Ex post evaluation – Afghanistan

Sector: Education facilities and training (11120)
Project: Primary Education Programme I cooperative programme (immediate assistance) (2004 66 060*; 2005 70 267 accompanying measure); Primary Education Programme II cooperative programme (2006 66 552*)
Executing agency: Afghan Ministry of Education

Ex post evaluation report: 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUR million</th>
<th>PEP I (Planned)</th>
<th>PEP I (Actual)</th>
<th>PEP II (Planned)</th>
<th>PEP II (Actual)</th>
<th>AM (Planned)</th>
<th>AM (Actual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment costs</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>8.56**</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart contribution</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which BMZ budget funds</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Random sample 2017 **) Additional funds from 2006 66 552 (main project) and 2009 67 455 vocational school programme for northern Afghanistan

Summary: In the context of the FC/TC cooperative programme "Primary Education Programmes (PEP) I and II", FC addressed deficits in the Afghan education system in the area of infrastructure: in PEP I and II, component 1, the new construction or renovation of four Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs) and 19 schools partly connected to the TTCs, in which the trained teachers could complete their teacher training, were financed in the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Kunduz, Takhar (PEP I) as well as Balkh and Sar-e Pol (PEP II, comp. 1, EUR 5 million). The development of a maintenance concept and the financing of laboratory equipment were included as part of an accompanying measure. The programme was supplemented in the vocational education sector via comp. 2 of PEP II, with the refurbishment of the technical school in Kabul / Kabul Mechanical Institute — KMI (EUR 3.5 million). TC supported the Ministry of Education and sector administration by improving the quality of the TTC training, with teacher management and through curricula development.

Objectives: The development objective (impact) of PEP I and II, component 1, was to improve primary education in the selected provinces of Afghanistan. The project objective (outcome) was to "improve teacher training in the area of primary school education at the supported TTCs and training schools". In PEP II, component 2: technical school of Kabul, the intention was to improve the availability of technical specialists on the Afghan labour market (impact). The project objective (outcome) was to improve the relevance and quality of vocational training at the technical school in Kabul. In view of this fragile context, the project was also to contribute to stabilisation (dual objective).

Target group: Students at the TTC, school children at the associated training schools, teachers and students at the technical school in Kabul.

Overall rating: 3 (phase I); 4 (phase II)

Rationale: Both programmes focused on Afghanistan's huge deficits in the area of school infrastructure. They made significant progress in these fields, which is reflected in factors like the increasing number of students. However, many TTC graduates are not hired by schools and a majority of graduates from the technical school in Kabul are not officially hired for jobs after they complete their training. This is also caused by the structure of the Afghan labour market, in which many forms of employment are unofficial. In surveys, however, graduates indicate that the training does not correspond to the desired career paths in many cases. Further challenges include the provision of financial resources for operating and maintaining the schools, as well as the volatile and deteriorating security situation.

Highlights: Despite the fragile environment, the financed education facilities are still in good condition after five to ten years and are used as intended in most cases. This indicates high quality and stable construction measures, and their design was adopted by other participants in the school construction sector to some extent.
Rating according to DAC criteria

Overall rating: 3 (Primary Education Programme I) and 4 (Primary Education Programme II)

Due to the regional, content and timeframe similarities, Primary Education Programmes I and II, including the technical school in Kabul, are presented together in one report, but are evaluated separately using the evaluation criteria. As there was not yet any FC vocational training programme when the measures for the technical school in Kabul started, the refurbishment of the technical school in Kabul was carried out in Primary Education Programme II.

Relevance

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is not only among the poorest nations in the world with per capita income of USD 562 (2016, current USD, World Bank), it has been among the most fragile nations in the world for many years as well. In addition to the security situation, the low level of education during the programme appraisal (PA) in 2005 was one of the greatest barriers to development. In 2005, only 31.3% of 15 to 24-year-olds could read and write, and the net enrolment rate for girls was only 29%. Furthermore, Afghanistan was and continues to be characterised by great gender disparities and a pronounced urban-rural gap in the education sector. At approximately the same time (2007), unemployment in Afghanistan was estimated at 7.1% (6.9% for men and 7.4% for women), although many question the reliability of these figures as only people officially looking for work were included here. Newer figures based on the Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) from 2013/2014 are presented as follows: unemployment 22.6% and underemployment 21.2% — figures that appear to be much more realistic. Unemployment among young people was and continues to be a particular challenge. The "Poverty Status Update Report" from the Afghan government and the World Bank from 2017 reveals that every second unemployed person is aged between 14 and 24. A lack of education is one of the most severe barriers to gaining access to employment, and not just in Afghanistan. At the time of the appraisal, there was a lack of both access to school infrastructure and to an appropriate quality of teaching at elementary, secondary and vocational schools. Primary Education Programmes I and II tackled this fundamental problem.

