the other population group had increased and tensions had been reduced.⁴⁹ These statements must be interpreted against the backdrop of the Syrian refugees' presence in Jordan for around ten years during the evaluation period and their ongoing integration into local society, at least in the border regions. In these regions, Syrians now speak the local dialect. **At the same time, there are still considerable reservations among the general Jordanian population about the presence of Syrian refugees in the country.**

With regard to the development policy additionality of the programme/project, it should be noted that without the programme/project, the majority of Syrian refugees would probably have continued to pursue their regular occupations – mostly in precarious conditions in agriculture, construction, food processing and the service sector – while many Jordanians would have sought skilled employment or given up working altogether. A key development policy additionality of the programme – along with many other development cooperation-funded projects/programmes – was that it visibly supported both Jordanian and Syrian citizens. **This took place against the backdrop of a sometimes heated national debate in which the alleged preferential treatment of Syrian refugees over the local population by international organisations was lamented.**⁵⁰ By employing Syrian and Jordanian workers equally – even though the latter were less in need of support – German development cooperation made it clear that Jordanians should also benefit from the presence of Syrian refugees in the country. In this way, the programme contributed to social peace.

The project's integration into a supra-regional employment programme implemented by the ILO contributed to its broad impact. The alignment of short-term employment relationships with the ILO's international core labour standards and the creation of a safe and regulated working environment, even for short-term measures, were exemplary and were partially adopted by other organisations such as UNOPS and GIZ. This approach was incorporated into the Standard Operating Procedures of the Cash-for-Work Working Group in Jordan, thereby influencing the work of many organisations.

15. Contribution to overarching unintended developmental changes

No overarching social, economic and environmental impacts beyond the changes described above could be identified.

The clean-up work can generally be expected to have positive environmental impacts, particularly with regard to reducing plastic waste in the natural environment. However, given the low level of environmental awareness among the population, these effects were only short-lived.

Rating summary of impact: **successful (2)**

The programme had a limited temporal and spatial impact on the income of beneficiaries and on the cleanliness and state of repair of public infrastructure. Other selective positive effects were observed with regard to the acceptance of women's employment and social cohesion in the project communities. The programme's approach to implementing short-term employment measures, which was based on the ILO's core international labour standards, was adopted by other actors in the cash-for-work sector and thus had a broad impact. The development effectiveness of the programme as a whole is therefore appraised as "successful".

Sustainability

The programme is part of the Middle East Employment Initiative, which was designed to provide short-term employment opportunities in the host countries of Syrian refugees. In doing so, limitations with regard to the sustainability of the respective measures were deliberately accepted. The evaluation confirms this limited sustainability claim, as the programme was entirely aimed at the short-term employment of vulnerable Syrian and Jordanian nationals. The appraisal of sustainability thus loses its status as a knockout criterion and the criterion is weighted appropriately in the overall rating.

⁴⁸ Excel Consulting, 2021: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase IV of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman: ILO/KfW; Idrc, 2021: Final Report. Conducting a Research on Jobs and Resilience. Amman: ILO/KfW.

⁴⁹ Fafo, 2022: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase V of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman.

⁵⁰ Jordan Strategy Forum, 2025: Facts and Figures – An In-Depth Analysis of Employment Reality in Jordan. Amman.

16. Capacities of beneficiaries and stakeholders

At the end of the project measures, only minor changes in the resilience of the target groups can be observed. The majority of participants used their wages directly for essential consumer spending such as food and rent, as well as to repay debts. Very few participants were able to save part of their wages and use them for investment purposes (e.g. for education expenses). **Furthermore, no improvements in the labour market integration of participants can be observed after the end of the measures; rather, there is a short-term deterioration. Syrian refugees were already highly integrated into the labour market, albeit under precarious conditions.** Among the female participants alone, there was an increased desire for gainful employment after the end of the measures⁵¹, but many of them were unable to realise this desire in the long term due to restrictive gender norms and a difficult labour market. The simple vocational skills that some participants acquired (e.g. painting, tree planting) were considered useful by individual participants and were probably used in other professional activities, but they did not significantly improve their labour market situation. Only a small proportion (8%) of participants in the two-month vocational training courses succeeded in entering the labour market on a longer-term basis, particularly in the mosaic sector. For Syrian refugees, many of whom are considered experienced farmers and skilled craftsmen, it was not so much a lack of qualifications that prevented them from entering the formal labour market as the restrictive regulatory framework (work permits, restricted sectors, ban on owning their own means of transport). For these reasons, the majority of them work in the informal sector.

At the end of the implementation period, the Ministry of Construction and some partner municipalities and construction companies had improved capacities to carry out labour-intensive measures.

17. Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

The programme worked intensively to strengthen the capacities of the Ministry of Construction, local authorities and private companies to plan and implement labour-intensive measures in compliance with international labour standards. To this end, project staff invested a great deal of time in training and coaching employees of the Ministry of Construction, local authorities and construction companies on topics such as planning and tendering for public construction contracts, performance contract management, construction site management, human resources and financial management, gender in the workplace, labour rights, conflict management, and compliance with labour, social and environmental standards. Through the Jordanian Engineers Association, the ILO also offered certified courses on these topics. In this way, the ILO sought to enable its partners to implement labour-intensive measures independently and to improve the overall quality of processes and structures in public construction. In an interview, local government employees confirmed that they are now applying the knowledge they acquired during the programme to other construction projects and public tenders. The programme thus contributed to the localisation of labour-intensive measures, i.e. the implementation of such measures under the responsibility of national structures. However, these institutionally supported capacities were no longer utilised by the FC, as cash-for-work measures from phase VI onwards are implemented with the Ministry of Agriculture, where such capacities still need to be built up. This led to considerable losses in sustainability and sunk costs.

The integration of Syrian refugees into the Jordanian labour market will remain difficult for the foreseeable future. In recent years, the Jordanian government has tightened the relevant regulations on several occasions. In 2023, non-Jordanians were banned from accessing a whole range of skilled trades and service occupations. In 2024, the requirements for obtaining a work permit were made even more difficult, making it unaffordable for informal workers. This was the government's response to the country's difficult economic situation following the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, even 10 years after the start of the Syrian crisis, Syrians still have no long-term economic prospects in Jordan. **The work permits for short-term workers arranged through the programme/project were limited to the respective measure and expired after one year at the latest. Given the restrictions on work permits for certain employers and sectors, they were hardly used by the target groups. Overall, the programme/project's contribution to strengthening the resilience of the target groups, including particularly disadvantaged groups, was therefore limited.**

The programme achieved a certain degree of sustainability in the regulatory area, particularly with regard to the labour rights of short-term workers. In doing so, it was able to build on the long-standing cooperation between the ILO and the Jordanian Ministry of Labour on issues of labour legislation and the protection of core labour standards. Through awareness-raising measures, the programme also improved short-term workers' knowledge of their labour rights.

The programme's activities were part of efforts promoted by TC to improve municipal cleaning and waste disposal in Jordan, which at the time of the evaluation were now being successfully managed independently in some project communities. **The programme may have set positive examples through its labour-intensive street cleaning work.** These may have been

⁵¹ Fafo, 2022: Conducting Workers Survey. Phase V of the project: Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure (EIIP) in Jordan. Amman.

consolidated by the technical advice provided by TC to the municipalities on this topic. In addition, the repair and stabilisation work improved the resilience and service life of the beneficiaries' roads to a certain extent. **Infrastructure such as planted trees or new pavements are expected to be usable for several years. Better integration into local development plans or similar planning instruments could have further increased their sustainability.**

18. Durability of impacts over time

With the fall of the Assad government in December 2024 and the establishment of a new government, the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan changed. By mid-2025, more than 100,000 Syrians had already returned to Syria from Jordan. However, given the continuing volatile political situation in Syria, it is uncertain to what extent this return movement will continue. Despite numerous challenges, Jordan has proven to be a stable and safe host country for Syrian refugees but does not wish to offer them permanent residence. For this reason, the uncertain situation of many Syrians will continue.

In order to maximise labour intensity, only minor infrastructure measures were deliberately carried out as part of the programme's cash-for-work measures, where material costs were low. The low sustainability of the infrastructure created or repaired in this way was deliberately accepted. The temporary road cleaning and beautification measures are unlikely to have any lasting effects beyond the end of the programme. Only the road repair work will enable the infrastructure to be used in the longer term after the programme/project has been completed.

The benefits of the short-term cash-for-work jobs were limited to the period of employment and do not offer any prospect of permanence. The contribution of the training measures to participants' access to the labour market fell short of expectations.

There is potential for the capacities created by the programme in local government and construction companies to carry out labour-intensive measures as part of public cleaning and maintenance work to be used in the future. However, other actors, such as TC agencies, are implementing such measures through national and international NGOs without involving local authorities, which means that the newly established capacities remain unused. At the time of the evaluation, there were no indications that the Jordanian government would finance comparable measures from its own resources. Instead, in recent years, the Jordanian government has focused on expanding the social safety net for Jordanian citizens.

