

Ex-post evaluation

Employment-intensive investment programme (EIIP) for Jordanians and Syrian refugees, Phases I and II, Jordan


Title	Employment-intensive investment programme for Jordanians and Syrian refugees (EIIP), Phases I and II		
Sector and CRS code	Material relief assistance and services 7201000		
Project number	2016 40 580 (Phase I) and 2017 40 729 (Phase II)		
Commissioned by	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)		
Recipient/Executing agency	International Labour Organisation (ILO)		
Project volume/ Financing instrument	Budget grant EUR 10 million (Phase I) and EUR 10 million (Phase II)		
Project duration	07/2016–10/2017 (Phase I) and 11/2017–12/2019 (Phase II)		
Year of report	2023	Year of random sample	2022

Objectives and project outline

The objective of Phases I and II of the project at outcome level was to improve the infrastructure in Irbid and Mafrq and to increase the employability of Syrian refugees and Jordanians. At impact level, the local living conditions should be improved and the project should contribute to strengthening social cohesion.

The projects were part of the Partnership for Prospects for the Middle East (BONO) and implemented Cash for Work programmes. Implementation was divided into components: (1) labour-intensive infrastructure programmes and (2) training and education programmes for Syrian refugees and Jordanians as well as institutions in the project areas. Both phases were directly carried out by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

Overall rating:
moderately successful



Key findings

The projects were effective in terms of providing short-term employment opportunities and contributed to social cohesion in the Jordanian host communities. They also had positive effects in terms of gender. The project was rated as being “moderately successful” for the following reasons:

- The project programmes were relevant. They eased the pressure on the host communities and were therefore in line with the political priorities and strategies for addressing the refugee crisis.
- The living situation in the host communities was improved by providing short-term income and repairing local infrastructure through Cash for Work measures.
- The participation by both genders of Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens in the projects contributed to social cohesion and had a positive effect on the change in role model stereotypes.
- The design of the projects remained unspecific with regard to the “training courses” or the component 2 chain of effects. The measures implemented in component 2 were unsuitable for achieving long-term employment effects.
- The implementation focused on component 1 and the creation of short-term employment opportunities. In view of this internal prioritisation and external factors, the long-term employment effects of the projects were marginal and the sustainability of the programmes was “moderately successful”.

Conclusions

- The projects were suitable for alleviating the acute emergency in the light of the refugee crisis.
- Specific, individual training programmes do not trigger any longer-term employment effects.
- In the labour sector, ILO played an important role as an advisor on workplace and social standards and in the harmonisation of donors under the various Cash for Work programmes.
- Programmes to improve long-term employability require detailed labour market analyses.
- The participation of women in work in the public sphere depends on the working conditions, such as the provision of protective clothing or transportation to the workplace.

Ex-post evaluation – rating according to OECD DAC criteria

General conditions and classification of the projects

Phases I and II of the Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) for Jordanians and Syrian refugees (BMZ nos. 2016.4058.0 and 2017.4072.9) were part of the Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East, which was launched in February 2016 as part of the conference on "Supporting Syria and the Region" held in London by the German Federal Government. The previous migration crisis in 2015/2016 led to the German development cooperation (DC) focusing on addressing the root causes of migration and supporting host countries. The focus was on the countries neighbouring Syria, where most of the refugees had been taken.

By mid-2016, Jordan had over 600,000 officially registered refugees from Syria, although the number was estimated to be much higher.¹ Most of the refugees lived in the northern governorates of Irbid and Mafrq on the border with Syria. The labour market situation there, which had already been very strained prior to the crisis, deteriorated dramatically. The unemployment rate in Irbid increased from 12.2% in 2010 to 14% in 2015; in Mafrq, it increased from 13.9% in 2010 to 15.2% in 2015.² The pressure on local government and the many families that had taken in relatives and acquaintances from Syria increased and this led to social tensions.

Given this situation, which was similar in all the countries neighbouring Syria, Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East aimed to provide rapidly available income, both for refugees and the vulnerable populations of the host communities (1). In most cases, Cash for Work (CfW) programmes were implemented for this purpose and this simultaneously contributed to the restoration and renewal of the local infrastructure. This was intended to further improve living conditions in the host regions (2). In addition, long-term career prospects would be opened up to the target groups (3).³ In view of this objective, Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East can be understood as an attempt to bridge the gap between short-term support programmes and long-term outcomes.⁴

This aspiration is also reflected in the design of Phases I and II of the EIIP: the aim was not to only provide income and improve infrastructure in the short term, but to make a longer-term contribution to the employability of the target groups. The projects were part of the Financial Cooperation (FC) and were financed via the special initiative "Tackling the root causes of displacement, (re)integrating refugees"⁵ of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The recipient and executing agency was the International Labour Organisation (ILO). ILO was directly commissioned by the FC to implement the projects, meaning there was no participation from other international donors as part of these projects. The FC contribution amounted to EUR 10 million in Phase I and EUR 9.93 million in Phase II after a reduction; there were no counterpart contributions. Phase I began in 07/2016 and ended in 10/2017. Phase II followed directly and ran from 11/2017 to 12/2019.

For the purpose of this evaluation, Phase II was pooled with Phase I, which was part of the sample for ex post evaluations (EPE) in 2022. Both phases are considered jointly, as the respective programmes cannot be sufficiently differentiated from one another, so it is not possible to ensure that impacts are attributed to the specific Phases. For example, the phases differed in the selection of some types of infrastructure, but their basic design, objectives and indicators were the same. In addition, part of the funds from Phase I were used in Phase II. The two Phases I and II of EIIP to be evaluated are referred to in the following report as "the projects"; "overall project" refers to EIIP from Phase I to the present.

Brief description of the projects

The conceptual approach of Phases I and II is due to ILO, which still, to this day, implements Employment Intensive Investment Programmes in the same format in more than 70 countries, especially in Africa. At its core is the link between job creation and the improvement of local infrastructure, with a particular focus on workplace and social standards and the involvement of vulnerable groups, especially women and people with disabilities.

¹ Cf. BPB 2016, GIGA 2016, UNHCR 2016.

² Cf. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour 2016, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour 2010.

³ Cf. BMZ 2023.

⁴ Cf. DEval 2021.

⁵ The special initiative (SI) is now called 'Refugees and host countries' (SIGA).

Two packages of programmes or components were implemented as part of Phases I and II. In component 1, labour-intensive infrastructure programmes were implemented, which can be divided into three groups. Each of these programmes was planned and implemented in cooperation with other government partners: (1) Road works (repairs, improvement, cleaning) involving the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH); (2) agricultural infrastructure (cistern construction and terraces, construction of greenhouses, work in nurseries) involving the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and (3) community works (cleaning, decorating, repairs) involving the local government of the communities of Sahel Horan (Phases I and II), Hosha (Phase I) and Al Khalidiyah (Phase II). Implementation agreements were signed with both the sector ministries and local government. Either construction companies were commissioned to implement the infrastructure programmes or they were carried out directly by the local authorities. The companies and the local authorities contracted Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens of the host communities, who received a salary for their work (Cash for Work, CfW). The training programmes carried out as part of component 2 included on-the-job training for employees as well as training for staff at the state partner institutions and construction companies.

CfW programmes generally refer to work on infrastructure that can be carried out without the use of machines if possible, making them particularly labour-intensive. In addition, they generally require little to no prior knowledge. Employees receive a salary (cash) for the work they do. CfW+ can be defined as programmes that are supplemented by additional training activities or programmes to strengthen social cohesion in the host communities. CfW++ describes projects that focus on less labour-intensive employment programmes, but rather on vocational and further training programmes as well as support in starting a business.⁶

Half of the project **target group** consisted of Syrian refugees⁷ and Jordanians affected by the crisis in the districts of Irbid and Mafraq, which are close to the border.

⁶ Cf. DEval 2021: 6.

⁷ Syrian refugees living in refugee camps at the time of implementation were not addressed by phases I and II.

Map of Jordan incl. project communities




Figure 1: Map to show the locations of the project areas of EIIP I and II.

Breakdown of total costs

The funds were disbursed in two tranches of EUR 5 million each across each of the Phases considered. EUR 1.51 million of residual funds from Phase I were used in Phase II. However, at the time of the decision, the funds were already on site, so there was no transfer between the Phases.

		Inv. Phase I (planned)	Inv. Phase I (actual)	Inv. Phase II (planned)	Inv. Phase II (actual)
Investment costs (total)	EUR million	10	10	10	9.93
Counterpart contribution	EUR million	0	0	0	0
Debt financing	EUR million	10	10	10	9.93
Of which BMZ funds	EUR million	10	10	10	9.93

Rating according to OECD DAC criteria

Relevance

Policy and priority focus

The objectives of the projects were based on the Jordanian government's political strategies and priorities for dealing with the Syrian crisis and the associated refugee flows in the years 2016 to 2019. For example, the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016–2018 underlined the importance of income creation programmes within the Livelihood and Food Security component.⁸ In addition, the projects supported the implementation of the Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP), which was launched by ILO and the Jordanian Ministry of Labour in 2006. In its 2018–2022 iteration, it included the creation of good working conditions for everyone and explicitly included refugees.⁹

On the German side, the projects were part of the Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East and thus part of German DC support for the countries neighbouring Syria that were particularly affected by the refugee crisis. The Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East was initiated at the aforementioned Syria Conference 2016 in London, when the Jordanian government pledged to simplify the issue of work permits for Syrian refugees.¹⁰

However, this commitment was initially contradicted by the legal regulations and procedures in place at the time for issuing work permits in Jordan. The permits had to be issued at local level by the directorates; there was not enough capacity to handle the large number of permits required in a short time. In addition, the procedures at the time were based on issuing work permits for migrant workers and not for refugees. For example, the former had to have an employment relationship at the time of crossing the border, which was not possible for refugees. The situation only began to improve in 2020, when the process became centralised and – on the initiative of ILO – the Labour Office was established within the Ministry of Labour as the sole competent authority. In 2021 and 2022, the Jordanian Ministry of Labour recorded over 62,000 work permits that were issued for Syrian refugees, while only 43,000 permits had been issued annually on average between 2016 and 2020.¹¹

Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders

According to the UNHCR, of the Syrian refugees who came to Jordan in 2016–2019, between 33% (2016) and 45% (2019) remained in the northern border governorates of Irbid and Mafrq,¹² where they lived with relatives or otherwise in the local communities or in refugee camps there. The increase in the population figures of Mafrq and Irbid¹³ by approx. 7.6%, respectively, from 2016 to 2019 further worsened the already strained labour market situation in both governorates. The focus of the project programmes on the Irbid and Mafrq project areas is therefore assessed as appropriate through to the present. In addition, jobs in cross-border trade and traffic had also been lost due to the war in Syria. Many of the refugees were forced to take on jobs in the informal economy, such as on construction sites. According to a study carried out by ILO in 2014, 99% of Syrian refugees worked outside Jordanian labour regulations or in the informal economy.¹⁴ Difficult access to the regular labour market and a lack of employment opportunities both for refugees and Jordanians resulted in an increase in poverty and social tension in the border regions. The **core problem**¹⁵ was thus correctly identified at the time of the evaluation. Refugees and vulnerable Jordanians needed both short-term income to cover their basic needs¹⁶ and longer-term employment prospects. Figure 2 combines the unemployment rates with the number of Syrian refugees in the various governorates of Jordan in 2016 – so before the project implementation – underpinning the suitability of the project's focus. Although Mafrq had a lower unemployment rate and a lower number of refugees than Irbid in 2016, more Syrian refugees sought refuge in Irbid than anywhere else in Jordan other than Amman and the unemployment rate was the second highest in the whole country. The unemployment rates are only rough approximations, as they do not take into account the informal economy, which was particularly relevant for

⁸ Cf. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 2015: 30.

⁹ Cf. ILO 2018: 16.

¹⁰ Cf. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2016.

¹¹ Cf. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour 2017; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour 2022.

¹² In 2023, 45.3% of Syrian refugees continue to live in these two regions. Cf. UNHCR 2023.

¹³ Cf. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour 2022.

¹⁴ Cf. ILO 2015: 3.