The logic of the impact chain was that infrastructure measures combined with the additional content-related support measures (teacher training in particular) from German TC have the potential to improve both teacher education in the primary school sector and also the relevance and quality of vocational training in the respective project regions. In turn, this is intended to improve the primary education system and — in the case of the technical school in Kabul — the availability of technical specialists to increase opportunities for graduates on the labour market. These impact assumptions are logical and also had the potential, among other things, to contribute to Millennium Goal 2 "Achieve universal primary education". Furthermore, the programmes were in line with the national development and education strategies of the Afghan government (NESP II 2010–14) and with the education strategies of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for Afghanistan (see BMZ 2014). The fact that promoting education can make an important contribution to alleviating poverty has been demonstrated many times in scientific literature. The proven effects range from immediate impacts in the form of income increasing in relation to the level of education to indirect impacts, for instance, that girls marry later which is associated with reduced fertility. One criticism is that no analysis of the labour market was performed before support was provided for the technical school in Kabul, which could limit the relevance of the vocation-specific knowledge conveyed.

Sites for the construction or renovation of schools were selected in cooperation with the local Departments of Education (DoE) responsible. The FC-financed construction projects were designed as an immediate aid measure in Primary Education Programme I to show results as quickly as possible and increase visibility. The expectations for the effects should not be diminished by this, but rather, it was

2 These figures are not entirely in line with those presented for 2013/14 in the ALCS 2015/16, which are based on six-month figures; see Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016–17 — Mid-term results — Highlights, p. 10.
assumed that it would be possible to gain the trust of the population more quickly this way. Component 1 of Primary Education Programme II was designed as follow-up financing for Primary Education Programme II. An externally financed vocational training expert determined the specific needs of the technical school in Kabul (component 2). TC and FC worked as a coherent unit: FC financed the building infrastructure and TC concentrated on improving the quality of the content in the supported teacher training centres and at the technical school in Kabul.

The reason this DC programme was run in parallel with the national education programme EQUIP is not immediately apparent, as EQUIP was also supported by FC and financed by many donors via the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), addressing the same problems with similar measures. However, the design of both programmes was generally suitable for addressing the fundamental problem, with certain limitations for component 2 of Primary Education Programme II due to the lack of a labour market analysis. This meant that the relevance of Primary Education Programme I was rated as good and Primary Education Programme II was only rated as just good.

Relevance rating: 2 (both phases)

Effectiveness

The project objectives laid out in the ex post evaluation (outcome) were: “improving teacher training in the primary school sector at the supported Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs) and training schools” (Primary Education Programme I and II, component 1) and “improving the relevance and quality of vocational training at the technical school in Kabul” (Primary Education Programme II, component: technical school).

For this ex post evaluation of the effectiveness of the Primary Education Programme the set of indicators was expanded — in line with the DC programme objective explicitly addressing the reduction of gender disparity — to measure the percentage of women studying to become teachers at the supported TTCs and to adequately address the particular challenges related to providing girls with a primary education: girls were largely prevented from having access to a primary school education during the Taliban regime (1996–2001). To gain at least a few impressions of the teaching quality of the trained teachers, assessments from several head-teachers of the training schools were obtained (non-representative survey). Indicators 6 and 7 are intended to provide information about the effectiveness of Primary Education Programme II / the technical school component. Due to the incompleteness of the information used and the fact it cannot be verified, the information in the tables should only be used as an indication, and not viewed as reliable measured figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Target value</th>
<th>Actual value at EPE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Usage of TTCs (number of students in teacher training in relation to capacity)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Random sample: Fayzabad/Badakhshan: 74.88% (816 spaces; 611 students for 2017) Kunduz: 175.6% (528 spaces for 927 students for 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Number of students in the training schools</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12 of 19 schools: 24,577 (with a total of 14,592 classroom places according to the final review)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Percentage of girls studying at the training schools (percentage of girls only)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>2016/17: 32.2% (according to the project completion report(PCR), 46% in 2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In individual interviews, we became aware during the PA (2005) that many promises had been made to the population, but not all of them had been kept. This could have damaged the credibility of international development cooperation in individual cases.

