Sector: 5101000 General budget support

Project: a) Support for poverty alleviation strategy II (BMZ no. 2008 65 709)*;  
b) Joint financing for supporting the Burkinabe poverty alleviation strategy III (BMZ no. 2011 65 281) and complementary measure (CM) BMZ no. 2011 70 307

Implementing agency: Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances

Ex post evaluation report: 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Planned)</th>
<th>(Actual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total costs ** )</td>
<td>EUR million</td>
<td>around 1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart contribution</td>
<td>EUR million</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>EUR million</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which BMZ budget funds (inc. CM)</td>
<td>EUR million</td>
<td>28.00</td>
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</table>

*) Project no. 200865709 in 2014 random sample  
**) The total costs relate to total international budget support for the period 2009–2015 (38 individual projects, financed by 9 donors)

Summary: General budget support for assisting the implementation of the Burkinabe poverty alleviation strategy CSLP (2009 to 2012) and its successor, the growth strategy SCAAD (2013 to 2015) as part of programme-oriented joint financing created by nine donors. Germany contributed EUR 15 million to the financing for the years 2009–2012 (Project A) and EUR 12 million for the years 2013–2015 (Project B) plus a complementary measure amounting to EUR 1 million.

Objectives: Both projects aimed to support implementing the two afore-mentioned strategies set up by the Burkinabe government. The objectives of both strategies (outcome level) were as follows: (1.) economic growth (pro-poor growth), (2.) protection of macro-economic stability, (3.) improved access to basic social services for poor members of the population, (4.) improved efficiency in the public sector. The development objectives (impact level) were: (1.) reduction of income poverty from 43.9% in 2009 to 35% in 2015, (2.) achievement of the MDGs in 2015, (3.) improvement to good governance. The weighting of the specified goals shifted slightly from a focus on improving social services in phase II to more of an emphasis on growth and reforms in phase III.

Target group: The entire population of Burkina Faso, with a particular focus on poor members.

Overall rating: 3 (both phases)

Rationale: The two projects were able to make a significant contribution to the country’s macroeconomic stabilisation, though only had a limited impact on the reduction of poverty in Burkina Faso. The implementation of the agreed reforms was only partially satisfactory.

Highlights: The implementation phase of both programmes began in the final stages of President Blaise Compaoré’s term of office, who governed for 27 years in a sometimes very authoritarian manner. Following Compaoré’s downfall in October 2014, programme funds were used to support a transitional government, successfully bridging a period of political instability in Burkina Faso and the region as a whole. A legitimate democratic government has been in office since 2015.
Rating according to DAC criteria

**Overall rating: 3 (both projects)**

The joint evaluation reviews the entire period from 2009 to 2014. This evaluation distinguishes between two phases: 2009–2012 and 2013–2015. This is partly based on the formal criterion for the two fund commitments from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to the Burkina Faso government. It is also based on the content-related criterion concerning support for the two Burkina Faso strategies: CSLP (2009–2012) and SCAAD (2013–2015).

The evaluation takes into account that target achievement in the first phase — measured by the most important indicators — was slightly better than the second phase but that the budget support for the second phase also helped to bridge a critical situation in the country and the region (civil wars in several neighbouring countries, outbreak of Ebola).

**General conditions and classification of the project (for complex projects only)**

In general, Burkina Faso (“The land of upstanding people”) is a relatively friendly and stable country in an exceptionally fragile region. While all changes of government between the country’s independence and 2014 were the result of military coups or revolts, the fact that very few people died as a result of these revolts is indicative of the country’s nature. Despite half of the population belonging to the politically dominant Mossi group, the country is characterised by the cultural diversity of the various ethnicities who live together in peace. On a geopolitical level, the country is an important anchor of stability in a fragile region and thus of great geopolitical importance.