¹⁵ The main problem is: "The northern districts of Jordan lack employment opportunities and access to the labour market for Syrian refugees and Jordanians." (KfW 2016: 7)

¹⁶ A survey of EIIP employees showed that most of them used their CFW wages for their daily needs (cf. ILO/NAMA 2019: 20).

Syrian refugees. The actual unemployment rates including informal employment in Jordan were probably significantly lower. Nevertheless, the unemployment rates indicate how precarious the labour market situation was for Jordanian citizens in the individual governorates and thus influenced the acceptance of arriving refugees. Overall, Figure 2 shows that there was a relatively high need for action in both project governorates in the EIIP in 2016 with regard to the socio-economic integration of Syrian refugees in Jordan and that the focus of Phases I and II of the EIIP is correct.




Figure 2: Absolute refugee numbers of Syrian citizens and total unemployment rate per governorate in Jordan for 2016.

The projects were aimed at providing as many employment opportunities as possible. Even if the employment relationships were only of a short duration and did not address the generally prevailing job shortage, this approach is appropriate in view of the emergency situation described in the project regions.

Construction companies were initially responsible for **selecting employees** to be appointed to work on roads within the scope of the project, those working on agricultural infrastructure were appointed by representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture at the directorate level and local government appointed people to engage in community works. It turned out that the selection was often non-transparent, and the applicants tried to exert pressure on the responsible persons. According to ILO, its surveys that looked into the poverty and vulnerability situation also showed that it was difficult to distinguish between different forms and degrees of vulnerability, not least in view of the general level of poverty and the lack of opportunities faced by large parts of the population in the project regions. Against this background, a random balloting system was introduced and a suitable number of women and men, Syrian and Jordanian persons and persons with disabilities were publicly drawn from the applications

received in accordance with the pre-determined quotas. This new procedure met with strong agreement and conflicts that had previously arisen due to the selection of employees were able to be resolved.

The decision on quotas for the selection of employees made at the start of the project appears to be appropriate – both at the time and now. Thus, the equal participation of Syrians and Jordanians in infrastructure programmes (50%-50%) corresponded to the fact that both groups suffered equally from poverty and difficult access to employment opportunities. This also served to reduce tensions between the two groups. The 10% quota for the participation of women was also suitably chosen, as employing women for public works outside enclosed buildings was initially rejected by both the public and construction companies. Numerous measures to raise awareness among the local population, community leaders and institutional partners were required, resulting in a very gradual change in mindset. In later project phases, the proportion of women was increased. As of Phase IV (current), this sits at 30%. It was possible for workers to apply several times for CfW measures within the projects. For example, some took part initially as employees and were then re-employed as team leaders in another CfW measure. More detailed information on this form of “multiple employment” is not available.

Similarly, the involvement of people with disabilities initially had to be promoted. In addition, suitable activities had to be identified that could be carried out by people with different disabilities as part of the infrastructure programmes. A quota of 3% is therefore appropriate. It was maintained by the executing agency over both phases.¹⁷

Appropriateness of design

The impact logic of the projects comprises two lines of action: “infrastructure” and “training”, which are reflected in the design of the two components and in the formulation of a dual objective for the module. By the same token, both chains are closely intertwined and can only be evaluated together. There is largely a common consensus among the parties involved about the definition of the first chain of effects: local infrastructure in the border regions of Irbid and Mafrq would be improved as the result of the short-term employment of Syrian refugees and Jordanians in CfW programmes. Accordingly, the **first module objective in the project proposal** was: improve rural infrastructure by means of labour-intensive methods.¹⁸

The **selection of the three types of infrastructure** (road works, agricultural infrastructure and community works) to be addressed in Phases I and II was jointly defined by ILO and KfW. According to the interviewees, the selection was deliberately broad and less criteria-based or study-based for reasons of urgency. However, the intention was to select measures that would benefit the local population in particular. The more precise selection of specific programmes (within each type of infrastructure) was made by the ILO project team based on the technical recommendations of an ILO consultant. In addition, the partner institutions (MPWH, MoA and the local authorities) provided lists of possible projects for their respective infrastructure type. Similarly, the local authorities were selected on the basis of a list of eligible local authorities provided by the Ministry of Local Administration. The criteria for selecting local authorities were based on the number of Syrian refugees, poverty rates and the existence of other donor-financed projects in similar sectors.

The selection of infrastructure programmes is in line with ILO’s EIIP approach, which aims – in addition to the creation of income – to generate the type of added value that local authorities derive from improvements to infrastructure.¹⁹ The cluster evaluation by ILO also concludes that Phase II – as well as the EIIP project in Lebanon, which was also evaluated – “attained a sound balance between providing short-term employment and asset creation and preservation” (ILO 2020: 36). This assessment seems fundamentally justified, as on the one hand, labour-intensive measures were to be selected and, on the other, additional value was to be created for local residents through the improved infrastructure.

The second chain of effects is based on the **selection of training** courses that would be implemented as part of the second component. Plans included three to four months of on-the-job training in companies, on-the-job training for employees, and training for staff at state institutions and construction companies, which seems appropriate as a means of increasing the employability of Jordanian and Syrian workers. The training in companies and on-the-job training were designed to target the same workers who were involved in the CfW programmes, and have a positive impact on their employability.

¹⁷ The final inspection report for Phase II does not mention the quota for people with disabilities, so the EPE initially assumed that it had been dropped in Phase II. A corresponding evaluation question was formulated accordingly (see Appendix 4).

¹⁸ Cf. KfW 2016: 7 and its impact matrix.

¹⁹ Cf. ILO 2019.

The **second module objective in the project proposal** is as follows: improvement of employability and access to the labour market for Syrian refugees and Jordanians.²⁰ The formulation of the objectives appears to be appropriate, as the training courses were associated with the expectation of imparting knowledge that should increase the employability of the target groups. Although some of the Syrian refugees were well educated, it can still be assumed that many of the target group had little prior knowledge, especially with regard to the available jobs, such as in the construction industry, which implies that the intended capacity increase is expedient. In addition, the training courses should convey knowledge about working standards and conditions. On the other hand, the training courses were intended to address the environment, reduce stigmas – for example at state institutions and construction companies – and thus increase access to the labour market. Apart from this, there was no absolute clarity on the importance of “employability” or the associated causal relations. Therefore, it was not precisely defined whether component 2 should generate follow-up employment or create the conditions for implementing the specific CfW programmes, i.e. from the outset of the project, there was some uncertainty with regard to claiming a longer-term impact in connection with the training courses. “[...] [T]his role of training is not clearly distinguished from its contribution to the effective implementation of project activities in the results matrix or project documents, and such a distinction is difficult to make.” (ILO 2020: 16). Similarly, it was not clearly defined whether the training of partner institutions should lead to a strengthening of institutions, which would then have a positive impact on the political context, such as the process for issuing work permits. This type of focus on advising and capacity building to improve the process of issuing work permits would have made sense given that they proved to be an obstacle to the implementation of the CfW programmes over a longer period of time.

For the purposes of the EPE, these two chains of effect were combined into one module objective, with the latter focusing on improving the employability of the workers. Based on the project documentation, it was assumed that the employability of the employees had increased due to their participation in the infrastructure programmes and training courses. The **adjusted module objective** is therefore as follows: in Irbid and Mafrqa, the infrastructure has improved and the employability of Syrian refugees and Jordanians has increased.

In the **causal chain**, the module objective is generally located at outcome level. In the present case, however, the module objective describes the direct results of the project activities, especially with regard to infrastructure, and could therefore also be understood as output. Similarly, the outcome indicators largely measure the implementation of activities, such as the amount of funds invested in infrastructure or the number of working days created. Accordingly, in the ILO cluster evaluation, the objectives are established at output level (and the improvement of living conditions is defined as the outcome).²¹ For the EPE, the module objective was retained at outcome level to take into account the fact that the projects were intended to achieve short-term effects. It was already clear from the project documentation that BMZ focused in practice on creating as many employment opportunities as possible, even though the objectives of Partnership for Prospects generally already went beyond this at that time (see above).

However, an additional level was included in the reconstructed causal chain (see Figure 3). The aim of this level is to depict the **use of the outcomes** and to close the gap between the module objective (outcome) and the intended developmental impacts (impact). For example, the improved infrastructure must be used and maintained over a longer period of time in order to have a positive effect on the living conditions of the population. With regard to the “training” chain of effects, it can be assumed that long-term developmental impacts will be achieved if employees find a job or independent employment following their participation in the projects.

A programme and/or impact objective was defined for both phases in order to map the expected developmental impacts. Nevertheless, the projects were individual programmes; there was no DC programme that merged FC and TC modules. The **impact objective in the project proposal** was that Syrian refugees and Jordanians have better living conditions due to increased access to employment opportunities and improved infrastructure.²²

The impact objective is very broad and difficult to measure. In contrast to the outcome objectives, which are directly related to the activities of the projects, the causal relationships at impact level are less specific. Two of the original impact indicators measure the benefits of the outcomes (improved access to infrastructure and benefits of increased income); one measures the prevention of social conflicts. The intention to position the improvement

²⁰ Cf. KfW 2016: 8 and the local results matrix. The body text solely refers to improved access to the labour market; the results matrix also mentions improved employability as a second module objective.

²¹ Cf. ILO 2020: 16.

²² Cf. KfW 2016: 8.

in living conditions as a broader effect of the project at impact level is appropriate – both during the project and now.

The impact objective was adapted as part of the ex-post evaluation so that it maps a peace-promoting contribution in the sense of the dual objective. The peace-promoting orientation of the project is derived from the peace and security marker, FS1, and appears to be prudent at the time of the evaluation. It appears plausible that the inclusive employment and training measures of Phases I and II lead to an improvement in social cohesion. Getting to know Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities in the context of employment and reducing economic and social exclusion are aimed at alleviating social tension.²³ Furthermore, three additional indicators are formulated at impact level for the EPE, which are intended to map the new impact level (use of outcome). In addition, the new indicators measure developmental impacts and are therefore deliberately more ambitious. The **adjusted impact** objective is now: the project contributes to improving the living conditions of the local population in Irbid and Mafraq in the medium term and to strengthening social cohesion between Syrian refugees and host communities.




Figure 3: Reconstructed causal chain (own representation).

Three of the existing **indicators** at outcome level measure the job opportunities created through the projects: the number of working days created, the number of jobs created and the percentage of workers who benefit from occupational health and safety. The first two are quantitative indicators; the third measures the quality of the job opportunities created. The number of working days is a widespread indicator in CfW projects; the number of jobs created was requested as an indicator on the German side. In 2017, BMZ issued a work instruction aimed in part at standardising the definition of “jobs” in all projects financed through the Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East. From that point, only jobs that lasted at least 40 working days were counted as jobs.²⁴ This changed the way projects were counted and led to discussions between ILO and KfW. The intention to achieve standardisation across various CfW projects by applying the definition of 40 days is understandable. Nevertheless, there are also disadvantages that come with this. For example, ILO and some of the partner institutions perceived the definition provided by BMZ as a restriction, as they stated that some of the infrastructure programmes lasted fewer than 40 days and that good employees should also be employed for more than 40 days.²⁵ Similarly, a survey of EIIP employees shows that a large number of workers were employed for well over 40 days between May 2018 and May 2019 (see Figure 4).

²³ Cf. DEval 2021: 18.

²⁴ Cf. BMZ 2017.

²⁵ Cf. ILO 2020: 35.




Figure 4: Ratio of percentage of employees/number of days worked (period 05/2018-05/2019) (ILO/NAMA 2019: 13)

Like the output indicators, the indicators at module objective level measure project activities, and thus do not reflect the actual outcome level. In addition, the formulations of the objectives and the indicators in the project documents within KfW and between ILO and KfW are sometimes inconsistent.²⁶ The target values of some indicators were adjusted several times over the course of the project;²⁷ why or on what basis the adjustments were made was not always justified or documented.

Response to changes/adaptability

The project design of Phase II included some learning experiences from Phase I. On the one hand, the construction of new schools was dropped once it became clear that new school buildings were unsuitable for CfW because they required various demanding work steps that had to be carried out by specialist staff. In addition, the construction of greenhouses in Phase II was not followed up. Instead, the number of forestry operations was increased in order to achieve a higher work intensity, i.e. the costs for workers in relation to the total construction costs.