2 See statistical data from the MoE

3 In accordance with statistical data from the Afghan Ministry of Education from 12 formerly supported training schools. The Afghan Ministry of Education was unable to provide data for three formerly supported schools.
Utilisation of the TTCs varies widely according to the figures collected, ranging from extreme capacity shortages to under-utilisation, as is the case in Fayzabad. According to statistical data from the MoE, the number of students at the TTC in Fayzabad/Badakhshan has fallen in recent years and the school is currently running at 75% capacity. The primary reasons given for this decline are the students' economic problems (e.g. indirect training costs due to loss of income). Furthermore, the poor employment opportunities for graduates had a negative effect on the enrolment rate too. Despite the high demand for better-educated teachers, generally speaking the number of hired teachers at the previously supported schools has fallen if anything. We have also received reports that the TTC students only view this training as an intermediate solution before they begin university studies, which is their actual preference. Regarding the quality of education at the TTCs, the GIZ reports that student teachers trained there perform particularly well during demonstration lessons. At the same time, the quality of the teaching staff trained at the TTC in Fayzabad were only rated average by two out of three of the head-teachers surveyed in the context of this evaluation. In any case, there was a slight improvement in the percentage of students studying to become teachers at the supported TTCs (from 64.07% in 2008 to 66.18% in 2017). This could also be one of the causes for the increase in the percentage of girls at the training schools from 26.4% (2008) to 32.2% (status: 2016/2017, statistical data from the MoE). However, this would mean that the original objective of reaching a percentage of 40% girls, which was exceeded in 2012 according to the final review, is no longer achieved. One of the reasons for this alarming development could be that the Taliban's influence of prohibiting girls from going to school is increasing again. The overall number of school children at the supported schools saw a substantial increase from 13,639 (3,604 girls) in 2008 to 24,577 (7,899 girls). The capacity for classroom places is probably being utilised very effectively on average as the capacity created was far below these figures. Classes in two and sometimes even three shifts are part of everyday school life.

4 According to statistical data from the Afghan Ministry of Education for the provinces of Takhar, Kunduz and Badakhshan.
5 GIZ BMZ “Education for all”, April 2014.
6 Similar information can also be found in other sources: under EQUIP, not a single graduate was hired as a teacher in 2014. The Ministry of Education's recruitment policy does not require teachers to hold a TTC degree and therefore does not favour TTC graduates during hiring.
7 GIZ “Education for all”, April 2014.
8 One surveyed school head-teacher even described a lack of male teachers as a problem at the secondary school because his young female colleagues were not able to control the male students and their authority was thus undermined.
9 However, the proportion of girls in 2014 was 35% and was thus higher than today.
Looking at the relevance and quality of vocational training at the technical school in Kabul (module objective of Primary Education Programme II), it was determined that many of the trainees are unemployed after graduation, despite the relatively good infrastructure prerequisites created for high quality education. A TC study of graduates from 2016, in which graduates from the technical school in Kabul were surveyed, revealed that 69% of graduates are unemployed (in 2012 it was only 56.4%) and that, of those who found employment, only 11% were working in their trained profession and an additional 25% had become self-employed in their trained profession. The two main reasons for unemployment seem to be a lack of employment opportunities (35.4%) on the one hand and the intention to continue studying on the other (41.2%). The usage rates of the technical school in Kabul are reasonably stable nevertheless. Around 1,300 young people (3% female) are trained there each year.

Other people beyond the target group also profit from the project. Numerous local companies and craftsmen are not only hired to build the schools, they also receive on-the-job training. New subject matter such as skills for appointment planning, costing and preparing tenders are also taught in the process. One positive feature is that after the construction measures were completed, residual funds from the accompanying measures were used to conduct four workshops about "building schools". Statements from participants clearly demonstrated that these training measures taught new skills to both government and non-government actors in the construction sector.

