

Ex post evaluation – Yemen

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Sector: Basic nutrition (51%, CRS code: 12240) and Food aid / Food security programmes (49%, CRS code: 52010)
Project: Basic nutrition / maternal and infant health III (BMZ no. 2014 68 446*)
Implementing agency: World Food Programme (WFP)



Ex post evaluation report: 2020

All figures in USD million	Project A (Planned)	Project A (Actual)
Investment costs (total)	29.74**	29.74
Counterpart contribution	0.00	0.00
Funding	29.74	29.74
of which BMZ budget funds	29.74***	29.74

*) Random sample 2019, **) The budgeted costs for the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200636 were USD 511.80 million, there is no data available regarding the final actual costs, ***) EUR 24 million.

Summary: The FC measure co-financed components of the WFP’s transitional assistance programme “Protracted Relief and Recovery” (PRRO 200636). In addition to specific food assistance, preventive nutritional supplement rations for toddlers, and curative special rations for pregnant and breastfeeding women and children under 5 suffering from malnutrition, the measure also co-financed an emergency system for distributing basic foodstuffs and a proportion of the implementation costs for the overall WFP programme.

In 2015, the safety situation in Yemen deteriorated to such an extent that the PRRO, originally designed as a transitional assistance programme, was suspended. PRRO 200636 was initially frozen in October 2015 with the initiation of the programme measures under EMOP 200890 until it was shut down completely on 31 December 2015. With the security situation intensifying there was an unplanned fund reallocation of EUR 0.4 million, which could not be directly allocated to the co-financed programme measures.


Development objectives: The programmes’ developmental goal was to help alleviate the worst effects of the food crisis (impact). The module goal was to contribute to improvements to the target group’s nutritional situation over the short term (outcome).

Target group: Pregnant and breastfeeding women, babies and toddlers (aged 6–23 months) and children under the age of 5 in the governorates affected by food shortages.

Overall rating: 3

Rationale: Due to its urgent nature, the project had limited sustainability expectations (emergency procedure in response to natural disasters, crises and conflicts in accordance with point 47 of the FC and TC guidelines). The project had a high relevance rating in the urgent humanitarian situation. Despite the earmarking of FC funds, the WFP had sufficient flexibility to apply the most urgently needed measures thanks to the swift reallocation measures. However, the politically optimistic appraisal of the security situation led to initial allocation inefficiencies in the WFP programme design, which was structured with a heavy focus on resilience instead of urgency. While the effects of the nutritional components failed to meet expectations in terms of prevention and treatment of malnutrition, it is plausible that the distribution of basic foodstuffs contributed to stabilising the nutritional situation.

Highlights: The swift provision of the co-financing by KfW, which took just 4 months, and thus the high priority given to the urgency were worth highlighting. The WFP’s flexible programme design also enabled the quick reprioritisation of the transitional assistance measures in favour of urgent relief measures.



Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 3

Ratings:

Relevance	3
Effectiveness	3
Efficiency	2
Impact	3
Sustainability	3


General conditions and classification of the FC measure

The FC measure co-financed the following components of the WFP's Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 200636): (1) Nutritional components in the form of specific food assistance: Allocation of special complete rations to children under 5 with moderate and acute malnutrition and to pregnant and breastfeeding women. The specific food assistance included both preventive measures for babies and toddlers under the age of 2, as well as curative measures for children under 5 with moderate and acute malnutrition and pregnant and breastfeeding women. (2) Urgent food relief via an emergency system: Distribution of basic foodstuffs to households that were heavily affected by food insecurity. (3) Implementation costs: Based on a short-term reallocation of funds, pro rata costs for the collection of data for project monitoring were financed, as well as the costs for the nationwide "food survey".

To factor in the urgent relief character of the programmes, the five DAC criteria were expanded on the basis of the assessment framework used in the joint evaluation by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) "German Humanitarian Aid Abroad" (2011). The criterion of relevance was expanded to include appropriateness, the criterion of effectiveness was widened to include an assessment of coverage, and the criterion of sustainability was assessed in terms of connectivity in longer-term development measures.