Burkina Faso has been receiving budget aid in the wider sense since 1991 as part of various structural adjustment programmes run by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Other donors, including the European Commission, the Netherlands and Switzerland, have also been providing budget support since the 1990s (previously often referred to as “macro-economic support”).

Burkina Faso has been receiving a new form of budget assistance since 2001 as part of the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC). Parallel to this, other donors have been providing budget support under the initiative “Partnership General Budget Support” (PGBS), sometimes known as “Joint Budget Support” (JBS).

The two processes (PRSC from the World Bank and PGBS from other donors) converged in 2005 under a joint budget support and poverty alleviation programme known as CGAB-CSLP (Cadre général d’organisation des appuis budgétaires en soutien à la mise en œuvre du cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté). This phase preceded the two phases evaluated here. Germany contributed to this preceding phase in 2006 and 2007 with EUR 2 million and EUR 3 million respectively, though both tranches were disbursed in 2007.

From 2009 onwards, this budget support programme (to which both the FC project and the complementary measures contributed) was designed to execute the Burkina Faso poverty alleviation strategies. During the period under review (2009–2015), the strategies in question were the aforementioned CSLP to begin with, before this was replaced by the SCAAD (Stratégie de croissance accélérée et de développement durable) in 2010. When comparing the two strategies, CSLP was a classic poverty alleviation strategy with an emphasis on social services for poor people while SCAAD’s programme focused more on growth, development and reforms.

The budget support programme for Burkina Faso comprised the conventional components of:

(a.) Financial contributions which were placed in the Burkina Faso national budget

(b.) Common objectives, the so-called “performance matrix”

(c.) A dialogue mechanism between the Burkina Faso government and the budget support donors, which was supplemented by cooperation with the donors who had not contributed to the budget support.
Alongside the financing, an intensive political dialogue regarding stable macro-economic management, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, poverty-oriented growth and improvements to the government's governance started to take place.

Apart from Germany, the European Commission, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and almost all key bilateral donors (France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden) contributed to financing the poverty alleviation strategy via general budget support.

For the period from 2009–2015, the total budget support amounted to around FCFA 900 billion (CFA franc), equivalent to approximately EUR 1.5 billion. Germany contributed the smallest amount at around FCFA 15 billion or EUR 27 million (plus a complementary measure amounting to EUR 1 million). Parallel to the general budget support, Germany also provided sector-related budget aid in the areas of urban water supplies and wastewater disposal as well as support at project level.

It seems worth noting that the World Bank did not formally classify its budget support as co-financing – which amounted to USD 505 million – and that it also formulated its own goals and indicators in some cases.¹ This evaluation and the joint evaluation issued on behalf of the European Commission² deal with the budget support, including the World Bank’s contributions, as one overall programme.

The implementation of the two programmes in the years from 2009 to 2015 (conclusion of financing agreement for phase II until the disbursement of the last tranche for phase III) took place during the final years of President Blaise Compaoré’s 27-year term in office. Following the 1987 coup against his predecessor Thomas Sankara, Compaoré took a rather authoritarian approach to government in certain cases. A formal democratisation process has been taking place since 1990/1991.

The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2007) had significant impacts on Burkina Faso. Côte d’Ivoire blamed Burkina Faso for supporting the rebels. In return, Burkina Faso issued a threat of military attack to support the two million Burkinabes and citizens of Burkinabe origin who had become targets of violence during the unrest. The end of the civil war was regarded as a diplomatic success for Burkina Faso.

The appraisal of the second programme phase in 2011 took place during a period of deep dissatisfaction among the population due to rising costs of living and political repression. School children and students protested, while units in the police and army rebelled. During this phase, some donors reduced their budget aid, while others continued with their support with the aim of retaining a direct influence over Burkinabe politics.

A planned change to the constitution, designed to allow Compaoré to assume a fifth term of office, led to large-scale demonstrations and riots from the start of 2014 onwards. On 30 October 2014, the day of the planned vote in parliament, the military disempowered the President, who then fled to Côte d’Ivoire.