Overall, the effectiveness of Primary Education Programmes I and II are evaluated as satisfactory: progress has been made in terms of student numbers and the number of students studying to become teachers. And at the technical school in Kabul, the training conditions have significantly improved. However, the effectiveness was affected by indications of the slow hiring of new teachers, the popular desire for a different course of study amongst those studying at the TTC and also primarily at the technical school in Kabul, as well as the problems faced by graduates from the school in Kabul on the labour market. That said, it should be taken into consideration here that the Afghan labour market is characterised by an extremely high degree of informality.

**Effectiveness rating: 3 (both phases)**

**Efficiency**

The total costs of Primary Education Programme I including accompanying measures was EUR 9.99 million upon completion. The percentage of consulting costs was relatively high in comparison to the funds invested at 36.61%. However, this is appropriate, considering the delays (110 instead of 36 months) and the fragile security situation, especially as the costs for training measures for local companies and craftsmen are also included. These measures were important to ensure the quality of the construction measures and led to more employment and income opportunities in the programme regions at the same time. The total costs for Primary Education Programme II were EUR 8.56 million: EUR 5 million for continued support of construction measures at TTCs and training schools and EUR 3.56 million for the technical school in Kabul. In turn, the consulting costs were relatively high at close to 30%, and were mainly due to delays and the precarious security situation.

In the course of supporting the four TTCs and 19 training schools, buildings with a total area of 40,333 m² were built according to the final review. The price per square metre is specified as USD 261.24. Including the consulting costs, but without the accompanying measure, the cost per square metre is a solid EUR 300. In view of the security situation, these costs are still acceptable.

The total costs for the technical school in Kabul were EUR 3.56 million (77% of this was investment costs). Here, the "conservation approach", i.e. recycling and reconditioning items that were still useable, proved beneficial. Ultimately, more construction measures (about 30% more) were executed than originally planned due to the efficient approach. Among other activities, it was also possible to build 12 new and urgently needed classrooms and outbuildings (storage rooms, guard house, shower facility, etc.).

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12 However, this year, only 800 trainees enrolled — which is partially due to changes in the academic calendar.
13 Against this backdrop, machines and old work benches (from the 1930s, 1940s or 1950s) that were worn out but of good quality were restored. Doors, windows, good bricks and other elements were reused whenever possible.
Use of the renovated and newly built training schools differs according to the location. In the more urban regions of Badakhshan Province there have been complaints about overly large class sizes (some classes have more than 60 students) and overcrowding. In a rural girl's school with an annual enrolment capacity of 100 new students, only about 30 new girls were enrolled each year. The reasons given were the long and inadequate paths to school for the girls and the poverty of the parents. Furthermore, the Taliban took over several newly built or renovated buildings in Kunduz Province, repurposing them for religious schools or, in one case, military barracks. The newly constructed dormitories at the TTCs in Fayzabad, Kunduz City and the city of Taloqan are all used, although not always as intended. Only the dormitory at the TTC in Fayzabad is filled with female students studying to become teachers. The other dormitories contain male students or teachers. No information about the occupancy of the constructed dormitory at the technical school in Kabul is available. The planned development of parents' councils at the schools is not working. According to statements from those surveyed and from project documents, local educational administrators are not interested in letting parents participate in the administration of the schools. Embedding the project in a DC programme ensured that the project was coordinated with TC. The efficiency of both programmes is rated as "satisfactory". Given that good quality work was done (see sustainability) despite the security situation, which made conditions difficult, this opens up the opportunity to use the infrastructure for a long time. At the same time, use of the infrastructure does not always meet expectations as several of the school buildings are under-utilised or have been taken over by the Taliban — with negative consequences on allocation efficiency. The allocation efficiency of the technical school in Kabul is limited by deficiencies related to acceptance of the offered training professions, the labour market, and even the graduates themselves. It should also be noted that the national education programme EQUIP, financed by the ARTF, focuses on similar bottlenecks, so higher transaction costs probably arise relative to the higher financing for EQUIP.