Yemen is characterised by chronic poverty, population growth rates are high, and the country's economic situation has continued to deteriorate over recent years. The agricultural sector is no longer able to sustain the population, meaning that currently 90 % of food has to be imported. In 2012, 45 % of the population did not have a secure supply of food; in 2014, this figure was 41 % before rising as high as 54 % in December 2016 and even 69 % in December 2019. In the Food Security Index, Yemen ranked in 83rd place out of 105 countries in 2012, 100th place out of 113 countries in 2016 and 111th out of 113 countries in 2019. Yemen is an exceptionally fragile country, which was impacted by the escalation of a domestic conflict into full civil war over the course of the programme period. In March 2015, a Saudi Arabian-led military alliance joined pro-government troops in an attempt to take down the Huthi rebels in the north of the country. The situation has yet to be resolved. The FC measure focuses on improving the population's nutritional situation in the period from December 2014 to September 2015 and was not geared towards dealing with the conflict or promoting peace. The "do-no-harm" principle was taken into account when distributing food and the weak state structures were involved in the project's implementation wherever possible. Food was distributed both in the Huthi-rebel-dominated governorates in the north of the country and in the southern regions ruled by Yemen's transitional government. However, the majority of beneficiaries reached by the food allocation were in the northern areas (see Project-specific visualisation of food allocation).

Project-specific visualisation of food allocation at governorate level – Food allocation in relation to food security at governorate level



Source reference of the map: GADM [Online]. Available at: https://gadm.org/download_country_v3.html
 Source reference IPC: Yemen: IPC Analysis - Summary of Findings, Indicative Acute Food Insecurity Current Situation Overview | June - August 2015 (FAO).
 Source reference of food distribution data: WFP (2015) Narrative Report to KfW on Protracted Relief & Recovery Operation (PRRO 200636).
 *Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

Relevance

Securing a sufficient supply of food for the Yemeni population has been a problem for many years¹ and is the result of multiple factors. In addition to the high market risks resulting from the heavy reliance on imports at a rate of 90 %, Yemen suffers primarily from its poor climatic and geographical conditions. The country's food situation is exacerbated by limited space for agriculture (which still manages to take up a large part of the restricted water supply), low levels of rainfall and ever-shrinking water resources coupled with high population growth. Furthermore, the civil war that has consumed Yemen on and off since 2011 is causing an ongoing rise in food prices and regular holes in the supply chain. This in turn has led to a sharp increase in the number of Yemenis living in extreme poverty and suffering from hunger. In response to the country's humanitarian crisis, the Yemeni government prioritised the expansion of humanitarian aid for at-risk population groups as part of the transitional programme for stabilisation and development, which was supported by the international community. Furthermore, back in 2011 it developed a national strategy for food supply security, which included a plan of action for reducing the insecurity of the food supply and malnutrition among children. In view of this context, the German Federal Government's response to the ongoing food crisis in the form of its FC co-financing was adequate. However, the design of the overall WFP programme had a limited adverse impact on the relevance assessment. Due to a tendency towards political de-escalation, which emerged in Yemen between 2012 and 2013, and given the resulting opening-up of new areas for the food assistance measure, the WFP designed PRRO as a programme with a strong focus on resilience². However, these activities were completely suspended in favour of urgent relief measures following the heightening of the political situation during the course of the project. The decision to implement food assistance as transitional development and structural assistance³ appears questionable in view of the safety-critical problems that were already emerging in Yemen in 2014 and leads to the conclusion that the political situation was misjudged at the time. Prioritising an urgent relief measure from the outset could have enabled the members of the population most affected by the crisis to be reached more quickly and effectively. Nevertheless, the highly flexible framework that formed the basis of the programme design enabled the WFP to quickly suspend the resilience-promoting measures during the course of the project in favour of urgent relief measures to respond to specific needs. This is rated as positive.

The selection of the WFP as the direct implementing agency was plausible as it is the leading humanitarian organization working in Yemen and therefore had experience in providing nutritional support and already had structures in place too. It was also involved in the programme's direct predecessor, which was co-financed through FC as well. The lack of strong alternative implementing agencies in Yemen at the time was another important factor, which also appears adequate in retrospect due to the cooperation with the WFP. Thanks to the coordination with the Ministry of Planning, the FC measure was also in line with the national strategy for tackling the food crisis.

The FC funds were earmarked for certain components, target groups and activities under the PRRO. Support for the WFP programme components related to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and repatriates, which were also part of the PRRO, was ruled out for the co-financing. The original earmarking of funds for specific components, target groups and activities in the WFP FC measure posed the risk of funds potentially being misallocated. While PRRO was designed as a programme that not only performed acute activities but also those to strengthen resilience, the link between both activities reflected an unsolvable trade-off at the expense of the acute activities in view of the heightened security situation, and could not be resolved until the resilience-strengthening measures were suspended. The earmarking of some of the FC funds was based on corresponding shortfalls for WFP operations and the German Feder-

¹ Includes the critical energy supply to the Yemeni population at the time of the evaluation.

