

Ex post evaluation – Ethiopia

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Sector: Emergency food aid (72040)

Programme/Project: (1) Food security measures I (BMZ No. 2008 66 244), (2) Food security measures II (BMZ No. 2009 67 307*), (3) Refugee operation and support in humanitarian crisis situation and strengthening resilience to food insecurity (BMZ No. 2011 66 610*), (4) Support in humanitarian crisis situation and strengthening resilience to food insecurity I (BMZ No. 2012 67 160*), (5) Support in humanitarian crisis situation and strengthening resilience to food insecurity II (BMZ No. 2013 67 168*)

Implementing agency: World Food Programme (WFP)



Ex post evaluation report: 2016

		Planned (2008-2015)	Actual (2008-2015)
Investment costs (total)	USD million	3,660.55**	2,308.36***
Counterpart contribution (WFP)	USD million	0.00	0.00
Funding (all donors)	USD million	2,356.76****	2,308.36****
of which BMZ budget funds	USD million	97.97*****	97.97*****

*) Project in the 2016 random sample;

**) Approved planned figures of the WFP for the three co-financed WFP operations 2008-2015;

***) Cumulative figures of the three co-financed WFP operations 2008-2015;

****) Donor figures for the co-financed WFP operations 2008-2015;

*****) Co-financing 2009-2014, USD figures of the WFP.

Summary: In response to calls for emergency help from international aid organisations and the Ethiopian government to overcome food crises triggered by the droughts and crop failures in 2008, 2011 and 2013 as well as by price hikes on food markets, the five FC projects from 2009 to 2014 supported three WFP operations (total volume: USD 2.3 billion) with FC grants of EUR 73.27 million (USD 97.97 million). The components of the operations comprised general food aid, targeted supply of malnourished individuals with fortified foods, support of those suffering from HIV/AIDS, school meals for girls in refugee camps, basic services for beneficiaries of the social security system and Food for Asset measures (food in exchange for work in constructing infrastructure).


Objectives: The development policy objective was to “Help alleviate the worst effects of this and future food crises”, while the programme objective was the “Short-term improvement in the nutritional status of the target group and strengthening their resilience to future food crises”.

Target group: The target group comprised people that were hungry and in need, in regions particularly affected by repeated droughts and therefore crop failures, those particularly at risk (children under five years old, pregnant and breastfeeding women, HIV/AIDS sufferers) and refugees in Ethiopian refugee camps.

Overall rating: 3 (all projects)

Rationale: As part of numerous operations and components, the WFP made a noticeable contribution in Ethiopia to improving the nutritional situation of the target group. Despite persistent challenges in the already protracted, complex food crisis in Ethiopia, there was a clear orientation on the part of the WFP and government institutions towards measures to strengthen resilience, which was successful with the target group to some extent.

Highlights: The social security system supported by the WFP, which implemented a range of structure-building measures, secured access to food for poor population groups and simultaneously addressed the structural causes of food insecurity through investments in rural infrastructure and agricultural activities. According to the 2015 “State of Food Insecurity in the World” report by the FAO, WFP and IFAD, this is considered a success story in combating malnutrition during prolonged crises.



Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 3

Classification of the project

The ex post evaluation (EPE) considers the benefits and effects of the components of WFP operations co-financed by FC in the programme years 2008-2014. The five FC projects essentially co-financed two consecutive WFP operations, supplemented by a parallel WFP operation, and are therefore evaluated together. An isolated consideration of the effects of the co-financing for each year of the funding and for each different component is not made. Uniform objectives were subsequently formulated for the FC project.

The co-financing was represented as follows:

- “Food security measures I” (EUR 7 million) and “Food security measures II” (EUR 8 million): earmarked co-financing of the emergency food aid component to ensure the provision of general basic services for people in need and refugees (“relief component”) of the then ongoing WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 10655.0) in the years 2009-2011.
- “Refugee operation and support in humanitarian crisis situation” (EUR 14.75 million): additional commitment of EUR 10.25 million in late 2011 due to food insecurity which had become acute and, in some cases, chronic, in order to support the three components of the PRRO 10655.0 (relief component), targeted supply of the malnourished population with fortified foods (Targeted Supplementary Feeding, TSF component) and support of those suffering from HIV/AIDS¹. Additional support for all components (general food aid for refugees, targeted supply of malnourished refugees and school meals for girls in refugee camps) of the parallel WFP refugee operation PRRO 10127.3 (2011 to March 2012) in the amount of EUR 4.5 million.
- “Support in humanitarian crisis situation and strengthening resilience to food insecurity in Ethiopia I” (EUR 24 million) and “Support in humanitarian crisis situation and strengthening resilience to food insecurity in Ethiopia II” (EUR 19.25 million): co-financing of all three components of the WFP successor operation PRRO 20029.0 (relief component, targeted supply of the malnourished population with fortified foods, seasonal basic services for beneficiaries of the social security system (Productive Safety Net, PSNP component) and – as part of the PSNP component – Food for Asset (FFA) measures) in 2013 and two components of the PRRO 20029.0 in 2014.²

In order to reflect the “emergency” nature of the aid, the five DAC criteria were expanded to include selected aspects that are used as independent evaluation criteria to assess humanitarian aid operations. In compliance with the evaluation framework for the joint evaluation of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the German Federal Foreign Office, “German Humanitarian Aid Abroad” (2011), the relevance criterion was expanded to include appropriateness, and the effectiveness criterion to include consideration of the coverage rate. Sustainability was evaluated in terms of the integrability of longer-term development-orientated measures.

Overall context

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in East Africa is bordered by Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti. Measured in terms of its population of around 99 million people (2015), Ethiopia is one of the most populous countries in sub-Saharan Africa and, with a land area of 1.1 million

¹ Thanks to food bonds and prefinancing mechanisms, it was possible to implement the FC funds promised in late 2011 that same year. Cash outflows in 2012 served to refinance and replenish the reserves.