**Efficiency rating: 3 (both phases)**

**Impact**

Primary Education Programmes I and II, component 1, were expected to contribute to improved primary school education, while the technical school component of Primary Education Programme II was expected to enhance the availability of technical experts and thus promote economic growth in Afghanistan (development objective, impacts). In addition to the sectoral objective, a stabilisation objective was added (dual objective) to take the fragile context into account: the local visibility of activities to ensure the state provision of basic needs in the education sector and the promotion of employment for young people were expected to contribute to stabilising the supported provinces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Status PA</th>
<th>Ex post evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Net attendance rates of primary schools at the national level(^{14}).</td>
<td>37% (2005)</td>
<td>56.7% (2016/17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Net attendance rates (years 1–6) for programme regions(^{15})</td>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>2013/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Badakhshan</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kunduz</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Takhar</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Balkh (PEP II)</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sar-e Pol (PEP II)</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>43.6% (2011/12 60.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{14}\) Data based on surveys by the national statistical office in Afghanistan (see NRVA 2005 and ALCS 2016–17).

\(^{15}\) According to statistical data from the Afghan Ministry of Education for the provinces of Takhar, Kunduz and Badakhshan.
Reliable figures about the development of the education sector are rare. Gross school enrolment rates for primary schools have been reported as being slightly above 100% (105–107%) with relatively large gender disparities (for girls approx. 88%, for boys significantly higher at 120%). Net school enrolment rates are not available. Gross and net "intake rates" were reported for the first time in the ALCS 2013/14 and deviate drastically from the previously reported gross school enrolment rates at 45.4% (gross: 51.4% boys and 39.4% girls) and 20.8% (net: 22.9% boys and 18.7% girls). The percentage of school children who are enrolled in and complete primary school is reported at 84.2% and is thus comparatively high. The numbers show that Afghanistan is still very far from universal comprehensive primary school education, even if progress has been made in the education sector at the national and regional levels in the last 12 years. The fact that gender disparities seem to be increasing again in individual Afghan provinces is particularly alarming. These disparities are not just indicative of the girl-to-boy attendance ratios for the programme provinces listed above.

The extent to which graduates of the technical school in Kabul or how much these programme components contributed to economic growth depends on factors such as graduate employment — which for various reasons has not been satisfactory up to now (see effectiveness). A further result of the TC study of graduates (2016) was that the income situation of the graduates worsened when compared to figures from 2012. In 2012, around 79% of graduates earned an equivalent of USD 200 to 400. In 2016, only 28% of graduates earned this amount. The vast majority of graduates earned less than USD 200 in 2016. According to a 2015 report from the World Bank, growth in gross domestic product (GDP) did not alleviate poverty and instead led to greater inequality. Poverty and youth unemployment have primarily increased in rural regions nationwide (World Bank 2017). Surveys of the national statistical office in Afghanistan estimated youth unemployment at 27% in 2013–14 (41% for young women). In the 2016-17 national survey, the percentage of young people (15 to 24-year-olds) who were not employed or in training increased to 38.6% (65.4% for girls). Widespread youth unemployment is a source of social unrest in society and affects the achievement of the intended stabilisation objective. Despite improvements to the provision of school infrastructure and the initially plausible impact assumption that the social infrastructure provided would lead to an improved perception of the Afghan government among the population, there is no indication of any positive trend: according to a survey by the Brookings Institution, the government's survey results declined in the period from 2007 to 2016. Due to the overall unsatisfactory impact of component 2 of
Primary Education Programme II, the overarching impacts for this programme are rated unsatisfactory. Primary Education Programme I is rated as only just satisfactory.

Impact rating: 3 (phase I) and 4 (phase II)

Sustainability

The sustainability of the primary and vocational schools constructed within the scope of Primary Education Programmes I and II depends on factors such as their expected useful life, which is in turn influenced by the construction quality and maintenance. The good quality of the construction and renovation work was highlighted by all those surveyed. According to their statements, the construction quality is simple, solid, earthquake-resistant and easy to maintain. During renovation work at the technical school in Kabul, existing, good quality construction elements like doors, windows and bricks were reused whenever possible. When it was necessary to purchase machines for the workshops, attention was paid to ensuring they were both modern and robust.