² With the school meals and cash for assets measures, the PRRO aimed to improve some of the structural problems in the country.

³ As a special financing tool used by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), transitional development assistance (ESÜH) contributes to closing the gap between humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation through the goals of promoting development and building structures. However, to take into account the urgent and short-term need for the measures in the case of the project in question, the handling of the food aid as part of humanitarian aid appears to be more appropriate. Nevertheless, within Germany, humanitarian aid falls within the remit of the Federal Foreign Office and is not a financing tool used by the BMZ.

al Government's political priorities related to its commitment to mother and child health care (Muskoka initiative), which it made at the G8 Summit in Huntsville, Canada, in 2010.

The WFP worked with six non-governmental organisations⁴, including local structures such as Charity for Social Solidarity and Welfare (local non-governmental organisation (NGO)) and decentralised health facilities to implement the programme. With regard to the involvement of local structures, the implementation concept was generally suitable for addressing the core problem at short notice, taking the underlying conditions into account. However, the existing political risks should have been taken into more consideration in the WFP programme design.

Relevance rating: 3

Effectiveness

For the evaluation, the FC measure's outcome-level project objective was reformulated in view of the short-term nature of the co-financed measures with the WFP, as follows: "To make a short-term contribution to improving the target group's food situation" (outcome).

PRRO 200636 was due to be implemented over 24 months up to June 2016. In fact, the programme was initially frozen in October 2015 with the prioritisation of the urgent relief measures and the assumption of the WFP follow-up programme⁵ until the WFP programme was shut down completely on 31 December 2015. The FC funds were allocated in full for the programme measures under PRRO 200636 until the end of September 2015.

As part of the "specific food assistance" programme component, the FC co-financing enabled 6,724 t⁶ of nutritional supplements to be purchased and provided in order to prevent malnutrition. A total of 572,500 beneficiaries were due to be reached with these supplements. Due to weak data, it is not possible to conduct a target-actual comparison for the components financed exclusively by the FC measure. For this reason, the FC measure can only be evaluated on the basis of plausibility appraisals derived from the level of the programme components. In total, the specific food assistance in the overall WFP programme was due to reach 1,713,000 beneficiaries in the project's two-year term⁷. However, reaching an actual number of 512,393 people, less than one third of the beneficiaries were reached with the programme measure and the target group remained far below expectations.⁸ To guarantee the seamless provision of food, the food deliveries to the health centres, which served as the food distribution points, included reserves for three months wherever possible. However, many of the selected health centres were closed or inoperative due to the heightened security situation, meaning that food could only be distributed to a limited extent. Also, beneficiaries began to increasingly avoid the distribution points as they were exposed to an increased safety risk while waiting for food to be distributed. An interruption to the supply chain related to the procurement of nutritional supplements also led to the success of treatment for children under 5 being heavily impacted during the course of the project. It therefore appears equally plausible that the actual figures fell a long way short of the planning figures formulated for target groups under the FC co-financing. Given the growing escalation of the security situation during the course of the project the general results are put into perspective, and the failure to reach planning figures is comprehensible, meaning that this does not have a negative impact on the effectiveness rating. Geographically linking the specific food assistance to existing health centres was intended to present an opportunity for the distribution of food to be combined with health measures. In reality, in the case of the worsened security situation, this structure prevented the target groups from being reached in a needs-based manner, which in turn impaired the coverage rate of the specific food allocation and also could not be balanced out by the insufficient use of mobile clinics. While the WFP endeavoured at the end of the project term to increase the flexibility of the

⁴ PU-AMI, Charity of Social Solidarity and Welfare (CSSW), Islamic Relief Yemen, Vision Hope International, IMC and Save the Children

⁵ EMOP 200890 (Emergency Food Assistance to the Food-Insecure and Conflict Affected People in Yemen)

⁶ Due to the volume of the PRRO, the plausibility of the use of the FC co-financing funds can only be assessed on the basis of the unit price per tonne of food plus distribution and administration costs.

⁷ Some of this information was counted twice, meaning that the reaching of the target group cannot be interpreted in relation to the total population.