Rating summary of sustainability: **moderately unsuccessful (4)**

The short-term jobs created by the programme were not sustainable and, like the training measures, did not contribute to the long-term integration of beneficiaries into the (formal) labour market. Similarly, the sustainability of the cleaning and maintenance work was limited, especially as the aim was to keep material costs low. The project strengthened the capacities of the Ministry of Construction and local authorities in the areas of project management, human resources management and accounting, but it is uncertain whether these capacities will be utilised in the long term. Overall, the sustainability of the programme's impact was below expectations and is appraised as 'rather unsuccessful'.

Overall assessment: **moderately successful (3)**

In the context of the Syrian crisis, the programme aimed to quickly create short-term employment opportunities for Syrian refugees and vulnerable members of the host communities in order to stabilise the situation of refugees in Jordan. The programme fully achieved this objective by financing labour-intensive cleaning and maintenance work on municipal infrastructure and roads, offering a targeted approach. This provided the beneficiaries with a good, but only temporary, source of income. The programme design was not suitable for integrating the target groups into the (formal) and socio-culturally segregated labour market in the medium to long term. This was not intended due to the political constraints of the Middle East Employment Initiative (BONO) and was also partly beyond the scope of the programme. At the time of the evaluation, however, this political directive appears only partially appropriate, as the prospects for the return of Syrian refugees were uncertain at the time of the programme review and implementation, and measures focused exclusively on the short term could not provide any medium-term prospects. From the outset, the alignment and integration of complementary training measures into the programme had only limited prospects of success, particularly due to the complex labour market context in Jordan, and some of the potential impacts remained untapped, leading to a reduction in relevance. Despite the coordination efforts of the programme, which were necessary in view of the extensive German development cooperation portfolio in Jordan, challenges in coordinating the TC and FC instruments could not be completely resolved until the end. For example, geographical overlaps and differences in working conditions and remuneration for equivalent cash-for-work measures offered by various German development cooperation actors persisted until the time of evaluation. The programme successfully contributed to positive changes in the acceptance of women's employment and social cohesion between refugees and locals. In addition, the programme made important technical contributions to the human rights-compliant design of short-term work measures (*cash-for-work*),

which were adopted by other international actors. The involvement of the ILO as project executing agency was crucial to this success and, with its institutional knowledge as a standard-setting labour organisation, ensured the provision of good jobs. Through capacity development measures, it also strengthened the capacities of local institutions to independently implement labour-intensive measures, which, however, are likely to remain limited to the immediate activities of this programme due to the change of implementing partner in the subsequent phase. The measures achieved a satisfactory level of labour intensity, but this undermined their potential for structural impact, ruled out more material-intensive infrastructure activities and reduced Allocation efficiency. The project measures successfully contributed to a temporary stabilisation of the living conditions of Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities, thus fully delivering the expected overarching developmental impact. At the time of the evaluation, the sustainability of the project's effects is below expectations and is not expected to improve over time. However, this is a direct consequence of the programme's short-term orientation, which means that sustainability requirements are limited. Despite the successful immediate and overarching impact of the programme, it is appraised as "limited success" overall due to shortcomings in relevance, coherence, efficiency and sustainability.

Contribution to Agenda 2030

The programme contributed to the following goals of the 2030 Agenda:

Sustainable Development Goal 1 (poverty reduction): The employment of short-term workers temporarily increased their income.

Sustainable Development Goal 5 (gender equality): With women accounting for 27 per cent of short-term workers – in a context of very low female labour force participation – the programme promoted the employment of women.

Sustainable Development Goal 8 (decent work): The workers' employment relationships were short-term but included an employment contract, a work permit, health and social insurance, and regulated working hours. Pay was adequate and workplace safety was ensured.

Sustainable Development Goal 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure): The short-term employment measures contributed to the cleaning and maintenance of public infrastructure.

Sustainability Goal 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions): Intensive capacity development improved management processes in the Ministry of Construction and local government administrations.

Principle of shared responsibility and accountability

The project supported the efforts of the Jordanian government to take in Syrian refugees in their country, together with other German development cooperation projects and other donors. The individual activities were coordinated in a cross-donor Cash-for-Work Working Group.

Principle of linking social, economic and environmental aspects

The labour-intensive measures were primarily aimed at improving the economic situation of the target groups, but also at promoting their social cohesion. The cleaning work along the roads and the planting of trees also had positive ecological effects.

Principle of "leaving no one behind"

The programme specifically targeted particularly disadvantaged population groups by offering unskilled jobs in the public sector (street cleaning, repair work on public infrastructure) associated with low social status. However, due to the good pay and working conditions, the programme also attracted other groups, such as Jordanian students. However, no long-term positive effects of the short-term job opportunities on the resilience of particularly disadvantaged groups are to be expected.