An inspection of three FC-financed schools in Badakhshan Province showed that the buildings, which were renovated and built 9-10 years ago, are still in good condition. Previously, before the school was renovated, it was reported that children had to sit on the floor and classes were often cancelled due to flooding of the school premises. However, small-scale renovation and maintenance work in and around the buildings has become necessary in the meantime. Several door handles and chairs are broken. Furthermore, the toilets are in a bad condition, which is related to the insufficient water supply. The administrative buildings are sparsely equipped with plastic furniture in some cases.

Safety at the schools is not reported as being problematic. The inspected schools were not misused and also not occupied by armed groups. Only one school in Kunduz, which had been used as a polling station, has reportedly been bombed and damaged. Reports about the technical school in Kabul also indicate that the general security situation in Afghanistan has not had a negative influence on work in the school as it is not a target for terrorist attacks.

Although a maintenance and repair concept for the constructed and renovated buildings was developed within the framework of Primary Education Programme I, no systematic maintenance is carried out. The degree to which maintenance measures are performed primarily depends on the initiative of the head-teachers and on funding. Small repairs had been made in two of the inspected training schools, whereas another school had not conducted any maintenance work at all. There are not enough resources here. Without appropriate maintenance work, the head-teachers estimate that the useful life of the newly constructed and renovated buildings (TTC and training schools in Badakhshan Province) will be another 10 to 20 years. Maintenance at the technical school in Kabul is also inadequate due to a lack of funds. For example, windows broken in May 2017 had still not been replaced seven months later.

The external conditions for the sustainability of the projects have worsened: downward trends in the economy and security situation in Afghanistan have since been observed. The situation threatens to undo important achievements in the field of education, particularly for girls. This tendency could also damage the new infrastructure and capacities, meaning their utilisation may be limited. The low national revenue and thus the decreasing budget for education combined with growing expenditures for security pose a further sustainability risk.

Due to the lack of funds for operation and maintenance for the schools and the critical security situation, the sustainability of both programmes is only guaranteed to a limited extent and thus their sustainability is only just rated satisfactory. On a positive note, the financed facilities are still in good shape despite the difficult conditions, and are used as intended in most cases.

Sustainability rating: 3 (both phases)

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22 One major problem is the water supply for the training schools as they are not connected to the drinking water network. Only one of the two previously supported schools has access to clean drinking water.
Notes on the methods used to evaluate project success (project rating)

Projects are evaluated on a six-point scale, the criteria being relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and overarching developmental impact. The ratings are also used to arrive at a final assessment of a project’s overall developmental efficacy. The scale is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Very good result that clearly exceeds expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Good result, fully in line with expectations and without any significant shortcomings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Satisfactory result – project falls short of expectations but the positive results dominate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory result – significantly below expectations, with negative results dominating despite discernible positive results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Clearly inadequate result – despite some positive partial results, the negative results clearly dominate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The project has no impact or the situation has actually deteriorated</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Rating levels 1-3 denote a positive assessment or successful project while rating levels 4-6 denote a negative assessment.

Sustainability is evaluated according to the following four-point scale:

Sustainability level 1 (very good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to continue undiminished or even increase.

Sustainability level 2 (good sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline only minimally but remain positive overall. (This is what can normally be expected).

Sustainability level 3 (satisfactory sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project (positive to date) is very likely to decline significantly but remain positive overall. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability of a project is considered inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation but is very likely to evolve positively so that the project will ultimately achieve positive developmental efficacy.

Sustainability level 4 (inadequate sustainability): The developmental efficacy of the project is inadequate up to the time of the ex post evaluation and is very unlikely to improve. This rating is also assigned if the sustainability that has been positively evaluated to date is very likely to deteriorate severely and no longer meet the level 3 criteria.

The overall rating on the six-point scale is compiled from a weighting of all five individual criteria as appropriate to the project in question. Rating levels 1-3 of the overall rating denote a "successful" project while rating levels 4-6 denote an "unsuccessful" project. It should be noted that a project can generally be considered developmentally "successful" only if the achievement of the project objective ("effectiveness"), the impact on the overall objective ("overarching developmental impact") and the sustainability are rated at least "satisfactory" (level 3).