⁸ This information relates to our own calculations, which were conducted based on data regarding the reaching of the target group provided by the WFP in its 2014 and 2015 Standard Report.

distribution mode for the nutritional components by linking the specific distribution of food to the general allocation of urgent food relief, this concept was not implemented by the time the FC co-financing was completed. This had a limiting impact on the effectiveness and is regarded as negative.

As part of the FC co-financing of urgent relief components, an additional 21,531 t of food (wheat and vegetable oil) were made available to a total of around 4 million beneficiaries, including 1.95 million women and 761,947 children, during the period from April to August 2015. As a result, significantly more people benefited from the urgent relief measures than originally intended as part of the school meals and safety net components⁹. Due to the re-allocation of funds from the school meals and safety net components, which were earmarked for food expenditure and cash transfers, to unearmarked urgent relief measures under the urgent relief system during the course of the project, it is no longer possible to conduct a target-actual comparison. As a result of the poor availability of food, the planned distribution of food as part of the urgent relief system was restricted to half rations in some cases. In addition to logistical problems, the urgent food relief measure suffered primarily from the evacuation of United Nations staff between March and May 2015 for safety reasons. As such, the goal of ensuring short-term food security was only achieved to a limited extent by the urgent relief system.

To support the management capacities of four initiatives in local institutions, EUR 0.4 million was due to be made available from the co-financing to the WFP programme. Due to the nationwide conflict, however, this was not possible and, instead, the funds were used to finance pro rata implementation costs that could not be directly allocated to the project, such as regular data surveys for monitoring the programme and the nationwide “food survey”. Both measures formed an important foundation for planning future investments and for evaluating WFP operations, so the re-allocation of funds appears appropriate from today’s perspective.

It is worth noting that the WFP worked mainly with Yemeni partners at the time of the PRRO co-financing, which meant that the WFP completed up to 80 % of the programme implementation using local NGOs. One particularly positive aspect worth highlighting is that, despite the evacuation of international NGOs in early 2015 as a result of the safety level, the programme was still implemented and food was still distributed to a minimal extent in regions that had been cut off by the conflict; this was achieved using local structures instead.

Since the German contribution only co-financed individual components of the overall programme, the impact of the FC share cannot be measured separately, but instead is based on plausibility considerations derived from the programme as a whole¹⁰. In terms of target achievement, the effectiveness indicators give a mixed impression. The contribution made by the specific allocation of food to improving the nutritional situation of babies, children and pregnant and breastfeeding mothers is unclear. At 69.6 %, the recovery rate of children under 5 suffering from acute malnutrition was only marginally below the anticipated target of over 75 %. By contrast, at 29.1 %, the drop-out rate for children under 5 suffering from acute malnutrition used to measure the lack of success caused by early withdrawal was significantly higher than the target of less than 15 % and is actually even worse than the value of 14.9 % measured at the start of the programme measures. While the rate of treatment success improved in comparison to the very below-average interim value of 42 % measured in December 2014, the WFP states that this is due to a data collection error and could possibly be attributed to the introduction of the specific food assistance measures, which were not launched until January 2015. However, the fluctuating values also reveal the difficulties in evaluating target achievement for short-term urgent relief measures in a volatile environment and give reason to assume that the WFP was only able to stabilise the nutritional situation to a limited extent. According to the WFP, other possible reasons for the below-average drop-out rate measured at the end of the project included the dysfunctionality of many health stations due to the safety situation. With regard to the final effectiveness indicator, the effectiveness of the components is revealed in more detail: the aver-

⁹ The goal of the school meals and safety net components was to reach 1.74 million beneficiaries. As part of the urgent relief system’s urgent food relief measure, food was generally distributed without being earmarked, which achieved a higher coverage of the target group.

¹⁰ The periods used to measure the effectiveness indicators in the WFP programme are not identical to the FC measure’s project term. The baseline values for the programme-level effectiveness indicators used during the evaluation were recorded in December 2013 and therefore correspond to the last available values before the PRRO programme measures were launched in July 2014. However, the FC funds were not available to the WFP programmes until December 2014. They were implemented throughout the course of the year 2015.

age diversity and quality of the food consumed (including in relation to its nutritional value) significantly exceeded the target value of at least 3 with a diet diversity score of 6.¹¹

Negative effects, such as distorted market prices caused by the purchase of food, cannot be ruled out. In some cases, 60 % of the food required was purchased in Yemen, which means that a possible drop in the target group’s purchasing power caused by an increase in demand for food (but with the same level of supply) is feasible. However, purchasing food locally not only promoted the Yemeni domestic market, but, above all, allowed for short procurement times, which are critical to the success of humanitarian crises and are therefore deemed to be appropriate. To ensure a constant humanitarian pipeline of food, potential deficits in local purchasing sources were supplemented by regional and international procurement. In some cases, transport losses and the expiry of food use-by dates limited the quality and availability of food but were always balanced out by the responsible cooperation partners like local suppliers.