² In the 2013 programme year of the PRRO 20029.0, due to financial gaps the TSF component was once again funded from FC funds, although the Federal Government had prioritised the funding of relief and PSNP components. This type of prioritisation can be found initially as “soft” earmarking in the 2012 project proposal and replaced the exclusive funding of certain components (such as 2008 and 2009 in favour of the relief component). The WFP was thus able to respond flexibly to acute financial gaps in components.

km², is the largest landlocked country in the world. In 2015, population growth in the country was at 2.5%. In the same year, Ethiopia's gross domestic product was around USD 61.5 billion (current USD). Despite high growth rates in recent years, the gross national income for 2015 was a low USD 590 per capita (Atlas method, current USD), making Ethiopia one of the countries with low incomes. In 2010, nearly 30% of the population were living below the national poverty line, and in 2015 the country's Human Development Index rating was 0.442 (rank 174), which put Ethiopia below average in terms of countries with a low stage of development.³

With a share of 41% of GDP, Ethiopia's economy is traditionally dominated by agriculture, with 85% of workers employed in this area. The share of industrial production (16%), however, has risen sharply in recent years due to government investment as part of the growth and transformation programme. Some 36% of the country's land area is used for agriculture purposes. The agricultural areas are characterised by tropical climates and strong topographical differences between the densely populated highlands and the Great Rift Valley. Agricultural productivity is low as a result of the traditional methods of cultivation and recurrent droughts, nevertheless remarkable progress in the agricultural sector has contributed to the high growth rates in Ethiopia (which have been consistently above 8% since 2006). Erratic rainfall, land degradation and desertification threaten the economic base of broad segments of the population however, and so Ethiopia remains susceptible to food crises due to the high population density, widespread poverty and unemployment, dysfunctional markets and limited access to social and health services.

All measures of the WFP operations under consideration were targeted towards persons in need living in food insecure areas or in refugee camps and suffering acute food insecurity. The identification and prioritisation of target regions was carried out continuously on the basis of analyses conducted by the Ethiopian government; the needs assessment was carried out in coordination with humanitarian organisations. The allocation to needy groups of people was carried out by the executing government agencies in each case on the basis of monthly, specific needs assessments and in accordance with established guidelines and selection criteria. To avoid the risk of misallocation through political interference – which exists in Ethiopia due to low government transparency and insufficient separation of state institutions and the ruling party – close monitoring by an increasing number of WFP Field Monitors as well as the integration of decentralised structures and local target group representatives was carried out.

The distribution of food rations for the relief component was carried out as part of the national food security programme⁴ and, following the supply by the WFP, was initially implemented by the Ethiopian Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA), before being transferred to the responsibility of the Disaster Management and Food Security Sector (DMFSS) in 2009. In the Somali region, owing to a lack of state structures and the security situation, food aid was implemented by the WFP directly via the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). The PSNP component flanked the national social security programme with food aid and was coordinated by the Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB) of the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture; while the logistics were handled by the DPPA or subsequently by the DMFSS, as had also been the case for the relief component. The TSF component supported the implementation of the Enhanced Outreach Strategy of the Ethiopian Ministry of Health with the provision of supplementary foodstuffs for malnourished mothers and children through health units and was implemented in close cooperation with UNICEF.⁵ The TSF component has supported the National Nutrition Programme (NNS) since 2013. The food distribution for the urban HIV/AIDS component was implemented by the Ethiopian HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office (HAPCO) with the help of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The provision of food in refugee camps was carried out by the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and was implemented in coordination with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and with some support from NGOs.

³ World Bank World Development Indicators

⁴ The Ethiopian Food Security Programme (FSP) has existed since 2003 and aims to progressively ensure security of food supply for beneficiaries of the programme.

⁵ While the WFP addresses the prevention and control of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), UNICEF is responsible for the treatment of children suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM).

Relevance

The region around the Horn of Africa has been repeatedly hit by serious food crises in recent decades, which were triggered by persistent or recurrent droughts and civil wars, and made crop and livestock farming difficult. In the years 2008, 2011 and 2013, Ethiopia was affected by recurrent droughts and crop failures, which – along with the price hikes on the food markets in 2008 (52% up on the previous year) and 2011 – led to acute food insecurity among the poor segments of the population. The densely populated highlands of Amhara and Tigray, the Oromia lowlands, parts of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region and the grazing areas of the Somali and Afar regions were particularly food insecure. The Ethiopian people in the regions particularly affected by droughts and flooding were no longer able to ensure the supply of the most essential foodstuffs on their own in the short term. Beneficiaries of the state social security system were also dependent on food aid in the short term due to temporarily reduced food availability and seasonal price increases. Refugees were also dependent on food aid; in particular the “new” refugees coming to Ethiopia in increasing numbers from the drought-affected and crisis-stricken areas of Sudan and Somalia were in very poor nutritional condition.

The Ethiopian government, together with humanitarian organisations, assesses the demand for humanitarian aid each year (and several times a year in crisis situations) – both for general emergency food aid and special care provisions for particularly vulnerable groups.⁶ The demand figures increased from 4.6 million in 2008 to 6.2 million at the end of 2009 as a result of droughts in the Horn of Africa. The demand figures fell continuously from 2010 onwards, reaching 2.5 million in 2013, before increasing again to over 10.0 million in 2016 as the result of another devastating period of drought. The actual proportion of hungry people (i.e. the proportion of the food insecure population whose consumed nutritional energy is not enough to meet their minimum energy requirements) is significantly higher than the government figures on the need for acute emergency food aid: in 2008 the figure was 41% or 34 million people, and in 2014 it was 33% (32 million people). In 2014, chronic malnutrition among children under five years of age remained above the emergency threshold⁷ at 40% (2005: 51%). In the 2008-2014 period, the number of refugees due to droughts and conflicts in the region also rose from around 85,000 to 660,000, which meant that Ethiopia was accommodating the lion's share of refugees in Africa.⁸ As a result of the limited access to land and the labour market, the refugees had hardly any opportunities to make their own living. At the same time, they were faced with poor prospects of return due to the ongoing crises in the region, particularly in the cases of Eritrea and Somalia.