In November 2014, a civil transitional president was appointed for one year and entrusted with the mandate of holding new elections within one year. On 16 September 2015, the presidential guard held a coup against the transitional government. More protests took place. Once it became clear that the population, army and police were not willing to accept the rebels as a new government, they gave up. At the presidential elections in December 2015, former Prime Minister Roch Marcel Kaboré received 53.49% of votes. During the parliamentary elections, Kaboré’s new party, MPP, won 55 of the 127 seats but failed to gain an absolute majority.

Chart 1 provides an overview of the timeline of key events between 2005 and 2015.

¹ See World Bank / Independent Evaluation Group (IEG): ICR Review, report number: ICRR 14764
### Chart 1

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<td>Political development strategies</td>
<td>Cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté (CSLP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National context</td>
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<td>Elections (legislative)</td>
<td>Social unrest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elections (presidential)</td>
<td>Social unrest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elections (municipal, parliamentary)</td>
<td>Social unrest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil uprising and transitional government</td>
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<tr>
<td>International context</td>
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<td>Rise in food and energy prices and financial crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Crisis in Niger</td>
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<td>Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ebola crisis in western Africa</td>
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<td>German budget support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008 65 709</td>
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<tr>
<td>Framework for political dialogue</td>
<td>Cadre general d'organisation des appuis budgétaires (CGAB)</td>
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Source: Anke Reichhuber; presentation based on joint financing report, May 2016, Volume 1, page 7, figure 3

In addition to the two financial contributions, the German FC commitment included a complementary measure with a volume of EUR 1 million. This was used for two components: (1.) Support for the Burkina court of auditors, including with the procurement of hardware and software, and (2) Support for the NGO network REN-LAC in anti-corruption measures. The German contributions took the form of participation in basket funding to implement the relevant annual action plans.

A comparison of target vs. actual costs was not possible for either the entire period from 2009 to 2015 or for phases II or III of the budget support. A really precise and binding multi-year plan for the national budget and its coverage did not exist at any point. The information available is marked by uncertainty regarding public revenue, uncertainty regarding donor funds and financial shortfalls that are due to be covered by other uncertain sources (project support, loans), etc.

### Relevance

Both of the evaluated projects were essentially relevant in terms of the focus of their content. The support for the central poverty and development strategies (CSLP and SCADD) addressed Burkina Faso’s main development problems. Both strategies – the CSLP poverty alleviation strategy and the SCADD growth strategy – had similar goals albeit with slightly different emphases and formulations.

Within the context of balanced economic and fiscal policy, both strategies aimed to achieve: 1.) inclusive economic growth, 2.) macro-economic stability, 3.) improved access to basic social services for poor members of the population, 4.) improved efficiency in the public sector. The strategies’ development objectives were poverty alleviation and good governance.

The country’s structural constraints were mentioned in both strategies. The measures supported by both projects were geared towards the priorities and the partner country’s two strategies, as described above.
These were dealt with in cooperation with the donors. The projects were therefore consistent with the postulated reform programmes, though differences were identified between the postulated programme and the government's actual priorities; see item 2 in the next section.

Concept-related shortfalls were identified in 4 areas in both programmes:

1. Weaknesses in incorporating goals into operations and in defining indicators

2. Deviations between the postulated goals in the reform programmes and the government's actual priorities

3. Emphasis on social measures and neglect of productive economic sectors

4. Disregard for population growth and the discrimination of women as a major obstacle to development.

Ad 1: With an original scope of 30 measures and 36 indicators, the policy matrix was relatively moderate in size. In contrast to other countries with sometimes highly complex systems of objectives, the focus on a moderate matrix can be regarded as very positive. Nevertheless, some of the measures and indicators appear to be unclear, difficult to understand or questionable in terms of content. For example, indicators for good governance included (i) the prompt publication of reports by the court of auditors, (ii) the Transparency International corruption index, and (iii) the development of Burkinabe revenue. While these indicators were easy to measure, they are evidently only able to reflect the quality of governance to a limited extent. Neglected aspects included, for instance, the very weak justice system, the quality and content of court of auditor's reports, the frequency, scope and quality of checks by the court of auditors, etc.