The achievement of the project objectives, which were adjusted for the purposes of the evaluation, can be summarised as follows for the FC measure:

Indicator	Status PA ¹² , target PA	Ex post evaluation
(1) Treatment success measured by recovery rate (moderate acute malnutrition (MAM))	Status PA: 57.8 %, target: > 75 %	69.6 %; Not achieved
(2) Treatment success measured by failure rate (moderate acute malnutrition (MAM))	Status PA: 14.9 %, target: < 15 %	29.1 %; Not achieved
(3) Food diversity measured by the diet diversity score	Target value: at least 3	6; Achieved

The values specified under the project appraisal correspond to the data recorded by the WFP in December 2013 as part of its monitoring activities. The data for the ex post evaluation corresponds to WFP monitoring data from December 2015. See also the PRRO Standard Project Report 2015.

Based on the information available, the FC measure’s target achievement remained below expectations. A limited yet positive contribution is plausible, particularly when considering the consistent deterioration of the situation during the term of the project and, in particular, from March 2015. During the FC measure’s implementation period, the WFP continuously adapted its output to the changing requirements and options available, for example, by distributing urgent food relief at short notice when the safety situation severely deteriorated in early 2015. In certain aspects, the nutritional situation in areas addressed by the WFP could be stabilised. In view of these circumstances, the effectiveness is assessed as satisfactory.

Effectiveness rating: 3

Efficiency

The FC measure’s cost structure is assessed as satisfactory overall based on the ever-deteriorating situation. At the time of the FC measure, there were no alternative organisations that could logistically have dealt with similar volumes of funds in terms of covering acute food requirements in far-reaching crises. Moreover, establishing our own structures would have taken much more time and not have been as effi-

¹¹ The information about the data relates to all of the effectiveness indicators reported by the WFP. See also: WFP Standard Project Report 2015 PRRO, Outcomes section.

¹² The baseline values specified in the table do not originate from the FC measure’s project appraisal but, in the case of the first two indicators, are taken from data recorded by the WFP in December 2013. The third indicator has no baseline value because new targets were formulated for the diet diversity score as a result of the suspension of school meals and safety net components in favour of urgent relief measures. These diet diversity score targets were not foreseen in the project design, either at the time of the programme appraisal or at the time of the project appraisal, but were used as a basis for the evaluation from today’s perspective. In general, a comparison with a project-related baseline for the FC measure is not possible because the only figures available are comparative data recorded from WFP’s annual “Post Distribution Monitoring”. The effectiveness indicators are therefore not evaluated at project level but only at WFP programme level.

cient. Overall, around 82 % of the German contribution could be used for food and cash support, including the associated transport and provision costs. The remaining funds were used for the contribution to administration (indirect project costs) and WFP's project-related costs in the country¹³. From the target group's perspective, the cost efficiency of the various forms of transfer depends heavily on the situation in the local markets. Due to the acute security situation, general food distribution was given preference over alternative cash transfers, which was more cost-efficient in the acute situation in Yemen due to the very poor access to markets, very high food prices and volatile exchange rates. This approach is regarded as appropriate, even from today's perspective.

The reduction of procurement times is critical to the success of effective crisis response. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development issued special approval for the FC measure, enabling the WFP programme measures to be financed in advance and thus ensuring the time-critical procurement of food. Short procurement times were also ensured by procuring the majority (60 %) of the food from local sources. Due to the safety situation, local food procurement was briefly suspended but then resumed again due to the logistical advantages. As such, from the current perspective the WFP is regarded as having responded with appropriate flexibility to the changing national context and used its scope for action to employ alternative measures. One positive element worth noting is that the WFP set up emergency reserves using its own global goods management system to guarantee the uninterrupted distribution of food. Food supplies to last three months were stored in the distribution centres so that enough special rations and nutritional supplements could be distributed as part of the nutritional components. Despite a sufficient volume of food reserves, the acute safety situation in Yemen and the resulting destruction and unavailability of many distribution centres in some areas meant that the food supply could not be safeguarded to an appropriate level. There were also additional plans for some supplement rations for toddlers to be produced locally in order to minimise procurement times and costs, strengthen the self-sufficient supply of special rations and promote the local domestic market. However, the safety situation in Yemen meant that these measures could not be implemented either and therefore impacted the efficiency of the programme measures.