The decisions concerning the FC co-financing of the WFP operations were made on the basis of appeals from the Ethiopian government, in coordination with its international partners, to help alleviate famine and the high demand figures⁹.

Given the continuing problems of widespread hunger and acute malnutrition, food aid was appropriate as an emergency aid measure for the entire period of the FC co-financing. The complementary resilience-promoting approaches were also appropriate due to the increasingly chronic problem situation. The earmarking of funds was carried out on the basis of corresponding financial gaps in the WFP operations and in the political priority setting of the Federal Government in connection with the “Drought Special Commitment 2008-2009” and the ministerial commitment for the Horn of Africa in August 2011. Since 2012, there has been a conceptual association between emergency food aid and the ongoing DC programme for sustainable land management. Ensuring food security through sustainable agriculture remains a priority area of German-Ethiopian development cooperation to this day.

UN programmes are coordinated with the Ethiopian government in principle; the FC co-financing of the WFP operations was implemented in a written agreement between the Federal Government and the Ethiopian government. The measures supported the developmental objectives¹⁰ of the Ethiopian government and the 2010 Growth and Transformation Plan¹¹, and have been coordinated with other donors as part of

6 Reliefweb (<http://reliefweb.int>)

7 WHO Global DB on Child Growth and Malnutrition (<http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/en/>); Emergency threshold: 40%.

8 FAOSTAT (<http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E>)

9 Shown in the Humanitarian Requirement Documents (HRD)

10 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).

11 2011-2015 Growth and Transformation Plan with the aim of becoming a middle-income country by 2025.

the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) since 2012 too. The WFP in Ethiopia has always worked closely with government agencies, accompanied by cooperation with NGOs if necessary.

The provision of funds occurred as a direct contribution to the WFP. The WFP is funded through voluntary contributions and is tasked with securing the food supply in war zones and disaster areas. The WFP was able to provide large quantities of food aid, has in place permanent structures in Ethiopia and also had concluded a framework agreement with the Ethiopian government on activities in the country.

Due to the urgency and the shortened appraisal according to No. 47, a detailed target group analysis and a conflict analysis were omitted from the project proposal. As shown in the project description, however, the execution was designed in a conflict-sensitive way, state agencies were incorporated within the framework of possibilities, and the measures supported state programmes and strategies and were carried out in coordination with other UN institutions. The target groups were chosen in coordination with the humanitarian organisations on the basis of established guidelines and selection criteria and under close monitoring.

During the 2008-2014 implementation period and in light of the increasingly chronic crisis, the WFP worked together with the Ethiopian government and humanitarian organisations to adapt the services to the changing needs and resources, for example, by replacing food supplies with cash payments (cash transfers), by supporting the targeted supply of the malnourished population through increased education and training for the implementing institutions, by ensuring ongoing capacity development within the implementing Ethiopian government institutions and by strengthening disaster risk management.¹² The PSNP component also helped the affected target groups in chronically food insecure areas to survive dry periods by securing basic services and strengthened the coping capacities of the population through establishing rural infrastructures and erosion control measures as part of FFA measures. The implementation concept was therefore generally appropriate for addressing the core problem adequately in the short term under the given framework conditions and taking the risks into account. The aspect of resilience to future food crises played an increasingly important role during the implementation period and was given greater consideration during the course of the programme.

Relevance rating: 2 (all projects)

Effectiveness

At outcome level, the project measures could be expected to result in a short-term improvement in the target group's nutritional status and also to increase the population's resistance in the medium term due to the structural, resilience-promoting activities. In the context of the EPE, the programme objective was thus formulated as follows: "Short-term improvement in the nutritional status of the target group and strengthening their resilience to future food crises". The demand-based distribution of food – taking the calculated rations for affected groups of people into consideration – served as an indicator for the programme objective in all projects. These output indicators were used as auxiliary indicators and, in the context of the EPE, were supplemented by selected outcome indicators that were reported on by the WFP for the respective components.¹³

¹² The following government projects have been supported since 2012: Food Management Improvement Project (FMIP), Livelihoods Early Assessment and Protection Project (LEAP) and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) System.

¹³ There are currently no generally accepted international standards for measuring resilience to future crises. Cf. ODI 2015: A comparative overview of resilience measurement frameworks. Analysing indicators and approaches. The households' coping strategies were used for this purpose.

Indicator	Ex post evaluation
(1) Demand-based distribution of food	<p>Relief component:</p> <p>PRRO 10665.0: 2009: 97% of the plan achieved; 2010: 5.3 million people in need (101% of planned figure); 2011: 3.9 million people in need (111% of planned figure)</p> <p>PRRO 20029.0: 2013: 2.2 million (96% of planned figure) recipients of general food distribution¹⁴ achieved; 2014: 2.5 million people in need (132% of planned figure¹⁵)</p> <p>PSNP component:</p> <p>PRRO 20029.0: 2013: Food provisions for 337,200 workers (FFA); 2014: 308,600 workers; in addition, supply of around 220,000 further people from households that were unable to take part in the FFA measures¹⁶</p> <p>TSF component:</p> <p>PRRO 10665.0: 2011: around 915,000 children under five years old diagnosed as moderately malnourished and pregnant / breastfeeding women (86% of planned figure).</p> <p>PRRO 20029.0: 2013: around 974,000 recipients (89% of planned figure)</p> <p>HIV/AIDS component:</p> <p>PRRO 10665.0: 2011: around 129,000 recipients (79% of planned figure)</p> <p>Refugee component:</p> <p>PRRO 10127.3: 2011: around 281,000 refugees in 14 camps and six host communities achieved, plus an additional approximately 20,300 pregnant and breastfeeding women and around 23,000 children in ten schools; Q1 2012: 300,500 refugees in 17 camps and four host communities; an additional approximately 22,350 pregnant and breastfeeding women and around 128,000 children in 15 schools; 2011 and Q1 2012: around 14,300 malnourished children under five years old.</p>
(2) Improved nutritional status of households as measured by Food Consumption Score (FCS) ¹⁷	<p>PRRO 10665.0: 2009 and 2010: Improvement in the FCS of beneficiaries of the relief component compared to the previous year¹⁸</p> <p>PRRO 20029.0: 2011: 36% acceptable FCS; relief component 2013 and 2014: 70%; PSNP component 2013: 75%</p>