There were also changes in the way workers are paid. In Phases I and II, the employees were paid by the construction companies, which caused delays and other problems in some cases. Later, the common cash facility²⁸ was used and bank cards were introduced for all employees so they could withdraw their salaries from ATMs. Along with the switch to the balloting system for the selection of employees referred to above, this adjustment demonstrates the projects' ability to respond to problem situations.

A third area includes discussions about the importance and potential of the training and capacity development measures within the projects. Conceptually, ILO and KfW were, on the one hand, caught between the urgent need to create as many jobs as possible to ease the pressure on the host communities and population while contributing to the Partnership for Prospects, and on the other, being motivated to facilitate long-term change from a development policy perspective. This tension continues throughout the subsequent Phases. Similar to the Partnership for Prospects, which evolved in the direction of CfW++ over the years, the design of the EIIP focused increasingly on long-term development. EIIP Phase VI (the current phase) therefore also includes measures that relate to infrastructure administration and maintenance.

²⁶ This was also pointed out in the 2020 ILO cluster evaluation. Cf. ILO 2020: 83f.

²⁷ For example, the project proposal specifies approx. 170,000 as a target value for the number of working days to be created (indicator 1.1). The final inspection report for Phase I refers to a target value of 125,000. The target value of 200,800 is given for Phase II in the financing proposal; in the final inspection report for Phase II, it is 224,000.

²⁸ The Common Cash Facility was established in 2016 and was available to Jordanians and Syrians. In the case of refugees, this made it possible to link the disbursements to the UNHCR's database where all refugees are registered. This should facilitate secure and transparent payments. The Common Cash Facility is used by numerous donor organisations. Cf. ReliefWeb (30 June 2023).

Summary of the rating

The core problem, namely the difficulty in accessing the regular labour market and a lack of employment opportunities both for refugees and Jordanians, was correctly identified and the choice of measures were aligned accordingly. In addition, the projects corresponded to the political priorities of the German and Jordanian governments. However, the design does have some inconsistencies, especially with regard to the medium-term chain of effects, “training” (component 2). Thus, the time horizon associated with increasing the employability of target groups was not clearly defined, nor was the decision regarding whether there should be institutional strengthening that would have a positive impact on the political environment. Furthermore, the formulations of the objectives are sometimes imprecise and the indicators do not fully reflect the expected project effects, especially at outcome level.

In the design phase, the programmes already focused on “infrastructure” (component 1) as a short-term chain of effects, which was also reflected in the distribution of project funds in the components (see chapter Efficiency). This focus was appropriate in view of the urgency of the emergency caused by the Syrian crisis and was in line with the political priorities and strategies of the German and Jordanian governments. For this reason, the inconsistencies in the design with regard to component 2 are less important in the evaluation of relevance and this is still evaluated as successful – despite the proven deficiencies.

Relevance: 2

Coherence

Internal coherence

The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commissioned the implementing organisations, KfW and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, to implement CfW projects, meaning both FC and TC instruments were used at the same time, albeit not in a complementary manner. While the FC projects were implemented via ILO, the TC implemented its CfW projects via various non-governmental organisations. This involved a large number of “implementing agents”, which made it difficult to coordinate the choice of locations for the infrastructure measures. As a result, at the Maru Station research centre in Irbid, which is operated as an independent unit by the Ministry of Agriculture, the hydroponic greenhouse financed by KfW in Phase II was accompanied by another greenhouse built in the same style with funding from GIZ. The director of the research station stated that the demand was so great that he requested the construction of a second greenhouse. Both greenhouses are still in operation today and are being fully utilised. Nevertheless, this case was a wake-up call that illustrated the need to improve coordination between planned projects and their locations.

ILO set up a working party comprising the various organisations implementing the CfW programmes, including the NGOs commissioned by GIZ and ILO. This format of the Cash for Work group significantly facilitated coordination between the TC and FC. Another instrument was the standard operating procedures (SOP), which had likewise been initiated by ILO and adopted in 2019 in the Cash for Work group. The SOP set out principles for all CfW projects, including the salary level.²⁹ Both the working party and the SOP were continued in the following Phases. Coordination with other FC projects was not necessary, as no comparable measures were carried out in the same sector during the implementation period of phases I and II.

External coherence

The FC projects supported the Jordanian government's own efforts. For example, the agricultural infrastructure programmes implemented under component 2 supported the implementation of an existing programme offering agricultural subsidies by the MoA.

Under the Jordan Response Plan, all donor projects that are being implemented in Jordan – including Phases I and II – must be registered in the Jordan Response Information System for the Syria Crisis (JORISS), which sometimes took months and delayed the start of implementation. In addition to the basic registration, there were

²⁹ In Phase I, the daily salary was initially JOD 15 (including the employee contribution to social security); later this was JOD 14, with the employers taking over social security completely. For the community works, a daily salary of JOD 12 was paid for unqualified workers and JOD 14 for semi-qualified team leaders.

no other plans to use the system for operational coordination between donors. However, given the fact that several donors were involved in the CfW sphere³⁰, institutionalised coordination arrangements would have been conducive to identifying and making the most of synergies between the different stakeholders.

The money transfer system used in the FC projects, through which employees received their salary, was highly coherent with other donors after the switch to the Common Cash Facility (see chapter Relevance).

Summary of the rating

The implementation of the projects was not coordinated between the FC and TC. However, ILO played a key role in standardising processes within the CfW programmes of the German FC and TC, thereby creating internal coherence. As a result, coordination between the FC and TC was significantly improved by the Cash for Work group and the SOP. There was also a strong need for CfW measures, which resulted in the commissioning of several German implementing organisations and made thematic overlaps between the TC and FC more likely. The external coherence of the projects is rated as high with regard to the support of the Jordanian government's own political efforts. However, there was a lack of institutionalised coordination mechanisms with other international donors. Due to these deficiencies, the overall coherence of the projects is assessed as only moderately successful.

Coherence: 3

Effectiveness

Achievement of (intended) targets

The objective, which was adjusted as part of the EPE, was: the infrastructure has been improved in Irbid and Mafraq and the employability of Syrian refugees and Jordanians has improved.

The target achievement at outcome level is summarised as follows:³¹

Indicator	Target value PA/EPE	Status in PA (EIIP 2016/EIIP II 2017)	Actual value at final inspection (EIIP I 2018/EIIP II 2020)	Actual value at EPE (2023)
1.1 Number of working days created	I: 125,000 II: 224,000 = 349,000 50%-50% refugees to Jordanians 10% women	I+II: 0	I: 137,106; achieved II: 285,969; achieved (49% Syrians; 17% women) = 423,075	No new actual value
1.2 Percentage of employees who benefit from occupational health and safety	80%	I+II: 0	I: 89 %; achieved II: 88.5 %; achieved	No new actual value

³⁰ In addition to the BMZ-financed CfW programmes, other programmes were implemented by NORAD (Norway), WFP, UN-HCR/UNICEF and ICDF (Taiwan) from 2016 onwards.

Source: [DIE \(2020\) Community Effects of Cash-For-Work Programmes in Jordan. Supporting Social Cohesion, More Equitable Gender Roles and Local Economic Development in Contexts of Flight and Migration. P. 56 f.](#)

³¹ The information on indicators 1.1–1.4 comes from the final inspection reports. The target value for indicator 2.1 was taken from the original indicator 2.2 of Phase I (proportion of participants receiving certification). The indicators are numbered consecutively, with the first digit referring to the assignment to the respective component.

1.3 Number of jobs created by the project	I: 4,150 II: 3,600	I+II: 0	I: 4,638 (ILO counting method); achieved II: 4,552 (ILO counting method); achieved II: 3,067 BMZ definition (not achieved) ³²	No new actual value
1.4 Amount of funds invested in infrastructure programmes	I: EUR 6.4 million II: EUR 8,686	I+II: 0	I: EUR 5.9 million; not achieved II: EUR 8.93 million; achieved	No new actual value
2.1 NEW: % of participants in the project's training programmes (Syrian refugees and Jordanians) who completed the courses	65%	n/a (because of new indicator for the EPE)		No value as ILO did not provide corresponding figures; achieved , based on target group interviews

The de facto output indicators used here as a proxy for outcome indicators (see also Relevance) refer to the quantification of the project performance within the scope of the infrastructure programmes (component 1) (nos. 1.1–1.4 in the table above), meaning their achievement can only be measured at the time of the final inspection. They primarily measure the implementation and not the benefit of the financed activities.

The target values of the indicators were achieved for the most part and even exceeded in almost all cases. Only the number of jobs created in Phase II falls short of the target, if the BMZ definition introduced in 2017 and stipulating a minimum employment period of 40 days (see above) is applied. In addition, the target value for the funds invested in infrastructure measures in Phase I was not achieved in full (indicator 1.4). The failure to achieve the objective in this indicator raises questions – particularly in light of the residual funds available in Phase I – which could not be resolved during the interviews and are evaluated negatively as part of the evaluation. The new indicator added to measure component 2 as part of the EPE (no. 2.1 in the table above) – and intended to measure the successful completion of the training measures – could not be measured, as ILO did not provide any corresponding data despite repeated requests. However, based on the interviews with workers, it can be assumed that most of the participants in the training measures also completed them successfully. None of the interviewed employees reported that they had withdrawn from the courses. The achievement of the objective in component 2 is therefore assessed as successful.

It is also clear that some indicators, especially those used to quantitatively measure the job opportunities created, were monitored more closely than others; some were not assessed at all in practice. These monitoring priorities resulted from the focus that Partnership for Prospects had initially placed on creating employment opportunities (see Relevance). Given the urgency of the Syrian crisis and the high needs of the target groups, this focus was understandable, but it could have been more clearly documented. Although the design of the projects also envisaged a longer-term increase in the employability of the target groups, phases I and II actually corresponded less to CfW+ projects and more to pure CfW projects. However, these differed from traditional CfW programmes because a particular emphasis was placed on local infrastructure and its use by the population as well as on the introduction of workplace and social standards (see relevance to the EIIP approach).

³² In 2017, BMZ introduced 40 days as the minimum duration of employment in CfW projects (see chapter Relevance). Before this, each individual CfW measure – regardless of its duration – was counted as a job.

Contribution to achieving targets

Regarding the **infrastructure programmes** implemented in **component 1**, most output indicators quantify the number of works carried out. This can be summarised as follows:³³

Output indicators	Target value Phase I	Status of Phase I (2018)	Target value Phase II	Status of Phase II (2020)
Number of km of road maintenance work	660 km	668 km	1345	1404
Number of agricultural infrastructure programmes implemented				
Cistern construction	350	231	41	81
Terracing work	15 km	7.5 km	5 km	7.2 km
Greenhouses	150	26	–	–
Irrigation systems	15 km ²	–	–	–
Forestry work		151 ha	345 ha	275 ha
Hydroculture greenhouses	–	–	2	2
Production of seedlings in plant nurseries	–	–	–	4 plant nurseries; 150,000 additional seedlings
Additional school rooms/repair work in schools	25	0	25	13

It is evident that many output indicators have been achieved. Only the number of newly built cisterns and greenhouses and the terracing work remained below their respective target values in Phase I.³⁴ Irrigation systems were not built and it was not possible to ascertain why this was not done during the EPE. Forestry work was identified as a sensible measure to increase labour intensity. New school buildings proved unsuitable for CfW measures; however, repair work was carried out in schools in Phase II (see also chapter Relevance).