Ad 2: There are doubts concerning the extent to which all points in the reform programme corresponded to the government's actual priorities. According to the cross-donor evaluation from 2016, Blaise Compaoré's regime demonstrated very little interest in the consistent implementation of the development strategies in the areas of decentralisation, structural reforms and good governance. The World Bank's "Implementation Completion Report" from February 2012 came to a similar conclusion. In-depth studies of the Burkinabe political economy reveal how powerful stakeholders combined with a corrupt regime systematically exploited their own country. This leads to the assumption that the battle against corruption and the implementation of structural reforms for a fairer distribution of income were not matters of paramount importance to the country's governing circles, who would have preferred to maintain the status quo. By contrast, the macro-economic stability supported by the donors was presumably a priority for the regime, as it was serving its own economic interests.

Ad 3: Another weakness in the Burkinabe strategies was the very extensive focus on social measures and reforms to state administration. While the need to promote productive sectors was identified, the strategies contained barely any effective measures, apart from the reduction of red tape and the assurance of macro-economic stability.

Ad 4: The exceptionally high population growth of 3% p.a. and the discrimination of women are decisive barriers to development in Burkina Faso. Although the Burkinabe strategies included the increased provision of contraceptives via public health care services, not enough attention was given to this subject on the whole.

A sub-aspect of relevance is the appropriateness of the funds in relation to the goals pursued. In the period 2009 to 2014, the budget support payments rose from FCFA 160 billion in 2009 to FCFA 180 billion in 2011, and then fell to around FCFA 120 billion in 2013 and 2014. The budget support payments (general and sectoral budget support) amounted to around 28% of the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) for 2009, 35% in 2011, and 20% in 2013 and 2014. This was equivalent to around 3.5% of GDP and 15% of public spending in the period from 2009 to 2011 and 1.6% of GDP and 7% of government spending in 2014. In terms of financing relevance, budget support was therefore very important from the outset. However, the ratio between budget support and the total national budget has been falling since 2011. In actual fact, budget support payments fell over several years while public spending continued to rise. The increase in income from gold mining and improved taxation in the country contributed to the strong increase.

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2 ICR Report 2551, World Bank, February 2012
in public expenses. Overall, budget support played a limited role – which also reduced over time – in terms of the scope of financial freedom. This is generally regarded as positive. On the other hand, the actual level of budget support was lower and its decline took place sooner than intended in the plans and forecasts.

The budget support programme was essentially productive and adequately designed. The aim of the budget support funds was to cover or reduce the country’s chronic budget deficits and to increase government spending, particularly in social sectors, without threatening macro-economic stability and without drastically increasing the tax rate. With both these measures and the other complementary measures (improvements to fiscal management), the aim was to promote inclusive growth and, as a result, alleviate poverty.

From the perspective of this evaluation, the fact that the budget support only amounted to 20–30% of the ODA indicates that the donors regarded the tool of budget aid in Burkina Faso as a supplement to project support.

In view of the government's sometimes fragile ownership of key parts of the strategy (poverty alleviation, decentralisation and improvements to good governance), the shortcomings relating to the promotion of productive sectors, and the reduction of population growth, the relevance is only rated as satisfactory.

No ratings for the individual DAC criteria were issued in the joint evaluation. However, the report explicitly points out that the relevance had "eroded" over time, particularly due to the deterioration of national governance.

Relevance rating: 3 (both phases)

Effectiveness

The aim of the projects was to support the implementation of the poverty alleviation and growth strategies in place at the time. The effectiveness of the projects is therefore measured according to the target achievement of these poverty alleviation and growth strategies.