¹⁴ General Food Distribution; this is addressed at recipients of the relief and PSNP component and is not reported on separately

¹⁵ Reduced planning due to the planned transfer of those in need to the PSNP component

¹⁶ A worldwide impact evaluation of the WFP with regard to FFA measures over the 2002-2011 period confirmed adequate effectiveness in achieving short-term food security, while financial gaps of up to 65% within the components were associated with insufficient rations and unreliable provision. (WFP 2014: Impact Evaluation Synthesis; Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food for Assets (2002-2011) and lessons for building livelihoods resilience)

¹⁷ Short-term indicator of food supply at household level (acceptable, borderline, poor) on the basis of household statements on food consumption over the past seven days.

¹⁸ Since both the baseline and the resulting values probably differ because of the different regions provided with assistance from year to year, only the trends common to all WFP annual reports are reported.

(3) Response strategies measured by Coping Strategy Index (CSI) ¹⁹	PRRO 10665.0: Relief component 2008 to 2011: High level between 17.8 (2008 and 2010) and 22.6, or 20.3 in the 2009 and 2011 crisis years PRRO 20029.0: Relief component 2012: 10.6, 2013: 13.2 and 2014: 12.75; PSNP component 2012: 12.1 and 2014: 9.6
(4) Success of the treatment of malnutrition ²⁰	PRRO 10665.0: TSF component 2011: Reduction of the dropout rate of malnourished women and children under five years old by half compared with the starting point, to 1.2% (target level: <15%), mortality rate: 0.5% (<3%), recovery rate: increase from an initial 61.4% to 65.1% in 2011 (>75%); HIV/AIDS component: increase in the recovery rate from 54% to 60% (>75%). PRRO 20029.0: TSF component: Recovery rate 2013: 83.2% and 2014: 93.7%

(1) Demand-based distribution of food:

The rations were in line with the valid guidelines set down by the World Health Organization (WHO) for minimum calorie intake, and with relevant national guidelines, while preferences and special needs of local target groups – particularly vulnerable groups and refugees – were taken into consideration where possible.²¹

Relief component:

- PRRO 10665.0: The WFP aimed to cover around 50% of demand in the country between 2009 and 2011, and achieved this goal. According to the HRD, there were 6.2 million people in need in 2009, 5.2 million in 2010 and 4.5 million in 2011. Since demand increased in 2010 and 2011 due to repeated crop failures and rising prices, even more people in need were provided with food aid than planned. Regional selection took place and the nature, scope and duration of the emergency assistance were determined on the basis of the government's early warning system and seasonal demand studies. The ration for general food aid in 2009 comprised 2,000 kcal per person, per day (from 2010 onwards, this increased to 2,300 kcal per person, per day) and an additional 570 kcal per person, per day for particularly vulnerable household members²². Due to supply shortages caused by the congested Port of Djibouti and limited transport capacities, it was only possible to implement seven of the twelve supply rounds planned for 2009. In addition, those that did take place did so with reduced rations (e.g. only 1,787 kcal per person, per day in 2010). The start of distribution was delayed in 2011 due to delays in identifying those in need.
- PRRO 20029.0: According to the HRD, there were 2.5 million people dependent on emergency food aid in 2013, with this number increasing to 2.7 million people in 2014. The rations for general food aid comprised 2,050 kcal per person, per day and an additional 570 kcal per person, per day for particularly vulnerable household members. Due to the delayed provision of the HRD data, it was only possible to implement six of the seven supply rounds planned for 2013. Although it was possible to reach

19 Proxy indicator for the security of food supply which expresses the frequency with which households implement response strategies when dealing with a lack of food and/or funds.

20 As measured on the basis of programme-specific indicators whose target levels are set by the generally recognised SPHERE standards. The dropout, recovery and mortality rates relate to the success of treatment over the course of the programme. Cf. The Sphere Project, 2011: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response.

21 E.g. with regard to the type of cereal or pulses in the relevant food basket or through the provision of specially fortified foods like Super Cereal or ready-to-use supplementary food (RUSF) to the malnourished population.

22 Blanket Supplementary Feeding; in areas identified through the early warning system as at risk of increasing global acute malnutrition, DPPA provides a blanket supplementary ration of fortified blended food with the general ration, reaching an estimated 35 percent of the targeted relief population.

more people in need in 2014, only six of nine distribution rounds were realised due to resource constraints. Due to a shortage of Super Cereal²³, it was also not possible to provide food aid to as many particularly vulnerable people in addition. In 2013, 250,000 beneficiaries of the relief component in the Amhara, Oromia and Somali regions received cash transfers amounting to around USD 9 per person, per month on average. This new transfer modality had been tested by means of market studies prior to its introduction, so as to ensure the availability and price stability of foodstuffs on the local markets. The recipients were thereby granted greater freedom when choosing their food (see indicator 2). Although due to the late start only approximately 35% of the planned funds could be paid out (i.e. fewer disbursement rounds took place), it was possible to already cover the Somali region. The number of beneficiaries decreased to approximately 225,000 in 2014, and due to resource bottlenecks only five out of seven disbursement rounds could be implemented. According to the WFP, the cash transfers were met with a positive response from the population on the whole. Moreover, it was possible to reduce the distribution time to a few days.