The community works included the following work in Phase II:

Community works	Status of Phase II (2020)
Cleaning work	
o roads	203 km
o Drainage trenches	4.25 km
o Parks and playgrounds	18
o Schoolyards	33
o Public organisations	21
o Mosques	91
o Cemeteries	28
Trees planted	2,600
Curbs freshly painted	35.8 km

As part of the projects, various infrastructure projects were created, repaired or cleaned through the CfW programmes. Selection of infrastructure programmes took place as planned (see chapter Relevance and Annex 3). The project visits as part of the EPE³⁵ demonstrated the good quality of the new construction and repair work, such as cisterns and hydroculture greenhouses as well as road drainage work, such as gabions to support water ditches and small tunnel systems along the roadside. The same applies to tree planting in the local authorities and repair work on pavements, playgrounds and terraces. All of these measures will continue to take place and will be used and maintained. Only the use of the cisterns is limited by the fact that pumps are required to remove

³³ The project documents contain different information about the indicators. In the event of contradictory information, the data from the final inspection reports has been adopted here.

³⁴ Information explaining why the indicators fell short of the target value was not available at the time of the evaluation.

³⁵ The short-term programmes, such as clean-up and maintenance work (e.g. on roads) could naturally not be inspected.

the water. It can be assumed that only a few of the farmers have such pumps and are therefore able to use the cisterns efficiently. In addition, the cisterns were built on private land, so they can only be used by their owners.

The infrastructure programmes enabled employees to earn an income in the short term – through the CfW approach – and therefore improve their standard of living. The employees and other project participants surveyed as part of the EPE considered this to be the main benefit of the projects. Apart from the cisterns, the CfW programmes of the projects also contributed to improving the local infrastructure in the project regions, which benefited broad sections of the population. It was also emphasised during the interviews that the work took place under fair working conditions and in mixed groups comprising women, men and people with disabilities. This has challenged role models and prejudices and led to new dynamics in families and communities (see also chapter Overarching Developmental Impacts). Internal project factors that contributed to the success of the projects included the system of selecting workers randomly, which ensured equal opportunities for all applicants and led to a diverse selection of employees. In addition, ILO's awareness-raising measures and services to advise on women's participation, working conditions and non-discrimination were important factors for success.

The project objective was not fully achieved for **component 2**, namely the increase in **employability**. Despite the training, it was not possible to significantly increase the target groups' ability to get a job. According to the interviewees, this was partly due to the fact that – as explained above – the project's internal priorities were to create as many short-term employment opportunities as possible. The training courses were primarily aimed at providing the participants with the expertise they immediately needed in the projects. For example, the workers were instructed on how to perform the respective CfW work, and they had brief training on workplace and social standards. Employees of ministries and construction companies were trained in the importance and implementation of labour-intensive infrastructure measures. Beyond these selective measures, training courses in companies and longer on-the-job training courses did not take place as planned. There were also other obstacles due to external circumstances. For example, the cause of unemployment is often not the lack of skills among jobseekers – Syrian refugees in particular are often very well trained – but primarily the lack of job offers. In Irbid and Mafrq, there are (if at all) vacancies in the construction industry, agriculture, the army and police, and the public sector. Job opportunities are therefore severely limited, especially for refugees. As soon as they complete one CfW programme, many try to continue working in the next CfW programme and want to extend the duration of their employment for as long as possible. The DEval evaluation of Partnership for Prospects also showed that longer-term CfW employment does not lead to greater alleviation of the current emergency or to continued employment.³⁶

Nevertheless, some of the interviewees stated that participation in the CfW programme had helped them to acquire new skills and knowledge, which in some cases enabled them to become self-employed. For example, two women who had worked in a plant nursery started selling their own seedlings.

Quality of implementation

Administration of the CfW programmes, i.e. the registration of employees, checking the hours worked, and the process for paying their salaries, entailed a great deal of administrative work, which ILO mastered well. Over the course of the project, ILO adapted and improved a number of processes, such as the payment of salaries. When it came to counting the number of days worked, KfW repeatedly raised queries, mainly because the ministries had sent ILO incorrect figures.

As explained above, partner institutions participated in the selection of local authorities and infrastructure measures (see chapter Relevance); however, they were not involved in the management of the project. Given the design of the projects, this appears appropriate.

Unintended consequences (positive or negative)

The evaluation identified unintended positive and negative consequences of the projects. The good working conditions for employees should be emphasised as an unintended positive consequence. For example, the workers interviewed during the EPE stated that they were very satisfied with the working conditions; some, especially women, highlighted the good working conditions as a standout feature of the projects. However, some complaints were also received in surveys that ILO regularly conducted among employees during the implementation.

³⁶ Cf. DEval 2021: Chapter viii.

Another unintended positive consequence arises from the MPWH's awareness of the possibilities of using the maintenance of its roads for CfW. A new instrument was introduced, whereby contracts with construction companies were based on performance (instead of quantities), which created incentives for labour-intensive forms of implementation. According to its own information, MPWH is currently conducting a study to analyse the potential of these performance-based contracts. The introduction of this new approach offers the possibility of a long-term change in the ministry's processes, which can lead to the creation of additional job effects.

No unintended negative consequences of the CfW programmes on the labour market could be identified. It was not possible to confirm that employees gave up other jobs to participate in the projects' CfW programmes, nor was there any evidence at the time of the evaluation that the CfW salaries paid had led to market distortions.

Summary of the rating

The projects were mainly effective with regard to component 1, which envisaged the labour-intensive provision of new and improved infrastructure by the target groups. Despite partially falling short of the target values of indicators 1.3 and 1.4, implementation of the programmes under component 1 is still assessed as successful. BMZ's adjustment to the definition of "jobs created" and the associated new method of counting were not sufficiently taken into account in the implementation designed for Phase II, meaning the target values were not met. Due to the operationalisation approach linked to the different design requirements for the minimum duration of employment, the ILO counting method is used to assess the target value achievement for the indicator that was met. However, the failure to achieve the target for infrastructure expenditure in Phase I (indicator 1.4) raises questions in light of the residual funds available in this Phase; these could not be clarified even during the interviews and are rated negatively as part of the evaluation. With regard to increasing the employability of Jordanian and Syrian workers (component 2), the projects fall short of the expected target. Although most of the interviews confirmed that the training courses and training programmes offered had been completed (indicator 2.1), these primarily served to provide employees with the knowledge they immediately needed to carry out the CfW work. This did not lead to an improvement in employability beyond the CfW measures taken. This was largely due to the institutions involved in the projects, i.e. BMZ, KfW and ILO, prioritising the creation of as many employment opportunities as possible, i.e. a focus on component 1, as well as external factors that cannot be influenced. Ultimately, additional unintended positive consequences were achieved in the areas of fair working conditions and female employment. Despite most of the indicators for components 1 and 2 being achieved, the projects are only rated as moderately successful overall due to the shortcomings in terms of achieving the target.

Effectiveness: 3

Efficiency

Production efficiency

The planned distribution of the project funds provided in Phases I and II across the different cost items was achieved, except for the residual funds. The administrative expenses of ILO – amounting to 9.1%, which increased slightly in Phase II (to 10.05%) – are comparable to those of other UN organisations, and therefore appropriate.

Components	Costs/financing in EUR million				
	Phase I (PP 2016)	Phase I (Final inspection 2018)	Phase II (Financing proposal 2017)	Phase II (ad- justed budget)	Phase II (Final in- spection 2020)
Project costs/direct investments					
Component 1	6.31	Not known	6.61	8.22	8.43
Component 2	0.49	Not known	0.7	0.52	0.5
TOTAL	6.8	5.89	7.31	8.74	8.93

Project management					
Staff costs	1.84	Not known	1.29	1.27	1.3
Operating costs (incl. M&E)	0.45	Not known	0.49	0.46	0.28
TOTAL	2.29	1.68	1.78	1.73	1.58
ILO administrative costs					
TOTAL	0.91	0.76	0.91	1.05	1.0
Total costs	10	8.33 (1.67 residual funds at final inspection)	10	11.51 (Carryover of 1.51 from Phase I due to exchange rate fluctuation)	11.51 (later minus the repayment of EUR 64,234.65)

Due to delays, mainly caused by the mandatory JORISS registration, the planned duration of 16 months in Phase I was exceeded by 2 months and in Phase II the original 15 months was exceeded by 11 months. The overrun in Phase I is therefore insignificant. Regarding Phase II, it had not been anticipated that the registration process would extend over such a long period.

Allocation efficiency

The broad and progressive selection of different infrastructure measures, which was made possible via the open programme approach, offered advantages during implementation. At the start of the overall project, various infrastructure programmes, primarily relating to agricultural infrastructure – which included the construction of cisterns and greenhouses, forestry work, terracing and work in nurseries – could be tested in terms of their implementation and the experience gained with regard to their potential for inclusive employment, e.g. the inclusion of women in the various types of work. In return, it was accepted there would be some reductions in labour intensity, which averaged at 58% in Phase II and ranged from 32% in cistern construction to 80% in community works.³⁷ In the evaluation, the fact that the programmes partially focused on employment inclusiveness to the detriment of the labour intensity was assessed as appropriate, as the aim to create a high number of short-term employment opportunities was balanced with the target group focus on vulnerable population groups.

Overall, however, the allocation efficiency of the Phase I and II programmes implemented was considered – at the time of the evaluation – to be in need of some improvement with regard to the project objectives and prioritisation. Although the varying financial allocation of the two components corresponds to the emphasis on short-term CfW programmes under component 1, a slightly higher financial allocation for component 2 would have enabled more extensive training that imparted knowledge beyond that merely required for the CfW programmes. A corresponding reallocation of the funds used may have had the potential to improve the impact of Phases I and II with regard to employability.

Alternatively, while focusing Phase I and II funding exclusively on component 1 would have meant the programmes would achieve a greater degree of coverage, as a larger number of workers could have been employed in the short term and more infrastructure could have been improved, the positive effects in terms of working conditions and raising awareness about employing women may not have been achieved under such an approach.

The presence of the residual funds in Phase I and their utilisation in Phase II also have a negative impact on allocation efficiency, as the direct effects (outcome) of Phase I were reduced³⁸ as a result, thereby implying a misallocation of the available financial funds.

³⁷ Cf. ILO 2020: 34.

³⁸ The infrastructure investment objective in Phase I was not achieved (see Effectiveness).

Summary of the rating

Conclusions on production efficiency can only be derived to a limited extent due to the limited data available and are therefore less important when evaluating efficiency. Overall, however, production efficiency is rated as worthy of improvement due to the implementation delay in Phase II. Due to major compromises in allocation efficiency, which was especially due to the retention of residual funds and the associated misallocation of FC funds, the efficiency of the projects overall is rated as moderately successful.

Efficiency: 3

Impact

Overarching developmental changes (intended)

The impact target adjusted as part of the EPE is: the project contributes to improving the living conditions of the local population in Irbid and Mafrq in the medium term and to strengthening social cohesion between Syrian refugees and host communities.

The achievement of the objective at impact level can be summarised as follows according to the original indicators adjusted as part of the EPE:

Indicator	Target value PA/EPE	Status PA (EIIP I 2016/EIIP II 2017)	Actual value at fi- nal inspection (EIIP I 2018/EIIP II 2020)	Actual value at EPE (2023)
NEW: (1) Number of Syrian refu- gees and Jordanians in Mafrq and Irbid using the improved infrastructure	EPE NEW: Descriptive sur- vey, no quantifi- cation possible	n.a. (due to new indicator)	n.a. (due to new indicator)	Achieved (qualita- tive statement)
NEW: (2) Number of project communities that have maintenance plans for the improved infrastructures and implement them				Partially achieved (qualitative state- ment)
NEW: (3) % of participants in the project’s training pro- grammes who find em- ployment (self-employed or employed) after com- pleting their CfW activity.	60% (taken from original outcome indicator 2.1., see above)			Not achieved (qualitative state- ment)
NEW: (4) Process for issuing work permits is improved	EPE NEW: de- scriptive survey, no quantification possible			Achieved (qualita- tive statement)
(5) The project did not cre- ate or exacerbate any vio- lent conflict				0

In Irbid and Mafrq, parts of the local infrastructure were improved between 2016 and 2019, most of which were publicly accessible (except for cisterns built on private land). Some of these improvements, such as new buildings and tree planting, continue to improve the living environment there. The infrastructures visited during the evaluation are maintained by the competent authorities, with all respondents stressing the limited financial resources available to both local authorities and ministries for maintenance. The employment effects in the project regions were of a short-term nature, as the positive income effects of the CfW measures were limited to the employment period. Despite the training and additional skills gained through the CfW jobs, only a few of the interviewed employees stated that they had found longer-term employment following the CfW programmes. This is in line with the results of the survey of blue-collar workers, which was carried out in 2019 on behalf of ILO, according to which only 28.8% of respondents were in employment after their employment in the EIIP (see also Figure 5). This figure is lower than before employment in the projects. (see ILO/NAMA 2019: 60)




Figure 5: Comparison between pre- and post-EIIP employment (ILO/NAMA 2019: 60)

However, interviewees stated that the bureaucratic context had improved, as it had become easier for Syrians to obtain work permits and they were no longer tied to an employer (the "Kafala" system³⁹). Moreover, there were no violent conflicts in the project regions in the years under review.