For the purpose of the annually recurring reviews (annual reviews) the target achievement of CSLP and SCADD were measured by the donors and government using a common list of selected indicators. On the basis of these lists, the selected goals were only achieved to 54% in 2009 and 63% in 2013. However, indicators aggregated in this manner can only provide a limited amount of conclusive information because only one arithmetic average is used to reflect different goals with varying levels of importance and ambition.

Effectiveness in terms of the achievement of the individual programme goals (outcomes) is assessed according to progress in the 4 following areas:

(a) Macro-economic stability
(b) Improved access to social services among poor people
(c) Growth and employment
(d) Reforms to public administration.

(a) Macro-economic stability

During the reporting period, the budget support covered around 40% of the national budget deficit. As described in the Relevance section, the budget support helped to expand the government's fiscal freedom, though this role deteriorated over time. It amounted to 27% of public revenue in 2009, 23% in 2011 and 9% in 2014.

The section below shows some of the macro-economic stability indicators over time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget deficit / GDP in %</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
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<td>-2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation rate %</td>
<td>&lt;3%</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>-0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>State arrears</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salaries and wages / public revenue in %</td>
<td>&lt; 35</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public revenue / GDP %</td>
<td>&gt; 17%</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: joint evaluation 2016, official Burkinabe information

It is clear that the budget support contributed to covering the budget deficit. Arrears were avoided and the inflation rate remained within the target corridor. The budget support's contribution to macro-economic stability was an important factor when dealing with external shocks and a prerequisite for economic growth. Parallel to this, the government undertook commendable efforts in mobilising further tax revenue. Public revenue was successfully increased, but in absolute terms and relative to GDP it is still at a modest level. During the reporting period, expenditure on salaries and wages exceeded the target value; this implied that the Burkinabe government was able to invest less than anticipated.

(b) Improved access to social services among poor people

In the social sectors, spending on education, health, water supply and hygiene facilities / wastewater disposal increased. Access to health services, education and water supply improved but remained below the target values in some cases.

There are significant shortcomings in two areas: (a) lack of efficiency in government spending, reflected in countless investments that have been started but not completed, and (b) poor quality infrastructure and services.

In a traditional FC investment project, “access” would not be a measure of success. Instead the focus would be on actual usage by the target group. In this sense, the use of schools and health stations increased during the reporting period, for example. The enrolment rate at schools and the proportion of births supervised by a midwife increased between 2008 and 2014. On the other hand, only around 60% of pupils successfully finished primary school in 2014; this is an indication of the ongoing deep-rooted deficits in state services (according to the World Bank, the average for Sub-Saharan Africa is around 70%; the graduation rate in Ghana is 95%).

(c) Growth and employment

During the reporting period, Burkina Faso recorded relatively robust growth figures (5.2% in 2008, 3.2% in 2009, 7.9% in 2010, 4.2% in 2011, 4% in 2014), though these were below expectations. The national growth strategy for the years 2010–2015 originally assumed average economic growth of 10% per year. This ambitious target was missed by a significant degree. With annual population growth of 3.1%, the actual growth rates were not sufficient to generate significant progress in economic development (see also development in per capita income and the poverty rate under Impact).

Mining had an important effect on economic growth and the structure of GDP. According to EITI Burkina Faso's gold production reached 33 tonnes in 2013, which is 9% more than the previous year and twenty times more than in 2006. The country thus became Africa's fourth largest gold producer. However, estimates believe that gold mining employs at most10,000 people, the majority of whom are unskilled labourers.

1 See joint evaluation 2016, page 69 onwards
2 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, see www.eiti.org
There is no reliable data available for the labour market. The ILO estimates unemployment to be a rather implausible 3.1% for the period 2008–2015. From a realistic perspective, newcomers to the labour market tend to be employed in agriculture and the informal sector with low productivity levels and correspondingly low incomes. It is unlikely that unemployment and under-employment were reduced during the reporting period.