PSNP component:

- PRRO 20029.0: The services were provided in addition to state social security benefits. Unlike the rations in the relief component, the rations consisted only of cereals, but covered the same calorie requirements. Due to financial gaps, it was only possible to reach 78% of the intended participants in 2013; the gap was bridged by the government programme. In 2014 it was not possible to implement cash transfers in the PSNP component as planned due to resource constraints.

TSF component:

- PRRO 10665.0: Those in need were identified by means of regular screenings as part of the National Enhanced Outreach Strategy and the Community-Based Nutrition Programme. Delays occurred as the result of late screenings, whereupon the WFP began to implement ad hoc distributions in known focal regions. The rations included special, fortified foods and cooking oil. In accordance with recent findings which indicate a realisation of treatment success in the first three months of treatment in particular, the WFP reduced the duration of support from six to three months, which had no negative impact on recovery rates (see indicator 4).
- PRRO 20029.0: Due to scarce funds, the WFP prioritised districts with malnutrition prevalence rates of over 15%. The rations consisted of Super Cereal or – alternatively – RUSF and cooking oil and, at 1,112 kcal per person, per day, were in line with both national and SPHERE standards.

HIV/AIDS component:

- PRRO 10665.0: The beneficiaries were identified by a two-stage screening process as part of individual treatment programmes in health centres as well as at household level by NGOs. The rations consisted of cereals, pulses and cooking oil, but did not yet include specially fortified foods as planned (for treatment success, see indicator 4). Overall, fewer beneficiaries were reached than planned, due to the delayed conclusion of the implementation agreements with local government agencies and scarcity of funds.

Refugee component:

- PRRO 10127.3: Overall, it was possible to supply all refugees through the ARRA – with increased support from NGOs in the implementation of the TSF component and school meals from 2012 onwards. The number of new arrivals fell short of the projected figures. In 2011, it was only possible for ten out of twelve distribution rounds to take place because of delivery difficulties. There were no gaps in supply in 2012 thanks to the WFP-internal Forward Purchase Facility²⁴. All refugees received a basic ration of 2,168 kcal per person, per day, as well as an additional 20% cereal ration to cover grinding costs and losses. Due to their poor nutritional status, Somali refugees were already receiving energy biscuits upon arrival at the registration offices. Furthermore, approximately 35,000 children under the age of five in 2011 and around 30,000 in 2012 received Super Cereal in addition to the basic

²³ A mixture of corn and soya enriched with vitamins and minerals

²⁴ Facility that allows the WFP to make advance purchases of food items at favourable prices to provide for future food aid emergency needs

ration in camps with very high malnutrition rates. School meals started late in 2011 due to delayed construction measures and registration; the rations consisted of 460 kcal per person, per day. Overall, the refugee component was largely able to achieve the objectives for food energy intake²⁵. The risk of resale in order to cover other needs remained high, with the result that the WFP initiated measures in partnership with the UNHCR and ARRA to ensure the timely provision of additional complementary services.

Overall, despite necessary schedule adjustments, the WFP mastered the logistical challenges of the timely and needs-based provision of emergency food aid and achieved a satisfactory result. The interim evaluation of PRRO 10665.0 called for increased engagement of the WFP in terms of capacity development of the government partners, in order to ensure the timely provision of services and to close gaps in supply. Efforts to improve the planning and logistics capacities of the government partners, the cooperative use of bonds from the national food reserve, provision from other sources as well as, increasingly, short-term compensation from government funds, prevented further supply gaps.

(2) Nutritional status of households:

- PRRO 10665.0: Due to the devastating drought of 2011, it was not possible to consolidate the good performance of 2009 and 2010; the results indicate, however, that the food aid improved households' food situation in the short term. The resilience to new shocks was considered insufficient (also see indicator 3).
- PRRO 20029.0: In the relief component, only the male-headed households were able to maintain the achieved level in 2013 of 70% acceptable FCS into 2014²⁶, while female-headed households fell short of this figure, achieving only approximately 60% due to their more limited access to land and employment opportunities. Compared to the acceptable FCS at only 36% of households in the drought of 2011, this still represented a significant improvement. In the PSNP component, where households receiving aid performed better by about 4 percentage points on average, it was almost possible to reach the target of 75% acceptable FCS in 2013, however, there was also little consolidation in 2014. Here again, the female-headed households underperformed, but with a difference of less than 5 percentage points. In addition to the FCS, the Household Dietary Diversity Score (DDS²⁷) was measured from 2014 onwards. This score reflects the diversity of food intake and is considered a proxy indicator for a balanced diet. Beneficiaries of both, the relief and the PSNP component consumed less than four out of twelve possible food groups, suggesting a low diversity of food intake and an associated risk of micronutrient deficiency. With an average value of 3.6, the PSNP households were still below the level of the relief households, which is a result of the rations consisting exclusively of cereals.

Overall, it was possible in the short term to contribute to improving the food situation and to bridging acute crises in all cases through providing general food emergency assistance in the relief and PSNP components. Resilience to future crises was improved only to a limited extent by these measures.

(3) Response strategies:

- PRRO 10665.0: The persistently high CSI points to the chronic poverty situation and intensifying food crisis, which even repeated relief measures were unable to address.
- PRRO 20029.0: It was not possible to reach the level of 2012 again in the relief component due to the ongoing crisis and the food shortages between the distribution rounds in 2013 and 2014; negative response strategies were necessary despite the aid.²⁸ In the PSNP component, where the PSNP beneficiaries were temporarily provided with food aid in order to bridge acute shocks, it was possible to continuously reduce the CSI up until 2014. Since more people on the whole were supplied with food than before and the reliable provision of additional aid in cases of need has been ensured for several years now, the beneficiaries were able to reduce their negative response strategies, build up assets and in-

²⁵ This was confirmed in a similar way by a joint evaluation from 2010 conducted by the WFP and UNHCR.

²⁶ The indicators were reported disaggregated with regard to gender for the first time in 2014.