With regard to the socio-economic development of the project governorates of Irbid and Mafrq in EIIP I and II, Figure 6 shows that at the time of the evaluation in 2023, unemployment rates fell back to the level prior to 2016, while pressure on the Jordanian labour market remains high. During the implementation period for both phases, unemployment rates in Irbid temporarily fell by 6%, while they increased by approximately 6% in Mafrq.

³⁹ Under the Kafala system, a local citizen, often the employer, takes on a guarantee for the foreign worker, which often makes it difficult or impossible to change jobs. In some cases, human rights violations occur under the Kafala system, which is used in many Arab countries.




Figure 6: Development of Jordan's unemployment rate in relation to the number of Syrian refugees; 2015–2023. Sources: **Labour Force Survey, Second Round 2016, Department of Statistics, Jordan/***International Labour Organisation. "ILO Modelled Estimates and Projections database (ILOEST)" ILOSTAT (5 September 2023)/**** UNHCR Refugee Data Finder (accessed: 14.12.2023). Own data.

Contribution to overarching developmental changes (intended)

The creation and improvement of local infrastructure can be attributed to the projects. Gabions, water channels, terraces and afforestation as well as renovation work in the communities are still visible and functional today. The overarching effects of one-off activities, such as tidying up or planting seedlings in nurseries, cannot be assessed due to their short-term nature.

The contribution of the projects to social cohesion was confirmed by all respondents during the evaluation, with the clean-up work in the local authorities in particular having been positively received by local residents. Former employees revealed that people had left their homes to thank them for their work and to bring them water and tea. The fact that Syrians and Jordanians worked together was highlighted as a positive aspect by most respondents. In particular, the employees themselves said that they had met each other and, in some cases, made friends. However, it should be noted that some of the workers from both population groups already knew each other, as some of the connections across the border between families and acquaintances or for business reasons were already close before the outbreak of the conflict. In some discussions, there was an impression that the joint work between refugees and the local population was less conflict-prone than bringing men and women together through the jointly implemented measures. The latter encountered major resistance at the start of the EIIP (see chapter Relevance).

The projects had little impact on improving living conditions by means of longer-term employment opportunities over and above the short-term salary payments under the CfW component. For example, in the 2019 survey, only 9.3% of Jordanian and 10.3% of Syrian respondents stated that EIIP helped them find follow-up employment (cf. ILO/NAMA 2019: 62). When asked in what form this help had taken place, the majority responded that it came through the relationships they were able to build with other employees. The responses of men and women here differ widely, as can be seen in Figure 7 below.




Figure 7: Information from employees regarding the reasons why EIIP had helped them find follow-up employment (ILO/NAMA 2019: 62)

In the interviews as part of the EPE, women also stated that they had learned new techniques through the projects, for example during their work in nurseries. When asked about follow-up employment, all respondents emphasised, however, that it was difficult for everyone and in general to find work in Irbid and Mafrq – especially when it comes to the formal economy (see chapter Effectiveness).

The broad impact of the projects was demonstrated by the role that ILO played in donor coordination within the Cash for Work group and with regard to the SOP. In addition, ILO advised the Jordanian Ministry of Labour and other stakeholders on workplace and social standards and, by centralising the issuing process, made a decisive contribution to the subject of work permits (see chapter Effectiveness). The fact that ILO was selected as the project-executing agency for the projects and actively fulfilled its role as a standard-setting institution in the field of workplace standards meant that it was possible to achieve added value beyond the activities of the projects.

Contribution to (unintended) overarching developmental changes

The projects made a positive contribution to increasing the acceptance of women's work in public spaces. This is directly related to raising awareness and enforcing the labour standards and conditions in which women can work more effectively, such as providing toilets and protective equipment (gloves, vests and shoes) and organising safe transport to the construction site and then back to the local community. In addition, the personalised bank cards ensured that women could withdraw their salaries independently. They were also able to report the loss of cards and request a new one if they had had to give the card to their husbands, for example. Some of the women surveyed during the EPE stated that caring for young children was a challenge as they could not bring them to the construction sites. ILO stated that it had attempted to set up childcare, but this was not possible due to local legislation.

Summary of the rating

At the level of overarching impacts, there is a mixed picture regarding the contributions of Phases I and II. The projects contributed to strengthening social cohesion by creating meeting spaces, thereby enabling prejudices to be reduced. Furthermore, the joint activities performed by women and men led to the dismantling of stereotypical role models and the empowerment of the women involved in the projects. The improved infrastructure, which is still in place today, had a positive effect on improving living conditions. However, the projects made only a small contribution to improving the employment situation for Jordanian and Syrian workers. This chain of effects does not bring about any medium-term improvements in living conditions, so the projects are assessed as only moderately successful overall despite positive contributions to the overarching developmental impacts.

Impact: 3

Sustainability

Capacities of participants and stakeholders

The capacities of the partner institutions involved in the projects are low, both technically and financially. The state institutions, i.e. local government, the MoA and MWPH, are working to maintain the improved infrastructure. However, according to their information, they lack the financial resources to perform this task on a permanent basis.

Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities

The institutional strengthening of the partner institutions involved in the projects was not a declared objective of the projects and the operational prioritisation was different (see chapter Relevance). The capacity building that took place via the training courses started at an individual level and was not supplemented by a holistic catalogue of measures to accompany organisational and institutional change processes. The training courses organised for employees of state institutions were unable to make any structural changes to the low capacities of the institutions involved. Nevertheless, there were some positive changes, for example in the MPWH, which learned about the advantages of performance-based contracts with construction companies as a result of the projects. It is now examining the extent to which they can continue to use them. In addition, the process for issuing work permits in cooperation with the MoL was improved and local government was made aware of the opportunities offered by CfW.

The expectations concerning long-term effects and sustainability, which were shared by all participants, were not clearly reflected in the design of the projects and were not treated as a priority during implementation. Although these are not traditional emergency or transitional aid projects – given that the Phases have durations of 16 and 26 months respectively – they still follow the logic of providing short-term support in the face of the Syrian crisis as an acute emergency situation.

Durability of impacts over time

Phases I and II laid the foundations for the continuation of the EIIP in subsequent phases. This resulted in various findings with regard to processes and the selection of the programmes that would be implemented in the subsequent phases and up to this day in the current Phase VI (see chapter Relevance). After Phase II, for example, cisterns were no longer built and the construction of hydroculture greenhouses, two of which were built in Phase II, was also no longer pursued. The school component was separated from the EIIP after Phase II and implemented in a separate project by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). In addition, the projects laid the foundation for the employment of women in the CfW programmes in the subsequent phases, which can be assessed as having a significant lasting impact on gender. Ultimately, a contribution was made to the enforcement of workplace and social standards in Jordan – including in the context of short-term employment arrangements and with the involvement of refugees – which can also be assessed as sustainable. Phases I and II thus demonstrate a high level of connectivity.

This is offset by the short-term effects on income and employment, which could only be partially compensated for by the positive effects of the restored or newly built infrastructure, which also improved living conditions in the project regions.

Summary of the rating

Although the introduction of component 2 was associated with the desire to achieve sustainable improvements for the target group with regard to their employability through training and education, this intention was neither reflected in the overall design nor was the project implementation designed to do so. While some of the infrastructure programmes implemented in Phases I and II can be assumed to have a lasting effect (e.g. road repairs, renovation work), it is not possible to establish any sustainability for others (e.g. clean-up work). Despite the existence of risks relating to the durability of the effects, Phases I and II demonstrate a high degree of connectivity, so it seems plausible that the effects will be sustained. Due to the predominantly positive results that are simultaneously accompanied by shortcomings, sustainability is rated as moderately successful overall.

Sustainability: 3

Overall rating

Overall, EIIP Phases I and II are rated as moderately successful.

The relevance of the projects plays a role in the overall evaluation, especially in the selection of programmes given the acute refugee crisis in 2016 and the acute needs of the host communities and target groups. This situation was justified by the fact that several donors including the German TC and FC implemented CfW programmes in a similar manner. ILO's involvement in donor coordination and the definition of rules and standards for CfW are significant contributions that the projects have made to greater coherence in this policy area.

Another key criterion for the overall evaluation is the effectiveness of the projects in terms of improving local infrastructure and providing short-term income. At the overarching developmental impact level, they contributed to strengthening social cohesion in the host communities and had a positive impact on changing role models and empowering women.

On the other hand, the employment effects triggered by the projects are of a short-term nature and their impact on a lasting improvement in living conditions is low.

Contributions to the 2030 Agenda

The projects contributed to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDGs 1, 2, 5, 8 and 16, by focusing on the creation of income (reducing poverty and reducing hunger) under decent working conditions and by contributing to gender equality and peaceful cooperation.

Universal application, shared responsibility and reporting

The Agenda 2030 principle of shared responsibility was taken into account through the strong alignment of the projects with the priorities of the partner government and numerous other donors. In addition, the projects made a significant contribution to donor coordination and the negotiation of common principles with other donors in the CfW field, which has also facilitated joint accountability.

Interaction between economic, ecological and social development

The projects bring together the economic and social dimensions of sustainable development by recognising that income and economic well-being are linked to social cohesion. For example, the projects had an impact on social aspects, such as reducing the stigma towards refugees and changing gender-specific role models, through their participation in the labour market.

Inclusiveness/leave no one behind

The projects contributed to the participation of women and people with disabilities in the labour market. Prejudices that had particularly prevented women from doing physical work in public spaces were broken down. The inclusion of disadvantaged groups was promoted in the communities.

Project-specific strengths and weaknesses as well as cross-project conclusions and lessons learned

The projects had the following strengths in particular:

- Appropriate identification of the core problem and appropriate selection of programmes to create short-term employment opportunities
- Alignment of projects with the priorities and policies of the Jordanian and German governments and the exploitation of political momentum
- Positive contribution to donor harmonisation and coordinating the content of the CfW programmes
- The capacity of the projects to learn and adapt e.g. with regard to the selection of infrastructure programmes and improving processes for selecting and paying employees

- Positive gender effects, i.e. influence on role models and empowerment of the women involved
- Positive impact on workplace and social standards through ILO as an organisation that sets standards in this area

The weaknesses of the projects include, in particular:

- Unclear definition of the timing for the intended results for component 2
- Inaccurate design with regard to the capacity development effects of the projects
- No analysis or documentation of the claims on sustainability
- The design of the projects does not provide for interventions at policy level that addressed the general job shortage in the governorates of Irbid and Mafrq
- Unclear definition of the impact hypotheses and location of the objectives at the impact levels
- Imprecise handling of indicators with regard to formulations, value allocation and target values
- Inconsistencies in the project documentation

Conclusions and lessons learned:

- The projects were suitable for alleviating the acute emergency in the light of the refugee crisis in the host communities and among target groups.
- Providing opportunities to gain qualifications by way of training programmes is not a sensible way of increasing the employability of target groups when there is a shortage of jobs, the target groups are already well-educated and the informal economy is already well developed.
- Selective training programmes that only take place at an individual level (for individuals and not for organisations and institutions) cannot trigger long-term employment effects.
- Detailed labour market analyses and legal context (concerning work permits, recognition of degrees, completion of interrupted vocational training and courses of study, etc.) are essential decision-making parameters for identifying suitable programmes to improve employment opportunities in the long-term
- Taking over the ongoing administration and maintenance of improved infrastructure by national ministries and authorities in the face of a lack of resources is a challenge that FC projects have no influence over after completion. Right from the design stage, FC projects should therefore factor in targeted institutional capacity building and technical advice on improving organisational structures, as well as the development of innovative use and maintenance concepts to ensure the sustainability of results beyond the end of the project.
- The gender effects of the projects are significant; it has been shown that women's participation in the labour market and whether this is socially accepted largely depends on working conditions such as the provision of protective clothing, transportation to and from the workplace and complaint mechanisms.