The failure to use mobile teams, which would have allowed for the more decentralised distribution of food, proved to be detrimental to the allocation efficiency. As a result of the logistically challenging situation, it was not possible to reach all beneficiaries through the intact distribution centres as was needed. However, one positive element to be highlighted is that sufficient quantities of special rations were distributed to pregnant and breastfeeding women as part of the targeted distribution of food. This took into account the subsequent redistribution of food within households and thus ensured the targeted distribution of food to the actual target group. However, the earmarking of some of the FC co-financing funds for certain components, regions and target groups presented a risk of FC funds being misallocated (also see Relevance). Nevertheless, the high degree of flexibility in the WFP programme enabled this risk to be minimised by allowing it to respond quickly to the changing overall context through the reprioritisation of transitional support measures in favour of urgent relief measures. The time-efficient approach, in particular, is worth highlighting here. As early as April 2015, just two months after the conflict began to escalate in March 2015, food started to be distributed by the urgent relief system. Under the aspect of time efficiency, one especially positive element to mention is the quick contractual processing and provision of the FC co-financing and the resulting high level of priority given to the urgency of the FC measure. The PRRO implementation began in July 2014, and by September 2014 KfW had received the appraisal order as part of the expedited process, which means that all of the co-financing was disbursed to the WFP within less than 6 months, in December 2014.

WFP's reports on the progress of the co-financed programme measures were always submitted on time, which means that transaction costs within KfW's project monitoring activities corresponded to an appropriate amount of work. The WFP employed a cluster to coordinate donors so that the financing contributions could be organised systematically and efficiently.

Based on the knowledge available both at the time and at present, the measures applied were the only option available. Due to the volatile safety situation, some of the programme's activities designed to increase efficiency (mobile teams, local production) could not be implemented. Owing to the swift imple-

¹³ The indirect project costs corresponded to 6.5 % and the project-related costs to around 11 % of the FC co-financing provided. The project-related costs cover administrative expenses for WFP's international and local implementation partners.

mentation of the contract and the quick adjustment of the programme measures to the acute safety situation, the FC measure is given a rating of good for the criterion of efficiency.

Efficiency rating: 2

Impact

The FC measure’s objective set out for this EPE (outcome level) was primarily geared towards a short-term improvement of the nutritional situation. The urgent food relief measures were expected to contribute at impact level to alleviating the worst effects of the food crisis (impact).

The proportion of the population with an insecure food supply was defined as an indicator for measuring the impact of the FC measure¹⁴. The Global Food Insecurity Index, which is published annually on behalf of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), serves as the database for this indicator. However, the FC funds for the WFP programme were available from December 2014 but they could not be implemented until October 2015. A comparison with a project-related baseline is therefore impossible, but plausibility assumptions can be derived for the FC measure using data from the WFP programme level. Despite the application of the programme measures, the Food Security Index Value indicates a deterioration in the proportion of the Yemeni population with an insecure food supply. With an index value of 35.2 in 2014, Yemen ranked 90th out of 109 countries and was therefore classed as one of the countries with relatively high food insecurity. In 2016, the index value fell by 1.2 points to 34, meaning that food insecurity had increased even by relative comparison (100th place out of 113).

A similar impression is given by the bi-annual Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) published on behalf of the UN OCHA. While the proportion of the population with an insecure supply of food was still just 41 % when the FC co-financing began in December 2014, this figure had risen to 50 % of the population as early as June 2015. In November 2015, the percentage of the Yemeni population reliant on food assistance had risen again to 55.6 %. In total, the FC measure reached around 4 million beneficiaries, which is equivalent to roughly 15 % of the population at the time. Since some of the beneficiaries were counted twice, it must be assumed that the actual number of people reached by the distribution of food is a lot lower than 15 % and that the measures were thus only able to reach a small proportion of the Yemenis classed as having an insecure food supply¹⁵.