²⁷ The WFP referred to the FAO methods and made use of a tool from the "FANTA" project: <http://www.fantaproject.org>

²⁸ E.g. missing meals, smaller portions, borrowing food from friends or family, etc.

crease their resilience to shocks. Overall, the timely and adequate supply, which has been continuously improved by the WFP, was an important factor in the avoidance of negative response strategies.

(4) Success of the treatment of malnutrition:

- PRRO 10665.0: In both the TSF and the HIV/AIDS component, the recovery rates continued to fall significantly short of expectations (10 to 15 percentage points). In both cases, this is attributed to the implementing health centres' lack of capacity with regard to the proper application of the admission criteria and of competent support, as well as to the widespread sharing of rations amongst food insecure households.
- PRRO 20029.0: In 2013 and 2014, it was possible to improve recovery rates significantly and to exceed the target value of 75%. This was due to the increased cooperation with the healthcare system and to new partnerships with NGOs as implementation partners, which continuously worked towards an improvement of the provision of care and advice to beneficiaries and compliance with the programmes admission and discharge criteria thanks to the training of health personnel. After many years of moderately successful implementation of TSF activities, this confirmed that the capacity constraints of healthcare system implementation partners can be successfully addressed by means of continuous and bottleneck-oriented cooperation. In case of a proper implementation of treatment and the support of TSF beneficiaries with complementary health advice and medical care, a positive contribution towards reducing the prevalence of malnutrition is expected.

Other intended and unintended impacts: It was possible to improve the participation of women over the course of the respective operations²⁹, an effect which can be attributed to continuous training, awareness raising and the inclusion of gender criteria in the regulations and responsibilities of the management committees as well as, not least, to the dedicated commitment to the empowerment of women at local level. Where regular school meals or food rations that could be taken away formed part of the measures, very high school attendance rates were achieved, e.g. 99% of children in the HIV/AIDS component in 2011. In the refugee component, it was possible to increase the rates of school attendance from 59% in 2007 to over 73% in 2012. The ratio of girls to boys recently reached 0.8. The HIV/AIDS component co-financed in 2011 contributed to the strengthening of government institutions and NGOs which, thanks to their support, made a significant contribution to helping affected groups return to public life, to increase awareness and to fight stigmatisation and discrimination against affected persons.³⁰

Effectiveness rating: 3 (all projects)

Efficiency

The cost structure of the projects is assessed as satisfactory overall³¹. There was and is no alternative organisation that could logistically handle the comparatively high volumes of funds required to cover emergency food needs in widespread crises. The WFP collected an administration fee of approximately 6.5% of the German contribution; this is among the lowest in the UN system. Overall, between 82% and 86% of the German contribution could be used for food or cash transfers including the associated transport and provision costs, while the remaining funds were deployed for the administration fee, the project-related costs incurred by the WFP in the country and other costs, including capacity development. In comparison to the WFP's average costs of USD 100/t for transport by sea or USD 180/t for transport by land³², according to our own calculations for PRRO 10665.0 and PRRO 10127.3, Ethiopia incurred lower costs of USD 70-77/t for international transport and USD 150-166/t for domestic transport and handling costs. It is be-

29 With the exception of the refugee component in 2012, where no systematic measures could be implemented (presumably) due to the rapid influx of Somali refugees in the new camps.

30 WFP, 2010: Mid-Term Evaluation, Ethiopia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 10665.0 (2008-2010): An Operation Evaluation.

31 In accordance with the principles of humanitarian aid, efficiency should be considered primarily in terms of the achievement of objectives and quality of food aid. The evaluation of production efficiency relates to the question of the expense of food aid as compared to other potentially deployable emergency aid measures. Allocation efficiency is evaluated in terms of the need to prioritise short-term impacts over approaches that are effective in the medium term.

32 WFP Logistics in 2012

lieved that factors such as large quantities, continuous improvement of the supply chain and warehousing after many years of operation, efforts on the part of the WFP to optimise costs (in shipping, for example) and the extensive procurement of local transport services all contributed to this reduction in costs. Due to the fact that, with the exception of the Somali region, the implementation process was carried out exclusively by existing government structures and was merely accompanied by NGOs, local distribution costs of government institutions were also incurred. It is plausible that the consistent use of existing local structures helped to optimise the costs; however, according to a report from a consultant mission, logistics management in Ethiopia and Kenya in 2012 remained patchy.³³

The reduction of procurement times is a critical success factor for effective crisis management. To avoid gaps in supply, the WFP made use of the internal Forward Purchase Facility. Since 2012, however, the organisation has relied on bonds from the Ethiopian government's strategic food reserve³⁴, which were funded via pledged donor contributions. In addition, as part of its own global goods management³⁵ process, the WFP created emergency reserves in three camps in Ethiopia. Supply gaps could not be completely avoided due to the highly fluctuating number of cases influenced by recurring crises; they were, however, actively addressed by the WFP with comprehensive measures in Ethiopia and worldwide³⁶.

Food was procured both nationally and internationally on the basis of market analyses and current market policies of the government, while the main criterion was the lowest price at a reasonable quality and with delivery to the main WFP camp in Ethiopia. The initiative to promote local market structures and procurement³⁷, which has been promoting local production, market development and the purchase of food from smallholders since 2010, allowed for local procurement of up to 28% in periods with conducive production conditions. In 2013, for example, local procurement made it possible to effect cost savings of up to 30% on individual foods. Local procurement has only rarely been limited by quality defects, such as in the case of Super Cereal in 2014, so purchase prices could be optimised where possible. Additional costs were incurred for labels and the printing of German DC logos on food packages. According to the WFP, the costs are dependent on the respective purchasing process and thus could not be reported separately. German DC has now dispensed with the costly printing process in favour of other effective visibility measures, which is viewed as a positive development.