Evaluation approach and methods

Methodology of the ex-post evaluation

The ex-post evaluation follows the methodology of a rapid appraisal, which is a data-supported qualitative contribution analysis and constitutes an expert judgement. This approach ascribes impacts to the project through plausibility considerations which are based on a careful analysis of documents, data, facts and impressions. This also includes – when possible – the use of digital data sources and the use of modern technologies (e.g. satellite data, online surveys, geocoding). The reasons for any contradicting information are investigated and attempts are made to clarify such issues and base the evaluation on statements that can be confirmed by several sources of information wherever possible (triangulation).

Documents:

BMZ (2017), German employment initiative “Partnership for Prospects (P4P)”, Methodology note on job definition and monitoring.

BMZ (2023), Cash for work. The Partnership for Prospects for the Middle East, see Cash for Work | BMZ (27.06.2023).

BPB (2016), Bleak prospects: Syrian refugees in Jordan.

DEval (2021), The effectiveness of German development cooperation in conflict-related crises. The Partnership for Prospects for the Middle East.

GIGA (2016), Syrian refugees in Jordan: between protection and marginalisation, in: GIGA Focus Middle East, 3.

ILO (2014), The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the labour market in Jordan: a preliminary analysis.

ILO (2015), Work permits for Syrian refugees in Jordan.

ILO (2018), Decent Work Country Programme 2018-2022.

ILO (2019), Employment through labour-intensive infrastructure in Jordan (information sheet on the project).

ILO/NAMA (2019), Workers Survey – Phase II, employment through labour-intensive infrastructure in Jordan, analytical report.

ILO (2020), Cluster evaluation of employment-intensive infrastructure programmes (EIIPs) in Jordan and Lebanon.

KfW (2016), German development cooperation with Jordan: Programme proposal Part B, FC module: employment-intensive investment programme for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.

KfW (2017), German development cooperation with Jordan: Funding proposal from the anticipated appraisal for the second phase at over EUR 10 million; employment-intensive investment programme for Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan.

KfW (2018), German development cooperation with Jordan: Final audit: ILO, Jordan, employment-intensive investment programme for Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan (EIIP, Phase I).

KfW (2020), German development cooperation with Jordan: Final audit: ILO, Jordan, employment-intensive investment programme for Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan (EIIP, Phase II).

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (2015), Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016-2018.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2016), The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis, s. [Supporting Syria the Region London 2016 - Jordan Statement.pdf](#) ([publishing.service.gov.uk](#)) (27.06.2023).

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour (2010), The National Labour Market Figures 2008–2010.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour (2016), The National Labour Market Figures 2014–2015.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour (2017), The National Labour Market Figures 2012–2016.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour (2022), The National Labour Market Figures 2017–2021.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour (2023), The National Labour Market Figures 2018–2022.

UNHCR (2016), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015.

UNHCR (2023), Operational Data Portal: Syria Regional Response.

Plus KfW project documentation (reports, notes for returning travellers, emails, etc.)

Data sources and analysis tools:

Minutes/records of interviews conducted

Interview partners:

Executing agency (ILO), KfW, GIZ, sector ministries, local government, employees

The analysis of impacts is based on assumed causal relationships, documented in the results matrix developed during the project appraisal and, if necessary, updated during the ex-post evaluation. The evaluation report sets out arguments as to why the influencing factors in question were identified for the experienced effects and why the project under investigation was likely to make the contribution that it did (contribution analysis). The context of the development measure and its influence on results is taken into account. The conclusions are reported in relation to the availability and quality of the data. An evaluation concept is the frame of reference for the evaluation.

On average, the methods offer a balanced cost-benefit ratio for project evaluations that maintains a balance between the knowledge gained and the evaluation costs, and allows an assessment of the effectiveness of FC projects across all project evaluations. The individual ex post evaluation therefore does not meet the requirements of a scientific assessment in line with a clear causal analysis.

The following aspects limit the evaluation:

- Numerous, small-scale project locations, some of which could no longer be clearly identified
- Difficulty in contacting employees from previous project phases
- Poor availability of reliable statistical data

Methods used to evaluate project success

A six-point scale is used to evaluate the projects according to OECD DAC criteria. The scale is as follows:

- Level 1** very successful: result that clearly exceeds expectations
- Level 2** successful: fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
- Level 3** moderately successful: project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
- Level 4** moderately unsuccessful: significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
- Level 5** unsuccessful: despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
- Level 6** highly unsuccessful: the project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all six individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a “successful” project while rating levels 4-6 denote an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“impact”) and the sustainability are rated at least “moderately successful” (level 3).

List of abbreviations:

GDP	Gross domestic product
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BONO	Partnership for Prospects for the Middle East
CfW	Cash for Work
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEval	German Evaluation Institute for Development Cooperation
DWCP	Decent Work Country Programme
EIIP	Employment-Intensive Investment Programme
EPE	Ex-post evaluation
EUR	Euro
DC	Development cooperation
FiVo	Financing proposal
FC	Financial cooperation
FC E	FC evaluation
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HDI	Human Development Index
ILO	International Labour Organization
JORISS	Jordan Response Information System for the Syria Crisis
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoL	Ministry of Labour
MPWH	Ministry of Public Works and Housing
NAMA	NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA	Project appraisal
PAR	Project appraisal report
PP	Programme proposal
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TC	Technical cooperation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	US dollar

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List of annexes

Annex 1: Target system and indicators

Annex 2: Risk analysis

Annex 3: Advantages and disadvantages of various infrastructure measures

Annex 4: Evaluation questions in line with the OECD DAC criteria/ Ex-post evaluation matrix

Annex 1: Target system and indicators

Project objective at outcome level		Rating of appropriateness (former and current view)			
During project appraisal: 1. Improvement of rural infrastructure using labour-intensive methods. 2. Improvement of employability and access to the labour market for Syrian refugees and Jordanians.		EIIP I+II are part of the German Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East (BONO) and reflect its objectives – both at outcome and impact level. Nevertheless, the two outcome objectives of the phases refer to the direct results of the project activities and could therefore also be perceived as outputs. Similarly, the outcome indicators largely measure the implementation of activities. However, since this is a cash for work (CfW) programme that was primarily intended to achieve short-term effects, the project objectives and their indicators were and remain appropriate. For the ex-post evaluation (EPE), the two desired changes described in the dual objective of the module (improved infrastructure and improved access to the labour market) are combined in a single module objective. The EPE focuses on the employability of the target group, as this is understood to be a direct result of the CfW measures and the associated on-the-job training; this corresponds to the impact level on which the module objective of the two phases is based. The target levels of the indicators were adjusted in several cases during the project. For this reason, if different information on the target levels is available, the EPE is based on the information from the two final inspection reports.			
During EPE (if target modified) In Irbid and Mafrq, the infrastructure has improved and the employability of Syrian refugees and Jordanians has increased.					
Indicator	Rating of appropriateness (for example, regarding impact level, accuracy of fit, target level, smart criteria)	Target level PA / EPE (new)	PA status (PP I: 2016) (FV II:2017)	Status at final inspection (I: 2018) (II: 2019)	Status at EPE (2023)
Indicator 1.1 (programme appraisal (PA)) Number of working days created	The indicator measures the implementation of labour-intensive employment measures. The indicator's target levels were adjusted several times across the two phases.	I: 125,000 II: 224,000 = 349,000 50%-50% Jordani-ans-refugees 10% women	I+II: 0	I: 137,106 II: 285,969 (49% Syrians; 17% women) = 423,075	Achieved, no new actual value

Indicator 1.2 (PA) % of employees who benefit from occupational health and safety	Indicator refers to the employees who participate in the project's work activities. It measures the quality of the short-term jobs offered by the project, which seems particularly appropriate.	80%	I+II: 0	I: 89% II: 88.5%	Achieved, no new actual value
Indicator 1.3 (PA) Number of jobs created by the project	Indicator measures the jobs created by the project's work activities, which is appropriate. Since 07/2017, the definition according to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development applies (min. 40 days in employment).	I: 4,150 II: 3,600	I+II: 0	I: 4,638 II: 4,552 (of which 3,067 meet the BMZ definition)	Achieved, although not all jobs comply with the BMZ definition introduced in 2017; no new actual value
Indicator 1.4 (PA) Amount of funds invested in infrastructure measures	Indicator is appropriate.	I: EUR 6.4 million II: EUR 8,686	I+II: 0	I: EUR 5.9 million II: EUR 8.93 million.	Achieved in Phase II, not achieved in Phase I; no new actual value
Indicator 2.1 (PA) % of Syrian beneficiaries who participated in the project's training measures find work and receive a work permit (new EPE indicator for employment at impact level (see below))	Indicator refers to Syrian refugees who participated in the training courses; however, it is not clearly determined whether short-term employment is meant as part of the work programmes or whether the indicator refers to long-term employment. Since its purpose is to measure outcome objective 2 (employability), it is assumed for the EPE that the indicator refers to long-term employment beyond the project programmes. The target group of the project as a whole (refugees and Jordanians) is also included in the indicator for the EPE. The new indicator is included at impact level (see below).	60%			
Indicator 2.1 (EPE) NEW % of participants in the project's training measures (Syrian refugees and Jordanians) who completed the courses	In line with the logic of the project's outcome indicators, a new indicator has been formulated for the EPE. This maps the project's activities to improve employability (outcome target).	65% (target value is based on that of output indicator 2.2. as a mean value of Phases I and II)	n/a	n/a	No value as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) did not provide corresponding figures

Project objective at impact level		Rating of appropriateness (former and current view)			
During project appraisal: Syrian refugees and Jordanians have better living conditions due to increased access to employment opportunities and improved infrastructure		The impact objective is very broad and difficult to measure. In contrast to the outcome objectives, which are directly related to the project's activities, the interdependencies at impact level are less specific. Two of the original impact indicators measure the benefits of the outcomes (improved access to infrastructure and benefits of increased income); one measures the prevention of social conflicts. The intention to position the improvement in living conditions as a broader effect of the project at impact level is appropriate – both during the project and now. The impact objective is adapted for the EPE in such a way that it maps the project's contribution to peace and security in the sense of the dual objective derived from peace and security marker, FS1.			
During EPE (if target modified): In the medium term, the project contributes to improving the living conditions of the local population in Irbid and Mafraq and to strengthening social cohesion between Syrian refugees and host communities.					
Indicator	Rating of appropriateness (for example, regarding impact level, accuracy of fit, target level, smart criteria)	Target level PA / EPE (new)	PA status (PP I: 2016) (FV II:2017)	Status at final inspection (I: 2018) (II: 2019)	Status at EPE (2023)
Indicator 1 (PA) Number of Syrian refugees and Jordanians benefiting from improved access to infrastructure and services	In order for the impact indicators to start at the same impact level, the existing indicator will be reformulated as part of the EPE so that it targets the use of the improved infrastructure. A second indicator focusing on the maintenance of the improved infrastructure has also been added. This is intended to bridge the gap between the module objective of the phases (sub-aspect of improved infrastructure) and the impact objective (sub-aspect of improved living conditions).				
Indicator 1 (EPE) REFORMULATED Number of Syrian refugees and Jordanians in Mafraq and Irbid using the improved infrastructure		EPE NEW: qualitative survey, no quantification possible	n/a	n/a	Achieved