The evaluation of the project’s impact-level objective is to be understood with consideration of the attribution gap between the WFP programme measures and the actual proportion of the population with an insecure food supply. From today’s perspective, the exact extent to which the WFP activities reduced the proportion of the population with an insecure food supply and which other stakeholders had an equivalent effect on this indicator are not clear. Consequently, the following indicator is to be interpreted solely as a proxy indicator.

The achievement of the objective at impact level can be summarised as follows:

Proxy indicator	Status PA, target PA	Ex post evaluation
(1) Treatment success measured by food insecurity based on the Food Security Index ¹⁶ .	Status 2014: 35.2 Target: < 35.2	Status 2016: 34.0 Not achieved

1) The data in the table corresponds to information from the UN’s Humanitarian Needs Overviews 2015 and 2016.

Particularly when considering the nationwide deterioration of the situation, it is plausible that the provision of food contributed to the short-term alleviation of the worst effects of the food crisis at the time at an individual level for recipients in the target regions. It is also plausible that this measure helped to improve the humanitarian situation. The impact is therefore rated as satisfactory in light of the acute security situation.

¹⁴ Due to the poor database, the impact indicator applied for earlier evaluations (reduction in the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5) has not been used.

¹⁵ In 2014, the population of Yemen was recorded as 25.82 million people.

¹⁶ The index is made up of the following categories: affordability, availability and quality of food; these are measured both collectively and individually on a scale from 0 to 100. The best possible result is 100.

The FC measure was also part of a DC programme, the aim of which was to improve the health situation of women and children in Yemen. As such, the DC programme was designed to make a direct contribution to the following Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): 2 (hunger), and 3 (health), while also contributing indirectly to SDG 4 (education) and SDG 5 (gender equality). In view of the short-term nature of the WFP programme components co-financed by FC, the task of breaking down the cycle of cross-generational chronic hunger and directly and indirectly contributing to the SDGs appears too ambitious. Over the medium term, the measures may contribute to alleviating the worst effects of the food crisis and also to ensuring economic and social stability.

Impact rating: 3

Sustainability

Due to the FC measure being characterised by the provision of urgent relief (Emergency procedure for natural catastrophes, crises and conflicts in accordance with item 47 in the FC-TC Guidelines), it had limited sustainability requirements.

Originally, the WFP's PRRO programme measures took the approach of transitional structural assistance, the aim of which was to ensure a link between urgent relief and longer term development cooperation over the short to medium term. However, the resilience-promoting measures under the planned school meals and safety net components were suspended¹⁷ in order to prioritise urgent relief measures in line with the acute safety situation.

The cash transfers planned as part of the suspended programme components (some of which were implemented) had the potential to enable the beneficiaries to improve their nutritional situation over the long term. This also applies equally to the resilience-promoting food-for-assets components. However, neither the cash-for-food measures nor the food-for-assets components were co-financed by the FC measure and their implementation only took place on a limited basis in the second half of 2014. The distribution of food was supplemented by information campaigns at health centres in order to encourage the target group to participate in local programmes related to social affairs, health and education.

Initially the FC measure was designed to co-finance special initiatives too with the aim of improving WFP programmes in future and reinforcing sustainability. Amongst other things, this plan included examining options for producing special foods in Yemen, which could have led to local production later on, as well as looking at options for improving monitoring through mobile and remote data transmission systems. Due to the worsening of the safety situation though, these activities could not be carried out.

Under the PRRO, the WFP focused on Yemeni partnerships (NGOs and government) in order to reach areas that were inaccessible to international stakeholders. From today's perspective, this approach reinforced the capacity of national structures and also created future points of reference for food distribution supported by local partners, which enabled the issue of nutrition to be embedded further here.

A better connectivity of the measures was difficult due to factors such as the safety situation and the fact that scarce resources were prioritised for distributing urgent food relief. Furthermore, the structurally difficult context of Yemen, which is marked not only by the acute safety situation but primarily by the country's reliance on imports, makes it more difficult to establish sustainable supply structures. Taking these limitations into account, the expectations for the sustainability evaluation were lower.

Sustainability therefore corresponded to the expectations for urgent relief measures.

Sustainability rating: 3

¹⁷ The programme measures from the safety net component were still implemented to a limited extent during 2014 before being fully suspended in 2015.

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

Level 1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
Level 2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
Level 3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
Level 4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
Level 5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
Level 6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).