In the context of the recurring acute food crises in Ethiopia, despite the Ethiopian government's ambitious infrastructure and growth programmes, emergency food aid continued to be required throughout the entire period. Data for the 2000-2010 period shows that humanitarian aid funds accounted for an above-average share of 18% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds in Ethiopia, with 81% of humanitarian aid funds consisting of emergency food aid and only a small amount of funds invested in essential emergency preparedness and resilience.³⁸ Given this state of affairs, it is of positive note that the WFP made clear reference to the need to address increasing chronic malnutrition in Ethiopia by means of resilience-building measures, which exhibit cost advantages over emergency measures in the medium term³⁹. The WFP thus deployed food aid strategically as a contribution to ongoing government programmes, which lead to an increase in agricultural production and improved health care services, social security and municipal infrastructure, thereby contributing to increased resilience to future crises. In addition, the WFP

33 The consultants also complained that only 58% of the funds were received by the beneficiaries. In the case of PRRO 10665.0, 49% of the total German contribution was used for food supplies (pure expenditure for food excluding transport and provision costs); in the case of PRRO 10127.3, this figure was 53%. For PRRO 20029.0, the food and cash transfer costs were shown including the provision costs.

34 Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR)

35 Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF)

36 See various efficiency initiatives in the annual WFP logistics reports (WFP Logistics 2012, 2013, 2014)

37 WFP Purchase for Progress Initiative

38 Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011: Humanitarian Financing to Ethiopia, 2000-2010

39 Cf. AFD and World Bank 2016: Resilience-building infrastructure measures in the African drought areas are advantageous in the medium term for strengthening resilience to drought by means of poverty reduction and offer cost advantages over emergency measures. The report attests to the feasibility in the context of available development assistance budgets, but also shows that a significant portion of the rural population in dry zones will remain vulnerable and in need of support in the form of social security systems and seasonal emergency systems.

supported the capacity development of early warning systems and disaster risk management, in order to increase the cost effectiveness of humanitarian aid in the medium term.⁴⁰

Efficiency rating: 3 (all projects)

Impact

Although the WFP operations were aimed primarily at the short-term improvement of the food situation, food emergency measures can be expected to contribute towards alleviating the worst effects of a food crisis and towards improving the humanitarian situation and social stabilisation. In the context of the EPE, the developmental objective was formulated as “Helping to alleviate the worst effects of this and future food crises” and was evaluated using the following indicators.

(1) Food insecurity: The measures made an immediate contribution to reducing hunger through the provision of food to the starving population: on a national level, it was possible to reduce the extent of hunger from 41% in 2008 to 33% in 2014. Although the number of hungry people remained high at 31.9 million due to high population growth,⁴¹ Ethiopia is the only country worldwide in a protracted, complex crisis which achieved the international hunger target⁴² (1991: 75%, 2015: 32%). In a situation where food aid alone is only able to contribute the bare minimum to survival, the WFP has contributed to the fight against chronic poverty as a cause of food insecurity as far as individually possible by identifying and implementing appropriate measures. The PSNP in particular, which now provides aid to approximately 8 million beneficiaries, is considered a success story according to the 2015 “State of Food Insecurity in the World” report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the WFP and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).⁴³ The programme secured access to food for poor population groups and simultaneously addressed the structural causes of food insecurity through investments in rural infrastructure and agricultural activities. Furthermore, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) underlines that, in Ethiopia in particular, the comprehensive infrastructure measures in the sanitary sector have contributed to the improved nutritional status.⁴⁴

(2) Prevalence of target group-specific malnutrition: The nutritional status of children under the age of five is considered a proxy indicator of the nutritional status of the overall population and, accordingly, specific thresholds trigger emergency measures. The proportion of acutely malnourished children under the age of five⁴⁵ decreased from 12.3% in 2005 to 8.7% in 2014. During the same period, the proportion of chronically malnourished children under the age of five⁴⁶ fell from 50.7% to 40.4%.⁴⁷ Although stunting rates are therefore still at a very high level, with an average annual reduction of 1.2 percentage points since 2000, Ethiopia is one of the top five most successful countries in the world in terms of reducing chronic malnutrition in children under five years old.⁴⁸ Infant mortality fell from 81 per 1,000 births in 2009 to 64 in 2013.⁴⁹ The proportion of pregnant and breastfeeding women who suffer from anaemia decreased from 32% in 2005 to 23% in 2011.⁵⁰ In the refugee camps, where humanitarian supply in 2011 and 2012 was co-financed by FC, the nutritional status worsened overall due to the massive influx of in some cases severely malnourished refugees from Somalia and Sudan. Malnutrition rates range from 4% in long-

40 As a study from 2012 shows, in the Ethiopian context, early responses to looming crises and the strengthening of resilience offer significant cost efficiency advantages compared to short-notice and at times delayed reactions to acute crises. (Cabot Venton et al., 2012: The economics of early response and disaster resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia)

41 FAO Food Security Indicators (<http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/#.V3IGqlf6ld0>)

42 Millennium Development Goal (MDG 1c, target 1.9): Halving hunger by 2015 compared to 1990, as measured by the prevalence of hunger.

43 FAO / WFP / IFAD: 2015 State of Food Insecurity in the World report

44 Headey, Derek D. 2015. Nutrition in Ethiopia: An emerging success story? ESSP II Research Note 40, IFPRI

45 Wasting (too low a weight in relation to height) is considered a sign of acute malnutrition and is reversible in the short term.

46 Stunting (“height for age” too low) serves as an indicator of chronic malnutrition and is irreversible.

47 WHO Global Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition (<http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/en/>)

48 In a study by the IFPRI, this was attributed to an improved birth weight as a result of a number of improvements in food supply and health care. The factor with the greatest impact is the huge improvement in sanitary provision in rural areas, which improved by more than 45 percentage points under the Community-Led Total Sanitation Initiative. (IFPRI 2015 – Nutrition in Ethiopia success story)

49 IFPRI 2015: Nutrition Country Profile – Ethiopia

50 WHO Global Database on Anaemia (<http://www.who.int/vmnis/anaemia/en/>)

established camps with predominantly Eritrean refugees to 51% in camps with a high proportion of newly arriving Somali refugees.