Methodology

Evaluation methodology

The ex-post evaluation follows the methodology of a rapid appraisal, i.e. a data-based, qualitative contribution analysis, and represents an expert opinion. The project is attributed effects based on plausibility considerations, which are based on a careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. Where possible, this also includes the use of digital data sources and modern techniques (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). The causes of any contradictory information are investigated, attempts are made to resolve them, and the assessment is based on statements that are confirmed by several sources of information (triangulation), where possible.

The analysis of the effects is based on assumed causal relationships, documented in the impact matrix developed during the project appraisal and updated during the ex-post evaluation, if necessary. The evaluation report sets out arguments as to why certain influencing factors were identified for the effects observed and why the project under review probably made a certain contribution (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure is taken into account in terms of its influence on the results. The conclusions are put into relation to the availability and quality of the data basis. An evaluation concept serves as the reference framework for the evaluation.

The method offers a balanced cost-benefit ratio for project evaluations, on average, with a balance between knowledge gain and evaluation effort, and allows for a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of DFG projects across all project evaluations. Individual ex-post evaluations cannot therefore meet the requirements of a scientific assessment in the sense of a clear causal analysis.

The main objective of the evaluations (knowledge interest) is to measure impacts, provide accountability, promote transparency and enable institutional learning.

Type of evaluation:

Trip to the project area.

Key questions of the evaluation according to the evaluation concept:

- Phases III-V continue the measures of phases I-II with some expanded components and have been extended to new project governorates. The evaluation will examine the extent to which the adjustments made in phases III-V were appropriate and relevant to success.
- What impact did the COVID-19 pandemic have on the implementation and effects of the programme? What adjustments were made? What lessons can be learned from this for the FC?
- The ILO's EIIP programme approach is currently being implemented on a supraregional basis. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the ILO's programme approach and to what extent can it serve as a model for the FC?
- The design of the measures under Phase V focused for the first time on strengthening social cohesion and reducing social tensions. To what extent was this reorientation appropriate and successful, and to what extent was it accompanied by appropriate measures?
- Some of the measures were implemented directly by the Jordanian Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH). What were the advantages and disadvantages of this approach? To what extent did this expansion of the implementation approach contribute to the success of the measures?
- Were the recommendations made in the final reviews (Section 5) implemented in the subsequent Phases V and VI?
- The conclusions of the evaluation should take into account current developments in the ongoing project phase VI.

Non-public (internal) documents

Project proposals, reporting and final reviews by KfW, project applications and half-yearly reporting by the ILO, internal studies and evaluation reports by the ILO.

Data sources and analysis tools

ILO monitoring data, GPS-supported site visits, expert interviews, focus group discussions

Project sites visited

Bergish municipality (Irbid governorate), Berein municipality (Zarqa governorate), Sabha municipality (Mafraq governorate), brief visits to other project sites in the governorates of Ajloun, Jerash and Amman. Selection of project sites: Sites were selected based on their size and logistical considerations. The random sample of locations visited was approximately 12%, corresponding to 3 out of 21 locations. Interview partners and modality (in person, virtual/by telephone, in writing)

Interview partners and modality (in person, virtual/by telephone, in writing)

KfW representatives (virtual and in person), ILO representatives (in person), Ministry of Construction representatives (in person), Ministry of Local Affairs representatives (in person), city/municipal administration representatives (in person), vocational training centre representatives (in person), Jordanian Engineers Association representatives (in person), Syrian and Jordanian participants in the labour-intensive measures (focus group discussions in person), Project Support Unit ILO/GIZ (in person)

The following aspects limited the evaluation

Possible influence on the target groups due to the inevitable participation of officials (e.g. mayors) in the discussions, termination of cooperation between KfW and ILO after phase VI, high expectations of local discussion partners with regard to a possible continuation of the labour-intensive measures in the communities.

Assessment methodology

A six-point scale is used to assess the project according to OECD DAC criteria, with the exception of the sustainability criterion. The scale values are as follows:

- Level 1** Very successful: results significantly above expectations
- Level 2** Successful: results fully in line with expectations, without significant shortcomings
- Level 3** Moderately successful: results below expectations, but positive results predominate
- Level 4** Moderately unsuccessful: significantly below expectations and negative results dominate despite recognisable positive results
- Level 5** Unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
- Level 6** Highly unsuccessful: the project is useless or the situation has deteriorated

The overall rating on the six-point scale is based on a project-specific weighting of the six individual criteria. Levels 1–3 of the overall rating indicate a ‘successful’ project, while levels 4–6 indicate an ‘unsuccessful’ project. It should be noted that a project can generally only be classified as "successful" in terms of development policy if both the achievement of objectives at the outcome level (effectiveness) and impact level, as well as sustainability, are rated at least as "moderately successful " (level 3).

Imprint

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