Indicator 2 (EPE) NEW Number of project communities that have maintenance plans for the improved infrastructure and that implement them		EPE NEW: qualitative survey, no quantification possible	n/a	n/a	Partially achieved
Indicator 3 (PA) Number of Syrian refugees and Jordanians benefiting from increased income	The indicator measures how many more individuals/family members benefit from the increased income that the individual worker receives through the CfW programmes. Beyond this projection, its information content is limited, which is why it is being replaced by an indicator that focuses on long-term employment (and thus higher income in the longer term) in the EPE. For this purpose, outcome indicator 2.1. has been reformulated and added here as indicator 3 (see above).				
Indicator 3 (EPE) NEW % of participants in the project training programmes who find employment (self-employed or employed) after completing their CfW activity.	If no corresponding surveys are available, the indicator in the EPE can only be determined through interviews or individual examples and its value estimated accordingly.	60% (of the original outcome indicator 2.1. adopted, see above)	n/a	n/a	Not achieved
Indicator 4 (EPE) NEW Process for issuing work permits has improved	If no corresponding surveys are available, the indicator in the EPE can only be collected through interviews or individual examples. There is an output indicator (2.1.), which is based on the work permit process. However, no data is available for this.	EPE NEW: descriptive survey, no quantification possible	n/a	n/a	Achieved
Indicator 5 (PA) The project did not create or exacerbate any violent conflict	For the EPE, the indicator can only be determined by assessing the parties involved.	EPE NEW: descriptive survey	0	0	Achieved

Annex 2: Risk analysis

Ex-ante risk (project proposal)	Ex-post risk (at EPE)	Relevant OECD-DAC criterion
Destabilisation due to social, economic and political crises Risk: not specified Influenceability: low	There were no social, economic or political crises; the project had a positive impact on social cohesion. Risk: low Influenceability: low	Impact (see report p. 17)
Uncertainty about the Ministry of Labour's commitment to issuing work permits for Syrian refugees Risk: medium Influenceability: low	Protracted process for issuing work permits slowed down project implementation until improvements were made through the establishment of the Labour Office in 2020. ILO advised on this process. Risk: medium Influenceability: high	Relevance (see report, p. 4)
Insufficient interest from construction companies in terms of using labour-intensive methods Risk: medium Influenceability: medium	Construction companies were trained in the importance and implementation of labour-intensive infrastructure measures. No indication that companies had no interest in using employment-intensive methods. Risk: low Influenceability: medium	Relevance (see report p. 6)
Lack of willingness of construction companies to employ Syrian refugees Risk: low Influenceability: not specified	Risk must be considered in a differentiated manner: construction companies had to be made more aware of the need to employ women and people with disabilities in the public sector. Risk: low (generally in relation to Syrian refugees), but medium in relation to women and people with disabilities Influenceability: medium	Relevance (see report p. 5)
Overall rating: Risk: medium Influenceability: medium	Overall rating: Risk: low Influenceability: medium	

Annex 3: Advantages and disadvantages of various infrastructure measures

Project type	Advantages	Disadvantages
Repair and maintenance of roads (with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH))	- Very employment-intensive - High visibility created acceptance - Opportunity to integrate women and unskilled workers (e.g. in cleaning streets) - Concepts for employment-intensive work and the PBC have been introduced in the MPWH	- Low sustainability, especially for cleaning-related work
Cistern construction and terracing (with Ministry of Agriculture (MoA))	- Alignment with national programme to support local farmers (with MoA) - Support for local economy	- Public investment in private land ownership - Difficult to monitor the selection of farmers - Difficult to pump water from the cisterns (farmers do not have pumps)
Hydroculture greenhouses (with National Center for Agricultural Research/MoA)	- Provides local farmers with new technology (through the research station) - Work suitable for women - Greenhouses can be used for different purposes (not just hydroculture)	- Technology requires a high initial investment and is therefore difficult for local farmers to replicate
Plant nurseries	- Plant nurseries can significantly increase their production - Work suitable for women - Employees learned techniques that they could apply to their own households or when starting their own business	- Transportation (because plant nurseries are situated outside the communities)
Community works	- High visibility and immediate benefit for the local population generated high acceptance	- Local authority had little capacity to continue projects after the EIIP ended

Annex 4: Evaluation questions in line with OECD-DAC criteria/ex post evaluation matrix

Relevance

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / o / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Policy and priority focus			1	o	
Are the objectives of the programme aligned with the (global, regional and country-specific) policies and priorities, in particular those of the (development policy) partners involved and affected and the BMZ?	Are the objectives of EIIP I+II aligned with the policies and priorities of the Jordanian government and BMZ?	Interviews with ministries and local authorities; KfW and ILO			
Do the objectives of the programme take into account the relevant political and institutional framework conditions (e.g. legislation, administrative capacity, actual power structures (including those related to ethnicity, gender, etc.))?	Do the objectives of EIIP I+II take into account the framework conditions and capacities of the ministries and local authorities involved?	Interviews with ministries and local authorities; KfW and ILO Data for issuing work permits (data from MoL)			
Evaluation dimension: Focus on needs and capacities of participants and stakeholders			2	o	
Are the programme objectives focused on the developmental needs and capacities of the target group? Was the core problem identified correctly?	What are the developmental needs and capacities of Syrian refugees and the resident population in Mafraq and Irbid? Are the objectives of EIIP I+II aligned with this? Was the core problem identified correctly?	Interviews with ministries and local authorities; KfW and ILO; employees Data on unemployment, employment in the informal economy and poverty in Irbid and Mafraq (ILO and MoL data)			

Were the needs and capacities of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group taken into account (possible differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)? How was the target group selected?	Which criteria were used for the selection of employees? Were the criteria appropriate? Is the choice of quotas (men/women, Syrians and Jordanians) made for the project appropriate? Why was the quota for people with disabilities dropped in Phase II?	Interviews with ministries and local authorities; KfW and ILO; employees			
Would the programme (from an ex post perspective) have had other significant gender impact potentials if the concept had been designed differently? (FC-E-specific question)	To what extent could EIIP I+II have been even more focused on women's needs? Could more women have been involved?	Interviews with ministries and local authorities; KfW and ILO; employees			
Evaluation dimension: Appropriateness of design			3	+	
Was the design of the programme appropriate and realistic (technically, organisationally and financially) and in principle suitable for contributing to solving the core problem?	Was the design of EIIP I+II suitable to help solve the core problem? To what extent are the components suitable for achieving the intended short-term and medium-term objectives of the phases? What criteria and priorities were used for the geographical and technical selection of the infrastructure projects? To what extent were participatory approaches used in the selection of infrastructure projects? Was the selection appropriate, i.e. aligned with the partner's priorities and useful for achieving the project objectives? To what extent was the selection of cooperation partners and course content in the training programmes appropriate?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; ministries and local authorities			
Is the programme design sufficiently precise and plausible (transparency	Are the target system of EIIP I+II and the underlying impact assumptions clear and reasonable? Is the target system	Interviews with ILO and KfW; ministries and local authorities			

and verifiability of the target system and the underlying impact assumptions)?	verifiable? Have target values and indicators been set/selected in a transparent manner? (Evaluate causal structure)	DEval evaluation of Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East (DEval 2021) ILO cluster evaluation (including Phase II) (ILO 2020)
Please describe the results chain, incl. complementary measures, if necessary in the form of a graphical representation. Is this plausible? As well as specifying the original and, if necessary, adjusted target system, taking into account the impact levels (outcome and impact). The (adjusted) target system can also be displayed graphically. (FC-E-specific question)	Addressed in the previous question	
To what extent is the design of the programme based on a holistic approach to sustainable development (interplay of the social, environmental and economic dimensions of sustainability)?	To what extent could greater attention have been paid to longer-term effects in the project design? What were the expectations for improving employability (component 2) with regard to longer-term employment? What were the expectations for the continued maintenance and longer-term use of the infrastructure items? (Located under CfW or CfW+?)	Interviews with ILO and KfW; ministries and local authorities
For projects within the scope of DC programmes: is the programme, based on its design, suitable for achieving the objectives of the DC programme? To what extent is the impact level of the FC module meaningfully linked to the DC programme (e.g. outcome impact or output outcome)? (FC-E-specific question)	Omitted	Projects are not part of a DC programme; the question concerning interaction between the impact levels is answered at the top in the question about impact logic
Other evaluation question 1	To what extent was the BMZ methodology and decision to set a threshold of 40 days for CfW jobs appropriate? What are	Interviews with ILO and KfW; ministries and local authorities

	the advantages and disadvantages of this approach?				
Evaluation dimension: Response to changes/adaptability			2	0	
Has the programme been adapted in the course of its implementation due to changed framework conditions (risks and potential)?	Were any potential improvements identified within the scope of Phase I included in the design of Phase II?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; ministries and local authorities			
Other evaluation question 1	Were potential improvements arising from Phases I and II implemented in the subsequent phases? Were any changes made to the design of the project due to the ongoing development of the Middle East employment campaign (as suggested in the DEval evaluation)?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; ministries and local authorities (Information on implementation in subsequent phases via interviews only, as an additional study of the subsequent phases would go beyond the scope of the EPE)			

Coherence

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Internal coherence (division of tasks and synergies within German development cooperation):			3	–	There was a need for numerous, similarly designed CfW programmes.
To what extent is the programme designed in a complementary and collaborative manner within the German development cooperation (e.g. integration into DC programme, country/sector strategy)?	To what extent were EIIP I+II designed and implemented in a way that complements TC projects?	Interviews with KfW and GIZ; ILO			

Do the instruments of the German development cooperation dovetail in a conceptually meaningful way, and are synergies put to use?	To what extent were EIIP I+II designed and implemented so that they complemented other FC projects in the same or neighbouring sectors (employment, education, governance, etc.)?	Interviews with KfW and GIZ			
Is the programme consistent with international norms and standards to which the German development cooperation is committed (e.g. human rights, Paris Climate Agreement, etc.)?	How was the role of ILO – as the international organisation responsible for standard-setting in the area of labour law – used within EIIP I+II, both in terms of its conception and its implementation?	Interviews with KfW and GIZ; ILO			
Evaluation dimension: External coherence (complementarity and coordination with actors external to German DC):			2	0	
To what extent does the programme complement and support the partner's own efforts (subsidiarity principle)?	Which measures has the Jordanian government taken to integrate Syrian refugees into the labour market? How far do EIIP I+II complement and support the Jordanian government's own efforts?	Interviews with ministries and local authorities; KfW and ILO			
Is the design of the programme and its implementation coordinated with the activities of other donors?	To what extent was there coordination with other donors in the CfW sector, for example with regard to the level of pay for employees?	Interviews with KfW and GIZ; ILO			
Was the programme designed to use the existing systems and structures (of partners/other donors/international organisations) for the implementation of its activities and to what extent are these used?	To what extent were existing systems used to select employees (registration) and to pay them (banking systems)? To what extent were Jordanian authorities involved in the design and implementation of the training measures?	Interviews with KfW and GIZ; ILO; ministries and local authorities			

Are common systems (of partners/other donors/international organisations) used for monitoring/evaluation, learning and accountability?	Are common systems (of partners/other donors/international organisations) used for monitoring/evaluation, learning and accountability?	Interviews with KfW and GIZ; ILO; ministries and local authorities
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Effectiveness

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / o / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Achievement of (intended) targets			3	o	
Were the (if necessary, adjusted) objectives of the programme (incl. capacity development measures) achieved? Table of indicators: Comparison of actual/target	--	Indicator table For new indicator: % of participants (Syrian refugees and Jordanians) in the project training measures who successfully complete the courses Data from ILO: lists of training participants, drop-off rate, number of participants receiving certification; differentiation according to refugees/Jordanians, men/women (this data was not provided)			
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to achieving targets			3	+	
To what extent were the outputs of the programme delivered as planned (or adapted to new developments)? (Learning/help question)	To what extent were the output indicators achieved?	Indicator table Interviews with ILO (for enquiries about target values)			