(3) Improved municipal facilities and increased household income: Since 2013, the WFP has been spot-checking the Community Asset Score (CAS) under the PSNP component, which supported municipal infrastructure through FFA measures. In selected communities, the CAS improved by 20 points, from 50 in 2012 to 70 in 2014. This points to a significant reduction in vulnerability and in the potential impact of future crises and periods of drought, though it is not currently possible to make a statement concerning long-term impact. According to the WFP's global impact evaluation of FFA measures⁵¹, the achievement of longer-term objectives is dependent on the durability of the structures created, which was ensured in more than 50% of the cases investigated. The Ethiopian programme was the only one with formulated long-term objectives. In the case of Ethiopia, positive income effects resulting from the FFA measures were considered as plausible in the medium term. Furthermore, the evaluation confirmed a positive contribution of the FFA measures to improving livelihoods in rural areas, especially where measures have been ensured in the long term and implemented using a community-based approach.⁵² In Ethiopia, the adjustment of the FFA measures to seasonal cycles and living conditions led to significant improvements and increased acceptance among the rural population, particularly in pastoral areas.

A joint evaluation of refugee operations in Ethiopia for the 2002-2010 period⁵³ showed that the short-term food energy supply objectives were indeed achieved, however, the medium to long-term objectives of an adequate nutritional status and the creation of permanent livelihoods were not addressed. The WFP was asked to track the medium to long-term objectives more consistently and to create livelihoods, despite not conducive legal framework conditions. In the subsequent years, the WFP addressed these recommendations by various means. The advice in the context of mother / child care was improved, food aid was replaced in part by cash handouts and better coordinated with the provision of complementary goods, and measures to develop livelihoods and increase environmental stability were supported in cooperation with other implementing institutions.

Overall, despite persistent challenges in the already protracted, complex food crisis in Ethiopia, a clear orientation on the part of the WFP and government institutions towards measures to alleviate the impact of potential future crises is apparent. Evaluation results have been implemented by the WFP within the framework of possibilities in the programme design.

Impact rating: 3 (all projects)

Sustainability

Based on the emergency aid focus (rapid response procedure in the event of natural disasters, crises and conflicts in conformity with No. 47 of the FC / TC guidelines), the project had a limited sustainability requirement. It is one of the principles of humanitarian aid, to enable a integrability to structure-building and developmental operations in accordance with the "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development" approach. Here, the capacity development of local players is a critical factor for success.

The interim evaluation of PRRO 10665.0 pointed to the importance of capacity development within Ethiopian government institutions in order to secure sustainable results and stressed that, despite positive trends in the introduction of risk and disaster prevention mechanisms in the face of recurring food crises, the WFP's approach has not yet gone far enough. A global effectiveness evaluation of the WFP⁵⁴ also came to the conclusion that the sustainable consolidation of results represents one of the core challenges

51 WFP 2014: Impact Evaluation Synthesis; Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food for Assets (2002-2011) and lessons for building livelihoods resilience

52 In cases where the WFP prioritised a high number of beneficiaries at the expense of timely and adequate supply, the measures remained ineffective in the medium to long term. The WFP has confirmed the appropriateness of the FFA financing mechanism and revised its internal implementation guidelines on the basis of the evaluation results. (Also see WFP Food for Assets: <https://www.wfp.org/food-assets>)

53 WFP and UNHCR, 2011: The Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations: its impact and role. A mixed method impact evaluation, (2002-2010).

54 WFP, 2011: WFP Effectiveness 2006-2011.

for the WFP, particularly when resilience-building measures are underfunded or introduced too late. In Ethiopia, emergency aid remained the prioritised response during the chronic crisis, although the WFP supported government programmes from the outset.⁵⁵ In 2013 and 2014, it was possible to stabilise approximately 36,000 hectares of land by means of biological and erosion control measures. In total, around 200 km of access roads have been improved, over 360 classrooms have been refurbished and nearly 600 new water sources have been tapped. Nevertheless, despite the long-standing commitment of the donor community, the Ethiopian drought of 2015/2016 – exacerbated by the persistent El Niño effect⁵⁶ – once again had devastating consequences, with 10.2 million people affected; resilience to future crises evidently remains weak.

The WFP provided major impulses for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of local supply chains, strengthened market development through the Purchase for Progress (P4P) initiative, which connects smallholders to markets, and increasingly worked towards the development of early warning systems and disaster risk management. In addition, the WFP served as a partner organisation of the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, which brings together an integrated approach to risk management at local level, improved resource management and social safety nets. Overall, the WFP now appears to be better positioned to impact, by means of the various national and international initiatives, on the increasingly preventive and resilience-building focus of the humanitarian and development-oriented measures in Ethiopia.

Given the limited sustainability requirement and the starting points for future, development-oriented measures and partnerships, the sustainability is rated as satisfactory overall.

Sustainability rating: 3 (all projects)

⁵⁵ The PSNP, under which the WFP supported a number of structure-building measures, is considered a success story in the fight against poverty and malnutrition.

⁵⁶ El Niño is a climatic phenomenon which is characterised by far-reaching climatic anomalies and, at times, dramatic consequences for the entire region (UN OCHA, 2016: El Niño).

Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency** and **overarching developmental impact**. The ratings are also used to arrive at a **final assessment** of a project's development effectiveness. The scale is as follows:

Level 1	Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations
Level 2	Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings
Level 3	Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate
Level 4	Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results
Level 5	Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate
Level 6	The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall (this is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive development effectiveness.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The development effectiveness of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a “successful” project while rating levels 4-6 denote an “unsuccessful” project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally “successful” only if the achievement of the project objective (“effectiveness”), the impact on the overall objective (“overarching developmental impact”) **and** the sustainability are rated at least “satisfactory” (level 3).