(d) Reforms to public administration

According to the results of the PEFA analysis conducted in 2013, there were limited successes in the (sub-) area of public financial management. For instance, access to budget information and budget control were both improved. At the same time, there were still huge challenges, particularly when it came to implementing the planned budget (adherence to budget).

The complementary measure co-financed using FC funds contributed to the strengthening of civil society's role in relation to externally monitoring public financial management and fighting corruption. The promoted NGO network's status also grew during the phase of the political transition. It helped to raise the transitional government's awareness of corruption, follow up on the previous government's corruption, and support the new election process. The support for the Burkinabe court of auditors – which was also financed using funds from the complementary measure – managed to complete 79% of the agreed activities.

No explicit rating for the DAC criterion “Effectiveness” was issued in the joint evaluation. The report highlighted the increase in government spending (output level), but also outlined the aforementioned limiting effects, which all remained significantly below expectations.

Taking all sub-goals as a whole, the effectiveness is rated as just about satisfactory.

**Effectiveness rating: 3 (both phases)**

**Efficiency**

In essence, it is reasonable to expect that pooling funds of around EUR 1.5 billion from nine different donors and taking a coordinated approach to these funds using national systems should be more efficient than running 300 individual projects with a volume of EUR 5 million each. The relatively high financing volume, the high degree of awareness among both the donors and the recipients, and the intensive dialogue should – in contrast to project support – contribute to a more efficient use of funds.

On the other hand, there are reports regarding the inefficient use of funds, including incomplete investments, unused investments, poor quality construction work, etc., in other words shortcomings that can be avoided in traditional project-based approaches compared to budget support.

It appears plausible that the budget support itself and the complementary measures helped to improve public financial management to a certain extent. The improvements to financial management relate not only to the budget support—which made up around 10–30% of the Burkinabe budget during the period under review—but also to the remaining 70–90% of the budget. In this regard, the leverage achieved reached a significant level.

The joint evaluation report from 2016 notes that the capacity building, which was supported by the budget aid and complementary measures, took a somewhat unsystematic and selective approach and that the decentralised administration bodies were often insufficiently qualified to do their jobs.

During the reporting period, there was no indication of any large-scale misappropriation of funds. The Burkinabe court of auditors did not identify any drastic issues with the implementation of the budget either.

No explicit rating for the DAC criterion “Efficiency” was issued in the joint evaluation. The report emphasises the afore-mentioned conceptual advantages of the instrument, but also mentions very clearly the poor implementation of investment measures and the disappointing effectiveness of the heavy increase in spending, particularly in the social sector.

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8 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, see www.pefa.org
Overall, efficiency is rated as just about satisfactory.

**Efficiency rating: 3 (both phases)**

**Impact**

The ongoing development goal of the budget support project – and thus of the two German contributions – was to help to alleviate poverty in Burkina Faso. The aim of the national growth strategy for the years 2010–2015 was to reduce poverty from 46.7% in 2009 to 35% by 2015. A comprehensive survey of households in 2014 revealed that Burkina Faso had achieved some success in alleviating poverty. The percentage of people living in poverty fell from the afore-mentioned 46.7% in 2009 to just 40.1% in 2014. The target of 35% was therefore missed. The absolute figure for people living in poverty also remained constant at 7 million between 2009 and 2014. The high degree of reliance on agriculture and mining and the low level of economic diversification means that there is a close link between poverty figures and international cotton and gold prices, as well as local rain fall.

In the period under review (2008–2014), Burkina Faso experienced growth rates of an average of 5.8% per annum. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the percentage of the overall population living in poverty fell, but economic growth did not reach the level of inclusivity anticipated. As poverty rates are only recorded at extended intervals, the programme could not be readjusted accordingly during its term.