Are the outputs provided and the capacities created used?	To what extent will the infrastructure that was established/upgraded be maintained? To what extent do employees take advantage of their improved employability and obtain long-term jobs? To what extent have the process for issuing work permits and the general framework conditions been improved?	These questions are addressed by the outcome indicator, as this is a CfW project that primarily seeks to bring about short-term effects (see above).
To what extent is equal access to the outputs provided and the capacities created guaranteed (e.g. non-discriminatory, physically accessible, financially affordable, qualitatively, socially and culturally acceptable)?	Do all populations have equal access to the improved public infrastructure?	Interviews with local authorities
To what extent did the programme contribute to achieving the objectives?		This is not a question at outcome level, as outcome objectives are direct results of the project.
To what extent did the programme contribute to achieving the objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?		This question is not relevant for the EPE, as the objectives already align with the intended beneficiaries (refugees/resident Jordanians).
Did the programme contribute to the achievement of objectives at the level of the particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups involved and affected (potential differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)?	To what extent did particularly vulnerable members of the target group (e.g. socioeconomically disadvantaged members of the resident population) benefit from EIIP I+II? Cf. also the selection of employees	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries
Were there interventions specifically addressing gender impact potential (e.g., through women's participation in project committees, water committees,	In addition to the minimum quota of women in the CfW projects (10%), were there other measures in EIIP I+II that specifically addressed women?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries

use of social workers for women, etc.)? (FC-E-specific question)				
Which project-internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Which internal project factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for achieving or not achieving the intended objectives of EIIP I+II?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries		
Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended objectives of the programme (also taking into account the risks anticipated beforehand)? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Which external factors were decisive for achieving or not achieving the intended objectives of EIIP I+II (also taking into account the risks anticipated in advance)?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries		
Evaluation dimension: Quality of implementation			2	0
How is the quality of the management and implementation of the programme (e.g. executing agency, consultant, taking into account ethnicity and gender in decision-making committees) evaluated with regard to the achievement of objectives?	What important governance mechanisms were implemented by ILO? What contribution have these governance mechanisms made towards achieving the targets?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries		
How is the quality of the management, implementation and participation in the programme by the partners/sponsors evaluated?	In what form did partners participate in overseeing EIIP I+II and its implementation? What contribution has this made towards achieving the targets?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries		
Were gender results and relevant risks in/through the project (gender-based violence, e.g. in the context of infrastructure or empowerment projects) regularly monitored or otherwise taken into account during implementation? Have	Was the participation of women in EIIP I+II qualitatively monitored (beyond the fulfilment of the quota)?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries		

corresponding measures (e.g. as part of a CM) been implemented in a timely manner? (FC-E-specific question)					
Evaluation dimension: Unintended consequences (positive or negative)			2	0	
Can unintended positive/negative direct impacts (social, economic, ecological and, where applicable, those affecting vulnerable groups) be seen (or are they foreseeable)?	Are any unintended direct positive/negative consequences identifiable or foreseeable? Did employees complain about their working conditions? How were such complaints handled? Did EIIP I+II lead to market distortions, i.e. were wages appropriate, did employees reject other job offers in order to participate in EIIP I+II, and how were the construction companies selected?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries; employees			
What potential/risks arise from the positive/negative unintended effects and how should they be evaluated?	If so, what potential/risks arise from these unintended consequences?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries; employees			
How did the programme respond to the potential/risks of the positive/negative unintended effects?	If so, how did EIIP I+II respond to this potential/these risks?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries; employees			

Efficiency

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Production efficiency			3	–	No input/output relation possible
How are the inputs (financial and material resources) of the programme distributed (e.g. by instruments, sectors,	How are the project funds distributed among the components and	Programme proposal (PP), financing proposal (FiVo) and final inspection (FI) reports			

sub-measures, also taking into account the cost contributions of the partners/executing agency/other participants and affected parties, etc.)? (Learning and help question)	management costs? Has the planned distribution been implemented?			
To what extent were the inputs of the programme used sparingly in relation to the outputs produced (products, capital goods and services) (if possible in a comparison with data from other evaluations of a region, sector, etc.)? For example, comparison of specific costs.		Given the different measures and the two lines of action under EIIP I+II, the inputs and outputs cannot be directly linked. The DEval evaluation of the Partnership for Prospects in the Middle East (BONO) likewise does not make a comprehensive assessment of the efficiency criterion (DEval 2021: 126).		
If necessary, as a complementary perspective: To what extent could the outputs of the programme have been increased by an alternative use of inputs (if possible in a comparison with data from other evaluations of a region, sector, etc.)?		Alternatively, other infrastructure projects could have been selected. The question on the appropriateness of the selection is stated above.		
Were the outputs produced on time and within the planned period?	To what extent did EIIP I+II adhere to their planned schedule and why were there delays?	Interviews with KfW and ILO		
Were the coordination and management costs reasonable (e.g. implementation consultant's cost component)? (FC-E-specific question)	Were the costs of project management and the ILO administrative costs (ILO standard costs) reasonable?	Interviews with KfW and ILO		
Evaluation dimension: Allocation efficiency			3	0
In what other ways and at what costs could the effects achieved (outcome/impact) have been attained? (Learning/help question)	Did the selection of infrastructure projects and training programmes actually take place as planned? To what extent could other infrastructure and course	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries; employees		

	content have been chosen to achieve the project objectives?	
To what extent could the effects achieved have been attained in a more cost-effective manner, compared with an alternatively designed programme?	To what extent could the project objectives have been achieved by investing less in infrastructure and training programmes?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries; employees
If necessary, as a complementary perspective: To what extent could the positive effects have been increased with the resources available, compared to an alternatively designed programme?	Would it have been possible to increase the positive effects even further with the same investment, such as through accompanying measures that do not incur any additional costs?	Interviews with ILO and KfW; local authorities and ministries; employees

Impact

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Overarching developmental changes (intended)			3	0	
Is it possible to identify overarching developmental changes to which the programme should contribute? (Or if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time.)	What changes occurred in Irbid and Mafrq between 2016 and 2019 in terms of the living conditions there? What changes have occurred in the years since then?	Interviews with members of local authorities and employees			
Is it possible to identify overarching developmental changes (social, economic, environmental and their interactions) at the level of the intended beneficiaries? (Or if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)	How did the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Irbid and Mafrq develop between 2016 and 2019? What changes have occurred in the years since then?	Interviews with members of local authorities and employees			

To what extent can overarching developmental changes be identified at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group to which the programme should contribute? (Or, if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)	To what extent did the living conditions of socioeconomically disadvantaged members of the population in Irbid and Mafrq change between 2016 and 2019? What changes have occurred in the years since then?	Interviews with members of local authorities and employees			
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to overarching developmental changes (intended)			3	0	
To what extent did the programme actually contribute to the identified or foreseeable overarching developmental changes (also taking into account the political stability) to which the programme should contribute?	What contribution did EIIP I+II make towards improving living conditions in Irbid and Mafrq and strengthening social cohesion among Syrian refugees and host communities?	Interviews with members of local authorities and employees			
To what extent did the programme achieve its intended (possibly adjusted) developmental objectives? In other words, are the project impacts sufficiently tangible not only at outcome level, but at impact level? (e.g. drinking water supply/health effects)	If the impact objective (see above) – namely the maintenance of the (public) infrastructure by the local authorities – were to be achieved, could the CfW employees find subsequent employment and was the process for issuing work permits for Syrian refugees improved? Has social cohesion in the communities been improved?	Interviews with members of local authorities and employees			
Did the programme contribute to achieving its (possibly adjusted) developmental objectives at the level of the intended beneficiaries?		Question not applicable as the impact objective is already assigned to the level of the intended beneficiaries.			
Has the programme contributed to overarching developmental changes or changes in life situations at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable parts of the target group (potential	To what extent have EIIP I+II improved the living conditions of particularly socioeconomically disadvantaged members of the population and women in Irbid and Mafrq?	Interviews with members of local authorities and employees			

differentiation according to age, income, gender, ethnicity, etc.) to which the programme was intended to contribute?				
Which project-internal factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended developmental objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Which internal project factors (technical, organisational or financial) were decisive for achieving or not achieving the impact objective?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ILO and KfW		
Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the intended developmental objectives of the programme? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Which external factors were decisive for the achievement or non-achievement of the impact objective of the programme?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ILO and KfW		
Does the project have a broad-based impact? - To what extent has the programme led to structural or institutional changes (e.g. in organisations, systems and regulations)? (Structure formation) - Was the programme exemplary and/or broadly effective and is it reproducible? (Model character)	What structural or institutional changes were instigated through EIIP I+II? What aspects/lessons learned from EIIP I+II were incorporated into other CfW programmes or otherwise replicated? To what extent did the implementation of the EIIP follow-up phases have a broad impact?	Interviews with ministries and local authorities; employees; ILO and KfW; GIZ		
How would the development have gone without the programme? (<i>Learning and help question</i>)				
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to (unintended) overarching developmental changes			2	0

To what extent can unintended overarching developmental changes (also taking into account political stability) be identified (or, if foreseeable, please be as specific as possible in terms of time)?	To what extent can overarching unintended developmental changes be identified?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ILO and KfW
Did the programme noticeably or foreseeably contribute to unintended (positive and/or negative) overarching developmental impacts?	What contribution did EIIP I+II make to these changes?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ILO and KfW
Did the programme noticeably (or foreseeably) contribute to unintended (positive or negative) overarching developmental changes at the level of particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable groups (within or outside the target group) (do no harm, e.g. no strengthening of inequality (gender/ethnicity))?	To what extent did EIIP I+II contribute to unintended changes at the level of particularly vulnerable groups, e.g. women within the target group?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ILO and KfW

Sustainability

Evaluation question	Specification of the question for the present project	Data source (or rationale if the question is not relevant/applicable)	Rating	Weighting (- / 0 / +)	Reason for weighting
Evaluation dimension: Capacities of participants and stakeholders					Not relevant for evaluation purposes, as the projects have no influence on the capacities of the parties involved or those affected
Are the target group, executing agencies and partners institutionally, personally and financially able and willing	Are the local authorities able and willing to maintain the public infrastructure improved through EIIP I+II? Can the	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ministries; ILO and KfW			

(ownership) to maintain the positive effects of the programme over time (after the end of the promotion)?	employees use the experience gained through EIIP I+II to find long-term employment? What experiences/measures from EIIP I+II can the participating ministries use to improve the situation of Syrian refugees? To what extent are construction companies prepared to employ Syrian refugees?				
To what extent do the target group, executing agencies and partners demonstrate resilience to future risks that could jeopardise the impact of the programme?		This question will not be addressed because, due to the risks identified in the project proposal (PP), the questions here are the same as stated under the sub-question above.			
Evaluation dimension: Contribution to supporting sustainable capacities:			3	0	
Did the programme contribute to the target group, executing agencies and partners being institutionally, personally and financially able and willing (ownership) to maintain the positive effects of the programme over time and, where necessary, to curb negative effects?	How did EIIP I+II contribute to changing attitudes and increasing capacity among local authorities, employees, ministries and construction companies?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ministries; ILO and KfW			
Did the programme contribute to strengthening the resilience of the target group, executing agencies and partners to risks that could jeopardise the effects of the programme?		This question will not be addressed because, due to the risks identified in the project proposal (PP), the questions here are the same as stated under the sub-question above.			
Did the programme contribute to strengthening the resilience of particularly disadvantaged groups to risks that could jeopardise the effects of the programme?		Question not applicable, as the project's entire target group is a vulnerable group.			

Evaluation dimension: Durability of impacts over time			3	0	
How stable is the context of the programme (e.g. social justice, economic performance, political stability, environmental balance)? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	What changes (political, economic, ecological) could occur that would affect the living conditions in Irbid and Mafrq? How likely are they to occur?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ministries; ILO and KfW			
To what extent is the durability of the positive effects of the programme influenced by the context? (<i>Learning/help question</i>)	Could this jeopardise the improvements made through EIIP I+II?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ministries; ILO and KfW			
To what extent are the positive and, where applicable, the negative effects of the programme likely to be long-lasting?	To what extent did EIIP I+II lead to lasting improvements in the living conditions in Irbid and Mafrq? Did EIIP I+II cause a deterioration of living conditions in Irbid and Mafrq that could also be long-lasting?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ministries; ILO and KfW			
To what extent can the gender results of the intervention be considered permanent (ownership, capacities, etc.)? (Question specific to FC Evaluation Department)	To what extent did EIIP I+II lead to a lasting improvement in the situation of women in Irbid and Mafrq?	Interviews with local authorities and employees; ministries; ILO and KfW			