When assessing the impact on poverty and growth, it is important to remember that Burkina Faso had to battle external shocks and various other conditions between 2008 and 2014. These factors had a long-lasting effect on stability. It is worth emphasising the stark increase in food prices and oil in 2008–2009, the global financial crisis from 2008, flooding in 2009, and political crises with resulting migration in neighbouring countries (Côte d'Ivoire 2011, Niger 2010 and Mali in 2012). Economic activities in Burkina Faso were also affected by temporary drops in the price of gold and cotton on the global market and the effects of the Ebola epidemic in western Africa.

The budget support made only a weak contribution to structural change and sustainable development in the productive sectors of agriculture and small- to medium-sized enterprises (see Relevance).

Burkina Faso missed most aspects of seven MDGs by the end of 2015. The results concerning the individual goals were mixed. Information shows that progress has been made in achieving the MDGs in terms of the fall in children suffering from malnutrition, a low prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS, and a reduction in gender differences in primary education. By contrast, the goals regarding school enrolment rates, literacy and maternal mortality were not achieved. In this regard, it must be considered that these goals were unrealistically high for a country that ranks 185 out of 188 countries worldwide in the UNDP’s Human Development Index.

Financial management and anti-corruption: According to the joint evaluation, public financial management improved to a satisfactory extent. Although the report highlights the improvements to transparency in particular, it also notes that there are still significant shortcomings in the management of funds and control mechanisms. According to the evaluation, the use of funds by decentralised units is especially problematic, though the regions and local authorities are responsible for just 6% of the national budget. The joint evaluation criticises the significant gaps between budget plans and actual budget use, particularly in terms of investments. Individual measures have been taken to target corruption, but – according to the studies specified under Relevance – no significant progress has been achieved.

Budget support normally aims to improve political governance, though the definition of these improvements tends to vary in clarity depending on the parties involved on the donor and recipient sides. Political governance in Burkina Faso improved moderately in 2014/2015, though this can be attributed less to the budget support and more to the huge public protests and the military response. In this case, it begs the question as to whether the budget support actually stabilised President Compaoré’s authoritarian regime for an unnecessarily long time. This argument is feasible, but it would have to be weighed up against the donors having a potentially moderating influence on the government.
No explicit "rating" for impact was issued in the joint evaluation. The report uses the European Commission's standard three-stage analysis framework to evaluate budget support. It is clear that the impact achieved was significantly below expectations.

**Impact rating: 3 (both phases)**

**Sustainability**

The sustainability of the (limited) changes achieved using the budget support depends primarily on the country's ongoing political development and external underlying factors.

The political upheaval generated positive impetus for improved governance. The transitional government approved several important laws. For instance, parliament passed a new mining act in June 2015. The code calls for compliance with EITI guidelines and requires the government and mining companies to publish all agreements and contracts in the official gazette.

In the first half of 2016, the newly elected government developed a follow-up strategy to SCAAD, the Plan National de Développement Economique et Social (PNDES), and discussed it with donors. PNDES was officially approved in July 2016 with a term of 2016 to 2020. However, the strategy has a very broad base and pursues a large number of goals, whereby financing is only partially secured. At a donors' conference in Paris in December 2016, the donor community planned to provide funds of USD 28.6 billion for the implementation of PNDES.

Apart from Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, Burkina Faso is also a member of the Sahel Alliance, currently supported by France and Germany.

The limited improvements to the health and education sectors will only last if the government is able to generate the requisite finances on its own. The increase in national revenue was a focus of the government's reform efforts and an important issue in political dialogue. Important progress was achieved with a tax reform, an increase in power for tax collection bodies and the introduction of more tax offices. Furthermore, Burkina Faso is less dependent on external finances thanks to its increased income from mining. While external support still made up 30% of all income in 2009, this figure had fallen to just 20% in 2014.

In light of the rises in public revenue and ongoing, broad international support for the country, sustainability is rated as satisfactory.

**Sustainability rating: 3 (both phases)**
Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects (and programmes) are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and overarching developmental impact. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project’s overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

**Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:**

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The **overall rating** on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).